Raymond Duch

University of Oxford, Dept of Politics and International Relations, Faculty Member

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Papers by Raymond Duch

Financial incentives for COVID-19 vaccines in a rural low-resource setting: a cluster-randomized trial

Nature Medicine, Nov 26, 2023

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Is There Broad-Based Support in High-Income Countries for COVID-19 Vaccine Donation? Evidence from Seven Countries

Applied Health Economics and Health Policy, Nov 29, 2021

Background Many high-income countries (HICs) have now vaccinated a substantial proportion of thei... more Background Many high-income countries (HICs) have now vaccinated a substantial proportion of their population against COVID-19. Many low-income countries (LICs) may need to wait until at least 2022 before even the most vulnerable 20% of their populations are vaccinated. Beyond ethical considerations, some redistribution of doses would reduce the risk of the emergence and spread of new variants and benefit the economy, both globally and in donor countries. However, the willingness of HIC governments to donate vaccine doses is likely to depend on public support. While previous work has indicated strong average levels of public support in HIC for donation, little is known about how broad-based this support is. Objective To investigate the extent to which support for donation holds across both pre-specified and exploratory subgroups. Methods From 24 November-28 December 2020 we conducted an online survey of 8209 members of the general public in seven HIC (Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Spain, UK and USA). We conducted tests of proportions and used Bayesian ordinal logistic regression models to assess the extent of support for donation across population subgroups. Results We found broad-based support for donations in terms of age, gender, socio-economic status and political ideology. We found no strong evidence that support for donations was higher among those with greater income or a university education. Support for donation among those on the political right and centre was lower than on the left, but 51% (95% confidence interval 48-53%) of respondents who identified with the right supported some level of donation. Those in the more altruistic half of the sample (as captured by willingness to donate money to a good cause) were more likely to support donation than those who were not, but around half of the less altruistic group supported some level of donation. Conclusion There is broad-based support for policymakers in HICs to donate some of their countries' COVID-19 vaccine doses for distribution to LICs. Previous research has found high average levels of support among the general public in high-income countries for donating COVID-19 vaccine doses to low-income countries, but little is known about how broad-based this support is. This study investigated the extent of support for donation in seven high-income countries across several subgroups. Our results suggest broad-based support for donations in terms of age, gender, socio-economic status and political ideology.

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Cash for COVID-19 Vaccines in Africa: A Financial Incentives Trial in Rural Ghana

Research Square (Research Square), May 2, 2023

We implemented a clustered randomized controlled trial with 7,227 residents in six rural Ghana Di... more We implemented a clustered randomized controlled trial with 7,227 residents in six rural Ghana Districts to determine whether financial incentives produce substantial increases in COVID-19 vaccine uptake. Villages were randomly assigned to receive one of four video treatment arms: a placebo, a standard health message, a high cash incentive ($10) and a low cash incentive ($3). Non-vaccinated subjects, assigned to the Cash incentive treatments had an average COVID-19 vaccine intention rate of 81% compared to the 71% for those in the Placebo treatment arm. Two months after the initial intervention the average self-reported vaccination rates for subjects in the Cash treatment were 3.5% higher than those for subjects in the Placebo treatment (95% CI: 0.001, 6.9; P < 0.03) -40% versus 36.5%. We verified the vaccination status of subjects: in the Cash treatment arm, 36.6% of verified subjects had at least one dose of the COVID-19 vaccine compared to 30.3% for those in Placebo -a difference of 6.3% (95% CI: 2.4, 10.2; P < 0.0001). For all three outcomes, the low cash incentive ($3.00) had a larger positive effect on COVID-19 vaccine uptake than the high cash incentive ($10.00). There is no evidence of spillover effects of the financial incentives that depress the vaccine uptake of subjects in non-financial treatment arms nor of non-treated proximate residents.

format_quoteVaccine intention rates were 75%, with the Low Cash arm highest at 83.1% compared to 71.3% in Placebo (p < 0.00001).format_quote

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How Should a Safe and Effective COVID-19 Vaccine be Allocated? Health Economists Need to be Ready to Take the Baton

PharmacoEconomics - open, Sep 3, 2020

format_quoteAstraZeneca aims to produce 30 million COVID vaccine doses for the UK by September and 100 million by year-end, with 2 billion globally.format_quote

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Cash versus lottery video messages: online COVID-19 vaccine incentives experiment

Oxford Open Economics

During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments offered financial incentives to increase vaccine uptake... more During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments offered financial incentives to increase vaccine uptake. We evaluate the impact on COVID-19 vaccine uptake of cash equivalents versus being entered into lotteries. We randomly assign 1628 unvaccinated US participants into one of three 45-second informational videos promoting vaccination with messages about (a) health benefits of COVID-19 vaccines (control), (b) being entered into lotteries or (c) receiving cash equivalent vouchers. After seeing the control health information video, 16% of individuals wanted information on COVID-19 vaccination. This compared with 14% of those assigned to the lottery video (odds ratio of 0.82 relative to control: 95% credible interval, 0.58–1.17) and 22% of those assigned to the cash voucher video (odds ratio of 1.53 relative to control: 95% credible interval, 1.11–2.11). These results support greater use of cash vouchers to promote information seeking about COVID-19 vaccination and do not support the use of l...

