Papers by Hermann Schmitt
Electoral Shocks
In 2015 the Liberal Democrats won 8.1 per cent of the vote, only a third of what they managed fiv... more In 2015 the Liberal Democrats won 8.1 per cent of the vote, only a third of what they managed five years earlier, making it their worst performance since 1970. As a result, they faced almost complete electoral wipe-out, winning only eight seats, losing forty-nine of the fifty-seven they had won in 2010. Two years later in 2017, the Liberal Democrats hoped that they might ride an anti-Brexit wave to recovery. Instead, the Liberal Democrats only made a net gain of four seats and lost a further half point of vote share. In this chapter we explore the reasons behind the 2015 collapse and failure to recover in 2017. We argue that the answer lies in the party’s involvement in the 2010–15 coalition government. As a result of coalition, many left-leaning Liberal Democrat voters deserted the party and as their support plummeted they also lost tactical voters because of the damage to their electoral viability.
British Election Study, 2015: General Election Results Dataset
ABSTRACT
The European Voter, 2005
Just like in the case of value orientations, one might expect a gradual decrease of the power of ... more Just like in the case of value orientations, one might expect a gradual decrease of the power of left-right orientations to explain party choice. However, no such monotonic decline can be observed. Voters’ left/right positions still are strongly related to party choice, but the strength of this association varies between countries and over time, without any particular kind of clearly discernable trend. The over-time variation in this association is strongly correlated with the degree of party polarization on the left/right continuum.
Citizen participation in European politics
In October 1999 a conference was held in Stockholm on Citizen Participation in European Politics.... more In October 1999 a conference was held in Stockholm on Citizen Participation in European Politics. The background of the discussion was a low Swedish turn-out in the Elections to the European Parliament in June. We wanted to give an account of and discuss research on citizen participation in European politics illuminating possible explanations. Special attention was given to the connection between on the one hand the level of participation and on the other hand the role of the institutions and of the mass media. 1
Partisanship in nine western democracies: Causes and consequences
This paper argues that variations in partisanship and the partisan vote are determined by ideolog... more This paper argues that variations in partisanship and the partisan vote are determined by ideological conflicts and the style of political competition, the latter being defined chiefly by the electoral system applied. It proceeds in three steps. First, it reviews the conventional modernisation-based and thus essentially sociological explanation of variations in partisanship and the partisan vote and advances a “political” complement to it. Then, it reviews the development of partisanship and the partisan vote in six West European democracies, and in the ‘settler nations’ Australia, Canada, and the US. Third and finally, it puts the “political” explanation of partisanship to an empirical test. The results suggest that the electoral system applied, but also the degree of politicisation of the electorate at a given election determines partisanship and the partisan vote much stronger than socio-political modernisation does.
European Journal of Political Research, 2019
At the time of the election of the European Parliament (EP) in 2014, the European Union (EU) was ... more At the time of the election of the European Parliament (EP) in 2014, the European Union (EU) was heavily affected by a multifaceted crisis that had-and still has-far-reaching implications for the political system of its member countries, but also for the European level of governance. Against the background of the strong Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 EP elections, this study aims to investigate in which way Eurosceptic parties of the left and the right respond to the multiple crises of the EU. Using data from the Euromanifesto Project from 2004/2009 and 2014, changes in the party positions towards the EU are analysed in the shadow of the multiple crises and the reasons thereof are explored. The findings show a general anti-European shift among the two types of Eurosceptic parties. Nevertheless, the changes in the EU polity tone are not determined by issue-based repercussions of the multiple crises, but by the EU-related evaluation-the polity mood-of the national citizenry. For far-right Eurosceptic parties, the shift is moderated by the level of public support for EU integration in their national environment. Among far-left Eurosceptic parties, by contrast, it is moderated by the more specific public attitudes about the monetary union policy of the EU. Consequently, political parties when drafting their manifestos for EP elections are not so much guided by the objective severity of political problems or by the evaluations of these problems by the citizenry. What matters in the end is the link that citizens themselves are able to establish between the severity of political problems, on the one hand, and the responsibility of the EU for these problems on the other. This has important consequences for understanding of the nature and substance of political responsiveness within the EU system of multilevel governance.
