Constitutive Rules

I wonder whether it makes sense to question the existence of fundamental legal acts. I present three examples from authors (Norberto Bobbio, Hannah Arendt, Rudolf von Jhering) who have put forward proposals regarding fundamental legal acts, in order to demonstrate that: (i) the term 'fundamental legal acts' can be understood in at least two different ways; (ii) in any case, there is no point in looking for fundamental legal acts; (iii) an analysis of the essential functions of fundamental legal acts nevertheless suggests a working hypothesis that justifies research into certain specific legal acts.

Generally, the focus in the theory of information is almost exclusively on information that can be termed declarative, descriptive, factual, constative, or apophantic, by which is meant information that has a semantic content that can be true or false. Examples of carriers of apophantic information are train timetables, bank account statements, and medical reports. However, alongside apophantic information, there is another type of information that is much less studied but no less important: information that serves a function that is not descriptive but normative, what we could call "normative information". A traffic sign indicating no overtaking, the land-use specifications outlined in a local plan, and the graphic instructions for assembling IKEA furniture are examples of items that convey normative information. The paper investigates this underexplored type of information and seeks to demonstrate the value of studying it for information theory and the philosophy of normativity.

Generally, the focus in the theory of information is almost exclusively on information that can be termed declarative, descriptive, factual, constative, or apophantic, by which is meant information that has a semantic content that can be true or false. Examples of carriers of apophantic information are train timetables, bank account statements, and medical reports. However, alongside apophantic information, there is another type of information that is much less studied but no less important: information that serves a function that is not descriptive but normative, what we could call "normative information". A traffic sign indicating no overtaking, the land-use specifications outlined in a local plan, and the graphic instructions for assembling IKEA furniture are examples of items that convey normative information. The paper investigates this underexplored type of information and seeks to demonstrate the value of studying it for information theory and the philosophy of normativity.

In this chapter, we investigate how interactional cringe humor performance is cued multimodally to be interpreted in a humorous frame. To do this, we compiled, annotated, and analyzed talk-show style cringe humor performances in a corpus of six episodes of Between Two Ferns with Zach Galifianakis (2008-2018) using a frame-analytic approach to multimodal behavior co-occurring with speech behavior (Bateson, 1972; Goffman, 1974). As such, we develop a preliminary taxonomy of serious-to-play frame transformations to identify spatial cues bracketing and keying the cringe-to-humor transformation. We identified would-be cringe utterances in which the humorist-host targets his interlocutor and/or himself for insults to self-image and/or autonomy, following (Brown, 1987)'s concepts of positive and negative face. We describe how Galifianakis layers surface FTAs and humorous or playful multimodal cues to systematically transform serious behavior into play. We hold that felicitous cringe humor performance does not follow from the framing of a bonafide impoliteness context (see Culpeper & Hardaker, 2017) despite featuring numerous rude or otherwise normatively embarrassing surface realizations. In successful interactional cringe humor performance, surface cringeworthy utterances appear systematically transformed to be interpreted as a unique genre of cringe-humorous play. Drawing on the relief theory of humor (Freud, 1905; Morreall, 1983), we posit that successful cringe humor performances, by using multimodal cues to systematically transform impoliteness into play-awkwardness, allow viewers to experience a pleasant reframing of what would normally be cause for vicarious embarrassment.

Las propuestas que pueden denominarse como "normativistas sofisticadas" tienen la aspiración de formular un inventario de las diferentes tipologías de normas que conforman los ordenamientos jurídicos. Proyectos semejantes descansan en algunos presupuestos teóricos, tales como qué cuenta como una norma y como una norma de un cierto tipo.
En este artículo analizo el proyecto normativista sofisticado emprendido en El lenguaje del derecho, de Daniel Mendonca. Algunos de los retos, las limitaciones y los inconvenientes a los que se enfrenta el libro son propios del programa de Mendonca; otros son propios de cualquier propuesta normativista sofisticada.

El presente artículo muestra que el deseo de morir se puede proteger jurídicamente de dos modos: (1) liberando de responsabilidad al personal sanitario que practica la eutanasia o asiste el suicidio, sin establecer derechos para los pacientes o (2) estableciendo auténticos derechos para los pacientes respecto de la eutanasia y la asistencia al suicidio. Ambas hipótesis son usadas para clasificar las principales legislaciones vigentes en el mundo.

sentido de jogo. 2 Xadrez como Jogo vs. Xadrez como rito. 3 Atividade constituída por regras vs. Prática. 4 A investigação impossível de Averróis. Referências O autor investiga o papel das regras constitutivas na construção da realidade social. Ele nega que as regras constitutivas sejam condição suficiente de uma prática como um jogo de xadrez. Para criar uma nova prática com regras, é necessário que já exista uma gramática dessa prática, ou seja, o sentido dessa prática (por exemplo, o sentido de jogo). É a gramática de uma prática -e não suas regras constitutivas -que determina a natureza de uma prática. O sentido de uma prática não pode ser criado por regras constitutivas.

