Religion: Common Practices
…
7 pages
Sign up for access to the world's latest research
Abstract
As long as ideals have been present in our world, our attempts of defining them has been as well.
Related papers
One of the difficulties in the appreciation of the religious consciousness is the idea of "religion" itself. The term "religion" has developed connotations that have little or nothing to do with more traditional understandings of this word, a point, of course, that begs the question of the autonomy of words. It is said by some that the word "religion" means what it does for us precisely because that is how we understand it. In contrast all traditional societies appreciate that words precede their understanding. 'In the beginning was the Word', says St. John. From this point of view the shifting connotations associated with the idea "religion" represent not an evolution but a devolution, a movement away from the original accompanied by a subsequent distortion of meaning. It is a sign of mental weakness and laziness to accept a distortion as the norm simply because it corresponds to one's own time. 1 The word "religion" suggests a complex interplay of social, spiritual, psychological, ritual, mythological, and political elements. The blanket grouping of these various areas is partly where the problem begins. Eric Sharpe observes that it is all too easily forgotten by western students that many languages simply do not have an equivalent of the word "religion" in their vocabulary. '"Law", "duty", "custom", "worship", "spiritual discipline", "the way"', he says, 'they know: "religion" they do not.' 2 For Sharpe the trouble lies with the strong political and moral overtones that the Latin word religio has. Whitall Perry recalls a conversation with a Native American Iroquois Indian who when asked about "religion" responded: 'Religion-it's a crutch for people who need it. A crutch is better than nothing, but people who can walk on their two feet spiritually don't need a crutch. If you see the Great Spirit in
Critic – Te Arohi, 2010
2020
In the modern age, religion seems to have abandoned its role as a symbol of meaning to the extent that, conversely, the scientific, rational view of the world has taken over this task. Apparently, there is an exclusive relationship between the two that makes a peaceful and equal coexistence more or less impossible. In this volume of the series "Philosophy and Psychology in Dialogue", Martin Klüners and Jörn Rüsen analyse the role religion plays in human existence and life. While Klüners interprets religion historically as a "pre-scientific" science of the soul and sees the antagonism between the reality principle and the pleasure principle as causally responsible for the opposition between reason and faith, Rüsen locates religion within historical thinking. Like history itself, religion appears as a significant factor in the cultural orientation of human life practice.
‘Religion’ as an analytical concept , 2022
Throughout history, the word "religion" has been used to characterize a wide range of aspects of life and the human experience. Although there isn't a single, agreed-upon definition of religion, the majority of definitions place a premium on activities and beliefs that have anything to do with the holy, the divine, or the supernatural. It is frequently linked to institutional, community, and ceremonial forms. Scholars and philosophers have disputed and analyzed the idea of "religion" for many centuries. It is a phrase that is used to describe a broad spectrum of human experiences. Some argue that the idea of religion is fundamental because it provides a framework for comprehending and interacting with the world. And according to this perspective, religion is a universal phenomenon that offers a collection of common beliefs and customs that may be employed to explain both personal and societal experiences. Others, on the other hand, contend that the idea of religion is socially manufactured and is too nebulous and imprecise to be helpful in understanding the nuanced truths of human experience. So for them, religion is no more than an outdated and simple idea with little usefulness in comprehending the complexity of human behaviour.
Argues that the normative definition of "religion" given in the Bible needs updating!
Social scientific research on religion (and related phenomena, including nonreligion, atheism, and secularity) is invariably prefaced by sheepish attempts to define these terms, followed by apologies for the inevitable inadequacy of the proposed definitions. This paper argues that scholars of religion and nonreligion should accept the fact that “religion” and “nonreligion” are, like all social scientific concepts (and some biological ones), fuzzy categories. There is no such thing as religion, such that the term “religion” picks out all and only all examples of religion, or specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for counting as religious. Rather, there are causally and phenomenologically distinct phenomena—such as the belief in supernatural agents, participation in rituals, formation of non-kin groups, obedience to moral codes, and so forth—that variously co-occur in packages we intuitively label as particular religions. Furthermore, these distinct phenomena are also present among ostensibly nonreligious (or secular) individuals and groups. Scholars of religion and nonreligion should therefore all but abandon the terms “religion” and “nonreligion”, and with them the clichéd definitional handwringing that typically comes with attempts at defining these terms. At best, they may retain their social functions—in names of departments, scholarly organizations, conferences, and journals, for example—but they have no legitimate scientific use.