Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Apr 1, 2020
Objections to the use of historical case studies for philosophical ends fall into two categories.... more Objections to the use of historical case studies for philosophical ends fall into two categories. Methodological objections claim that historical accounts and their uses by philosophers are subject to various biases. We argue that these challenges are not special; they also apply to other epistemic practices. Metaphysical objections, on the other hand, claim that historical case studies are intrinsically unsuited to serve as evidence for philosophical claims, even when carefully constructed and used, and so constitute a distinct class of challenge. We show that attention to what makes for a canonical case can address these problems. A case study is canonical with respect to a particular philosophical aim when the features relevant to that aim provide a reasonably complete causal account of the results of the historical process under investigation. We show how to establish canonicity by evaluating relevant contingencies using two prominent examples from the history of science: Eddington's confirmation of Einstein's theory of general relativity using his data from the 1919 eclipse and Watson and Crick's determination of the structure of DNA.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2023
Scientific research is constrained by limited resources, so it is imperative that it be conducted... more Scientific research is constrained by limited resources, so it is imperative that it be conducted efficiently. This paper introduces the notion of epistemic expression, a kind of representation that expedites the solution of research problems. Epistemic expressions are representations that (i) contain information in a way that enables more reliable information to place the most stringent constraints on possible solutions and (ii) make new information readily extractible by biasing the search through that space. I illustrate these conditions using historical and contemporary examples of biomolecular structure determination. Then, I argue that the notion of epistemic expression parts ways with pragmatic accounts of scientific representation and an understanding of models as artifacts, neither of which require models to accurately represent. Explicating epistemic expression thus fills a gap in our understanding of scientific practice, extending Morrison and Morgan’s (1999) conception of models as investigative instruments.
Proteins play central roles in many life-sustaining processes. Because their function is closely ... more Proteins play central roles in many life-sustaining processes. Because their function is closely tied to their structure, the practice of protein structure determination is a promising area for philosophical inquiry. I argue that a modest monism about protein structure determination is both more faithful to this practice and a productive route for raising fruitful questions about internal and external experimental validity: when can we conclude that an experimental model is right in its context, and when are we warranted in extending conclusions from one experimental context to another? I proceed via a critique of Mitchell and Gronenborn (2017), who understand this practice through the framework of integrative pluralism. I argue that this practice is neither pluralistic nor, strictly speaking, integrative. Further, the framework of integrative pluralism makes us liable to overlook questions about experimental validity and assume answers to them. A modestly monistic perspective better facilitates inquiry about experimental validity in the practice of protein structure determination.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
Objections to the use of historical case studies for philosophical ends fall into two categories.... more Objections to the use of historical case studies for philosophical ends fall into two categories. Methodological objections claim that historical accounts and their uses by philosophers are subject to various biases. We argue that these challenges are not special; they also apply to other epistemic practices. Metaphysical objections, on the other hand, claim that historical case studies are intrinsically unsuited to serve as evidence for philosophical claims, even when carefully constructed and used, and so constitute a distinct class of challenge. We show that attention to what makes for a canonical case can address these problems. A case study is canonical with respect to a particular philosophical aim when the features relevant to that aim provide a reasonably complete causal account of the results of the historical process under investigation. We show how to establish canonicity by evaluating relevant contingencies using two prominent examples from the history of science: Eddington's confirmation of Einstein's theory of general relativity using his data from the 1919 eclipse and Watson and Crick's determination of the structure of DNA.
The structures of protein and DNA were discovered primarily by means of synthesizing component-le... more The structures of protein and DNA were discovered primarily by means of synthesizing component-level information about bond types, lengths, and angles, rather than analyzing X-ray diffraction photographs of these molecules. In this paper, I consider the synthetic and analytic approaches to exemplify alternative heuristics for approaching mid-twentieth-century macromolecular structure determination. I argue that the former was, all else being equal, likeliest to generate the correct structure in the shortest period of time. I begin by characterizing problem solving in these cases as proceeding via the elimination of candidate structures through the successive application of component-level information and interpretations of X-ray diffraction photographs, each of which serves as a kind of constraint on structure. Then, I argue that although each kind of constraint enables the elimination of a considerable proportion of candidate structures, component-level constraints are significantly more likely to do so correctly. Thus, considering them before X-ray diffraction photographs is a better heuristic than one that reverses this order. Because the synthetic approach that resulted in the determination of the protein and DNA structures exemplifies such a heuristic, its use can help account for these discoveries.