Complete version available here: https://journals.openedition.org/revus/11413

Resumen
En el presente ensayo se analizan tres “intenciones” que operan en las teorías de la interpretación textual: la "intentio auctoris" (intención del autor), la "intentio lectoris" (intención del lector) y la "intentio operis" (intención de la obra). Posteriormente, se trasladan estas categorías al análisis de la interpretación jurídica. En particular, se discute la noción de “intención del legislador (constituyente)”. La tesis central es que, si bien las posturas formalistas y escépticas radicales perviven aún en el debate, una vía más fructífera se encuentra en una teoría moderadamente realista orientada a la "intentio operis". Desde esta perspectiva, el texto (de la constitución) impone restricciones interpretativas a través de una comunidad de intérpretes, lo cual permite afirmar la posibilidad del error interpretativo –bajo criterios públicos de corrección– sin caer en una concepción subjetivista.

Abstract
This essay analyzes three types of “intentions” that operate in theories of textual interpretation: "intentio auctoris" (author’s intention), "intentio lectoris" (reader’s intention), and "intentio operis" (text’s intention), and then applies these categories to the field of legal interpretation. In particular, it discusses the notion of the “intention of the (constituent) legislator.” The central thesis is that, although formalist and radically skeptical positions still persist in the debate, a more fruitful path lies in a moderately realist theory oriented toward the "intentio operis": according to this view, the (constitutional) text imposes interpretive constraints through a community of interpreters, which allows for the affirmation of the possibility of interpretive error (based on public criteria of correctness) without resorting to a subjectivist conception.

This chapter examines the longstanding philosophical issue of how to define sport. It begins by presenting the challenge that there may be no single set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, which adequately captures the meaning and range of activities commonly grouped under the term, including McBride's argument that both the intension and extension of 'sport' are inherently vague, rendering attempts to produce a classical definition futile. For contrast, the chapter presents Suits' influential account, according to which sports are goal-directed, rulebound, voluntarily hindered, physical skill-based activities with stable popularity. To scrutinize Suits' classical account, the chapter provides an overview of a wide array of "hard cases", and shows how these cases generate persistent ambiguities for Suits' conditions, particularly with respect to rule-boundedness, the nature and degree of physical skill, and the relevance of popularity or historical stability. The chapter argues, that some ambiguities and disagreements arise because participants rely on different notions of what it is to define, and distinguishes four types of definitions: idealist, lexical, stipulative, and explicative. It further argues that differences in the approach to defining are often motivated by the practical purposes a definition of sports serves. The chapter concludes that definitions remain useful tools for structuring inquiry and clarifying arguments, but cannot by themselves resolve normative questions concerning how various activities should be labelled or treated. Instead, clarity about the purpose of a definition, and humility regarding its limits, are essential for productive conceptual analysis of sport.

"I promise to mow your lawn, but I don't know whether I will." Call promises of this form, "Moorean", based on their resemblance to Moore's paradox. Moorean promises sound absurd. But why? In the literature on assertion, many have used Moore's paradox to motivate a knowledge norm of assertion. I put forward an analogous norm on promising, according to which one should only make a promise if one knows one will fulfill it. A knowledge norm explains why Moorean promises are absurd; it accounts for a variety of linguistic data; and it sheds light on how promises generate obligations.

