Defence Engineering

Il complesso militare‑industriale europeo è il caso paradigmatico attraverso cui le contraddizioni del potere economico contemporaneo emergono nella loro forma più visibile e verificabile. È qui che si intrecciano interessi industriali nazionali, logiche politiche divergenti e sedimentazioni storico‑culturali che rendono la cooperazione non solo difficile, ma strutturalmente instabile. Il volume introduce un quadro analitico fondato su tre categorie di conflitto — economico, politico, storico‑culturale — che attraversano l’intero arco della ricerca e offrono una chiave di lettura unitaria per comprendere la persistenza della frammentazione europea. Questo framework permette di osservare come, dal 1960 al 2025, ogni tentativo di integrazione nel settore della difesa sia stato sistematicamente neutralizzato da incentivi incompatibili e da istituzioni incapaci di produrre convergenza. Il paradosso è evidente: l’Europa sa da sessant’anni che deve cooperare, riconosce razionalmente i vantaggi della cooperazione e ne proclama la necessità in ogni crisi. Eppure, nonostante dichiarazioni, programmi e iniziative, la cooperazione non si realizza. Non si tratta di un deficit di volontà politica, né di un errore di progettazione: è una contraddizione strutturale radicata nelle economie politiche nazionali e nei loro rapporti con il potere industriale. Analizzando processi decisionali, filiere produttive, modelli istituzionali e traiettorie storiche, il libro mostra come queste contraddizioni non siano anomalie da correggere, ma elementi costitutivi del sistema europeo. Comprenderle significa comprendere i limiti dell’integrazione e le condizioni reali entro cui può svilupparsi una capacità strategica comune.

Partitioning national Defence into portfolios, where key capabilities and activities are appropriately aggregated together, has been suggested as an effective way to manage national Defence. This paper examines in detail the application of a heuristic approach to achieve this, assessing the efficacy of various ways of partitioning national Defence using the established heuristics of systems architecting. The insights gained may then be applied to configure or refine the structure and to establish linking of the portfolios.

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This brief study focuses on skin as sensory interface, and explores the latest discoveries in bioelectronic science. The work analyzes at what extent invisibility is possible by emulating nature, and if military applications can really benefit from technology that combines epidermal systems and virtual reality.

This brief study focuses on skin as sensory interface, and explores the latest discoveries in bioelectronic science. The work analyzes at what extent invisibility is possible by emulating nature, and if military applications can really benefit from technology that combines epidermal systems and virtual reality.

Enterprise architecture is at a point in the hype cycle where there is perception that it has not lived up to its promise. In this talk, we cover the history of the DoD Architecture Framework, current challenges facing the architect, and the forces that drive enterprises to design and deliver where there is no time for a strategic pause to architect. The author discusses important concepts that are addressed in the DoDAF that must be paid attention to regardless of the direction where the DoDAF evolution is headed. This talk was presented at the Association of Enterprise Architects, San Diego CA on February 24, 2017.

In March 2015, a Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission commenced in South Australia, lead by former South Australian Governor and retired Royal Australian Navy Rear Admiral, Kevin Scarce. It was tasked to consider opportunities and risks associated with expanding South Australia's role in the nuclear fuel cycle.

South Australia currently mines and exports uranium for enrichment, fuel fabrication and its eventual use in nuclear power plants. After use, spent nuclear fuel is regarded as high level nuclear waste.

The Royal Commission's final report was published in May 2016 and recommended that South Australia explore a perceived economic opportunity in receiving, managing and disposing of spent nuclear fuel from other nations. Various infrastructure would be required to facilitate this, including a deep underground storage facility capable of isolating the waste from the environment.

It also recommended that prohibitions at State and national levels be repealed to allow for other nuclear fuel cycle activities to be undertaken in the future, including the further processing of uranium, reprocessing of spent fuel and nuclear power generation.

This short presentation poses the question "Who wants a nuclear South Australia... and why?" and thus explores the various sectoral interests invested in receiving nuclear waste locally and enabling further nuclear industrial development nationally.

