RFC 5652: STD 70: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
- R. Housley
Internet Standard
Network Working Group R. Housley Request for Comments: 5652 Vigil Security Obsoletes: 3852 September 2009 Category: Standards Track Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Abstract This document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This syntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message content. Status of This Memo This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright and License Notice Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the BSD License. This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English. Housley Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 5652 Cryptographic Message Syntax September 2009 Table of Contents 1. Introduction ....................................................3 1.1. Evolution of the CMS .......................................4 1.1.1. Changes Since PKCS #7 Version 1.5 ...................4 1.1.2. Changes Since RFC 2630 ..............................4 1.1.3. Changes Since RFC 3369 ..............................5 1.1.4. Changes Since RFC 3852 ..............................5 1.2. Terminology ................................................5 1.3. Version Numbers ............................................6 2. General Overview ................................................6 3. General Syntax ..................................................7 4. Data Content Type ...............................................7 5. Signed-data Content Type ........................................8 5.1. SignedData Type ............................................9 5.2. EncapsulatedContentInfo Type ..............................11 5.2.1. Compatibility with PKCS #7 .........................12 5.3. SignerInfo Type ...........................................13 5.4. Message Digest Calculation Process ........................16 5.5. Signature Generation Process ..............................16 5.6. Signature Verification Process ............................17 6. Enveloped-Data Content Type ....................................17 6.1. EnvelopedData Type ........................................18 6.2. RecipientInfo Type ........................................21 6.2.1. KeyTransRecipientInfo Type .........................22 6.2.2. KeyAgreeRecipientInfo Type .........................23 6.2.3. KEKRecipientInfo Type ..............................25 6.2.4. PasswordRecipientInfo Type .........................26 6.2.5. OtherRecipientInfo Type ............................27 6.3. Content-encryption Process ................................27 6.4. Key-Encryption Process ....................................28 7. Digested-Data Content Type .....................................28 8. Encrypted-Data Content Type ....................................29 9. Authenticated-Data Content Type ................................30 9.1. AuthenticatedData Type ....................................31 9.2. MAC Generation ............................................33 9.3. MAC Verification ..........................................34 10. Useful Types ..................................................34 10.1. Algorithm Identifier Types ...............................35 10.1.1. DigestAlgorithmIdentifier .........................35 10.1.2. SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier ......................35 10.1.3. KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ..................35 10.1.4. ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ..............36 10.1.5. MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm ................36 10.1.6. KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier ..................36 10.2. Other Useful Types .......................................36 10.2.1. RevocationInfoChoices .............................36 10.2.2. CertificateChoices ................................37 Housley Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 5652 Cryptographic Message Syntax September 2009 10.2.3. CertificateSet ....................................38 10.2.4. IssuerAndSerialNumber .............................38 10.2.5. CMSVersion ........................................39 10.2.6. UserKeyingMaterial ................................39 10.2.7. OtherKeyAttribute .................................39 11. Useful Attributes .............................................39 11.1. Content Type .............................................40 11.2. Message Digest ...........................................40 11.3. Signing Time .............................................41 11.4. Countersignature .........................................42 12. ASN.1 Modules .................................................43 12.1. CMS ASN.1 Module .........................................44 12.2. Version 1 Attribute Certificate ASN.1 Module .............51 13. References ....................................................52 13.1. Normative References .....................................52 13.2. Informative References ...................................53 14. Security Considerations .......................................54 15. Acknowledgments ...............................................56 1. Introduction This document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This syntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message content. The CMS describes an encapsulation syntax for data protection. It supports digital signatures and encryption. The syntax allows multiple encapsulations; one encapsulation envelope can be nested inside another. Likewise, one party can digitally sign some previously encapsulated data. It also allows arbitrary attributes, such as signing time, to be signed along with the message content, and it provides for other attributes such as countersignatures to be associated with a signature. The CMS can support a variety of architectures for certificate-based key management, such as the one defined by the PKIX (Public Key Infrastructure using X.509) working group [PROFILE]. The CMS values are generated using ASN.1 [X.208-88], using BER- encoding (Basic Encoding Rules) [X.209-88]. Values are typically represented as octet strings. While many systems are capable of transmitting arbitrary octet strings reliably, it is well known that many electronic mail systems are not. This document does not address mechanisms for encoding octet strings for reliable transmission in such environments. Housley Standards Track [Page 3]