A normative system is an evolutive set of norms identified by criteria of membership 1 . As an evolutive set of norms, a normative system is dynamic and, consequently, it is in constant change: whenever a norm is introduced or removed the system is modified. Such dynamic character of normative systems leads to consider different normative «sets-in-time», specifically in the sense that each normative system is composed of different and successive sets of norms. While all of them are part of the same normative system (as an individuated one), each one of them is a unique set that, at a certain moment in time, contains a specific aggregate of norms that regulates behaviour. Accordingly, when someone does φ at time3 (for instance), it is the correspondent «set-in-time3» that contains the norm that qualifies doing φ as permitted, forbidden or mandatory 2 . Each normative system has a foundational set-in-time: «set-in-time0». No matter the normative system at hand, such a set contains three norms: (i) a norm of competence, following an assumption of power by some entity or community and grounding the creation of other norms; (ii) a norm of conduct, establishing that norms created in the terms of the system shall be qualified as such (membership criterion of legality); and (iii) another norm of conduct, imposing that norms that are logical inferences of others shall also be qualified as norms of the system (membership criterion of deductibility) 3 . These norms are customary and follow from an «is to ought» jump made by the entity or community that created them. As a definitional explanation of the original inception of a normative system, it clearly aims to cover all instances of normative systems 4 . 1 By «normative system» it is usually covered a significant variety of systems of norms such as linguistic conventions, morality and others. Yet, here it is used just to reference «legal systems» (Portuguese Law, German Law, European Law or International Law). Similarly, Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin (1971:3). 2 At least when norms are strictly prospective or when there is no norm imposing to apply a norm of an anterior set-in-time. The point here is on «normal cases». On time and applicability, Riccardo Guastini (2016:226). 3 This three norms explanation looks quite similar to the one proposed by Eugenio Bulygin and Daniel Mendonca (2005:50). Yet, their scheme of identification seems to have some flaws (here tentatively corrected): (i) it does not explain which norms form the initial set; (ii) it does not explain from where such norms come from; and (iii) it unnecessarily doubles competence. The equivalent Hartian «rule of recognition» (Herbert Hart [1994(1961):96]) is also untenable, especially given its circularity: ultimately, it says that officials recognize norms that recognize officials. 4 The customary nature of these norms in «set-in-time0» also explains the overall strength customary norms have, even within contemporary (statutory) systems: their legitimacy is the same as the one grounding the original norms that constituted the system. On the matter, Damiano Canale (2019:73).

This article offers a critical review of John Rawls's 1955 essay Two Concepts of Rules and argues that a full understanding of his mature work requires examining his early philosophical development. The central hypothesis posits that Rawls's analysis of constitutive rules is essential for understanding the epistemic foundations of his later theory of justice. A key distinction is that drawn between justifying an action that falls within a rule (or practice) and justifying the rule itself. This distinction allowed Rawls to defend utilitarianism against its critics, highlighting their logical misunderstanding of how this theory evaluates actions. Furthermore, the article argues that Rawls's early concern with practices and social institutions directly influenced his subsequent interest in the basic structure of society, developed in A Theory of Justice. Ultimately, it reveals Rawls's nascent attention to the evaluation of systems of rules that shape social practices, rather than focusing solely on individual actions, representing a crucial step in the elaboration of his theory.

En este ensayo se defiende que Alchourrón y Bulygin no se equivocaron al adoptar a la concepción semántica (hilética) de normas y al sostener que ésta es consistente con la teoría jurídica positivista. No obstante, es cierto que no proporcionan argumentos acerca de cómo se relaciona la concepción semántica con la tesis positivista de los hechos sociales. Por lo tanto, en este trabajo se buscan exponer los motivos por los cuales las concepciones rivales no son satisfactorias y, además, se propone al convencionalismo como una vía de explicación acerca de cómo es posible adoptar la concepción semántica de manera consistente con una ontología anti-realista acorde a la tesis de los hechos sociales. Palabras clave: normas; ontología; concepción semántica; concepción pragmática; concepción ecléctica; positivismo jurídico; convencionalismo.

In his recent book, Artefatti giuridici. Il diritto tra intenzione, storia, funzione (2023), Corrado Roversi organically expounds his artefactual theory of law, a theory that aims to account for the institutional dimension of legal phenomena within a broader three-dimensional theory of law. In this paper I have two objectives: the first is to highlight the main aspects (and what seem to me to be the strong points) of Roversi’s artefactual theory; the second is to propose a possible extension of Roversi’s theory, making it react with the idea of affordance proposed by the psychologist James J. Gibson, in order to deepen the dimension of the concrete effects that legal artefacts can have in the society in which they operate (the so-called para-institutional dimension).

On a beautiful island, in the archipelago known as ‘the Carolines’. It’s a sunny day, and the market is busy. Many people roam around the stalls, chatting, haggling, buying and selling what they need for their daily chores. Two people are having a lively conversation. It is reported here by memory, as recalled by one of the participants, identified with the fictional name of ‘Yip’.

