Attentional Control

That anything appears as something at all rests on a structure that cannot be argued for, because every argument already enacts it. This paper isolates that structure and claims for it exactly one thing, and no more. The structure has three equiprimordial momentsdifference, continuity, and a directed orientation toward determinacy-of which none can be removed without destroying the phenomenon. The third moment is the load-bearing and most easily misread: it is not a neutral asymmetry but a taking of something as something, ordered from the not-yet-determined toward the determinate. We show, by a bracketing argument, that this directed orientation is constitutive of appearing-as rather than merely posited, since any attempt to suspend it is itself an instance of it; and we fix its status precisely as objective as form-invariant across all enactments, but not a fact obtaining independently of them. We then mark, against the suggestion carried by the symbol ∇, what the root does not contain: neither an irreversible arrow across the succession of acts, nor a measured gradient with magnitude, nor a single privileged terminus toward which all determining runs. These are later, costed additions. The prefix Proto marks the threshold: the root is what a gradient must be before there is a field in which it could be measured. It claims the root, not the tree.

This treatise proposes that the self has three distinct modes, that ordinary English already encodes them in the three grammatical persons of the first-person pronoun, and that each corresponds to a specific neurological seat within the architecture the Neurological Qabalah has mapped. The I is the self as agent-the nominative, the singular focused self present in the doing of an act-and it is seated in the left hemisphere, the analytical, sequential, focused-beam mode the system identifies with Chokmah and the Logos. The Me is the self as whole-the accusative, the self as object of reference, the collective bundle of all that makes up the person-and it is seated in the right hemisphere, the broad, contextual, holistic mode the system identifies with Binah and the Spirit. The Myself is the self as reflexive unity-the only grammatical person in which subject and object coincide, the self taking itself as its own object while remaining the subject, which is the precise structure of selfaware consciousness-and it is seated not in the corpus callosum that merely binds the hemispheres but in Tiphareth, the salience network with its core in the anterior insula, whose function is to harmonise the I-stream and the Me-stream into a single salient self-presence. The treatise develops each mode, shows that the reflexive Myself is grammatically and neurologically the harmonised unity of the other two rather than a third thing beside them, and draws out the consequences: that the guilt-shame distinction is the pathology of the I and the Me respectively, that the crisp salient awareness the salience network generates is the felt substance of the Myself, and that source-monitoring inversion is the collapse of the I-Me distinction into a false unity whose cure is the rebuilding of the distinction so that a true Myself can reform .

Advances in the study of brain networks can be applied to our understanding of anxiety disorders (eg, generalized anxiety, obsessive-compulsive, and posttraumatic stress disorders) to enable us to create targeted treatments. These disorders have in common an inability to control thoughts, emotions, and behaviors related to a perceived threat. Here we review animal and human imaging studies that have revealed separate brain networks related to various negative emotions. Research has supported the idea that brain networks of attention serve to control emotion networks as well as the thoughts and behaviors related to them. We discuss how attention networks can modulate both positive and negative affect. Disorders arise from both abnormal activation of negative affect and a lack of attentional control. Training attention has been one way to foster improved attentional control. We review attention training studies as well as efforts to generally improve attention networks through stimulation in self-regulation.

Across multiple societies, we see a shift from regimes of truth (ROT) to "regimes of posttruth" (ROPT) characterized by proliferating "truth markets." ROT corresponded to disciplinary society, tighter functioning between media/political/education apparatuses, scientific discourses, and dominant truth-arbiters. ROPT corresponds to societies of control, where power exploits new "freedoms" to participate/produce/express (as well as consume/diffuse/evaluate). These developments further correspond to postpolitics/postdemocracy, where issues, discourses, and agency for sociopolitical change remain constrained, despite the enabling of a new range of cultural and pseudopolitical participation around, among other things, truth. ROPT emerge out of postpolitical/postdemocratic strategies common to control societies where especially resource rich political actors attempt to use data-analytic knowledge to manage the field of appearance and participation, via attention and affect.