format_quoteCash incentives increased vaccine interest to 16%, outperforming lotteries (14%) and control (11%), with an odds ratio of 1.47 for cash treatment efficacy.format_quote

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Elitist theory and political tolerance in Western Europe

Political Behavior, Sep 1, 1991

This paper addresses the problem of democratic elitism within the context of Western European pol... more This paper addresses the problem of democratic elitism within the context of Western European politics. An entrenched assertion of the so-called elitist theory of democracy is that elites are more strongly committed to democratic values such as political tolerance than are ordinary citizens. The processes through which elites become more tolerant include political socialization, resociatization, political practice, and experience. Some have even argued that elites are the primary carriers of the democratic creed, Our purpose here is to test several hypotheses drawn from elitist theory. Relying on opinion surveys conducted in each of the twelve nations of the European Community in 1988, we focus on political tolerance. Our basic hypothesis is that political activism contributes to greater political tolerance. Special attention is given to a sample of opinion leaders as a test of the elitist theory. The analysis is conducted both at the level of the individual citizen and the level of the nation state. This is one of very few efforts to test elitist theory from a broad, cross-national perspective. Conseqnently, the analysis will be crucial in recasting elitist theory to comport more closely with empirical evidence. One of the most firmly entrenched research findings in the science of polities is that elites are more strongly committed to democratic values than are members of the mass public. While various scholars identify" different hypotheses to account for this divergence between leaders and ordinary people, only a lonely few have challenged the basic descriptive finding. This empirical assertion has long formed the backbone of the so-called elitist theory of democracy.' This theory posits that support for democratic values is concentrated in one particular segment of society: the e]ites. Ordinary members of the mass public are only weakly committed to democratic

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Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union

The Journal of Politics, May 1, 1992

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, a... more JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact

format_quoteAround one-third of respondents claimed all rights queried, positioning the USSR among the more rights-conscious in Europe.format_quote

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The electoral connection and democratic consolidation

Electoral Studies, Jun 1, 1998

Political parties are accorded an important role in the historical development of democratic inst... more Political parties are accorded an important role in the historical development of democratic institutions. This article explores the contribution of political parties to the consolidation of the democratic process in the recent post-communist regimes. Three general perspectives on how parties might affect the democratization process are evaluated. One argument is that there is an absence of "civil society" in these countries and hence cleavages or group identifications have little relevance for party preferences. A second argument is that party preferences in these post-communist democracies are based on opposition to democratic or market institutions and hence pose a threat to the democratic consolidation. I argue that the party issue space in postcommunist regimes tends to be multidimensional reflecting a variety of different salient cleavages and that opposition to the institutions of democratic capitalism are either inconsequential or counterbalanced by a number of other salient socio-political cleavages. The analysis is based on survey data from the Times-Mirror surveys conducted in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia during 1990 and 1991.

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Postmaterialism and the Emerging Soviet Democracy

Political Research Quarterly, Mar 1, 1994

This paper evaluates whether postmaterialist theory helps explain the democratization movement in... more This paper evaluates whether postmaterialist theory helps explain the democratization movement in the Soviet Union. The findings are based on two public opinion samples conducted in the USSR: one conducted in the Moscow Oblast in February/March, 1990, and the other in the European USSR (May, 1990). Our approach to the measurement of postmaterialism follows closely the work of Ron Inglehart. We find that postmaterialist value orientations seem to play an important role in Soviet mass politics. Postmaterialists, though small in number, are unusually supportive of basic democratic institutions and processes, and are more likely to engage in unconventional, regime challenging political behavior. There is some evidence in our data that postmaterialism is concentrated among younger Soviets, although the relationships are not strong. In general, we think it fair to conclude that postmaterialist value orientations are affecting Soviet politics in much the same way they have affected Western politics.

Strategic Voting in Post-Communist Democracy?

British Journal of Political Science, Dec 18, 2001

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Political Intolerance in the USSR

Comparative Political Studies, Oct 1, 1993

Political tolerance is a democratic value that has often been studied by those interested in the ... more Political tolerance is a democratic value that has often been studied by those interested in the relationship between mass public opinion and democracy. Yet most research efforts have been mounted in relatively democratic regimes. Little is known about political tolerance in relatively totalitarian regimes. The authors' purpose in this article is to explore intolerance within the mass public of the Soviet Union. Focusing on two surveys of public opinion conducted in the USSR in 1990, the authors demonstrate that political intolerance is fairly widespread in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the objects of intolerance are focused, not dispersed pluralistically. Many of the predictors of intolerance found useful in the West (e.g., perceptions of threat, closed-mindedness) are also good predictors in the Soviet Union. Level of education plays an especially interesting role, contributing to support for more general democratic values, but not directly to political tolerance. The authors conclude this article by speculating about the future of the democratization process in the USSR in light of regnant intolerance in that country.