Social functionalism comes in two kinds, evolutionary and non-evolutionary. However, each faces a significant problem. The most prominent kind of non-evolutionary functionalism, rational choice functionalism, relies on value judgments to distinguish between institutions with and without a function, which makes it inadequate as an explanatory theory (the axiological problem). Evolutionary functionalism identifies culture with traits of individuals, behavioral or informational. Because of this, it fails to capture the complexity of institutions, in particular the interdependences and relations between their participants (the complexity problem). Solving these problems requires a richer theory of institutions, one that involves not only equilibria but also rules. First, I argue that rules provide for a non-arbitrary way to distinguish institutions that have a function from those that do not. Second, they help to do justice to their complexity: they capture their symbolic and normative features and account for social roles and material resources. Thus, it is possible to develop two adequate conceptions of social functions, which account for both the proliferation and the persistence of institutions.

Questo libro cerca di fornire un’esposizione attendibile, sintetica e (per quanto possibile) esaustiva delle ricerche dedicate da Amedeo G. Conte
al fenomeno della costitutività, ossia alla capacità del diritto (in generale) di creare una “realtà” diversa da quella naturale, una “realtà giuridica” appunto. In che cosa consiste tale costitutività? Come è possibile? E
(soprattutto) quali sono i modi del costituire? Si tratta d’un tema che permea, in modo più o meno patente, vari ambiti di ricerca in cui Conte ha spinto con particolare profondità la sua originale e innovativa
indagine, almeno tre: (i) la filosofia della norma giuridica, (ii) la filosofia dell’atto giuridico, (iii) la filosofia della validità giuridica. A tal fine, i vari contributi di Conte sono presentati e ricostruiti secondo una personale chiave prospettica che intende, da un lato, comunque essere fedele al
pensiero di Conte (anche per coloro che si accostano alle sue indagini per la prima volta) e, dall’altro lato, esibire alcuni snodi argomentativi e concettuali che possono stimolare, anche in chiave critica, sviluppi e
nuovi percorsi di ricerca.

En este libro, el autor plantea un análisis del problema de la competencia a partir de dos abordajes: uno metateórico y uno teórico. En virtud de este análisis metateórico, el autor procede a un abordaje teórico del problema, es decir en la construcción de una teoría de la competencia, y de las normas de competencia, que, si bien tiene en cuenta lo analizado por otros autores, pretende ser superadora de dichos enfoques. A tal fin el autor presenta una teoría del concepto de competencia como un tipo de poder institucional que tiene dos modalidades, vertical y horizontal. En lo que a las normas de competencia respecta, presenta un modelo que contempla tres normas i) atributivas de la competencia de un sujeto; ii) modulativas de la competencia; iii) que determinan el procedimiento competencial. Dichas normas conforman un sistema constitutivo que determinan la competencia de un sujeto. Este enfoque de las normas de competencia permite analizar todo el fenómeno de la producción normativa, desde que a un sujeto se le concede la competencia y llegando a la producción de un acto normativo concreto.

Alejandro Calzetta es abogado por la Universidad de Buenos Aires y Doctor en Filosofía del Derecho por la Universidad de Génova. Ha dictado clases y dado seminarios en varias universidades de Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Croacia, Ecuador, España, Italia y Francia, entre otras. Ha publicado en revistas nacionales e internacionales y en obras colectivas.

One of the key motifs of modern philosophy is the desire to view the world not as an object of our cognition or our technical domination, but as something that happens to us. However, what does this mean for law? Is it possible to reflect on the basic question of the philosophy of law in a

Andrei Marmor's rich and penetrating new book, Foundations of Institutional Reality (hereinafter FIR), outlines a detailed and comprehensive account of institutional reality, of its nature and grounds. 1 This account has a reductive aim, i.e. to show how complex collective social practices -such as games, languages, money and law -are built from interactions between large collections of individual actions, attitudes and mental states. Along the way, Marmor takes up a number of diverse but interconnected topics. In chapter 1 he introduces some of the book's key concepts (such as the notions of an institutional fact, a social practice and a rule), and singles out his object of interest as the fragment of social reality he calls 'institutional'. In chapter 2 he lays out some

Assuming that the vocabulary of the so-called "legal positions" is, under certain circumstances, interchangeable with the normative vocabulary, this work reformulates the question of whether legal positions exist as the question of whether they are ontologically reducible to (dismissible and replaceable by) legal norms. Since there is no doubt that the so-called "legal positions" are part and parcel of the reality that is assumed as existent in specialized legal discourses, the question raised by this work is situated at the level of meta-legal theory. In Parts II and III two different answers to this question are reconstructed: the affirmative answer that seems to be dominant in legal theory, and the negative answer elaborated by Ross. In Part IV both answers previously reconstructed are translated into the language of reduction, where the question of whether legal positions exist is reformulated again, this time as the question of whether legal theory must consider them to exist or not. Building on the distinction between different types of reduction, the ultimate goal is to distil, refine or shape the dominant discourse of legal theory according to which legal positions must be accepted as existent.