■ Dual-task scenarios require a coordinated regulation of the processing order of component tasks in light of capacity limitations during response selection. A number of behavioral and neuroimaging findings suggest a distinct set of control processes involved in preparing this task order. In this study, we investigated electrophysiological correlates of task-order preparation in a variant of the overlapping dual-task paradigm with cue-determined task order that resulted in trials with blockwise fixed task order as well as trials with repeated and switched task order in blocks with variable task order. During the cue-stimulus interval, we found an earlier centroparietal order-mixing positivity and a later parietal order-switch positivity. A decoding approach based on multivariate pattern analysis showed that the order-mixing positivity is a necessary prerequisite for successful order selection, whereas the order-switch positivity appears to facilitate the implementation of a new task order after its selection. These correlates of order preparation share striking similarities to commonly found potentials involved in the preparation of individual tasks in the (single-)task-switching paradigm, which is strong empirical support for the account that the underlying preparatory processes are to be considered as higher-level control signals that are implemented independently of specific task representations. ■

This paper explores how modern digital systems increasingly reshape human perception of time, attention, and memory. It argues that the contemporary attention economy extends beyond distraction into the restructuring of temporal awareness itself through algorithmic stimulation, infinite-scroll environments, and AI-mediated engagement. The paper introduces the concepts of Temporal Sovereignty and Memory Density Theory, proposing that fragmented digital consumption creates psychologically “low-density” time, while reflection, reading, focused work, and meaningful engagement create “high-density” time. It further argues that future societal divides may increasingly emerge between coherent and fragmented cognition rather than solely along economic lines. Ultimately, the paper examines how attentional coherence may become one of the defining psychological resources of the AI era.

23/05/2026

People often intend to act, recognize why the action matters, and still do not begin. This article argues that such failures reveal an under-specified transition in psychological theories of behavior: the moment at which intended action becomes capable of onset. Existing theories explain central parts of the action sequence, including intention formation, implementation planning, self-regulation, effort allocation, and habit. Yet behavioral onset is often treated as a downstream consequence of these processes rather than as a transition with its own enabling conditions. This article develops a threshold account of action initiation. On this account, intention can orient the person toward action, but onset occurs only when effective activation exceeds a resistance- and state-sensitive boundary. Initiation, therefore, depends not only on wanting or planning an action but also on readiness, execution compatibility, attentional stabilization, initiation resistance, structured instability, and prior trajectory. Integrating evidence from intention-behavior research, implementation intentions, procrastination, educational delay, health behavior, digital engagement, and within-person variability, the article distinguishes intention from action possibility and onset from persistence. The account generates falsifiable predictions concerning conditional intention effects, nonlinear onset, resistance manipulation, execution compatibility, path dependence, and structured variability. Its contribution is to specify when valued and intended actions become capable of beginning.

Background: The expansion of Large Language Models between 2023 and 2026 has reopened the debate on the Extended Mind thesis. Cognitive offloading to external systems raises questions about decisional autonomy, epistemic vigilance, and responsibility.
Methods: Interdisciplinary comparative analysis integrating Clark and Chalmers’ 1998 Extended Mind theory, Heidegger’s critique of Gestell, Lacanian subject structure, and neuroscientific data on top-down attention.
Results: Current LLMs partially satisfy accessibility and automatic endorsement criteria but fail the reliability criterion due to hallucinations and bias. A correlation is observed between intensive LLM use and reduced engagement in endogenous attentional processes.

This interdisciplinary theoretical paper proposes the Narrative Field Hypothesis (NFH), an integrative framework describing how four interacting domains—choice, belief, narrative construction, and grounding—may collectively shape individual behavior, psychological regulation, and systemic outcomes. Drawing from cognitive neuroscience, executive-function research, placebo and expectancy literature, narrative identity theory, mindfulness studies, and network science, the framework operationalizes these domains as four functional “engines” of agency associated with decision-making, expectation modulation, meaning construction, and attentional regulation. The analysis examines how interactions between executive control systems, expectancy effects, coherent narrative identity, and grounded attentional states may reinforce behavioral stability, emotional regulation, and adaptive decision-making. Extending beyond the individual level, the paper further proposes a network-level hypothesis in which highly regulated individuals function as resilient nodes within decentralized human systems, increasing informational integrity and adaptive stability under stress. Using analogies drawn from decentralized networks and blockchain systems, the framework explores how distributed transparency, redundancy, and behavioral coherence may contribute to resistance against corruption and fragmentation within complex social systems. The paper is explicitly hypothesis-generating and proposes multiple empirically testable predictions concerning autonomic regulation, resilience, decision quality, and network recovery dynamics.