It has been widely recognised that to meet the challenges of developing Command and Control (C2) capability in the networked era, a rigorous design approach needs to be taken. The mandates of US DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) and its Australian variant -the Defence Architecture Framework (DAF) are the reflection of this trend. However, these frameworks only define the architecture products that are needed and do not recommend a methodology for architecting. Even though a few techniques are presented in DoDAF Deskbook, it lacks a systematic comparison and evaluation of various approaches. This paper seeks to redress this deficiency by firstly describing a framework for the rational, reasoned and traceable selection of a hybrid development methodology and, then by addressing the problem of integrating the candidate methodologies into a single, unified hybrid methodology that will meets the specific needs of the Australian Land C2 capability development context. The specific methodology developed in this paper could be described as a soft mantle with a hard systems core. Differing from other soft systems/object-oriented approaches, this paper establishes a mapping from component methodologies of the hybrid to DoDAF products via a common UML modelling medium.

This paper presents a brief history of engineering and the emergence of systems engineering as one base of the argument. The paper also discusses the nature of research and discusses the range of research methodologies appropriate for use in systems engineering. The particular position argued in this paper is that engineering design, when performed in a situation of considerable complexity

As megaprojects have become ubiquitous, their real benefits and costs have come under increased scrutiny. We interviewed Bent Flyvbjerg, who has extensively studied megaproject development. Flyvbjerg has found systematic problems in the development process: by intentionally misrepresenting information and deliberately disregarding risks, proponents instigate projects that result in fewer benefits and higher costs than promised.

A Bachelor of Engineering program revision was conducted during 2000 with a view to improving the program with respect to pedagogical form and the value of graduates to the electrical and electronics related industries in South Australia. The program redevelopment included a complete reconstruction of the engineering management stream of studies to offer a perspective specifically related to the needs of the information technology related industries, as distinct from engineering in general. The reorganisation of the Systems Engineering stream was also explicitly linked to development of the Graduate Qualities of the University of South Australia. The Graduate Qualities framework was used to ensure that the method of learning and content are linked as part of the system for developing engineers in the framework of the whole program. This paper discusses the issues in this part of the program revision.

Megaproject Planning and Management: Essential Readings contains the seminal articles from the growing body of research on megaproject planning and management along with an original introduction by the editor, Bent Flyvbjerg. The leading and most cited authority in the field, Flyvbjerg has used crowdsourcing and 25 years of experience to cherry-pick from several hundred articles and books the writings that define the field. This volume will be an indispensable source for those wishing to speak with authority about how megaprojects are prepared, delivered, and fought over. The target audience is students, academics, practitioners, and media pundits alike, as well as communities affected by megaprojects.

Control (C2)?" by first defining three key perspectives that cover that which comprises C2: Command Arrangements, Command and Command Support Systems. The paper examines the system-level properties of these three perspectives in combination, drawing the important conclusion that Command and Control cannot be understood by attempting to decompose the field into individual components. The paper then analyses the concept of a 'science' of C2 by extracting the core components of a science: an organised body of knowledge and the processes of acquiring and applying that body of knowledge. In addition to these, the paper recognises the role that the application of the 'science' plays in advancing the state of understanding of C2. The paper then uses the definition of the science of C2 to formulate a general matrix for understanding C2 research programs. The paper closes by studying examples of extant research placed in this matrix. The result is a comprehensive definition of the science of C2 and a tool for understanding C2 research.

This paper describes the application of novel systems concepts and methodologies to the design and implementation, or more generally the acquisition, of complex real-time information systems. A hybrid methodology is proposed that combines contemporary 'soft' systems thinking with traditional hard systems engineering methodology, to result in an acquisition life cycle appropriate to such systems. This approach acknowledges the difficulties faced when applying hard systems engineering practice to real-time information system projects with barely definable goals, significant human interaction and where implementation technology is evolving faster than the "system solution" can be designed and developed. The paper outlines the basic concepts of systems thinking that underpin the design of complex systems. Essential elements of traditional hard systems engineering, along with their failings, are described. Soft systems concepts are described and related to the problem of real time information systems. A novel systems methodology for real-time information systems is proposed. This methodology is then examined in the context of the development of innovative combat system architectures for future naval surface combatants.

It has been widely recognised that to meet the challenges of developing Command and Control (C2) capability in the networked era, a rigorous design approach needs to be taken. The mandates of US DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) and its Australian variant -the Defence Architecture Framework (DAF) are the reflection of this trend. However, these frameworks only define the architecture products that are needed and do not recommend a methodology for architecting. Even though a few techniques are presented in DoDAF Deskbook, it lacks a systematic comparison and evaluation of various approaches. This paper seeks to redress this deficiency by firstly describing a framework for the rational, reasoned and traceable selection of a hybrid development methodology and, then by addressing the problem of integrating the candidate methodologies into a single, unified hybrid methodology that will meets the specific needs of the Australian Land C2 capability development context. The specific methodology developed in this paper could be described as a soft mantle with a hard systems core. Differing from other soft systems/object-oriented approaches, this paper establishes a mapping from component methodologies of the hybrid to DoDAF products via a common UML modelling medium.