El objeto de este trabajo es, por un lado, recopilar los principales estudios teóricos y filosóficos que han servido para diferenciar entre reglas regulativas y reglas constitu-tivas y, por otro, realizar una revisión de dichas propuestas para efectos de cuestionar la posibilidad de una distinción tajante entre ambos tipos de reglas. La primera parte del texto corresponde a una exposición de los postulados de los autores enunciados. En seguida, se formulan cuestionamientos a los criterios que se advierten en el apar-tado precedente. Finalmente, se expone la viabilidad de una distinción concluyente entre ambos tipos de reglas

Nel presente lavoro cerco di indagare le condizioni di possibilità di quel
fenomeno che Amedeo G. Conte ha chiamato nomotropismo e che consiste nell’agire in funzione di norme. A tal fine, farò ricorso all’idea di affordance proposta dallo psicologo James J. Gibson, per mostrare che l’agire nomotropico sia, in realtà, un agire in funzione delle affordances che un certo istituto giuridico può offrire. In tale prospettiva, mostrerò come l’idea di affordance consenta, da un lato, di illuminare gli stessi processi evolutivi che interessano determinati istituti giuridici; dall’altro lato, di fare emergere la complessità che connota l’agire nomotropico, in cui le regole giuridiche si intrecciano con altre regole o altri elementi della realtà bruta che vengono in gioco nello specifico contesto in cui si svolge l’azione.

Se introduce la discusión del presente número en torno al trabajo de Juan Pablo Mañalich referido a la ontología de las normas. Tras contextualizar el debate en torno a la naturaleza de las normas y sus dos principales concepciones elaboradas por Alchourrón y Bulygin, se analizan las consecuencias que se siguen de la adopción de una u otra, tanto para el derecho penal como para la concepción de los sistemas jurídicos en general. Luego de ello, se presenta de forma general qué implica la adopción de una teoría artefactualista de las normas. Asimismo, se explican los principales puntos de desacuerdo entre comentaristas y el trabajo de Mañalich en cada uno de los asuntos tratados.

Esta réplica ofrece una respuesta a los comentarios de Arriagada, Rodríguez y Godinho, centrada en los siguientes problemas: el entendimiento de las preguntas ontológicas sobre el cual se asienta la categorización de las normas jurídicas como artefactos institucionales abstractos; la relación existente entre las normas y el lenguaje, a propósito de la reconstrucción crítica de las concepciones expresiva e hilética y de la clarificación de cómo se conectan la semántica y la pragmática; la inteligibilidad de la postulación de artefactos culturales abstractos, entendidos como entidades dependientes de actitudes intencionales, y de la categorización de las normas jurídicas como entidades de esta clase; y la compatibilidad de la caracterización ontológica de las normas de comportamiento punitivamente reforzadas como artefactos institucionales con su caracterización funcional como razones autoritativas y externas para la acción, en consideración a las implicaciones que esa doble caracterización tiene para la teoría de los sistemas de derecho penal.

The author maintains that norms that confer competence (or power) on persons should be understood as duty-imposing norms addressed to legal officials, rather than as special competence norms whose sole function is to confer competence, and which are addressed to the competence-holders themselves. The argument is that only duty-imposing norms are genuine norms in the sense that they give complete reasons for action. En route to this conclusion the author analyzes norms in terms of reasons for action, and considers the problem of norm-individuation and the actionguiding capacity of norms. Norms that Confer Competence 91 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003. 5 Some writers conceive of competence as an ability or possibility in a concrete situation to bring about the relevant change of legal positions: See, e.g., MacCormick 1981, 72-3. I have given my reason for rejecting that view in Spaak 1994, 67-9. 6 To be sure, the same can be said about, inter alia, norms that declare a person an adult in the legal sense upon reaching, say, his eighteenth birthday. But that change of legal position is not the result of an act performed by the agent, and so cannot be a result of him exercising his competence.

