Papers by Timothy Furnish
ISIM Newsletter, 1999
Among scholars of Islam and some Muslims today, a curious misperception dominates: that only the ... more Among scholars of Islam and some Muslims today, a curious misperception dominates: that only the Shi c a believe in the coming the awaited Mahdi. Sunni Arab views of the Mahdi since the Six Days War of 1967 have reached heretofore unplumbed depths of eschatological belief and the vigorous debate among the Arab intelligentsia concerning these beliefs, as well as the degree to which they impact the Muslim social and political realms, have followed suit.
Bin Ladin: The Man Who Would Be Mahdi
Middle East Quarterly, Apr 1, 2002
... rival. Members of Kaplan's organization, Hilafet Devleti, were reportedl... more ... rival. Members of Kaplan's organization, Hilafet Devleti, were reportedly sent by him to Afghanistan to push for bin Ladin to assume the caliphate. ... Mahdi? First, he would appeal to the hadith and cite his compatibility with them. ...
Eschatology as politics, eschatology as theory : modern SunnĪ Arab Mahdism in historical prespective /
Fighting for end of the (Christian) World
Dr. Furnish explores what Muslims believe in regards to eschatology and points out that groups li... more Dr. Furnish explores what Muslims believe in regards to eschatology and points out that groups like ISIS are trying to create the end times from their perspective
Review of The Culture of Islam: Changing Aspects of Contemporary Muslim Life
Middle East Quarterly, Sep 1, 2005
A Review of “From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic”
History: Reviews of New Books, 2013
Today, as the Turkish Republic appears to be sliding back toward its Ottoman roots amid global ca... more Today, as the Turkish Republic appears to be sliding back toward its Ottoman roots amid global calls for the re-establishment of the caliphate, examining aspects of the republic’s creation from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire might prove quite illuminating. Dr. Hakan Özoğlu, a native Turk who is associate professor of history at the University of Central Florida, has written just such a work, which may be aimed at specialists in the field of late Ottoman and early Turkish history but also proves accessible to the educated layman interested in the modern Middle East. This topic has still-potent political ramifications in Turkey, making access to many relevant Ottoman and Turkish archival sources difficult. However, Özoğlu draws from an impressive corpus of available primary documents in Turkish, British, and US State Department collections to examine one key issue: “the process in which the opposition in the new republic was silenced” (1). He concludes that “the nature of the new Turkish state was not a result of a predetermined vision but a pragmatic synthesis of political realities and opportunities” (1–2). Özoğlu deftly sorts out and identifies the agendas of the major political players in the post–World War I Ottoman state: the TGNA (Turkish Grand National Assembly); the CUP (Committee on Union and Progress), the politicized incarnation of the former Young Turk movement originally dedicated to making the Ottoman Empire a constitutional monarchy; the Ankara Circle, consisting largely of Turkish nationalists and former CUP members; and the diehard Ottomanists in the Istanbul Circle, who clung to the idea of an Ottoman, if not necessarily an Islamic, state. The TGNA (at Kemal Atatűk’s behest), abolished first the sultanate, then the caliphate, in 1922 and 1924, respectively. This did not, however, end opposition to Atatűrk and the Ankara Circle; rather, it intensified it. Opponents were “members of the Ottoman dynasty . . . many ulama in the religious establishment; former high-level Ottoman bureaucrats and administrators . . . and . . . the pro-Istanbul press” (15). This group cannot be reduced to simply Islamists, however, for it also encompassed some pro-Western modernists. The Ankara Circle consisted primarily of the military, lower-ranking Islamic religious officials, local notables, and some CUP members—elements of Ottoman society who had fought the War of Independence to maintain the empire but, by the early 1920s, had