This paper focuses on problems and their causes and cures in policy and planning for large infrastructure projects. First, it identifies as the main problem in major infrastructure development pervasive misinformation about the costs, benefits, and risks involved. A consequence of misinformation is massive cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and waste. Second, the paper explores the causes of misinformation and finds that political-economic explanations best account for the available evidence: planners and promoters deliberately misrepresent costs, benefits, and risks in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not the competition's, that gain approval and funding. This results in the "survival of the unfittest," where often it is not the best projects that are built, but the most misrepresented ones. Finally, the paper presents measures for reforming policy and planning for large infrastructure projects, with a focus on better planning methods and changed governance structures, the latter being more important.

Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman must be commended for their clear identification of causes and cures to the planning fallacy in “Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives’ Decisions” (July 2003). Their look at overoptimism, anchoring, competitor neglect, and the outside view in forecasting is highly useful to executives and forecasters. However, Lovallo and Kahneman underrate one source of bias in forecasting—the deliberate “cooking” of forecasts to get ventures started. My colleagues and I call this the Machiavelli factor.

As megaprojects have become ubiquitous, their real benefits and costs have come under increased scrutiny. We interviewed Bent Flyvbjerg, who has extensively studied megaproject development. Flyvbjerg has found systematic problems in the development process: by intentionally misrepresenting information and deliberately disregarding risks, proponents instigate projects that result in fewer benefits and higher costs than promised.

The Supplementary Green Book Guidance on Optimism Bias (HM Treasury 2003) with reference to the Review of Large Public Procurement in the UK (Mott MacDonald 2002) notes that there is a demonstrated, systematic, tendency for project appraisers to be overly optimistic and that to redress this tendency appraisers should make explicit, empirically based adjustments to the estimates of a project’s costs, benefits, and duration. HM Treasury recommends that these adjustments be based on data from past projects or similar projects elsewhere, and adjusted for the unique characteristics of the project in hand. In the absence of a more specific evidence base, HM Treasury has encouraged departments to collect data to inform future estimates of optimism, and in the meantime use the best available data. In response to this, the Department for Transport (henceforth DfT), has contracted Bent Flyvbjerg in association with COWI to undertake the consultancy assignment "Procedures for dealing with Optimism Bias in Transport Planning". The present Guidance Document is the result of this assignment.

Do different types of megaprojects have different cost overruns? This apparently simple question is at the heart of research at the University of Oxford aimed at understanding the characteristics of megaprojects, particularly in terms of how they are established, run and concluded. In this study, we set out to investigate cost overruns in the Olympic Games. To do so, we examined the costs of the Games over half a century, including both summer and winter Olympics. We looked at the evolution of final reported costs and compared these to the costs established in the Games bids, submitted to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) up to seven years before the Games occurred. In so doing we established the largest dataset of its kind, and documented for the first time in a consistent fashion the costs and cost overruns for the Olympic Games, from 1960 to 2012. We discovered that the Games stand out in two distinct ways compared to other megaprojects: (1) The Games overrun with 100 per cent consistency. No other type of megaproject is this consistent regarding cost overrun. Other project types are typically on budget from time to time, but not the Olympics. (2) With an average cost overrun in real terms of 179 per cent – and 324 per cent in nominal terms – overruns in the Games have historically been significantly larger than for other types of megaprojects, including infrastructure, construction, ICT, and dams. The data thus show that for a city and nation to decide to host the Olympic Games is to take on one of the most financially risky type of megaproject that exists, something that many cities and nations have learned to their peril. For the London 2012 Games, we find that: (1) With sports-related real costs currently estimated at USD14.8 billion, London is on track to become the most costly Olympics ever. (2) With a projected cost overrun of 101 per cent in real terms, overrun for London is below the historical average for the Games, but not significantly so. (3) The London cost overrun is, however, significantly higher than overruns for recent Games since 1999. London therefore is reversing a positive trend of falling cost overruns for the Games.