In 2 experiments, the authors investigated whether the attributes "small" and "large" associated with individual digits are responsible for the effects of size congruity on judgments of physical size . In Experiment 1, a size congruity effect was observed when participants judged the relative physical sizes of two digits. However, size congruity effects were just as strong when participants judged the relative physical sizes of small digits (i.e., 1-4) paired with letters. In Experiment 2, a similar size congruity effect was observed when participants judged the sizes of squares within which individual small digits were presented. Consistent with memory-based theories of automaticity, these results suggest that associations between the attribute "small" and individual small digits are sufficient to explain many, if not all, size congruity effects.

Contemporary debates on consciousness are often anchored to a familiar question: how can subjective experience arise from physical or functional processes? This framing obscures a more basic issue: under what structural conditions can a system sustain conscious experience without disintegrating or collapsing? This paper introduces habitability as a structural criterion for consciousness. Habitability denotes a system's capacity to maintain an integrated experiential field along four interdependent axes: coherent integration, experiential self-reference, attentional modulation, and sufficiently stable temporal continuity. Crucially, habitability also requires the absence of persistent structural friction, understood as internal instability generated by rigid self-structuring that over-constrains experiential dynamics. From this perspective, consciousness is neither an omnipresent feature of reality nor a mere functional illusion, but a real, localized, condition-dependent phenomenon. The habitability framework reorganizes the consciousness debate without reducing experience to information processing or invoking strong metaphysical commitments, and it offers a structural basis for thinking about altered states, disorders of consciousness, and potentially conscious artificial systems.

This work integrates new neuroimaging results with existing behavioral and computational studies to produce a model of attentional control within the Stroop task. The Stroop task is the paradigmatic example of how attentional control can facilitate processing of weak, less wellpracticed behaviors, such as the ability to name the ink color of a word in the face of the more dominant response of reading the word itself. Attentional control is implemented in the model as an excitatory bias from a maintained frontal task set ...

The chosen research topic allows us to immerse ourselves in an objectively interesting analytical process that requires increased attention to people and perseverance. We chose to develop our own questionnaire, as none of the previously found questionnaires on the websites of reputable universities were original and did not meet the objective of this study of identifying the conditions and patterns of enhancing voluntary visual attention in students. Nevertheless, the authors of the original questionnaire, which was replicated in a significant number of copies on university websites, deserve deep gratitude. To ensure that the questionnaire met the needs of this study, individual questions from the existing questionnaire were also adapted to the objectives addressed in this study.

Abstract
This essay reinterprets Plato’s Cave as a model of human world construction rather than a metaphysical allegory. Drawing on predictive processing theory, probabilistic models of perception, and cross cultural phenomenology, it shows how the Cave anticipates a multi tier architecture in which inner, social, and environmental dynamics jointly shape experience. Brigliadori’s “quantum cave” provides a vivid metaphor for this inferential landscape, while the HUM framework clarifies the coherence dynamics through which worlds stabilize, rupture, and reorganize. Buddhist phenomenology contributes the first person texture of these same processes. Together, these perspectives reveal a unified account of how humans generate, maintain, and revise the experiential worlds they inhabit.

Edge Force Transition  a state in which a person's life trajectory is balanced like a body laid across a knife's edge, with one side of the blade representing life and the other death. The thesis is that most people in this state are not consciously choosing which side they fall toward; their environment, their unprocessed emotions, and the predictive defaults of their nervous system are choosing for them. Drawing on criticality theory in physics, predictive-processing models of emotion, default-mode brain dynamics, and allostatic-load research, Dr. Paul W Dyer says that the "edge" is not a metaphor but a measurable neurobiological regime  and that the corrective force capable of leaning the blade toward life is consciousness itself, exercised as a trainable skill.

This paper presents a unified operational framework for the research axis NSI–OTIP–OSP–AIAI–SBI. Its central claim is methodological: outcome-level success alone is insufficient to distinguish maintained direction from weaker or misleading patterns such as proxy achievement, stale continuation, evaluator-path exploitation, collapse under interference, or bounded but valid requalification. The paper therefore organizes several previously separate lines of work into a layered Anti-Goodhart structure in which each component has a distinct function and a distinct claim boundary.

Within this framework, NSI is treated as a stability-style measurement layer, OTIP as an intervention-based direction-testing layer, OSP as a placement layer for structured operational interpretation, AIAI as an architectural execution layer, and SBI as a bounded continuity/interrogation layer. A key move of the paper is to reposition the continuity branch as a compact continuity module inside OTIP rather than as an isolated or inflated claim. This makes it possible to interpret maintenance, takeover resistance, negative-control failure, bounded requalification, and first-step environment probing as connected parts of one disciplined evaluation logic.