determined to eliminate Istanbul as a political force. This was done by stripping citizenship from the Yűzellilikler (the 150ers)—influential members of the Istanbul Circle who were problematic for Atatűrk’s rule (caliphal officials, Ottoman bureaucrats and army officers, ulama, signees of the supposedly treasonous Treaty of Sevres, and pro-Ottoman journalists). After liquidating opponents in Istanbul, Atatűrk moved against those in Ankara via a law called the Takriri Sűkun [TiS], or Law on the Maintenance of Order. Atatűrk’s group, by then the Republican People’s Party, wielded TiS against the rival Progressive Republican Party, invoking the Kurdish Sheikh Said Revolt of 1925. Although Özoğlu insists that “there exists no conclusive evidence to substantiate the Kemalist instigation of the revolt” (93), he argues that “it is not a misjudgement to suggest that the [TiS] law’s primary aim was not the handling of the Sheikh Said Revolt but rather the opposition” (102)—and, under the TiS, the PRP was smeared with “manipulating religion for the purpose of gaining political power” (114). Finally, Atatűrk and the RPP used the 1926 assassination attempt on him as a rationale to weed out an alleged nationwide counterrevolutionary conspiracy, thus crushing any remaining PRP legitimacy. In trials held in Izmir and Ankara, dozens of suspected CUP and PRP members (many former Ottoman military) were sentenced to exile or death. These trials “effectively ended the short period of a power struggle in the early Turkish Republic” (154); Turkey would be a one-party state until after World War II. Özoğlu adduces a 1923 report by US Consul Maynard Barnes that the postOttoman power struggle consisted of Kemalist nationalism versus the panIslamic threat posed by the surviving CUP, which was still enamored of a constitutional Ottoman sultanate. With neo-Ottoman dreams resurfacing in Erdoğan’s Turkey, Özoğlu’s book should be a required read for area experts and State Department officials. Compared to Carter V. Findley’s Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789–2007 (Yale University Press, 2010), Özoğlu’s work is less comprehensive—but also less grandiose. Whereas Amit Bein’s Ottoman Ulema, Turkish Republic: Agents of Change and Guardians of Tradition (Stanford University Press, 2011) focuses on the Islamic clerics’ role in this period, it does not elucidate the more secular opposition, as does the excellent From Caliphate to Secular State.
Bin Ladin: The Man Who Would Be Mahdi
Middle East Quarterly, 2002
... rival. Members of Kaplan's organization, Hilafet Devleti, were reportedl... more ... rival. Members of Kaplan's organization, Hilafet Devleti, were reportedly sent by him to Afghanistan to push for bin Ladin to assume the caliphate. ... Mahdi? First, he would appeal to the hadith and cite his compatibility with them. ...
Holiest Wars: Islamic Mahdis, Their Jihads, and Osama Bin Laden
... This book deals with eight of the most prominent such movements within the Sunni Muslim world... more ... This book deals with eight of the most prominent such movements within the Sunni Muslim world: those of Ibn Tumart (d. 1130), Ibn Abi Mahallah (d. 1613), and Muhammad Amzian (d. 1879) in North Africa; Muhammad Jawnpuri (d. 1505) and Ahmad Barelwi (d. 1831) in India ...
Beheading in the Name of Islam
Middle East Quarterly, 2005
... Sura (chapter) 47 contains the ayah (verse): "When you encounter... more ... Sura (chapter) 47 contains the ayah (verse): "When you encounter the unbelievers on the battlefield, strike off their heads until you have ... A half century later, in the years after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded the Turkish Republic and imposed secular government, a revolutionary ...
Holiest Wars: Islamic Mahdis, Their Jihads, and Osama bin Laden
... This book deals with eight of the most prominent such movements within the Sunni Muslim world... more ... This book deals with eight of the most prominent such movements within the Sunni Muslim world: those of Ibn Tumart (d. 1130), Ibn Abi Mahallah (d. 1613), and Muhammad Amzian (d. 1879) in North Africa; Muhammad Jawnpuri (d. 1505) and Ahmad Barelwi (d. 1831) in India ...
Uploads
Papers by Timothy Furnish