Papers by Gustavo Flores-Macías
Perspectives on Politics, Dec 27, 2019
What are the political consequences of militarizing law enforcement? Across the world, law enforc... more What are the political consequences of militarizing law enforcement? Across the world, law enforcement has become increasingly militarized over the last three decades, with civilian police operating more like armed forces and soldiers replacing civilian police in law enforcement tasks. Scholarly, policy, and journalistic attention has mostly focused on the first type, but has neglected the study of three main areas toward which we seek to contribute: 1) the constabularization of the military-i.e., when the armed forces take on the responsibilities of civilian law enforcement agencies, 2) the extent to which this process has taken place outside of the United States, and 3) its political consequences. Toward this end, we unpack the concept of militarized law enforcement, develop theoretical expectations about its political consequences, take stock of militarization in Latin America, and evaluate whether expectations have played out in the region. We show that the distinction between civilian and military law enforcement typical of democratic regimes has been severely blurred in the region. Further, we argue that the constabularization of the military has had important consequences for the quality of democracy in the region by undermining citizen security, human rights, police reform, and the legal order. ights of soldiers patrolling urban neighborhoods, responding to reported crimes in progress, collecting evidence, and staffing checkpoints on major highways are increasingly common worldwide. Latin America, now the most violent region in the world, is no exception in the trend to militarize law enforcement. In Mexico, for example, more than 67,000 troops have participated in widespread policing operations since 2006 (Ordorica 2011). In Brazil, the armed forces have helped state governments regain control of urban areas, with soldiers patrolling city streets on nearly 100 days in 2016 (The Economist 2017). In Honduras, the government created the Military Police for Public Order (PMOP) in 2013 to combat drug trafficking and close to 6,000 soldiers take part in joint army-police operations (Secretaría de Defensa Nacional de Honduras 2013). Even countries that historically have lacked a military, like Costa Rica and Panama, are considering proposals to militarize law enforcement.
World Development, May 1, 2018
In spite of the importance of taxation for political and economic development, we know relatively... more In spite of the importance of taxation for political and economic development, we know relatively little about the conditions under which citizens might not exact a political cost on leaders for adopting a particular tax. Drawing on insights from the literature on institutional design, this article examines how certain features of taxessuch as allowing for civil society oversight, sunset provisions that make the duration of taxes finite, and earmark mechanisms that direct tax revenue for a specific purposeaffect political support behind them. It also evaluates the role of three important aspects of the fiscal exchange, namely trust in government, perceptions of the public good, and level of income. Based on an original survey experiment focusing on the provision of public safety in Mexico, I find that these design features increase political support for taxation, especially among those with low trust in government, perceptions of high quality of the public good, and low income. These findings have important implications for Mexico, as well as a number of other countries that have both low levels of extraction and increased public spending imperatives.
Studies in Comparative International Development, Oct 4, 2013
Governments across the developing world in general, and Latin America in particular, tend to have... more Governments across the developing world in general, and Latin America in particular, tend to have difficulty in raising taxes from elites. In 2002, however, the Colombian government introduced the first of a series of wealth taxes aimed solely at rich individuals and companies with large liquid assets. Revenue from these taxes, which amounted to about 1 per cent of GDP, was earmarked for security. Drawing on elite interviews, surveys, government documents, and media sources, I examine why these taxes were introduced, and explore three different explanations: the combination of fiscal and security crises; elite solidarity; and perceptions that the government was making Colombia a safer place. It was the interaction of all three factors that led to this unusual outcome.
Contemporary State Building
If economic elites are notorious for circumventing tax obligations, how can institutionally weak ... more If economic elites are notorious for circumventing tax obligations, how can institutionally weak governments get the wealthy to shoulder a greater tax burden? This book studies the factors behind the adoption of elite taxes for public safety purposes. Contrary to prominent explanations in the literature on the fiscal strengthening of the state – including the role of resource dependence and inequality – the book advances a theory of elite taxation that focuses on public safety crises as windows of opportunity and highlights the importance of business-government linkages to overcome mistrust toward government from corruption and lack of accountability. Based on evidence from across Latin America and rich case studies from experiences in Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Mexico, the book provides scholars and policymakers with a blueprint for contemporary state-building efforts in the developing world.