The contribution is intentionally bounded. The paper does not claim proof of broad external autonomy, independent blinded validation, or open-world generality. Instead, it provides a tighter conceptual and methodological scaffold for future testing. In this sense, the framework is offered as a consolidation step: it strengthens interpretive discipline, clarifies what the current evidence does and does not support, and defines a cleaner route from internal continuity tests toward more demanding shared-environment evaluation.

Before you speak, something in you has already spoken.

Speech is not where expression begins. It is where expression finally becomes visible.
Before words arrive, something deeper is already taking shape. We know this not only from theory, but from life itself: from the newborn’s cry, from the posture of an animal, from the human experience of feeling something we cannot yet say. What appears outwardly as language is often only the final surface of a more complex interior event.

This paper proposes a stratified ontological model of consciousness, necessity, and agency that reconfigures the traditional opposition between freedom and necessity. It argues that necessity is not merely a form of constraint but a constitutive condition for the possibility of coherent experience and action. A distinction is introduced between structural necessity, understood as the non-contingent conditions of experience, and constructed necessity, which arises through symbolic and institutional stabilization and may be misrecognized as ontological, producing false necessity. Consciousness is modeled as a stratified structure composed of pre-structural awareness, structural conditioning, and symbolic mediation. On this basis, it is defined as a localized manifestation of structured reality becoming experientially accessible. The paper further introduces existential inertia and constitutional readiness to account for continuity and variability in the integration of change. Within this framework, conscious adaptation is defined as the capacity to distinguish between structural and constructed necessity, enabling structured orientation within constraints. The paper concludes by redefining freedom as operational orientation within stratified conditions of necessity rather than its negation.

This essay examines focus and speed of play in precision action, arguing that they are not separate elements but parts of a single process. It proposes that focus is not produced through mental effort, but appears when perception, decision, and movement are timed so that they follow each other without interruption. Drawing on examples from cue sports, it shows how gaps in this process allow interference from evaluation and internal commentary, reducing precision. The essay reframes technique as a tool for training that must not be carried into execution, suggesting that it is learned so that it can be forgotten. It further explores how pressure, verification, and control disrupt continuity, and how practice can be used to restore it. The aim is to provide a clear structure for players whose progress has slowed or who have become overly reliant on technique, and to offer continuity as the central condition for stable performance.

This study examined the effects of varying the predictability of nonrewarding events on behavior and neural activation using a rapid mixed-trial functional magnetic resonance imagery (fMRI) design. Twelve adult subjects were scanned with echo planar imaging during performance of a visual detection task where the probability of events (target and nontarget) varied. This task included expected and unexpected nonrewarding events (expected target, unexpected nontarget, and omission of target) in a design that closely parallels studies of dopamine function and reward processing in the alert monkey. We predicted that activation in dopamine-rich areas of the forebrain would behave like the animal literature shows that dopamine neurons in the midbrain behave. Specifically, we predicted increased activity in these regions when an unexpected event occurred and decreased activity when an expected event was omitted. Two main regions, the anterior cingulate and dorsal striatum, showed this pattern. The response in these regions was distinguished by enhanced anterior cingulate activity following the occurrence of an unexpected event and greater suppression of caudate activity following the omission of an expected event. These results suggest that neural activity within specific dopamine-rich brain regions can be modulated by violations in the expectation of nonrewarding events and that the direction of the modulation depends on the nature of the violations.

The terms of self-awareness and self-consciousness, which have been mentioned under various different names for centuries, they are also studied experimentally in social psychology. Within the concept of this study, the information about descriptions, raised theories, suggested concepts, significant studies and adjusted scales on these terms are reviewed from the perspective of social psychology. Although there are various different descriptions of these terms under various disciplines and a wide range of relevant literature, this study is approached only from the perspective of social psychology and limited with the most efficient studies included in the published social psychology literature. The review shall be an enlightening source for the researchers studying on social psychology and the self-concept and is concluded with suggestions on further research interests.

