Charles R . W . Sears
Charles R.W. Sears is a researcher and author working at the intersection of Artificial Intelligence and Philosophy of Mind. By combining a formal Computer Science education with experience in military IT and law enforcement, Sears develops conceptual models that map biological behavior onto digital structures.
His work focuses on applying technical logic—specifically network protocols and security frameworks—to cognitive neuroscience. He is the author of The Cognitive Framework Model (2023) and The Architecture of Awareness. Most recently, his paper The Extra Ingredient claims to dissolve the "hard problem" of consciousness by identifying the biological survival imperative as a structural component inherent in neural networks.
Phone: +1(661)331-3349
His work focuses on applying technical logic—specifically network protocols and security frameworks—to cognitive neuroscience. He is the author of The Cognitive Framework Model (2023) and The Architecture of Awareness. Most recently, his paper The Extra Ingredient claims to dissolve the "hard problem" of consciousness by identifying the biological survival imperative as a structural component inherent in neural networks.
Phone: +1(661)331-3349
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Papers by Charles R . W . Sears
The argument proceeds in three stages. First, it defines the "logical layer" as a representational structure requiring a distinguished self-node, temporal persistence, and affective edges that encode survival-relevant valence. Under this framework, qualia are recontextualized not as intrinsic properties, but as relational configurations indexed to the self-node. Second, the paper identifies a fundamental "reification error" in the Hard Problem, arguing that the explanatory gap is generated by a false temporal assumption: that experience accompanies processing in real-time. Drawing on global workspace dynamics, the author demonstrates that experience is the product of retrospective integration (occurring with a 300-500ms lag), effectively dissolving the intuition of an ontological gap between function and feeling. Finally, the account integrates evolutionary game theory and teleosemantics to explain why this architecture evolved, asserting that self-modeling outcompetes "processing in the dark" in complex environments.
The paper applies this framework to resolve classic objections, including Nagel’s bat, Jackson’s Mary, and the conceivability of zombies, arguing that zombie conceivability relies on conceptual opacity regarding the identity between graph configuration and phenomenal character. The result is a unified theory that satisfies Chalmers’ criteria for a structural explanation of consciousness without positing non-physical ingredients.