A model of the mechanisms underlying exploratory behaviour, based on empirical research and refin... more A model of the mechanisms underlying exploratory behaviour, based on empirical research and refined using a computer simulation, is presented. The behaviour of killifish from two lakes, one with killifish predators and one without, was compared in the laboratory. Plotting average activity in a novel environment versus time resulted in an inverted-U-shaped curve for both groups; however, the curve for killifish from the lake without predators was (1) steeper, (2) reached a peak value earlier, (S) reached a higher peak value, and (4) subsumed less area than the curve for killifish from the lake with predators. We hypothesize that the shape of the exploration curve reflects a competition between motivational subsystems that excite and inhibit exploratory behaviour in a way that is tuned to match the affordance probabilities of the animal's environment. A computer implementation of this model produced curves which differed along the same four dimensions as differentiate the two killifish curves. All four differences were reproduced in the model by tuning a single parameter: the time-dependent component of the decay-rate of the exploration-inhibiting subsystem. 1 Others (MacArthur and Piankam [1966]; Roithlat [1985]) refer to this process as "optimal decision making-. This term is somewhat inappropriate because the behaviour need not be optimal.
At the core of our uniquely human cognitive abilities is the capacity to see things from differen... more At the core of our uniquely human cognitive abilities is the capacity to see things from different perspectives, or to place them in a new context. We propose that this was made possible by two cognitive transitions. First, the large brain of Homo erectus facilitated the onset of recursive recall: the ability to string thoughts together into a stream of potentially abstract or imaginative thought. This hypothesis is supported by a set of computational models where an artificial society of agents evolved to generate more diverse and valuable cultural outputs under conditions of recursive recall. We propose that the capacity to see things in context arose much later, following the appearance of anatomically modern humans. This second transition was brought on by the onset of contextual focus: the capacity to shift between a minimally contextual analytic mode of thought, and a highly contextual associative mode of thought, conducive to combining concepts in new ways and ‗breaking out of a rut'. When contextual focus is implemented in an art-generating computer program, the resulting artworks are seen as more creative and appealing. We summarize how both transitions can be modeled using a theory of concepts which highlights the manner in which different contexts can lead to modern humans attributing very different meanings to the interpretation of one concept. What is the essence of our human-ness? We propose that what is at the core of our uniquely human cognitive abilities is the capacity to place things in context, or see things from different perspectives. This enables us to be not just creative, but to put our own spin on the inventions of others, modifying them to suit our own needs and tastes, in turn leading to new innovations that build cumulatively on previous
The birth of a creative idea. Commentary on ‘The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms’ by Margaret Boden
Complexity in the abstract and the concrete: an interview with Bruce Sawhill
Quantum mechanical modeling of consciousness
The creative process at work in musical composition.: An introspective account
Cultural learning as the transition mechanism in an evolutionary process. Commentary on ‘Cultural Learning’ by Tomasello et al
Cultural evolution as distributed human computation
Perspectives on Artistic Creativity: A Review of ‘The Artful Mind’ (Mark Turner, Ed.)
This book is not actually about the artful mind, ie the mind of one who uses devious means to ach... more This book is not actually about the artful mind, ie the mind of one who uses devious means to achieve certain ends, but the artistic mind, ie the mind of one who creates art. It consists of fourteen chapters by prominent scholars from a variety of disciplines ranging from art history to ...
This paper proposes an explanation of the cognitive change that occurs as the creative process pr... more This paper proposes an explanation of the cognitive change that occurs as the creative process proceeds. During the initial, intuitive phase, each thought activates, and potentially retrieves information from, a large region containing many memory locations. Because of the distributed, content-addressable structure of memory, the diverse contents of these many locations merge to generate the next thought. Novel associations often result. As one focuses on an idea, the region searched and retrieved from narrows, such that the next thought is the product of fewer memory locations. This enables a shift from association-based to causation-based thinking, which facilitates the fine-tuning and manifestation of the creative work.
Current opinion in behavioral sciences, Jun 1, 2019
This paper outlines the implications of neural-level accounts of insight, and models of the conce... more This paper outlines the implications of neural-level accounts of insight, and models of the conceptual interactions that underlie creativity, for a theory of cultural evolution. Since elements of human culture exhibit cumulative, adaptive, open-ended change, it seems reasonable to view culture as an evolutionary process, one fueled by creativity. Associative memory models of creativity and mathematical models of how concepts combine and transform through interaction with a context, support a view of creativity that is incompatible with a Darwinian (selectionist) framework for cultural evolution, but compatible with a non-Darwinian (Self-Other Reorganization) framework. A theory of cultural evolution in which creativity is centre stage could provide the kind of integrative framework for the behavioral sciences that Darwin provided for the life sciences.