The aim was to explore the pattern of associations between visual cognitive performance and community functioning in a sample of outpatients with schizophrenia participating in a rehabilitation program. Visuo-spatial tests from the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB) were administered to assess cognitive performances in 88 subjects. The Multnomah Community Ability Scale (MCAS) was used to measure dimensions of community functioning. Our results showed that the sustained attention score was significantly associated with the global community functioning score and with two specific dimensions: "adjustment to living" and "behavioral problems". No association was found between other cognitive indices and MCAS scores. Since the sustained attention task mainly involves the executive component of working memory, these findings suggest that attentional control processes are limiting factors for community functioning in schizophrenia outpatients. M...

Sensory integration and the ability to discriminate target objects from distractors are critical to survival, yet the developmental trajectories of these abilities are unknown. This study investigated developmental changes in 9-(n = 18) and 11-year-old (n = 20) children, adolescents (n = 19) and adults (n = 22) using an audiovisual object discrimination task with uni-and multisensory distractors. Reaction times (RTs) were slower with visual/audiovisual distractors, and although all groups demonstrated facilitation of multisensory RTs in these conditions, children's and adolescents' responses corresponded to fewer race model violations than adults', suggesting protracted maturation of multisensory processes. Multisensory facilitation could not be explained by changes in RT variability, suggesting that tests of race model violations may still have theoretical value at least for familiar multisensory stimuli.

Sensory integration and the ability to discriminate target objects from distractors are critical to survival, yet the developmental trajectories of these abilities are unknown. This study investigated developmental changes in 9-(n = 18) and 11-year-old (n = 20) children, adolescents (n = 19) and adults (n = 22) using an audiovisual object discrimination task with uni-and multisensory distractors. Reaction times (RTs) were slower with visual/audiovisual distractors, and although all groups demonstrated facilitation of multisensory RTs in these conditions, children's and adolescents' responses corresponded to fewer race model violations than adults', suggesting protracted maturation of multisensory processes. Multisensory facilitation could not be explained by changes in RT variability, suggesting that tests of race model violations may still have theoretical value at least for familiar multisensory stimuli.

AI is widely described as a democratising force — a tool that will distribute intelligence more equally across populations. This paper challenges that framing. Drawing on distributed cognition theory and documented interaction patterns, it argues that AI functions as an amplifier of pre-existing human motivational structure rather than an equaliser of cognitive outcomes. The paper introduces the Motivational Gradient — a five-level spectrum from passive convenience use to architect-level recursive engagement — to explain why users with equivalent AI access produce radically different cognitive returns. It further introduces composite cognition to describe the emergent intelligence produced by sustained, directed human-AI interaction, and cognitive leverage inequality to name the structural divergence in outcomes that results. The bottleneck in the AI era is not access to the tool. It is the motivational architecture of the mind using it.

25/03/26

This essay introduces the Ghost Zone—a parallel interior topology in which the self functions at a remove from reality, either through rehearsed success or anticipated defeat. Drawing on phenomenological observation, it examines how displacement of the experiential center shapes presence, relationship, and the capacity for encounter. Part I of The Ghost Zone Series, a conceptual extension of the lemniscate framework developed in the author's forthcoming monograph.

 In a Kalman filter, A is just "how the world tends to change from one moment to the next." In the brain, that isn't a literal matrix-it's the pattern of synaptic connections and dynamics that collectively behave like a transition model.  The brain doesn't store numbers; it stores tendencies. Those tendencies function like a state-transition operator even though they're implemented biologically, not mathematically.  On the two-minds question, your view is consistent with current neuroscience: the fast system (Intuitive Mind) always drives behavior, because only it operates quickly enough.  The Narrative Mind contributes only when the Intuitive Mind generates a pause signaleither because of training (mindfulness) or because prediction error ("something's off") triggers a slowdown.  So control is simple: Intuition acts; Narrative advises when invited. The invitation itself is an intuitive process. The Narrative Mind doesn't generate its own motives; it verbalizes, organizes, and reframes motives that originate in the Intuitive Mind. It can propose plans or identities, but those only matter if the Intuitive system adopts them. In that sense, the Narrative Mind is a tool for modeling and justification, not an independent source of drive. A useful way to put it is that the Narrative Mind can shape motivations over time, but it cannot originate or enforce them in the moment. If you want to quantify mental health , you need a model of how their internal states evolve over time-and that's exactly the role the "A-matrix" plays in a Kalman-style framework.  The Intuitive Mind corresponds to the fast, automatic state-update system. In a Kalman analogy, this is the part that uses the transition model A to predict the next internal state.  The Narrative Mind corresponds to the slow, interpretive correction system. In the analogy, this is like the measurement update: it notices mismatches, reframes them, and slowly adjusts the underlying model.  Mental health, in a computational sense, is about how stable, accurate, and flexible those internal state transitions are. If the transition dynamics are distorted (e.g., overly rigid, overly noisy, catastrophizing, ruminative), the system's predictions become maladaptive. So the link is: To quantify mental health, you need to quantify the stability and accuracy of the internal transition dynamics-the same role the A-matrix plays in a Kalman filter.