Liberty, Authority, and the New Politics

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Jul 1, 2004

Page 1. http://jtp.sagepub.com/ Journal of Theoretical Politics http://jtp.sagepub.com/ content/1... more

Collective Decision-Making and the Economic Vote

Comparative Political Studies

Experimental evidence suggests that decision makers with proposal power are held responsible for ... more Experimental evidence suggests that decision makers with proposal power are held responsible for collective decisions. In the case of coalition governments, voter heuristics assign responsibility for economic outcomes to individual parties, directing the economic vote toward the Prime Minister party. Using extensive survey data from 1988 to 2010 in 28 democracies, we demonstrate that voters also identify the Finance Minister party as responsible depending on whether the coalition context exaggerates or mutes its perceived agenda power. When parties take ownership for particular policy areas, and decision-making is compartmentalized, voters perceive the Finance Minister as having proposal power and it receives a larger economic vote. Online survey experiments in Ireland and the Netherlands confirm that subjects employ compartmentalization signals to identify, and punish, coalition parties with proposal power.

format_quoteResponsibility for economic outcomes in coalition governments is attributed to PM and FM parties, depending on their agenda-setting power context.format_quote

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Reply to Spreco et al.: Perceived corruption and preferences for COVID-19 vaccine allocations

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Who should be first in line for the COVID-19 vaccine? Surveys in 13 countries of the public’s preferences for prioritisation

ABSTRACTHow does the public want a COVID-19 vaccine to be allocated? We conducted a conjoint expe... more ABSTRACTHow does the public want a COVID-19 vaccine to be allocated? We conducted a conjoint experiment asking 15,536 adults in 13 countries to evaluate 248,576 profiles of potential vaccine recipients that varied randomly on five attributes. Our sample includes diverse countries from all continents. The results suggest that in addition to giving priority to health workers and to those at high risk, the public favours giving priority to a broad range of key workers and to those on lower incomes. These preferences are similar across respondents of different education levels, incomes, and political ideologies, as well as across most surveyed countries. The public favoured COVID-19 vaccines being allocated solely via government programs, but were highly polarized in some developed countries on whether taking a vaccine should be mandatory. There is a consensus among the public on many aspects of COVID-19 vaccination which needs to be taken into account when developing and communicating ...

format_quoteThe conjoint experiment involved 15,536 subjects making 124,288 pairwise vaccine recipient comparisons based on five priority attributes.format_quote

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The COVID-19 pandemic and health-related quality of life across 13 high- and low-middle-income countries: A cross-sectional analysis

PLOS Medicine

Background Most research on the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) health burden has focused on ... more Background Most research on the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) health burden has focused on confirmed cases and deaths, rather than consequences for the general population’s health-related quality of life (HRQoL). It is also important to consider HRQoL to better understand the potential multifaceted implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in various international contexts. This study aimed to assess the association between the COVID-19 pandemic and changes in HRQoL in 13 diverse countries. Methods and findings Adults (18+ years) were surveyed online (24 November to 17 December 2020) in 13 countries spanning 6 continents. Our cross-sectional study used descriptive and regression-based analyses (age adjusted and stratified by gender) to assess the association between the pandemic and changes in the general population’s HRQoL, measured by the EQ-5D-5L instrument and its domains (mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression), and how overall health d...

format_quoteMore than one-third of 15,480 participants experienced reduced HRQoL, averaging a 0.066 loss (8%) in EQ-5D-5L index due to the pandemic.format_quote

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A randomized controlled trial to test financial incentives for COVID-19 vaccination in Ghana

Nature Medicine

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La Arquitectura De Elección Mejora La Selección De Pensiones

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2021

REPLICATION_GUIDE.MD

Do Content Warnings Help People Spot a Deepfake? Evidence from Two Experiments

The advent and rapid advancement of 'deepfake videos' — so named as they are fake videos ... more The advent and rapid advancement of 'deepfake videos' — so named as they are fake videos made to look real with the use of deep learning artificial intelligence programs — pose serious challenges to our digital information environment. As the technology continues to improve and fake videos proliferate, there is uncertainty about how people will discern genuine from manipulated videos, and how this will affect trust in online content. This paper conducts a pair of experiments aimed at gauging the public's ability to detect deepfakes from ordinary videos, and the extent to which content warnings improve detection of inauthentic videos. In the first experiment, we consider capacity for detection in natural environments: that is, do people spot deepfakes when they encounter them without a content warning? In the second experiment, we present the first evaluation of how warning labels affect capacity for detection, by telling participants at least one of the videos they are t...

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