Genetic Programming and Evolvable Machines, Dec 6, 2008
A perceived limitation of evolutionary art and design algorithms is that they rely on human inter... more A perceived limitation of evolutionary art and design algorithms is that they rely on human intervention; the artist selects the most aesthetically pleasing variants of one generation to produce the next. This paper discusses how computer generated art and design can become more creatively human-like with respect to both process and outcome. As an example of a step in this direction, we present an algorithm that overcomes the above limitation by employing an automatic fitness function. The goal is to evolve abstract portraits of Darwin, using our 2nd generation fitness function which rewards genomes that not just produce a likeness of Darwin but exhibit certain strategies characteristic of human artists. We note that in human creativity, change is less choosing amongst randomly generated variants and more capitalizing on the associative structure of a conceptual network to hone in on a vision. We discuss how to achieve this fluidity algorithmically.
National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Nov 6, 2008
EVOC (for EVOlution of Culture) is a computer model of culture that enables us to investigate how... more EVOC (for EVOlution of Culture) is a computer model of culture that enables us to investigate how various factors such as barriers to cultural diffusion, the presence and choice of leaders, or changes in the ratio of innovation to imitation affect the diversity and effectiveness of ideas. It consists of neural network based agents that invent ideas for actions, and imitate neighbors' actions. The model is based on a theory of culture according to which what evolves through culture is not memes or artifacts, but the internal models of the world that give rise to them, and they evolve not through a Darwinian process of competitive exclusion but a Lamarckian process involving exchange of innovation protocols. EVOC shows an increase in mean fitness of actions over time, and an increase and then decrease in the diversity of actions. Diversity of actions is positively correlated with population size and density, and with barriers between populations. Slowly eroding borders increase fitness without sacrificing diversity by fostering specialization followed by sharing of fit actions. Introducing a leader that broadcasts its actions throughout the population increases the fitness of actions but reduces diversity of actions. Increasing the number of leaders reduces this effect. Efforts are underway to simulate the conditions under which an agent immigrating from one culture to another contributes new ideas while still 'fitting in'.
After doing away with the evolutionary scaffold for BVSR, what remains is a notion of "blindness"... more After doing away with the evolutionary scaffold for BVSR, what remains is a notion of "blindness" that does not distinguish BVSR from other theories of creativity, and an assumption that creativity can be understood by treating ideas as discrete, countable entities, as opposed to different external manifestations of a singular gradually solidifying internal conception. Uprooted from Darwinian theory, BVSR lacks a scientific framework that can be called upon to generate hypotheses and test them. In lieu of such a framework, hypotheses appear to be generated on the basis of previous data-they are not theory-driven. Simonton (2014) does not explain how the hypothesis that creativity is enhanced by engagement in a "network of enterprises" is derived from BVSR; this hypothesis is more compatible with competing conceptions of creativity. The notion that creativity involves backtracking conflates evidence for backtracking with respect to the external output with evidence for backtracking of the conception of the invention. The first does not imply the second; a creator can set aside a creative output but cannot go back to the conception of the task he/she had prior to generating that output. The notion that creativity entails superfluity (i.e., many ideas have "zero usefulness") is misguided; usefulness is context-dependent, moreover, the usefulness of an idea may reside in its being a critical stepping-stone to a subsequent idea.
Because human cognition is creative and socially situated, knowledge accumulates, diffuses, and g... more Because human cognition is creative and socially situated, knowledge accumulates, diffuses, and gets applied in new contexts, generating cultural analogs of phenomena observed in population genetics such as adaptation and drift. It is therefore commonly thought that elements of culture evolve through natural selection. However, natural selection was proposed to explain how change accumulates despite lack of inheritance of acquired traits, as occurs with template-mediated replication. It cannot accommodate a process with significant retention of acquired or horizontally (e.g. socially) transmitted traits. Moreover, elements of culture cannot be treated as discrete lineages because they constantly interact and influence one another. It is proposed that what evolves through culture is the mind; ideas and artifacts are merely reflections of its current evolved state. Interacting minds transform (in part) through through a non-Darwinian autopoietic process similar to that by which early life evolved, involving not survival of the fittest but actualization of their potential.
makes the unwarranted assumption that nonmonotonicity supports a Darwinian view of creativity. Da... more makes the unwarranted assumption that nonmonotonicity supports a Darwinian view of creativity. Darwin's theory of natural selection was motivated by a paradox that has no equivalent in creative thought: the paradox of how change accumulates when acquired traits are not inherited. To describe a process of cumulative change in which acquired traits are retained is outside of the scope of the theory of natural selection. Even the early evolution of life itself (prior to genetically mediated template replication) cannot be described by natural selection. Specifically, natural selection cannot describe change of state that involves horizontal (Lamarckian) exchange, or occurs through interaction with an incompletely specified context. It cannot describe change wherein variants are evaluated sequentially, and wherein this evaluation can itself change the state space and/or fitness function, because no two variants are ever evaluated according to the same selection criterion. Concerns are also raised as to the methodology used in Simonton's study.
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Papers by Liane Gabora