Between 1929 and 2000, Mexico was an authoritarian regime. During this time, elections were held ... more Between 1929 and 2000, Mexico was an authoritarian regime. During this time, elections were held regularly, but because of fraud, coercion, and the massive abuse of state resources, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) won virtually every election. By 2000, however, the regime came to an end when the PRI lost the presidency. Mexico became a democracy, and the PRI made the transition from authoritarian ruling party to authoritarian successor party. Yet the PRI did not disappear. It continued to be the largest party in Congress and in the states, and it was voted back into the presidency in 2012. This electoral performance has made the PRI one of the world's most resilient authoritarian successor parties. What explains its resilience? I argue that three main factors explain the PRI's resilience in the aftermath of the transition: 1) the PRI's control over government resources at the subnational level, 2) the post-2000 democratic governments' failure to dismantle key institutions inherited from the authoritarian regime, and 3) voters' dissatisfaction with the mediocre performance of the PRI's competitors. I also suggest that the PRI's resilience has been harmful in various ways, including by propping up pockets of subnational authoritarianism, perpetuating corrupt practices, and undermining freedom of the press and human rights.
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2019
When the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force on January 1st, 1994, it cre... more When the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force on January 1st, 1994, it created the largest free trade area in the world, and the one with the largest gaps in development between member countries. It has since served as a framework for trilateral commercial exchange and investment between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. NAFTA’s consequences have been mixed. On the positive side, the total value of trade in the region reached $1.1 trillion in 2016, more than three times the amount in 1994, and total foreign direct investment among member countries also grew significantly. However, the distribution of benefits has been very uneven, with exposure to international competition reducing economic opportunity and increasing insecurity for certain sectors in all three countries. Twenty-four years later, the three countries renegotiated the terms of NAFTA and renamed it the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). The negotiation responded in part to the nee...
Perspectives on Politics, 2019
What are the political consequences of militarizing law enforcement? Across the world, law enforc... more What are the political consequences of militarizing law enforcement? Across the world, law enforcement has become increasingly militarized over the last three decades, with civilian police operating more like armed forces and soldiers replacing civilian police in law enforcement tasks. Scholarly, policy, and journalistic attention has mostly focused on the first type, but has neglected the study of three main areas toward which we seek to contribute: 1) the constabularization of the military—i.e., when the armed forces take on the responsibilities of civilian law enforcement agencies, 2) the extent to which this process has taken place outside of the United States, and 3) its political consequences. Toward this end, we unpack the concept of militarized law enforcement, develop theoretical expectations about its political consequences, take stock of militarization in Latin America, and evaluate whether expectations have played out in the region. We show that the distinction between c...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
In spite of the importance of taxation for political and economic development, we know relatively... more In spite of the importance of taxation for political and economic development, we know relatively little about the conditions under which citizens might not exact a political cost on leaders for adopting a particular tax. Drawing on insights from the literature on institutional design, this article examines how certain features of taxessuch as allowing for civil society oversight, sunset provisions that make the duration of taxes finite, and earmark mechanisms that direct tax revenue for a specific purposeaffect political support behind them. It also evaluates the role of three important aspects of the fiscal exchange, namely trust in government, perceptions of the public good, and level of income. Based on an original survey experiment focusing on the provision of public safety in Mexico, I find that these design features increase political support for taxation, especially among those with low trust in government, perceptions of high quality of the public good, and low income. These findings have important implications for Mexico, as well as a number of other countries that have both low levels of extraction and increased public spending imperatives.