Philosophers of group agency have argued forcefully that we should view
structured groups – with a hierarchy and decision mechanisms – as agents
capable of rational and moral agency. These include, but are not limited to,
corporations, universities, and states. Most theorists have maintained that
moral agency allows groups to participate in our responsibility practices that
are shaped by the reactive emotions. Part of this practice is an entrenched
care for each other’s quality of will. Consequently, these theorists must also
hold that groups are capable of a good or ill will. This dissertation argues
that despite these aspirations, most theories of group agency fall short of
providing a theory of a group or corporate will. It first surveys List and
Pettit’s prominent, functionalist theory of group agency, as well as alternative accounts. Two desiderata for any adequate model of a corporate will
are developed. The account must 1) be able to distinguish between group
activity in which the group is not in control and autonomous group action
and 2) explain why certain normative profiles and functional structures that distinguish corporations from universities and states can undermine a group’s capacity for moral agency and its capacity to manifest an
autonomous will. After arguing that List and Pettit’s theory cannot meet
these challenges, a positive proposal is developed that provides a successful
answer. It extends List and Pettit’s functionalist picture with a collective
version of David Velleman’s constitutive aim of agency: Self-Intelligibility.
As part of this proposal, a novel way of capturing a group’s practical identity
is developed that builds on the notion of constitutive rules to model social
practices. The resulting constitutive theory of group agency is able to satisfy
both desiderata and provides insights into how different types of corporate
governance of public corporations undermine and enable their capacity for
moral and autonomous agency

A widespread opinion holds that norms and codes of conduct as such can only be established via words, that is, in some lexical form. This perspective can be criticized: some norms produced by human acts are not word-based at all. For example, many norms are actually conveyed through graphics (e. g. road signs and land-use maps), sounds (e. g. the referee's whistle), a silent gesture (the traffic warden's signal to halt). In this article, we will focus on the norms that are created by means of drawings and can be termed "drawn norms" or "graphical norms." Specifically, we will inquire into the phenomenon of graphical norms with particular regard to traffic signs and land-use plans, and we will discuss the philosophical and legal problems to which these phenomena give rise.

This papers belongs to a project that deals with juridical acts, powers and competences. It is primarily meant for a readership with an interest in implementing juridical acts in a knowledge-based system, but only the final part of the paper is technical. Most of the paper is devoted to creating an understanding of what goes on when the law makes it possible to intentionally create or modify legal facts. To this purpose, there is special attention for the concept of a juridical acts and for the different kinds of rules which make it possible to change the 'world of law' by means of intentional acts.

Antonio Incampo è Professore ordinario di Filosofia del diritto all'Università degli Studi di Bari Aldo Moro. È stato Direttore del «Dipartimento per lo studio del Diritto penale, del Diritto processuale penale e della Filosofia del diritto» e Presidente dei Corsi di laurea della seconda Facoltà di Giurisprudenza nella stessa Università di Bari. Autore di numerosi studi di filosofia della validità giuridica, di semiotica e logica del linguaggio normativo, dirige per i tipi di Cacucci la collana editoriale Unità del sapere giuridico. Quaderni di scienze penalistiche e filosofico-giuridiche. È stato insignito nel 1998 dalla Presidenza della Repubblica d'Austria della "Gran Decorazione d'Onore" [Großes Ehrenzeichen] per meriti scientifici.

The author maintains that norms that confer competence (or power) on persons should be understood as duty-imposing norms addressed to legal officials, rather than as special competence norms whose sole function is to confer competence, and which are addressed to the competence-holders themselves. The argument is that only duty-imposing norms are genuine norms in the sense that they give complete reasons for action. En route to this conclusion the author analyzes norms in terms of reasons for action, and considers the problem of norm-individuation and the actionguiding capacity of norms. Norms that Confer Competence 91 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003. 5 Some writers conceive of competence as an ability or possibility in a concrete situation to bring about the relevant change of legal positions: See, e.g., MacCormick 1981, 72-3. I have given my reason for rejecting that view in Spaak 1994, 67-9. 6 To be sure, the same can be said about, inter alia, norms that declare a person an adult in the legal sense upon reaching, say, his eighteenth birthday. But that change of legal position is not the result of an act performed by the agent, and so cannot be a result of him exercising his competence.

Artifactual theories of law-such as the one proposed in Italy by Corrado Roversi-evoke the idea of the artificiality of law, an aspect typically connected to its positivity; so much so that someone has reduced this theory to a mere positivist doctrine. In my opinion, however, the explanatory power of the conceptual apparatus offered by artifactual theory goes beyond the aspect of positivity of law. To this end, I test this conceptual apparatus with reference to two phenomenal areas normally emphasized by anti-positivist legal doctrines: (i) the creative activity deployed by judges-an aspect on which the various forms of legal decisionism rely; and (ii) the customary law-a case in point for those sociological and realist perspectives that emphasize the spontaneous formation of law.

