Papers by Guido Tabellini
Journal of the European Economic Association
This paper studies how voters’ selective ignorance interacts with policy design by political cand... more This paper studies how voters’ selective ignorance interacts with policy design by political candidates. It shows that the selectivity empowers voters with extreme preferences and small groups, that divisive issues attract most attention, and that public goods are underfunded. Finer granularity of information increases these inefficiencies. Rational inattention can also explain why competing opportunistic candidates do not always converge on the same policy issues.
Journal of Political Economy
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch ge... more Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
Brazilian Review of Econometrics, 1991
Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics is meant to serve. as a graduate textbook and lite... more Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics is meant to serve. as a graduate textbook and literature survey of the recent advances in modelling government economic policy making. It is extremely successful in achieving both goals, unifying many of the different ap proaches to endogenizing government policy, one of the most active areas of macroeconomic theorizing in recent years. In addition to summarizing this literature, the "monograph," as the authors call it, presents some new results. Before the emergence of this new literature, the policymaker was treated like "a machine," in the authors' words, that could be sim ply < l programmed." One would model how the economy would re spond to any exogenously determined values of the policy variables, and one would then calculate the optimal policy rules. The new ap proach assumes that the policymaker is a "rational and maximizing agent, or collection of agents, who respond to incentives and con straints just like the rest of the economy." The authors note that one can describe the new approach in terms of the principal-agent problem, where the many principals are the public, and the agent is the government. Some of the various articles in the literature analyze how the principals, acting in their "political role," impose political constraints on the government's policy decision, while other articles examine how the principals, acting in their "economic role," impose credibility constraints on the policy decision. The monograph is organized in two parts: the fi rst part analyzes monetary policy, and the second part looks at fi scal policy, more specifi cally the problems of wealth taxation and the accumulation of government debt. For economists unfamiliar with the literature who
The Economic E?ects of Constitutions
Allocating Responsibilities in the European Union: an Economic Analysis
Qa Rivista Dell Associazione Rossi Doria, 2003
Deuda externa, fuga de capitales y riesgo pol�tico
Instituciones políticas y monetarias y finanzas públicas en los países industrializados
Ekonomiaz Revista Vasca De Economia, 1992
How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structure, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies
Ambizione e pazienza per rilanciare il Sud
Rivista Giuridica Del Mezzogiorno, 2009
Un passo più coraggioso verso il federalismo fiscale
Il Mulino, 1995
Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule
Endogenous Distortions in Product and Labour Markets
Seigniorage and Political Stabiliity
Cepr Discussion Papers, Mar 1, 1990
The importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly ac... more The importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries. The main theoretical implication of this paper is that countries with more unstable and polarized political systems rely more heavily on seigniorage. This result is obtained within the context of a political model of tax reform. The model implies that the more unstable and polarized
Monetary and Fiscal Policy, Vol. 2: Politics
Economic Inquiry, 1987
The time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the efects of tax distortions. Thus t... more The time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the efects of tax distortions. Thus the issue of hou to improve upon the time-consistent suboptimul monetary policy is related to that of the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. W e present a model with three players (the central bar:k, the fiscal authority, and wage setters) in which distortionary itaxes are explicitly modelled. W e show that binding commitments to monetary rules are not necessarily welfare improving if monetary and fiscal policy are not coordinated. W e also examine the efects of diferent degrees of independence of the central bank.
Culture and Institutions
... cultural traits. As noted by Cavalli-Sforza (2001), such vertical cultural transimission is s... more ... cultural traits. As noted by Cavalli-Sforza (2001), such vertical cultural transimission is slow and conservative. At the same time, we do observe significant variation in the specific con-tent of values across time and space. In particular ...
La ripartizione delle competenze nell'Unione Europea: un'analisi economica
Qa Rivista Dell Associazione Rossi Doria, 2003
Inflation Targets Reconsidered: Comments on Paul Krugman
Working Papers, 2014
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Papers by Guido Tabellini