Comparative Politics, 2018
In response to the threat posed by drug-trafficking organizations, developing countries are incre... more In response to the threat posed by drug-trafficking organizations, developing countries are increasingly relying on the armed forces for their counter-drug strategies. Drawing on the literature on violence and state capacity, this paper studies how the militarization of anti-drug efforts affects state capacity along two dimensions: public safety and fiscal extraction. It advances theoretical expectations for this relationship and evaluates them in the context of Mexico. Based on subnational-level analyses, it shows that the militarization of anti-drug efforts has decreased the state's capacity to provide public order and extract fiscal resources: homicide and kidnapping rates have increased while tax collection has decreased. Given the wide-ranging consequences of diminished state capacity, the findings have implications not only for Latin America but also across the developing world.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2015
How does the way states finance wars affect public support for conflict? Most existing research h... more How does the way states finance wars affect public support for conflict? Most existing research has focused on costs as casualties rather than financial burdens, and arguments that do speak to the cost in treasure either minimize potential differences between the two main forms of war finance—debt and taxes—or imply that war taxes do not dent support for war among a populace rallying around the fiscal flag. Using original experiments conducted in the United States and the United Kingdom, we evaluate the relationship between war finance and support for war. We find that how states finance wars has an important effect on support for war and that the gap in support resulting from different modes of war finance holds across the main democracies engaging in conflict, regardless of the type of war or individuals’ party identification. The findings have important implications for theories of democratic accountability in wartime and the conduct of conflict, since borrowing shields the publi...
The Journal of Politics, 2013
Studies in Comparative International Development, 2013
Governments across the developing world in general, and Latin America in particular, tend to have... more Governments across the developing world in general, and Latin America in particular, tend to have difficulty in raising taxes from elites. In 2002, however, the Colombian government introduced the first of a series of wealth taxes aimed solely at rich individuals and companies with large liquid assets. Revenue from these taxes, which amounted to about 1 per cent of GDP, was earmarked for security. Drawing on elite interviews, surveys, government documents, and media sources, I examine why these taxes were introduced, and explore three different explanations: the combination of fiscal and security crises; elite solidarity; and perceptions that the government was making Colombia a safer place. It was the interaction of all three factors that led to this unusual outcome.
Political Science Quarterly, 2012
ESTIMATED AT US$325 BILLION IN 2010, 1 migrants' remittances have been called "a lifeline for the... more ESTIMATED AT US$325 BILLION IN 2010, 1 migrants' remittances have been called "a lifeline for the poor." 2 Corresponding to three times the size of total foreign development assistance to the developing world, they infuse the recipient country with capital and help relatives and friends make ends meet. 3 In some cases, the amount of remittances represents a sizable share of the recipient country's gross domestic product (GDP). From Tajikistan to Honduras, from Moldova to Haiti, remittances represent more than 25 percent of these countries' total GDP. Although the amount of money transferred is staggering, it is not surprising that migrants would hope to send money back to their families. What is surprising is that they would engage in collective remittances-the act of sending money as a group to their hometown to finance infrastructure projects-and that they would partner with the government of their country of origin to do so. After all, this is the same government whose neglect implicitly contributed to the individual's decision to migrate elsewhere.
NAFTA's Unfulfilled Immigration Expectations
Peace Review, 2008
Signed in 1992 and implemented in 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) deeply tr... more Signed in 1992 and implemented in 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) deeply transformed the bilateral relations between the United States and Mexico in many respects. U.S.–Mexico trade increased fourfold, from $81.5 billion in 1993 to $346.8 billion in 2007. The United States has been Mexico’s main trading partner since NAFTA came into effect, and currently accounts for 88 percent of Mexico’s exports and 56 percent of Mexico’s imports. Mexico receives 14 percent of U.S. exports and provides 11 percent of U.S. imports. Similarly, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Mexico increased dramatically as a result of NAFTA, with the United States becoming the main investor in its southern neighbor. Total FDI increased from an average of $3 billion annually during the 1980s to an average of $14 billion since 1994, reaching $23 billion in 2007 alone. Roughly two-thirds of the total FDI flowing into Mexico every year comes from the United States. NAFTA’s resulting integration of the two countries economies contributed to their increasing synchronization. By 2008, the two partners’ economies behaved practically in lockstep.