RFC 5652 Cryptographic Message Syntax September 2009 1.1. Evolution of the CMS The CMS is derived from PKCS #7 version 1.5, which is documented in RFC 2315 [PKCS#7]. PKCS #7 version 1.5 was developed outside of the IETF; it was originally published as an RSA Laboratories Technical Note in November 1993. Since that time, the IETF has taken responsibility for the development and maintenance of the CMS. Today, several important IETF Standards-Track protocols make use of the CMS. This section describes that changes that the IETF has made to the CMS in each of the published versions. 1.1.1. Changes Since PKCS #7 Version 1.5 RFC 2630 [CMS1] was the first version of the CMS on the IETF Standards Track. Wherever possible, backward compatibility with PKCS #7 version 1.5 is preserved; however, changes were made to accommodate version 1 attribute certificate transfer and to support algorithm-independent key management. PKCS #7 version 1.5 included support only for key transport. RFC 2630 adds support for key agreement and previously distributed symmetric key-encryption key techniques. 1.1.2. Changes Since RFC 2630 RFC 3369 [CMS2] obsoletes RFC 2630 [CMS1] and RFC 3211 [PWRI]. Password-based key management is included in the CMS specification, and an extension mechanism to support new key management schemes without further changes to the CMS is specified. Backward compatibility with RFC 2630 and RFC 3211 is preserved; however, version 2 attribute certificate transfer is added, and the use of version 1 attribute certificates is deprecated. Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) v2 signatures [MSG2], which are based on PKCS #7 version 1.5, are compatible with S/MIME v3 signatures [MSG3]and S/MIME v3.1 signatures [MSG3.1]. However, there are some subtle compatibility issues with signatures based on PKCS #7 version 1.5. These issues are discussed in Section 5.2.1. These issues remain with the current version of the CMS. Specific cryptographic algorithms are not discussed in this document, but they were discussed in RFC 2630. The discussion of specific cryptographic algorithms has been moved to a separate document [CMSALG]. Separation of the protocol and algorithm specifications allows the IETF to update each document independently. This specification does not require the implementation of any particular Housley Standards Track [Page 4]
RFC 5652 Cryptographic Message Syntax September 2009 algorithms. Rather, protocols that rely on the CMS are expected to choose appropriate algorithms for their environment. The algorithms may be selected from [CMSALG] or elsewhere. 1.1.3. Changes Since RFC 3369 RFC 3852 [CMS3] obsoletes RFC 3369 [CMS2]. As discussed in the previous section, RFC 3369 introduced an extension mechanism to support new key management schemes without further changes to the CMS. RFC 3852 introduces a similar extension mechanism to support additional certificate formats and revocation status information formats without further changes to the CMS. These extensions are primarily documented in Sections 10.2.1 and 10.2.2. Backward compatibility with earlier versions of the CMS is preserved. The use of version numbers is described in Section 1.3. Since the publication of RFC 3369, a few errata have been noted. These errata are posted on the RFC Editor web site. These errors have been corrected in this document. The text in Section 11.4 that describes the counter signature unsigned attribute is clarified. Hopefully, the revised text is clearer about the portion of the SignerInfo signature that is covered by a countersignature. 1.1.4. Changes Since RFC 3852 This document obsoletes RFC 3852 [CMS3]. The primary reason for the publication of this document is to advance the CMS along the standards maturity ladder. This document includes the clarifications that were originally published in RFC 4853 [CMSMSIG] regarding the proper handling of the SignedData protected content type when more than one digital signature is present. Since the publication of RFC 3852, a few errata have been noted. These errata are posted on the RFC Editor web site. These errors have been corrected in this document. 1.2. Terminology In this document, the key words MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL are to be interpreted as described in [STDWORDS]. Housley Standards Track [Page 5]
RFC 5652 Cryptographic Message Syntax September 2009 1.3. Version Numbers Each of the major data structures includes a version number as the first item in the data structure. The version numbers are intended to avoid ASN.1 decode errors. Some implementations do not check the version number prior to attempting a decode, and if a decode error occurs, then the version number is checked as part of the error handling routine. This is a reasonable approach; it places error processing outside of the fast path. This approach is also forgiving when an incorrect version number is used by the sender. Most of the initial version numbers were assigned in PKCS #7 version 1.5. Others were assigned when the structure was initially created. Whenever a structure is updated, a higher version number is assigned. However, to ensure maximum interoperability, the higher version number is only used when the new syntax feature is employed. That is, the lowest version number that supports the generated syntax is used. 2. General Overview The CMS is general enough to support many different content types. This document defines one protection content, ContentInfo. ContentInfo encapsulates a single identified content type, and the identified type may provide further encapsulation. This document defines six content types: data, signed-data, enveloped-data, digested-data, encrypted-data, and authenticated-data. Additional content types can be defined outside this document. An implementation that conforms to this specification MUST implement the protection content, ContentInfo, and MUST implement the data, signed-data, and enveloped-data content types. The other content types MAY be implemented. As a general design philosophy, each content type permits single pass processing using indefinite-length Basic Encoding Rules (BER) encoding. Single-pass operation is especially helpful if content is large, stored on tapes, or is "piped" from another process. Single- pass operation has one significant drawback: it is difficult to perform encode operations using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.509-88] encoding in a single pass since the lengths of the various components may not be known in advance. However, signed attributes within the signed-data content type and authenticated attributes within the authenticated-data content type need to be transmitted in DER form to ensure that recipients can verify a content that contains one or more unrecognized attributes. Signed attributes and authenticated attributes are the only data types used in the CMS that require DER encoding. Housley Standards Track [Page 6]