Genius has traditionally been interpreted as an exceptional intellectual ability possessed by a small number of individuals capable of producing transformative discoveries. While this interpretation highlights individual differences in intelligence or creativity, it provides limited explanation for the cognitive mechanisms underlying moments of breakthrough insight. Recent advances in cognitive neuroscience suggest that complex cognition emerges through dynamic interactions between distributed neural networks rather than isolated brain regions. This paper proposes a theoretical framework describing genius as an emergent state of cognitive integration. The model introduces the Genius Ignition Equation, a nonlinear representation of how motivational persistence, neural synchronization, associative idea generation, rational evaluation, salience detection, and accumulated knowledge interact to produce intellectual breakthroughs. Within this framework, insight occurs when the integrated activity of these systems surpasses a critical threshold. The proposed model integrates insights from creativity research, network neuroscience, and cognitive psychology while outlining experimental approaches capable of testing the theory empirically.

Computerized assessment of executive functions (EF) has the potential to increase access to more costeffective diagnostics, considering the relevance of these skills for quality of life and adaptive functioning. Objective: This study conducted a scoping review to identify computerized fixed batteries for assessing EF in adults. Methods: A systematic search was conducted in the United States National Library of Medicine (PubMed), Scopus, Web of Science, Cochrane Library (Reviews), PsychNet, and Scientific Electronic Library Online (SciELO) databases, following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analyses Extension for Scoping Reviews (PRISMA-ScR). Results: A total of 15,704 records were identified, of which 62 studies met the eligibility criteria. In these, 42 batteries were mapped, which together encompassed 174 tasks associated with executive domains. No battery exclusively assesses EF, and most were developed for computerized application in a supervised face-to-face format. It was also observed that there was no explicit theoretical basis in the construction of the instruments, evidencing important conceptual gaps. Conclusion: There are fixed computerized batteries applicable to the assessment of EF in adults, although not specific, reflecting the advance of digitalization in neuropsychological practice. The findings highlight the need for cross-cultural adaptations and psychometric validation studies that strengthen the theoretical basis and diagnostic accuracy of these instruments.

Attention can be conceptualized as comprising the functions of alerting, orienting, and executive control. Although the independence of these functions has been demonstrated, the neural mechanisms underlying their interactions remain unclear. Using the revised attention network test and functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined cortical and subcortical activity related to these attentional functions and their interactions. Results showed that areas in the extended frontoparietal network (FPN), including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, frontal eye fields (FEF), areas near and along the intraparietal sulcus, anterior cingulate and anterior insular cortices, basal ganglia, and thalamus were activated across multiple attentional functions. Specifically, the alerting function was associated with activation in the locus coeruleus (LC) in addition to regions in the FPN. The orienting functions were associated with activation in the superior colliculus (SC) and the FEF. The executive control function was mainly associated with activation of the FPN and cerebellum. The interaction effect of alerting by executive control was also associated with activation of the FPN, while the interaction effect of validity by executive control was mainly associated with the activation in the pulvinar. The current findings demonstrate that cortical and specific subcortical areas play a pivotal role in the implementation of attentional functions and underlie their dynamic interactions.

Language operates not merely as a symbolic medium but as a cognitive environment. Sustained exposure to emotionally intense lexical domains influences attentional bandwidth, neural activation patterns, and interpretative framing. As artificial intelligence systems increasingly function as persistent conversational partners, their linguistic architecture becomes part of users' cognitive ecosystems. This article introduces the concept of configurable AI language architecture as a cognitive environment design strategy. Integrating neurocognitive research, pedagogical theory, and AI system design, the framework proposes that lexical frequency distributions and framing orientations can be deliberately calibrated to support attentional stability, reflective reasoning, and cooperative discourse patterns. The paper concludes with an empirical research program for evaluating the hypothesis.
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18731496