En el presente trabajo se intentará efectuar algunas precisiones conceptuales respecto de la noción de “inconstitucionalidad”, para luego ofrecer reconstrucciones diversas del criterio de legalidad que presupone cada modelo de orden jurídico. Para finalizar, se planteará un interrogante que permite marcar cierta relación entre el orden jurídico depurado y los presupuestos del positivismo incluyente.

D'altro canto, Czesław Znamierowski, che fu professore all'Università di Poznań, è ben noto in Italia sopratutto grazie ai lavori di Giuseppe Lorini 15. Znamierowski è conosciuto primariamente per i lavori nei quali ha introdotto alla filosofia del diritto concetti ormai accolti da numerosi studiosi come quello di regola costitutiva o quello di atto thetico. Tutavia nella sua carriera universitaria la critica dello psicologismo, soprattutto nella versione di Petrażycki, ispirò lo sviluppo delle sue proprie teorie sin dall'inizio della sua carrierala sua tesi di dottorato, pubblicata nel Przegląd Filozoficzny 16 nel 1922, è fondata su una profonda critica alle idee di Petrażycki. Jerzy Lande, da parte sua, ha trapiantato le idee di Petrażycki nell'ambiente di Cracovia così efficacemente che l'influenza di Petrażycki sulla comunità scientifica di Cracovia è paragonabile alla influenza di Petrażycki stesso a Varsavia, dove egli aveva insegnato. 17 Lande però non è considerato soltanto un filosofo di orientamento petrażyckiano, ma anche, o soprattutto, un difensore delle idee petrażyckiane in quanto il portavoce quasi ufficiale di Petrażycki stesso. L'attività di Lande è stata ancora più importante a causa della quiete di Petrażycki nelle discussioni scientifiche nella sua fase polacca. 18 Per motivi ignoti, Petrażycki, dopo esser diventato il professore dell'Università di Varsaviaa differenza della veemenza e del dettaglio con cui difendeva le sue tesi civilistiche nelle sue fasi russe e tedeschenon si difendeva dagli attacchi teorici dei suoi avversari, e in tale situazione, come ricorda Krzysztof Motyka 19 , il ruolo di Lande non è da sottovalutare, soprattutto considerando il fatto che Petrażycki non fu presente al-Convegno sulla teoria del diritto‖ nei giorni 25-27 marzo 1924 a Cracovia, dove Lande, in-sostituzione‖ di Petrażycki, si confrontò nel complesso dibattito con Znamierowski. 20 In qualità difensore delle idee di Petrażycki, Jerzy Lande non solo aveva sostenuto le idee elaborate da Petrażycki, ma anche, basandosi sempre sulle ricerche del suo maestro, tentò di superare alcuni problemi dell'approccio petrażyckiano; in particolare ridusse l'importanza di alcune sue affermazioni sostenendone il carattere non essenziale, bensì polemico. Nello stesso tempo Lande aveva propagato un modo di concepire la teoria di Petrażycki secondo il quale tale teoria non limiterebbe il diritto a un fenomeno

D'altro canto, Czesław Znamierowski, che fu professore all'Università di Poznań, è ben noto in Italia sopratutto grazie ai lavori di Giuseppe Lorini 15. Znamierowski è conosciuto primariamente per i lavori nei quali ha introdotto alla filosofia del diritto concetti ormai accolti da numerosi studiosi come quello di regola costitutiva o quello di atto thetico. Tutavia nella sua carriera universitaria la critica dello psicologismo, soprattutto nella versione di Petrażycki, ispirò lo sviluppo delle sue proprie teorie sin dall'inizio della sua carrierala sua tesi di dottorato, pubblicata nel Przegląd Filozoficzny 16 nel 1922, è fondata su una profonda critica alle idee di Petrażycki. Jerzy Lande, da parte sua, ha trapiantato le idee di Petrażycki nell'ambiente di Cracovia così efficacemente che l'influenza di Petrażycki sulla comunità scientifica di Cracovia è paragonabile alla influenza di Petrażycki stesso a Varsavia, dove egli aveva insegnato. 17 Lande però non è considerato soltanto un filosofo di orientamento petrażyckiano, ma anche, o soprattutto, un difensore delle idee petrażyckiane in quanto il portavoce quasi ufficiale di Petrażycki stesso. L'attività di Lande è stata ancora più importante a causa della quiete di Petrażycki nelle discussioni scientifiche nella sua fase polacca. 18 Per motivi ignoti, Petrażycki, dopo esser diventato il professore dell'Università di Varsaviaa differenza della veemenza e del dettaglio con cui difendeva le sue tesi civilistiche nelle sue fasi russe e tedeschenon si difendeva dagli attacchi teorici dei suoi avversari, e in tale situazione, come ricorda Krzysztof Motyka 19 , il ruolo di Lande non è da sottovalutare, soprattutto considerando il fatto che Petrażycki non fu presente al-Convegno sulla teoria del diritto‖ nei giorni 25-27 marzo 1924 a Cracovia, dove Lande, in-sostituzione‖ di Petrażycki, si confrontò nel complesso dibattito con Znamierowski. 20 In qualità difensore delle idee di Petrażycki, Jerzy Lande non solo aveva sostenuto le idee elaborate da Petrażycki, ma anche, basandosi sempre sulle ricerche del suo maestro, tentò di superare alcuni problemi dell'approccio petrażyckiano; in particolare ridusse l'importanza di alcune sue affermazioni sostenendone il carattere non essenziale, bensì polemico. Nello stesso tempo Lande aveva propagato un modo di concepire la teoria di Petrażycki secondo il quale tale teoria non limiterebbe il diritto a un fenomeno