Back cover text: This book aims to enlarge the understanding of decision-making on mega-projects and suggest recommendations for a more effective, efficient and democratic approach. Authors from different scientific disciplines address various aspects of the decision-making process, such as management characteristics and cost-benefit analysis, planning and innovation and competition and institutions. The subject matter is highly diverse, but certain questions remain at the forefront. For example, how do we deal with protracted preparation processes, how do we tackle risks and uncertainties, and how can we best divide the risks and responsibilities among the private and public players throughout the different phases of the project? - Presenting a state-of-the-art overview, based on experiences and visions of authors from Europe and North America, this unique book will be of interest to practitioners of large-scale project management, politicians, public officials and private organisations involved in mega-project decision-making. It will also appeal to researchers, consultants and students dealing with substantial engineering projects, complex systems, project management and transport infrastructure.

A major source of risk in project management is inaccurate forecasts of project costs, demand, and other impacts. The paper presents a promising new approach to mitigating such risk, based on theories of decision making under uncertainty which won the 2002 Nobel prize in economics. First, the paper documents inaccuracy and risk in project management. Second, it explains inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Third, the theoretical basis is presented for a promising new method called "reference class forecasting," which achieves accuracy by basing forecasts on actual performance in a reference class of comparable projects and thereby bypassing both optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Fourth, the paper presents the first instance of practical reference class forecasting, which concerns cost forecasts for large transportation infrastructure projects. Finally, potentials for and barriers to reference class forecasting are assessed.

During World War I, the US Congress made it unlawful to speak against the war. The executive prosecuted many for doing so and when tried at the Supreme Court it upheld the sentences. During the Iraq War it was not a crime to speak against the war, but it was almost impossible to be heard if you had anything critical to say. Mass media practiced a self-imposed censorship. The op-ed below was written a few days after the invasion of Iraq and sent to main media in the US, but none wanted to print it on the grounds that critique of the war was considered untimely.

"Over budget, over time, over and over again" appears to be an appropriate slogan for large, complex infrastructure projects. This article explains why cost, benefits, and time forecasts for such projects are systematically over-optimistic in the planning phase. The underlying reasons for forecasting errors are grouped into three categories: delusions or honest mistakes; deceptions or strategic manipulation of information or processes; or bad luck. Delusion and deception have each been addressed in the management literature before, but here they are jointly considered for the first time. They are specifically applied to infrastructure problems in a manner that allows both academics and practitioners to understand and implement the suggested corrective procedures. The article provides a framework for analyzing the relative explanatory power of delusion and deception. It also suggests a simplified framework for analyzing the complex principal-agent relationships that are involved in the approval and construction of large infrastructure projects, which can be used to improve forecasts. Finally, the article illustrates reference class forecasting, an outside view de-biasing technique that has proven successful in overcoming both delusion and deception in private and public investment decisions.

Out-of-control information technology (IT) projects have ended the careers of top managers, such as EADS CEO Noël Forgeard and Levi Strauss’ CIO David Bergen. Moreover, IT projects have brought down whole companies, like Kmart in the US and Auto Windscreen in the UK. Software and other IT is now such an integral part of most business processes and products that CEOs must know their IT risks, which are typically substantial – and overlooked. The analysis of a sample of 1,471 IT projects showed that the average cost overrun was 27% — but that figure masks a far more alarming “fat tail” risk.  Fully one in six of the projects in the sample was a Black Swan, with a cost overrun of 200%, on average, and a schedule overrun of almost 70%. This highlights the true pitfall of IT change initiatives: It’s not that they’re particularly prone to high cost overruns on average – it is that there are a disproportionate number of Black Swans. By focusing on averages instead of the more damaging outliers, most managers and consultants have been missing the real risk in doing IT. In conclusion, the article outlines ideas as to what can be done to avoid Black Swans.

This paper explores how theories of the planning fallacy and the outside view may be used to conduct quality control and due diligence in project management. First, a much-neglected issue in project management is identified, namely that the front-end estimates of costs and benefits – used in the business cases, cost-benefit analyses, and social and environmental impact assessments that typically support decisions on projects – are typically significantly different from actual ex post costs and benefits, and are therefore poor predictors of the actual value and viability of projects. Second, it is discussed how Kahneman and Tversky’s theories of the planning fallacy and the outside view may help explain and remedy this situation through quality control of decisions. Third, it is described what quality control and due diligence are in the context of project management, and an eight-step procedure is outlined for due diligence based on the outside view. Fourth, the procedure is tested on a real-life, multibillion-dollar project, organized as a public-private partnership. Finally, Akerlof and Shiller’s recent discussion in economics of “firing the forecaster” is discussed together with its relevance to project management. In sum, the paper demonstrates the need, the theoretical basis, a practical methodology, and a real-life example for how to de-bias project management using quality control and due diligence based on the outside view.