This expansion paper provides descriptive containment for the concept of non-act expression within the Phenomenological Expression suite. Written under RC Posture™, it clarifies appearance that is not organized as motor intent, readiness, inhibition, or execution-horizon. The paper introduces a negative taxonomy to differentiate appearance-without-act from adjacent interpretive framings such as pre-motor staging, latent intention, or functional readiness. It names a predictable register drift in which stillness and non-movement are re-rendered as preparation or withheld action. The expansion stabilizes the descriptive category without introducing motor theory, neurological explanation, behavioral frameworks, or prescriptive implications. Its function is classificatory and boundary-stabilizing rather than explanatory or methodological.

Normal aging holds negative consequences for memory, in particular for the ability to recollect the precise details of an experience. With this in mind, Jennings and Jacoby (2003) developed a recollection training method using a single-probe recognition memory paradigm in which new items (i.e., foils) were repeated during the test phase at increasingly long intervals. In previous reports, this method has appeared to improve older adults’ performance on several non-trained cognitive tasks. We aimed to further examine potential transfer effects of this training paradigm and to determine which cognitive functions might predict training gains. Fifty-one older adults were assigned to either recollection training (n = 30) or an active control condition (n = 21) for six sessions over 2 weeks. Afterward, the recollection training group showed a greatly enhanced ability to reject the repeated foils. Surprisingly, however, the training and the control groups improved to the same degree in rec...

Schizotypy" is a latent organization of personality related to the genetic risk for schizophrenia. Some evidence suggests that schizophrenia and schizotypy share some biological features, including a link to dopaminergic D2 receptor signaling. A polymorphism in the D2 gene (DRD2 rs1076560, guanine > thymine (G > T)) has been associated with the D2 short/long isoform expression ratio, as well as striatal dopamine signaling and prefrontal cortical activity during different cognitive operations, which are measures that are altered in patients with schizophrenia. Our aim is to determine the association of schizotypy scores with the DRD2 rs1076560 genotype in healthy individuals and their interaction with prefrontal activity during attention and D2 striatal signaling. A total of 83 healthy subjects were genotyped for DRD2 rs1076560 and completed the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ). Twenty-six participants underwent SPECT with [ 123 I]IBZM D2 receptor radiotracer, while 68 performed an attentional control task during fMRI. We found that rs1076560 GT subjects had greater SPQ scores than GG individuals. Moreover, the interaction between schizotypy and the GT genotype predicted prefrontal activity and related attentional behavior, as well as striatal binding of IBZM. No interaction was found in GG individuals. These results suggest that rs1076560 GT healthy individuals are prone to higher levels of schizotypy, and that the interaction between rs1076560 and schizotypy scores modulates phenotypes related to the pathophysiology of schizophrenia, such as prefrontal activity and striatal dopamine signaling. These results provide systems-level qualitative evidence for mapping the construct of schizotypy in healthy individuals onto the schizophrenia continuum.

Previous studies have reported abnormal prefrontal and cingulate activity during attentional control processing in schizophrenia. However, it is not clear how variation in attentional control load modulates activity within these brain regions in this brain disorder. The aim of this study in schizophrenia is to investigate the impact of increasing levels of attentional control processing on prefrontal and cingulate activity. Blood oxygen level--dependent (BOLD) responses of 16 outpatients with schizophrenia were compared with those of 21 healthy subjects while performing a task eliciting increasing levels of attentional control during event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging at 3 T. Results showed reduced behavioral performance in patients at greater attentional control levels. Imaging data indicated greater prefrontal activity at intermediate attentional control levels in patients but greater prefrontal and cingulate responses at high attentional control demands in controls. The BOLD activity profile of these regions in controls increased linearly with increasing cognitive loads, whereas in patients, it was nonlinear. Correlation analysis consistently showed differential region and load-specific relationships between brain activity and behavior in the 2 groups. These results indicate that varying attentional control load is associated in schizophrenia with load-and region-specific modification of the relationship between behavior and brain activity, possibly suggesting earlier saturation of cognitive capacity.