Theory suggests that, relative to the preceding first order election result, turnout is lower in ... more Theory suggests that, relative to the preceding first order election result, turnout is lower in second-order elections, government parties loose, and small parties and ideologically extreme parties win. These regularities are not static but dynamic-government parties' losses are greater the closer a second-order election is located around first-order midterm. These 'aggregate' predictions of second-order elections theory have mostly been tested using aggregate data. The fact that they are based upon individual-level hypothesis has received much less attention. Only very recently, scholars started to uncover some of these microfoundations of second-order election theory and confront them with micro-level empirical evidence. It is in this area that the current article aims at contributing some theoretical structure and empirical evidence.
Chapitre 2. Représentation politique et intégration européenne
Le vote des Quinze
The Electoral Consequences of Low Turnout in European Parliament Elections
How Democracy Works
The Micro-Foundations of the Second-order Election Model
The impact of Eurosceptic challenger parties of the left and right on party competition over Europe
The EU through Multiple Crises
Politics and Governance
The second-order election (SOE) model as originally formulated by Reif and Schmitt (1980) suggest... more The second-order election (SOE) model as originally formulated by Reif and Schmitt (1980) suggests that, relative to the preceding first-order election result, turnout is lower in SOEs, government and big parties lose, and small and ideologically extreme parties win. These regularities are not static but dynamic and related to the first-order electoral cycle. These predictions of the SOE model have often been tested using aggregate data. The fact that they are based on individual-level hypotheses has received less attention. The main aim of this article is to restate the micro-level hypotheses for the SOE model and run a rigorous test for the 2004 and 2014 European elections. Using data from the European Election Studies voter surveys, our analysis reveals signs of sincere, but also strategic abstentions in European Parliament elections. Both strategic and sincere motivations are also leading to SOE defection. It all happens at once.
The reshaping of political conflict over Europe: from pre-Maastricht to post-‘Euro crisis’
West European Politics
Abstract Party competition over European integration is structured by two main dimensions of poli... more Abstract Party competition over European integration is structured by two main dimensions of political conflict: a socio-economic dimension (market liberalisation vs. a more regulated economy) and a socio-cultural dimension (libertarian, cosmopolitan values vs. authoritarian, nationalist values). This article investigates the relationship between these conflict dimensions and parties’ positions towards EU issues across time and space, in particular focussing on two ‘critical junctures’ in the European unification process. For this purpose, analysis is made of the election manifestos of parties competing in European Parliament elections (Euromanifestos) from 1979 to 2014. First, it is found that the key moment of the Maastricht treaty significantly reshaped party competition over Europe. After Maastricht, positions towards European integration have become less connected to the economic dimension and much more related to the cultural dimension in Western Europe. Second, it is contended that the Euro crisis has not dramatically restructured political conflict over European integration.
Eur Union Polit, 2000
This paper asks two questions. First, why are party voters less favourable towards specific EU po... more This paper asks two questions. First, why are party voters less favourable towards specific EU policies than party elites? Second, how does political representation of EU preferences actually work, is it an elite-or a mass-driven process? The data-sets of the European Election Studies 1979 and 1994 are analysed which involve both an elite and a mass survey component. In contrast to earlier research, it appears that political representation of EU preferences works rather well regarding the grand directions of policy making, and that party elites behave responsively in view of changing EU preferences among their voters.
This paper explores the evolution of leader effects on the vote. The laboratory in which this is ... more This paper explores the evolution of leader effects on the vote. The laboratory in which this is done is the German Federal Republic (after re-unification: West Germany), and the time horizon is roughly the last four decades. It is argued that leader effects on the vote have their place in a "realistic" model of representative democracy, and that they are expected to increase due to processes of partisan dealignment and personalisation of politics. While earlier German research could not identify a secular increase in leader effects on vote choices, we do find some hints in this direction. Developments are not linear though, and dramatic events and the political actors on stage after 1983 seem to have reversed earlier trends to some degree. Methodological issues are also taken up. A strategy for the simultaneous analysis of vote choices in multi-party systems is proposed, and an 'ideal' research design for the identification of leader effects on the vote is identified-if only at the very end of the paper.
European Election Study 2014: The Voter Study. Cologne: GESIS Data Archive
Cologne Gesis Archive 2015, 2015
This is a data set of a representative survey conducted in 29 EU member countries. It containes s... more This is a data set of a representative survey conducted in 29 EU member countries. It containes some 30 000 interviews, is documented in the English language, and freely available to members of the scientic community for secondary analysis.
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Papers by Hermann Schmitt