El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo principal examinar y debatir las ideas de Carlos S. Nino sobre el concepto de “poder constituyente”, generadas a partir de su discusión de una excelente monografía que Genaro Carrió escribió sobre el mismo tema. En este sentido, intentaré mostrar que los planteamientos de Nino también son susceptibles de algunas críticas (y no necesariamente orientadas en favor del enfoque inicial de Carrió) lo que, en cualquier caso, no le quita a Nino el mérito de haber contribuido con importantes reflexiones sobre esta materia. Este balance crítico, en el que se analizan varios aspectos de orden conceptual recurrentemente involucrados en los momentos constituyentes latinoamericanos, se efectúa a 30 años del fallecimiento de Nino, a 40 años de su discusión con Carrió, a 50 años de la publicación de la (ya clásica) monografía de Carrió y a 80 años del natalicio del primero.

In everyday discourse, and also in the academic literature, the expressions "regulatory interventions" (i.e. interventions intended to regulate behaviours) and "normative interventions" (i.e. interventions which set norms/rules) are usually assumed to be synonymous. From this perspective, any regulatory intervention is also normative, and vice versa. This article investigates the relationship between regulation and rules/norms in order to verify whether the "regulatory" and the "normative" aspects are intrinsically and essentially connected, as is usually thought (on the assumption that there is no regulation without rules and no rules without regulation).

In everyday discourse, and also in the academic literature, the expressions "regulatory interventions" (i.e. interventions intended to regulate behaviours) and "normative interventions" (i.e. interventions which set norms/rules) are usually assumed to be synonymous. From this perspective, any regulatory intervention is also normative, and vice versa. This article investigates the relationship between regulation and rules/norms in order to verify whether the "regulatory" and the "normative" aspects are intrinsically and essentially connected, as is usually thought (on the assumption that there is no regulation without rules and no rules without regulation).

This paper reviews the development of research methods teaching on the Engineering Doctorate (EngD) in Systems programme at the University of Bristol. The programme is aimed at high-calibre Research Engineers working in a diversity of sectors including defence and aerospace, rail, transport, energy production, construction and the water industry. Projects concern real-world industrial problems in areas including safety, quality, sustainability and innovation: all are characterised by socio-technical complexity and require crossdisciplinary inquiry and knowledge. Current teaching is based on methods drawn from disciplines spanning systems engineering, management, problem structuring and systems thinking, and seeks to integrate methodologies from diverse research traditions. The programme fundamentally embraces the position that all hard systems are embedded in soft systems. Pedagogical developments emerge from a process of learning together: it is driven by the systemic inquiry of real-world problem situations and by the needs of industrial partners as established for each project. Results demonstrate that the programme is delivering value to industrial partners through enhanced performance, and has contributed understanding to the application of systems thinking. The generic body of knowledge being developed on this programme, though currently diffused amongst the application domains of each project, has the potential for much higher leverage. In this paper we therefore argue for a rigorous programme of research using the EngD projects themselves as the data source in order to integrate this systems thinking body of knowledge, to discover the generic issues currently inhibiting the wider implementation of systems thinking in industry, and to drive further pedagogical development. Such a programme has just been launched and will run for the next four years. This paper also makes the case that such research is best accomplished in integrative centres of excellence such as the IDC in Systems.