RFC 5652 Cryptographic Message Syntax September 2009 3. General Syntax The following object identifier identifies the content information type: id-ct-contentInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) ct(1) 6 } The CMS associates a content type identifier with a content. The syntax MUST have ASN.1 type ContentInfo: ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { contentType ContentType, content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType } ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER The fields of ContentInfo have the following meanings: contentType indicates the type of the associated content. It is an object identifier; it is a unique string of integers assigned by an authority that defines the content type. content is the associated content. The type of content can be determined uniquely by contentType. Content types for data, signed-data, enveloped-data, digested-data, encrypted-data, and authenticated-data are defined in this document. If additional content types are defined in other documents, the ASN.1 type defined SHOULD NOT be a CHOICE type. 4. Data Content Type The following object identifier identifies the data content type: id-data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 1 } The data content type is intended to refer to arbitrary octet strings, such as ASCII text files; the interpretation is left to the application. Such strings need not have any internal structure (although they could have their own ASN.1 definition or other structure). S/MIME uses id-data to identify MIME-encoded content. The use of this content identifier is specified in RFC 2311 for S/MIME v2 [MSG2], RFC 2633 for S/MIME v3 [MSG3], and RFC 3851 for S/MIME v3.1 [MSG3.1]. Housley Standards Track [Page 7]
RFC 5652 Cryptographic Message Syntax September 2009 The data content type is generally encapsulated in the signed-data, enveloped-data, digested-data, encrypted-data, or authenticated-data content type. 5. Signed-data Content Type The signed-data content type consists of a content of any type and zero or more signature values. Any number of signers in parallel can sign any type of content. The typical application of the signed-data content type represents one signer's digital signature on content of the data content type. Another typical application disseminates certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs). The process by which signed-data is constructed involves the following steps: 1. For each signer, a message digest, or hash value, is computed on the content with a signer-specific message-digest algorithm. If the signer is signing any information other than the content, the message digest of the content and the other information are digested with the signer's message digest algorithm (see Section 5.4), and the result becomes the "message digest." 2. For each signer, the message digest is digitally signed using the signer's private key. 3. For each signer, the signature value and other signer-specific information are collected into a SignerInfo value, as defined in Section 5.3. Certificates and CRLs for each signer, and those not corresponding to any signer, are collected in this step. 4. The message digest algorithms for all the signers and the SignerInfo values for all the signers are collected together with the content into a SignedData value, as defined in Section 5.1. A recipient independently computes the message digest. This message digest and the signer's public key are used to verify the signature value. The signer's public key is referenced in one of two ways. It can be referenced by an issuer distinguished name along with an issuer-specific serial number to uniquely identify the certificate that contains the public key. Alternatively, it can be referenced by a subject key identifier, which accommodates both certified and uncertified public keys. While not required, the signer's certificate can be included in the SignedData certificates field. Housley Standards Track [Page 8]
RFC 5652 Cryptographic Message Syntax September 2009 When more than one signature is present, the successful validation of one signature associated with a given signer is usually treated as a successful signature by that signer. However, there are some application environments where other rules are needed. An application that employs a rule other than one valid signature for each signer must specify those rules. Also, where simple matching of the signer identifier is not sufficient to determine whether the signatures were generated by the same signer, the application specification must describe how to determine which signatures were generated by the same signer. Support of different communities of recipients is the primary reason that signers choose to include more than one signature. For example, the signed-data content type might include signatures generated with the RSA signature algorithm and with the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature algorithm. This allows recipients to verify the signature associated with one algorithm or the other. This section is divided into six parts. The first part describes the top-level type SignedData, the second part describes EncapsulatedContentInfo, the third part describes the per-signer information type SignerInfo, and the fourth, fifth, and sixth parts describe the message digest calculation, signature generation, and signature verification processes, respectively. 5.1. SignedData Type The following object identifier identifies the signed-data content type: id-signedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 2 } The signed-data content type shall have ASN.1 type SignedData: SignedData ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers, encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo, certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL, crls [1] IMPLICIT RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL, signerInfos SignerInfos } DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo Housley Standards Track [Page 9]