This paper specifies a language-form distinction for phenomenological reporting in which texture and appearance are reported without tissue claims or substrate attribution. It describes a recurring reception misclassification in which appearance-language is read as explanatory anatomy and identifies interpretive acceleration as a structural tendency when anatomical labels enter the reporting layer. It rejects a vague ↔ specific axis as the operative framing and offers an appearance-faithful ↔ explanatorily preemptive axis as a descriptive orientation to language function and reception drift. A three-layer separation is described-phenomenological texture (reporting), interpretive labeling (secondary overlays), and explanatory mechanism discourse (tertiary models)-without introducing enforcement, evaluation, or verification functions. The paper defines key terms of art (texture, label, substrate claim, implicit legibility, bracketing) and articulates texture-only reporting as a descriptive constraint that preserves endogenous discovery as an observer-side event rather than an authorial claim.

The A·B Point proposes an ontological framework that identifies the smallest irreversible unit of life and time as a decisive threshold—the moment in which existence transitions from potential to action. Grounded in Boko Dual Gravity (BDG), the work interprets reality as a dynamic interplay between attraction and repulsion, stabilization and dispersion, rather than a linear progression.

Within this framework, entropy is not treated merely as physical decay, but as a universal condition that governs biological behavior, cognitive decision-making, and temporal irreversibility. The A·B point emerges as the minimal locus where life, time, and responsibility converge, marking the boundary at which choice becomes ontologically binding.

By integrating concepts from philosophy of nature, process ontology, and BDG, this manifesto reframes life as a sequence of irreversible thresholds rather than continuous states. The model offers implications for ethics, education, consciousness studies, and artificial intelligence, proposing that meaningful agency arises precisely at points of constrained freedom rather than unlimited possibility. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18460840

This article proposes a threshold-based model of consciousness, arguing that conscious experience does not primarily arise in stable cognitive states but emerges at moments of transition where a system can no longer sustain its current mode of operation. Rather than treating consciousness as a static condition or a continuous background, the paper conceptualizes it as a functional and temporal process that becomes visible at points of decision, irreversibility, and uncertainty. By integrating perspectives from cognitive science, ethics, and legal theory, the study examines how consciousness manifests at critical thresholds in both everyday and technical systems. The proposed framework does not seek to reduce individual responsibility but to relocate it temporally, emphasizing pre-threshold awareness rather than impaired states at the moment of action.

A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that perception, decision-making, and action initiation routinely occur prior to conscious awareness. These findings challenge traditional models that position consciousness as the central driver of cognition, yet they leave unresolved the question of why consciousness exists at all if behavior can proceed without it. The Subconscious-First Consciousness (SF-C) model proposes a functional reorganization of cognitive architecture in which subconscious systems perform the primary work of perception, prediction, and action, while conscious awareness serves a secondary but indispensable role.


According to SF-C, consciousness functions as an adaptive feedback interface that enables explicit evaluation of outcomes, episodic and declarative memory formation, and learning that generalizes across contexts. While subconscious processing is sufficient for effective moment-to-moment performance, flexible adaptation, transfer, and narrative integration depend on conscious access. This framework accounts for a wide range of phenomena—including but not limited to blindsight, trauma-related amnesia, dream forgetting, and pre-conscious decision-making—by distinguishing between performance execution and feedback-dependent learning.


The SF-C model generates falsifiable predictions regarding the selective role of consciousness in adaptive learning and offers a unifying functional account of awareness grounded in empirical findings. By reframing consciousness as a mechanism for feedback-constrained learning rather than as a central executive or epiphenomenal byproduct, the model clarifies both the necessity and the limitations of conscious awareness in cognitive systems.

Cognitive Narrow Perception (CNP) is a theoretical framework designed to elucidate the fundamental structure of conscious human thought. By synthesizing empirical psychological findings with marginalized psychodynamic and existential concepts, CNP posits that human consciousness is governed by a singular, sequential processing limitation. This essay explores CNP as a biological imperative that functions as an existential governor, a mechanistic basis for primitive drives, and a primary determinant of behavioral regression.

A descriptive SPL analysis naming interpretive load, non-demand appearance, and pre-interpretive data structures as environmental variables that shape how expression appears before interpretation. The paper remains fully non-instrumental, describing civic and computational environments at the level of appearance without proposing design changes, behavioral insights, or functional outcomes.

A descriptive SPL examination of pre-personal givenness and gravitational structuring as ontological conditions for appearance. The paper clarifies how expression registers under these early conditions without mechanism, function, or interpretive claims.

A descriptive SPL paper defining location-first registration as an entry constraint for written phenomenological expression. It clarifies the distinction between registration and account-making without introducing method, intervention, or interpretive inference.