We argue that the policy uncertainty generated by elections encourages private actors to delay in... more We argue that the policy uncertainty generated by elections encourages private actors to delay investments that entail high costs of reversal, creating pre-election declines in the associated sectors. Moreover, this incentive depends on the competitiveness of the race and the policy differences between the major parties/candidates. Using new survey and housing market data from the United States, we test these arguments. The survey analysis assesses whether respondents' perceptions of presidential candidates' policy differences increased the respondents' likelihood of delaying certain purchases and actions. The housing market analysis examines whether elections are associated with a pre-election decline in economic activity, and whether any such decline depends on electoral competitiveness. The results support the predictions and cannot be explained by existing theories.
Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking
We develop an informational theory that analyzes conditions under which a reelection-seeking exec... more We develop an informational theory that analyzes conditions under which a reelection-seeking executive will act in the public interest. The theory considers factors such as executive com- petence, challenger quality, and the likelihood that voters will learn the consequences of policy decisions before an upcoming election. We …nd that an executive who has information sug- gesting that a popular policy
Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis
An enduring and controversial debate centers on whether there exist '&am... more An enduring and controversial debate centers on whether there exist ''two presidencies,'' that is, whether presidents exercise fundamentally greater influence over foreign than domestic affairs. This paper makes two contributions to understanding this issue and, by extension, ...
Ideologically Rigid? 1
Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public ? By Brandice Canes-Wrone
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 2007
Electoral Uncertainty and Inverse Political Business Cycles: An Examination of U.S. Housing Market Dynamics
Issue Accountability and the Mass Public: The Electoral Consequences of Legislative Voting on Crime Policy
... Jessica Bonney i William and Mary Law School Brandice Canes-Wrone ii Princeton University Wil... more ... Jessica Bonney i William and Mary Law School Brandice Canes-Wrone ii Princeton University William Minozzi iii Ohio State University July 31, 2007 ... (although cf. Popkin 1991, 61-3, for a discussion of how voters care about both issue proximity and competence). ...
While a large body of work exists on presidents' public approval, no study identifies the conditi... more While a large body of work exists on presidents' public approval, no study identifies the conditions under which approval generates policy influence. This gap is particularly significant since empirical research has produced inconsistent findings on whether popularity affects a president's legislative success. In the following, we argue that public salience and issue complexity determine the extent to which a president can capitalize on approval, and we proceed to test this hypothesis on U.S. House of Representatives roll-call votes between 1989 and 2000. The empirical analysis provides strong support for our hypothesis, which holds across a variety of econometric specifications and estimates of approval.
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Papers by Brandice Wrone