Comparative Politics, 2010
Beginning with the election of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in 1998, the rise to power of the... more Beginning with the election of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in 1998, the rise to power of the left took Latin America by surprise. During the previous two decades, the region's economies had increasingly moved toward an open, market-oriented model of development and away from the statist, import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) model that had prevailed for decades. 1 Toward the end of the twentieth century, there were few if any challengers to the liberalizing trend. The devastating effects of the debt crisis of the early 1980s contributed to a generalized perception that ISI and state-interventionist policies advocated by the left had failed. The collapse of the Soviet Union-exposing the vices and inconsistencies of centrally planned economies-gave credence to this view and heralded the universalization of the market economy as the only feasible mode of organizing economic relations. The Washington Consensus permeated most policy and academic circles as the dominant paradigm. 2 Against these trends, the left's political revival seemed extremely unlikely. To make matters worse for the left, the market-oriented reforms adopted across the region severely undermined the left's main base of support-organized labor. The exposure of previously protected domestic industries to foreign competition and the privatization of state-owned companies resulted in widespread layoffs particularly affecting highly unionized sectors. Stabilization policies that relied on wage restraints to enhance productivity and competitiveness eroded labor's negotiating power. Overcoming these obstacles was a challenging task for leftist parties in the region. In describing its general disarray in the early 1990s, Steve Ellner and Barry Carr characterized the left as "more disoriented and lacking in credible options than ever before." In this adverse context, a series of leftist electoral victories swept the region.
American Political Science Review, 2013
What determines when states adopt war taxes to finance the cost of conflict? We address this ques... more What determines when states adopt war taxes to finance the cost of conflict? We address this question with a study of war taxes in the United States between 1789 and 2010. Using logit estimation of the determinants of war taxes, an analysis of roll-call votes on war tax legislation, and a historical case study of the Civil War, we provide evidence that partisan fiscal differences account for whether the United States finances its conflicts through war taxes or opts for alternatives such as borrowing or expanding the money supply. Because the fiscal policies implemented to raise the revenues for war have considerable and often enduring redistributive impacts, war finance—in particular, war taxation—becomes a high-stakes political opportunity to advance the fiscal interests of core constituencies. Insofar as the alternatives to taxation shroud the actual costs of war, the findings have important implications for democratic accountability and the conduct of conflict.
In response to the threat posed by drug trafficking organizations, many developing countries are ... more In response to the threat posed by drug trafficking organizations, many developing countries are increasingly relying on the armed forces for their counter-‐drug strategies. Drawing on the literature on violence and state capacity, this paper studies how the militarization of anti-‐drug efforts affects state capacity along three dimensions: rule of law, social compliance, and fiscal extraction. I advance theoretical expectations for this relationship and evaluate them in the context of Mexico. Based on a series of subnational-‐ level analyses and difference-‐in-‐differences estimation, I show that the militarization of anti-‐drug efforts has resulted in the weakening of the state along the three dimensions. Given the wide-‐ranging consequences of diminished state capacity—affecting governments’ ability to dispense justice, provide social services, help ailing economies, and enforce the rule of law—the findings have implications not only for Latin America but also across the d...
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 2023
What is the relationship between violent crime and the expansion of executive power? Whereas the ... more What is the relationship between violent crime and the expansion of executive power? Whereas the literature on crises and executive power has focused on the centralization of authority resulting from the war on terror, the role played by other forms of crises short of interstate war has been neglected, especially in the developing world. This article argues that public safety crises have enabled executives to expand their power at the expense of other branches of government, levels of government, and protections
against government abuse. It does so with examples from Latin America, where violent crime has become an important concern in many countries, highlighting the adoption of states of exception and the militarization of public life as avenues for the expansion of presidential power. It also provides in‐depth, longitudinal evidence from the Mexican case to show the adoption of these measures over time and their consequences for democracy.
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Papers by Gustavo Flores-Macías
against government abuse. It does so with examples from Latin America, where violent crime has become an important concern in many countries, highlighting the adoption of states of exception and the militarization of public life as avenues for the expansion of presidential power. It also provides in‐depth, longitudinal evidence from the Mexican case to show the adoption of these measures over time and their consequences for democracy.