RFC 5652 Cryptographic Message Syntax September 2009 The fields of type SignedData have the following meanings: version is the syntax version number. The appropriate value depends on certificates, eContentType, and SignerInfo. The version MUST be assigned as follows: IF ((certificates is present) AND (any certificates with a type of other are present)) OR ((crls is present) AND (any crls with a type of other are present)) THEN version MUST be 5 ELSE IF (certificates is present) AND (any version 2 attribute certificates are present) THEN version MUST be 4 ELSE IF ((certificates is present) AND (any version 1 attribute certificates are present)) OR (any SignerInfo structures are version 3) OR (encapContentInfo eContentType is other than id-data) THEN version MUST be 3 ELSE version MUST be 1 digestAlgorithms is a collection of message digest algorithm identifiers. There MAY be any number of elements in the collection, including zero. Each element identifies the message digest algorithm, along with any associated parameters, used by one or more signer. The collection is intended to list the message digest algorithms employed by all of the signers, in any order, to facilitate one-pass signature verification. Implementations MAY fail to validate signatures that use a digest algorithm that is not included in this set. The message digesting process is described in Section 5.4. encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content type identifier and the content itself. Details of the EncapsulatedContentInfo type are discussed in Section 5.2. certificates is a collection of certificates. It is intended that the set of certificates be sufficient to contain certification paths from a recognized "root" or "top-level certification authority" to all of the signers in the signerInfos field. There may be more certificates than necessary, and there may be certificates sufficient to contain certification paths from two or more independent top-level certification authorities. There may also be fewer certificates than necessary, if it is expected that recipients have an alternate means of obtaining necessary Housley Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 5652 Cryptographic Message Syntax September 2009 certificates (e.g., from a previous set of certificates). The signer's certificate MAY be included. The use of version 1 attribute certificates is strongly discouraged. crls is a collection of revocation status information. It is intended that the collection contain information sufficient to determine whether the certificates in the certificates field are valid, but such correspondence is not necessary. Certificate revocation lists (CRLs) are the primary source of revocation status information. There MAY be more CRLs than necessary, and there MAY also be fewer CRLs than necessary. signerInfos is a collection of per-signer information. There MAY be any number of elements in the collection, including zero. When the collection represents more than one signature, the successful validation of one of signature from a given signer ought to be treated as a successful signature by that signer. However, there are some application environments where other rules are needed. The details of the SignerInfo type are discussed in Section 5.3. Since each signer can employ a different digital signature technique, and future specifications could update the syntax, all implementations MUST gracefully handle unimplemented versions of SignerInfo. Further, since all implementations will not support every possible signature algorithm, all implementations MUST gracefully handle unimplemented signature algorithms when they are encountered. 5.2. EncapsulatedContentInfo Type The content is represented in the type EncapsulatedContentInfo: EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { eContentType ContentType, eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER The fields of type EncapsulatedContentInfo have the following meanings: eContentType is an object identifier. The object identifier uniquely specifies the content type. eContent is the content itself, carried as an octet string. The eContent need not be DER encoded. Housley Standards Track [Page 11]
RFC 5652 Cryptographic Message Syntax September 2009 The optional omission of the eContent within the EncapsulatedContentInfo field makes it possible to construct "external signatures". In the case of external signatures, the content being signed is absent from the EncapsulatedContentInfo value included in the signed-data content type. If the eContent value within EncapsulatedContentInfo is absent, then the signatureValue is calculated and the eContentType is assigned as though the eContent value was present. In the degenerate case where there are no signers, the EncapsulatedContentInfo value being "signed" is irrelevant. In this case, the content type within the EncapsulatedContentInfo value being "signed" MUST be id-data (as defined in Section 4), and the content field of the EncapsulatedContentInfo value MUST be omitted. 5.2.1. Compatibility with PKCS #7 This section contains a word of warning to implementers that wish to support both the CMS and PKCS #7 [PKCS#7] SignedData content types. Both the CMS and PKCS #7 identify the type of the encapsulated content with an object identifier, but the ASN.1 type of the content itself is variable in PKCS #7 SignedData content type. PKCS #7 defines content as: content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL The CMS defines eContent as: eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL The CMS definition is much easier to use in most applications, and it is compatible with both S/MIME v2 and S/MIME v3. S/MIME signed messages using the CMS and PKCS #7 are compatible because identical signed message formats are specified in RFC 2311 for S/MIME v2 [