In this dissertation, I define epistemic representations to be tools for gaining information abou... more In this dissertation, I define epistemic representations to be tools for gaining information about aspects of the target systems they represent, which I call as phenomena of interest. I ask: in virtue of what is one vehicle of representation, rather than another, selected when the user’s aim is to learn about such a phenomenon? I argue that examining the nature of epistemic representation promises to be more fruitful than the present debate about scientific representation. I look at two sorts of contexts in which epistemic representations are used: those in which little or nothing is known about the phenomenon of interest, and those in which this phenomenon is already relatively well understood. To see how epistemic representations are used in the first sort of context, I examine the histories of the discoveries of protein and DNA structure. I argue that the process of structure determination may be understood as one of successively eliminating possible structures through the consid...
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, forthcoming
Objections to the use of historical case studies for philosophical ends fall into two categories.... more Objections to the use of historical case studies for philosophical ends fall into two categories. Methodological objections claim that historical accounts and their uses by philosophers are subject to various biases. We argue that these challenges are not special; they also apply to other epistemic practices. Metaphysical objections, on the other hand, claim that historical case studies are intrinsically unsuited to serve as evidence for philosophical claims, even when carefully constructed and used, and so constitute a distinct class of challenge. We show that attention to what makes for a canonical case can address these problems. A case study is canonical with respect to a particular philosophical aim when the features relevant to that aim provide a reasonably complete causal account of the results of the historical process under investigation. We show how to establish canonicity by evaluating relevant contingencies using two prominent examples from the history of science: Eddington's confirmation of Einstein's theory of general relativity using his data from the 1919 eclipse and Watson and Crick's determination of the structure of DNA.
The structures of protein and DNA were discovered primarily by means of synthesizing component-le... more The structures of protein and DNA were discovered primarily by means of synthesizing component-level information about bond types, lengths, and angles, rather than analyzing X-ray diffraction photographs of these molecules. In this paper, I consider the synthetic and analytic approaches to exemplify alternative heuristics for approaching mid-twentieth-century macromolecular structure determination. I argue that the former was, all else being equal, likeliest to generate the correct structure in the shortest period of time. I begin by characterizing problem solving in these cases as proceeding via the elimination of candidate structures through the successive application of component-level information and interpretations of X-ray diffraction photographs, each of which serves as a kind of constraint on structure. Then, I argue that although each kind of constraint enables the elimination of a considerable proportion of candidate structures, component-level constraints are significantly more likely to do so correctly. Thus, considering them before X-ray diffraction photographs is a better heuristic than one that reverses this order. Because the synthetic approach that resulted in the determination of the protein and DNA structures exemplifies such a heuristic, its use can help account for these discoveries.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2016
In this paper, I characterize visual epistemic representations as concrete two-or three-dimension... more In this paper, I characterize visual epistemic representations as concrete two-or three-dimensional tools for conveying information about aspects of their target systems or phenomena of interest. I outline two features of successful visual epistemic representation: that the vehicle of representation contain sufficiently accurate information about the phenomenon of interest for the user's purpose, and that it convey this information to the user in a manner that makes it readily available to her. I argue that actual epistemic representation may involve tradeoffs between these features and is successful to the extent that they are present.
In this paper, I take scientific models to be epistemic representations of their target systems. ... more In this paper, I take scientific models to be epistemic representations of their target systems. I define an epistemic representation to be a tool for gaining information about its target system and argue that a vehicle's capacity to provide specific information about its target system-its informativeness-is an essential feature of this kind of representation. I draw an analogy to our ordinary notion of interpretation to show that a user's aim of faithfully representing the target system is necessary for securing this feature.
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Papers by Agnes Bolinska