CONFLICT AS A LOGICAL AND SEMANTIC PROBLEM 1994

In : Synopsis, v.5, Encounter of cultures: from collision to dialogue. Yerevan, 1995, p. 93-101. Suren Zolyan CONFLICT AS LOGICO-SEMANTIC PROBLEM * Regional conflicts are viewed as the most topical and serious political problem of today.Abortive attempts at their political resolution demand urgent re-evaluation and modernization of the existing outlines and mechanisms. Alongside with numerous legal,political,military,historical, as well as conflictological proper issues there is an aspect which has not been paid due attention to yet.This aspect involves methodological foundations of the description of regional conflicts,in particular,such fundamental aspect for the humanities as the correlation between the language of description and reality.At the same time there is an obvious connection between the failure of the attempts to solve regional conflicts and of those to describe them. Lacking is the awareness of the fact that conflict also poses a methodological problem in fact, any military or political confrontation presupposes first of all axiological,conceptual and ideological confrontation which acquires a historical, legal, sociocultural, etc shape. Thus a situation which is common for the humanities emerges: reality is replaced by its description which gives rise to the specific manifestation of such fundamentals for the 20th century philosophy problems as history and interpretation,language and reality,truth and method.A real-life political problem acquires a mythologized coating , reality comes out not by itself but in a certain structuralized form, i.e. as a description which implicitly suggests an outline for a solution acceptable for this or that party concerned (this party may or may not be a party of the conflict ).The constantly appearing new descriptions which seek to describe the problem "as it is in reality" or else to provide its "new interpretation" are but a rhetorical device which disguises the efforts to offer a new political solution. The "objectivity" of the description can be reached neither by reducing the existing points of view to a common denominator, nor by their simple reproduction. The objectivity can be acquired on the basis of such description that explicitly takes into consideration the impact of the conceptual language of description on the resulting image of reality,i.e. which has bracketed out the "subjectivity" inherent in any political problem (norms,value judgements, goal-settings,alternatives and similar factors due to which the description has to take into account not only the object world but also conceptual worlds). Convictions and goals are not something external to reality but its structural component. Trivial as these statements may seem (for they are universally recognized in the humanities),they are virtually ignored by political science, with the exception of some versions of philosophy of history. Thus, turning to current practices, it is usually believed that there are diametrically opposite descriptions of a regional conflict like Armenian and Azeri, Georgian and Abkhasian, Serbian and Croatian, etc., points of view.These viewpoints may change in course of time but they remain mutually exlusive.The whole range between them is occupied by descriptions put forward by neutral ("disinterested") parties, who try to combine opposite attitudes. Such efforts are in principle doomed to failure because it is logically impossible to replace two reciprocally exlusive statements by a third one which would be compatible with both. The form of adequate description can be comprehended only in case the characteristic feautures of its language (structure) and thesaurus are revealed. Having admitted the possibility of different descriptions, we thus admit the necessity of the analysis of this very possibility, of this ambiquety, i.e. the characteristic features of the language which enables us to form various statements,including the mutually exlusive ones. Such an analysis of the relationship between conflict and its description, as well as between various descriptions, makes it possible to discover the essential features of the conflict itself. It should not be forgotten that the participants of historical events, even if the situation is not that of conflict, do not have exhaustive and reliable knowledge about the realities but rather proceed from more or less plausible hypotheses.Therefore, both the language of self-description they use and the metalanguage which describes their behaviour, cannot be considered as first-degree language (i.e. they cannot represent reality in an absolutely certain and definite way).In the conflict situation when the uncertainty as to what is to be regarded as reality becomes the conflict-generating factor, the inadequacy of first-degree languages becomes obvious. However,this circumstance having not been taken into account, the result is, that besides theoretical inadequacy, there are practical difficulties - the use of such languages dooms us to choose out of three options: (a) both parties are right; (b) both are wrong ; (c) one party is right. That is, the resolution of conflict is substituted essentially by a judicial verdict which is unacceptable for at least one party concerned. The danger of political, moreover, of propaganda manipulation of history is inherent in nature of a histirical fact, and it will be much easier to tackle all sorts of problems (including practical ones ) if we don't ignore this specific feature of social knowledge and if we don't insist that only "our" decription ( i.e. the one that is consistent with our system of values and interests) is true. Rather we should accept this peculiarity and make use of the principle of complementarity, i.e. we should take into consideration the impact that instruments of description have on its object. Otherwise the disputes based on facts that have not been subjected to methodological analysis will result only in reproduction of conflict in scholarly circles. Approaching the conflict-generating problem and the possibilities of its political settlement in terms of value attitudes and admitting that the perspective of the parties of conflict is primarily axiology aiming at specific results will enable us to bring to light the basis of creation of political myths which seeks to replace reality and thus induces conflict. The rational discussion of a problem presupposes its treatment not in the frames capacity of derivative myths, but at the level of principal axiological ( value ) systems. That is why the possible perspectives (points of view) can be as many as the axiological systems. To defend this or that particular perspective would not mean solidarity with this or that party of the conflict but acceptance of a certain value scale. An explication of values will allow to transfer