I'm a lecturer (assistant professor) at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia, where I teach moral philosophy. Before that, I got my PhD at MIT and my B.A. at UT Austin. My website: www.munozphilosophy.com
When agents are uncertain, we distinguish what they objectively ought to do-roughly, what should ... more When agents are uncertain, we distinguish what they objectively ought to do-roughly, what should be done given full knowledge of the situation-from what they subjectively ought to do, where this is sensitive to their false and gappy beliefs. 1 Clearly, these 'oughts' can come apart. You objectively ought to play the slots if the machine will in fact pay out, but if the odds are low, you subjectively ought to play it safe. For the gambler and other uncertain agents, the subjective 'ought' is the proper guide to action; it is the 'ought' of rationality. An agent can be guided only by what is "present to the agent's mind" (Jackson, 1991: 467; cf. Gibbons, 2009: 174). Beliefs are present; unknown facts are not. But it is almost irresistible to think that, in some sense, the objective 'ought' is more authoritative. It is the ideal guide, the 'ought' that would guide us if only we knew more, the 'ought' whose advice we most desire. 1 The distinction between objective and subjective 'oughts', and the question of which is prior, have received enormous
There are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle i... more There are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about "supererogatory" deeds beyond the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that supererogation emerges from a clash between justifying and requiring reasons.
Justification depends on context: even if E on its own justifies H, still it might fail to justif... more Justification depends on context: even if E on its own justifies H, still it might fail to justify in the context of D. This sort of effect, epistemologists think, is due to defeaters, which undermine or rebut a would-be justifier. I argue that there is another fundamental sort of contextual feature, disqualification, which doesn't involve rebuttal or undercutting, and which cannot be reduced to any notion of screening-off. A disqualifier makes some would-be justifier otiose, as direct testimony sometimes does to distal testimony, and as manifestly decisive evidence might do to gratuitous evidence on the same team. Basing a belief on disqualified evidence, moreover, is distinctively irrational. One is not necessarily irresponsible. Instead one is turning down a free upgrade to a sleeker, stabler basis for one's beliefs. Such an upgrade would prevent wastes of epistemic effort, since someone who bases her belief on a disqualified proposition E will need to remember E and reth...
Supererogatory acts are those that lie "beyond the call of duty." There are two standard ways to ... more Supererogatory acts are those that lie "beyond the call of duty." There are two standard ways to define this idea more precisely. Although the definitions are often seen as equivalent, I argue that they can diverge when (i) options are infinite, or when (ii) there are cycles of better options; moreover, each definition is acceptable in only one case. I consider two ways out of this dilemma.
How could it be wrong to exploit—say, by paying sweatshop wages—if the exploited party benefits? ... more How could it be wrong to exploit—say, by paying sweatshop wages—if the exploited party benefits? How could it be wrong to do something gratuitously bad—like giving to a wasteful charity—if that is better than permissibly doing nothing? Joe Horton argues that these puzzles, known as the Exploitation Problem and All or Nothing Problem, have no unified answer. I propose one and pose a challenge for Horton’s take on the Exploitation Problem.
Consequentialists say we may always promote the good. Deontologists object: not if that means kil... more Consequentialists say we may always promote the good. Deontologists object: not if that means killing one to save five. "Consequentializers" reply: this act is wrong, but it isn't for the best, since killing is worse than letting die. I argue that this reply undercuts the "compellingness" of consequentialism, which comes from an outcome-based view of action that collapses the distinction between killing and letting die.
In the classic Miners case, an agent subjectively ought to do what they know is objectively wrong... more In the classic Miners case, an agent subjectively ought to do what they know is objectively wrong. This case shows that the subjective and objective ‘oughts’ are somewhat independent. But there remains a powerful intuition that the guidance of objective ‘oughts’ is more authoritative—so long as we know what they tell us. We argue that this intuition must be given up in light of a monotonicity principle, which undercuts the rationale for saying that objective ‘oughts’ are an authoritative guide for agents and advisors.
Deontologists believe in two key exceptions to the duty to promote the good: restrictions forbid ... more Deontologists believe in two key exceptions to the duty to promote the good: restrictions forbid us from harming others, and prerogatives permit us not to harm ourselves. How are restrictions and prerogatives related? A promising answer is that they share a source in rights. I argue that prerogatives cannot be grounded in familiar kinds of rights, only in something much stranger: waivable rights against oneself.
Supererogatory acts—good deeds “beyond the call of duty”—are a part of moral common sense, but co... more Supererogatory acts—good deeds “beyond the call of duty”—are a part of moral common sense, but conceptually puzzling. I propose a unified solution to three of the most infamous puzzles: the classic Paradox of Supererogation (if it’s so good, why isn’t it just obligatory?), Horton’s All or Nothing Problem, and Kamm’s Intransitivity Paradox. I conclude that supererogation makes sense if, and only if, the grounds of rightness are multi-dimensional and comparative.
Philosophers have long argued that duties to oneself are paradoxical, as they seem to entail an i... more Philosophers have long argued that duties to oneself are paradoxical, as they seem to entail an incoherent power to release oneself from obligations. I argue that self-release is possible, both as a matter of deontic logic and of metaethics.
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
Contingent negative existentials give rise to a notorious paradox. I formulate a version in terms... more Contingent negative existentials give rise to a notorious paradox. I formulate a version in terms of metaphysical grounding: nonexistence can’t be fundamental, but nothing can ground it. I then argue for a new solution, expanding on work by Kit Fine. The key idea is that negative existentials are contingently zero-grounded—that is to say, they are grounded, but not by anything, and only in the right conditions. If this is correct, it follows that grounding cannot be an internal relation, and that no complete account of reality can be purely fundamental.
Justification depends on context: even if E on its own justifies H, still it might fail to justif... more Justification depends on context: even if E on its own justifies H, still it might fail to justify in the context of D. This sort of effect, epistemologists think, is due to the possibility of defeaters, which undermine or rebut a would-be justifier. I argue that there is another fundamental sort of contextual effect, disqualification, which doesn’t involve rebuttal or undercutting, and which cannot be reduced to any notion of screening-off. A disqualifier makes some would-be justifier unnecessary, as direct testimony sometimes does to distal testimony, and as manifestly decisive evidence might do to weaker, gratuitous evidence on the same team. Basing a belief on disqualified evidence, moreover, is irrational in a distinctive way. One is not necessarily irresponsible. Instead one is turning down, for no reason, an upgrade to a sleeker, stabler basis for one's beliefs. Such an upgrade would prevent wastes of epistemic effort, since someone who bases her belief on a disqualified proposition E will need to remember E and rethink her belief should she come across a defeater for E. The upgrade might also reduce reliance on unwieldy evidence, if E is relevant only thanks to some labyrinthine argument; and to the extent that even ideal agents should doubt their ability to follow such an argument, even they should care about disqualifiers.
Uploads
Papers by Daniel Muñoz