Organ markets: problems beyond harms to vendors
The American journal of bioethics : AJOB, 2014
For more than a quarter century, the World Health Organi-zation (WHO) has encouraged nations to b... more For more than a quarter century, the World Health Organi-zation (WHO) has encouraged nations to ban the purchaseor sale of human organs for transplantation from living ordeceased donors (WHO 2010). Most countries now imposecriminal penalties on organ commercialism, and the Coun-cil of Europe Convention against Trafficking in HumanOrgans, which received final approval by the Committeeof Ministers on July 9, 2014, extends the offense of organtrafficking to include the actions of brokers in advertisingfor and recruiting organ vendors, as well as physicianswho knowingly transplant a vended organ (Lopez-Fragaet al. 2014). In the past decade, professional bodies such asthe Declaration of Istanbul Custodian Group have activelypromoted the adoption and implementation of laws to haltorgan commercialism and transplant tourism (Danovitchet al. 2013). Nonetheless, as Julian Koplin (2014) describes,a vocal group of liberal philosophers and free-marketadvocates has argued that the shortfall in the supply oforgans (particularly kidneys) for transplantation could beovercome through a “regulated market” (Matas, Hippen,and Satel 2008). The market proponents portray the trade-off in terms of principles, between promoting liberty andextending human lives, on the one hand, and protectinghuman dignity and preventing commodification of thehuman body, on the other. They confidently predict thatpaying for organs would achieve the former, while loss ofthe latter would not prove harmful to society or individuals.But proposals to establish a regulated market in organs canalso be viewed in consequentialist terms. Indeed, Koplinprovides strong evidence that regulated markets will not infact safeguard kidney vendors from physical, psychological,social, and financial harms—in other words, that they posereal threats to people, not solely to principles.Beyond those strong reasons for rejecting proposals torepeal the prohibitions on organ purchases, three objec-tions that Koplin notes merely in passing deserve furtherexploration. First, regulated organ markets would be veryexpensive and complex to administer and risk creatingreal or perceived unfairness. Second, ample evidenceexists that the form of regulated organ purchases beingproposed would not increase the net supply of organs fortransplantation. Finally, regulated markets contain theseeds of their own undoing and would soon devolve intounregulated markets.“REGULATED MARKETS” FOR ORGANS WOULDBE VERY EXPENSIVE AND COMPLEX TO ADMINISTERSome proponents of using payments to increase thesupply of organs have actually accepted the conclusionof the Declaration of Istanbul that in the resource-poorcountries where organ commercialism has been concen-trated, buyers have targeted “impoverished and other-wise vulnerable donors,” which has led “inexorably toinequity and injustice” (Declaration of Istanbul 2008).Yet, they contend, such problems would not arise inwealthier countries where the financial incentivesoffered to organ vendors—principally to living personswho are selling one kidney, but also to the next of kinof deceased persons who permit removal of any trans-plantable organs—could be chosen so as not to appealto the very poor, who want immediate cash. This is theheart of “regulating” the market in organs, namely, thatpayments would be in a deferred form, such as adeposit into a retirement or college account for futureuse, and that the amount would be set at a level appro-priate to the risk and inconvenience involved—calcu-lated at $15,000 by Gary Becker, the late Nobel laureatein economics—rather than an amount generatedthrough the interplay of demand and supply.Beyond the expense that such a payment would add tothe total cost of transplantation (namely, $1,500,000,000more to clear the U.S. kidney transplant waiting list), thefirst objection to a fixed price is that it would not appealequally to all groups in society. In order to offer a financialincentive that would be as attractive to high-income as tomiddle- or low-income people, the amount paid wouldhave to vary according to each person’s income (orwealth). This would require potential organ sellers to dis-close private financial information and administrators toinvestigate these submissions. To induce donation, adver-tisements would have to promise “You’ll get your fairreward,” rather than offering a set incentive to everyone.
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