the discussion to a higher level: the conflict between the parties will be replaced by the discussion on the hierarchy of values. Since it is obvious that in the modern society not all values are equally acceptable and some of them are altogether unacceptable ( e.q. the principle of primacy of the State over the human rights or the justification of ethnic cleansing in the name of national security ), the acceptance of multiplicity of persprctives and even a conflict between them leads neither to recognition of their equal admissibility, nor to their infinite multiplication.The insoluble task of finding a middle ground between the viewpoints of the conflicting parties is substituted by the resolvable procedures of explication and assessing the conflicting axiologies. The inevitably growing complexity of description and it becoming increasingly multi-level are quite a fair price for the resolvability of the task in principle. And what seems the simplest way out, viz. to try and to find an impartial observer who would alleqedly describe the situation "as it is" is but a positivic illusion. As soon as the description of the conflict (even when made by a neutral party) exceeds the limits of mere chronicle it cannot in principle be neutral and not affecting the political solution.It always aims at getting to the result.In K.Popper's words, "their aim is not to increase knowledge but to achieve political success".The desired result, however, is not as a rule formulated in an obvious way. It is concealed in the language used which manipulates such notions as genesis,perspective, participants, their nomination etc., and these notions in turn, are a implicitly modal. Therefore, any description which uses a language like this stops being neutral because explicitly or implicitly it will operate with concepts that have axiological and modal nature. The apparatus of modal semantics in its two versions - semantics of propositional attitudes and semantics of possible worlds seems to be the most adequate for logico-semantic modelling of such descriptions which inevitably involve propositional attitudes ( contexts of faith, knowledge, belief etc.) and modal relations (obligation,advisability, necessity, etc.).Modal semanticts came into being in 1920-30s as part of non-classical (modal) logics when it became obvious that the physical world picture presupposes alternative descriptions. Developing L. Wittgenstein's concept of the description of the states of affairs ( = worlds ), R. Karnap reintroduced the concept of possible worlds - complete conjuction of propositions. Since only the omniscient Being can be knowledgeable about which one out of the possible sets of propositions coincides with  the actual world, i.e. which one single proposition is true, the task was put forward to find out the propositions true in all worlds ( logically necessary truths). Subsequently these possible sets of propositions (possible worlds) came to be seen as a more adequate description of reality.This description presumably takes into consideration not only the kind of world this is but also what kind it could be. Since the 50s the semantics of possible worlds gained new impetus when applied to the description of the issues in the humanities.In the situations of underdefined knowledge in which the concept of truth (i.e. correspondence to reality ) was substituted by the concept of possibility (i.e. possible truth ) or in case the description of the reality proceeds from the attitude of belief, obligation, assesstments, etc. (i. e. propositional attitudes ), it is necessary to examine not just merely one world, but a system of worlds, which are interconnected by logico-semantic relations. This is basically the so-called S. Kripke model strucrure, especially in those of its versions which have been worked out as regards the description of temporal relations ( Prior), of ethical and moral norms ( Wright, Montague ) and epystemic systems ( Hintikka, Lewis ). This formalization reflects the old philosophical tradition ( its very name was borrowed from Leibniz ) worked out of the premise that activity is creation of realities, and both physical and mental objects are the realities it manipulates, and not only physical events, but their possible alternatives which may become factual in future, should be taken into consideration. And whereas for an historian Aristotele's statement is still valid, the political scientist, especially in the treatment of current events, should also take into consideration the advice to proceed from modal approach: "The historian speaks about what in fact happened, whereas the poet speaks about what could have happened due to chance or necessity". For the description of the conflict situations when it is a must to represent various stands within a uniform system, a theoretical apparatus of modal semantics seems to be the most appropriate one both for generating alternatives and for bringing them together in a modal system of world in which procedures of transition from one world to another ( the transworld compatibility between them ) are also reflected. The admittance of possibility of various descriptions does not lead to relativism or to the loss of reality. Reality, however, is reconstructed not as a sort of an middle ground among the reciprocally exclusive approaches and not as their sum total but it is perceived as a result of overlapping of various worlds and the procedures of transition from one state of affairs to another. The description of a regional conflict is seen, then, as a system of worlds connected by modal relations.Not just one world but system of worlds come out as a reality to be described. Like any other political problem, the description of conflict requires taking propositional attitudes, ( i.e. contexts of faith, belief, obligation, etc ) into consideration. The suggested approach results in a significant methodological shift: the description does not turn out to be directed at a search for the true world (i.e. a world which is existing or once existed ) among possible worlds, but at marking out the world as it must be. This approach enables us to describe the processes from the points of view of the participating parties and at the same time to reveal their basic attitudes. Not claiming to describe the situation as it is in reality, such an approach reveals how the participants perceive the situation which is but one of essential components that shape the situation itself. Moreover, the complementarity principle considering the impact of the describer on the description itself, is implemented as a system which takes into account the interraction of subjects and which describes the reality in their language and which at the same time allows to evaluate their descriptions and attitudes. Thus, political history is supplemented by political psychology.