Risk, including economic risk, is increasingly a concern for public policy and management. The possibility of dealing effectively with risk is hampered, however, by lack of a sound empirical basis for risk assessment and management. This article demonstrates the general point for cost and demand risks in urban rail projects. The article presents empirical evidence that allow valid economic risk assessment and management of urban rail projects, including benchmarking of individual or groups of projects. Benchmarking of the Copenhagen Metro is presented as a case in point. The approach developed is proposed as a model for other types of policies and projects in order to improve economic and financial risk assessment and management in policy and planning.

The article first describes characteristics of major infrastructure projects. Second, it documents a much neglected topic in economics: that ex ante estimates of costs and benefits are often very different from actual ex post costs and benefits. For large infrastructure projects the consequences are cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and the systematic underestimation of risks. Third, implications for cost–benefit analysis are described, including that such analysis is not to be trusted for major infrastructure projects. Fourth, the article uncovers the causes of this state of affairs in terms of perverse incentives that encourage promoters to underestimate costs and overestimate benefits in the business cases for their projects. But the projects that are made to look best on paper are the projects that amass the highest cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in reality. The article depicts this situation as ‘survival of the unfittest’. Fifth, the article sets out to explain how the problem may be solved, with a view to arriving at more efficient and more democratic projects, and avoiding the scandals that often accompany major infrastructure investments. Finally, the article identifies current trends in major infrastructure development. It is argued that a rapid increase in stimulus spending, combined with more investments in emerging economies, combined with more spending on information technology is catapulting infrastructure investment from the frying pan into the fire.

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of traffic forecasts in transportation infrastructure projects. The sample used is the largest of its kind, covering 210 projects in 14 nations worth U.S.$59 billion. The study shows with very high statistical significance that forecasters generally do a poor job of estimating the demand for transportation infrastructure projects. For 9 out of 10 rail projects, passenger forecasts are overestimated; the average overestimation is 106%. For half of all road projects, the difference between actual and forecasted traffic is more than ±20%. The result is substantial financial risks, which are typically ignored or downplayed by planners and decision makers to the detriment of social and economic welfare. Our data also show that forecasts have not become more accurate over the 30-year period studied, despite claims to the contrary by forecasters. The causes of inaccuracy in forecasts are different for rail and road projects, with political causes playing a larger role for rail than for road. The cure is transparency, accountability, and new forecasting methods. The challenge is to change the governance structures for forecasting and project development. Our article shows how planners may help achieve this.

This paper focuses on problems and their causes and cures in policy and planning for large-infrastructure projects. First, it identifies as the main problem in major infrastructure developments pervasive misinformation about the costs, benefits, and risks involved. A consequence of misinformation is cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and waste. Second, it explores the causes of misinformation and finds that political-economic explanations best account for the available evidence: planners and promoters deliberately misrepresent costs, benefits, and risks in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not those of their competition, that gain approval and funding. This results in the ‘survival of the unfittest’, in which often it is not the best projects that are built, but the most misrepresented ones. Finally, it presents measures for reforming policy and planning for large-infrastructure projects with a focus on better planning methods and changed governance structures, the latter being more important.

Results from the first statistically significant study of the causes of cost escalation in transport infrastructure projects are presented. The study is based on a sample of 258 rail, bridge, tunnel and road projects worth US$90 billion. The focus is on the dependence of cost escalation on: (1) the length of the project‐implementation phase, (2) the size of the project and (3) the type of project ownership. First, it was found, with very high statistical significance, that cost escalation was strongly dependent on the length of the implementation phase. The policy implications are clear: decision‐makers and planners should be highly concerned about delays and long implementation phases because they translate into risks of substantial cost escalations. Second, projects have grown larger over time, and for bridges and tunnels larger projects have larger percentage cost escalations. Finally, by comparing the cost escalation for three types of project ownership - private, state‐owned enterprise and other public ownership - it was shown that the oft‐seen claim that public ownership is problematic and private ownership effective in curbing cost escalation is an oversimplification. The type of accountability appears to matter more to cost escalation than type of ownership.

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of cost escalation in transportation infrastructure projects. Based on a sample of 258 transportation infrastructure projects worth US$90 billion and representing different project types, geographical regions, and historical periods, it is found with overwhelming statistical significance that the cost estimates used to decide whether such projects should be built are highly and systematically misleading. Underestimation cannot be explained by error and is best explained by strategic misrepresentation, that is, lying. The policy implications are clear: legislators, administrators, investors, media representatives, and members of the public who value honest numbers should not trust cost estimates and cost-benefit analyses produced by project promoters and their analysts.

Back cover text: Megaprojects and Risk provides the first detailed examination of the phenomenon of megaprojects. It is a fascinating account of how the promoters of multi-billion dollar megaprojects systematically and self-servingly misinform parliaments, the public and the media in order to get projects approved and built. It shows, in unusual depth, how the formula for approval is an unhealthy cocktail of underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, undervalued environmental impacts and overvalued economic development effects. This results in projects that are extremely risky, but where the risk is concealed from MPs, taxpayers and investors. The authors not only explore the problems but also suggest practical solutions drawing on theory, experience and hard, scientific evidence from the several hundred projects in twenty nations and five continents that illustrate the book. Accessibly written, it will be the standard reference for students, scholars, planners, economists, auditors, politicians and interested citizens for many years to come.

This paper describes the analysis of a hypothetical command and control architecture for a proposed future land force conducting maneuver operations under various conditions. The Systems Engineering tool CORE ® has been used to capture the user needs, and to develop a hierarchy of functions necessary to implement the proposed command and control system. CORE also facilitates behavioral modeling of the functional architecture. This paper shows how the tool can be used to analyze the performance of candidate physical architectures based on a common functional architecture. The models that are formed serve as valuable aids for the user to evaluate novel operational concepts, and for the system architects to determine productive areas for research into improving technological support for command and control.

Australia has a skills shortage in the defence industry. Growing demand for complex defence systems highlighted the need for additional systems engineers and systems integration specialists. This is compounded by sustained growth in Australia's resources sector, and competition for engineering professionals. The Skilling Australia's Defence Industry (SADI) initiative provides significant funding for new skills activities. This paper describes one such activity; the creation of a Masters degree in Military Systems Integration (MSI). Designing and implementing the program required some novel educational approaches, to capture the value of industry experience, and integrate critical but elusive aspects that require tacit knowledge transfer.

This paper addresses the question "what is the Science of Command and Control (C2)?" by first defining the three key perspectives that cover that which comprises C2, and by examining the system-level properties of these three perspectives in combination. The paper then analyses the concept of a 'science' of C2 by extracting the core components of a science: an organised body of knowledge and the process of acquiring that body of knowledge. In addition to these, the paper recognises the role that the application of the 'science' plays in advancing the state of understanding of C2. The paper then uses the definition of the science of C2 to formulate a general matrix for understanding C2 research programs. The paper closes by studying examples of extant research placed in this matrix. The result is a comprehensive definition of the science of C2 and a tool for understanding C2 research.

2008. 352 pp. r150.00 (hardcover). This volume is intended to explain why major investment projects (the so-called mega-projects) often are not completed on time and cost more than originally budgeted. Drawing from experiences of European and North American countries, the book also suggests ways to avoid such failures. Although the topic is rather specific, the book is worth reading for both experts and nonexperts as infrastructure development continues to be a major key to economic expansion across the globe.g row_486 380.. 408 For those who only have a vague idea of what a mega-project is, the book begins by introducing the topic and reviewing the most important recent literature. The first part of the volume, then, provides numerous insights on the complexity of mega-projects, starting from the large number of reasons why mega-projects might fail. For example, the project might be "underdesigned," thus less costly but less robust to unforeseen developments, or it might be "overdesigned," when a large number of weaknesses and possible problems are considered in advance, and solutions are evaluated before the problem actually occurs. Overdesigned projects are more robust, less likely to fail, but are much more costly. The project might involve the use of innovative technologies that have never been applied to a similar context, and that involve more uncertain implementation costs and results. Most projects have an impact on the environment and might face opposition for example from environmentalist groups. If representative of these groups have not been directly involved in the design of the project, they might try to stop it, thus causing delays and increasing costs. Finally, because of incorrect predictions of 380 GROWTH AND CHANGE, JUNE 2009