Etienne Gilson

This paper demonstrates that a Thomistic epistemology, reconstructed from Aquinas's primary texts and sharpened through engagement with Lonergan, O'Callaghan, and Deely, establishes the categorical impossibility of artificial intelligence functioning as a knower. The argument identifies three jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for genuine cognition-immaterial form-reception (esse intentionale), immanent concept-generation (verbum mentis through intellectus agens abstraction), and truth-apt judgment grounded in the intellect's complete reflexive self-presence (reditio completa)-and demonstrates that these are ontological determinations no computational system can satisfy. This demonstration is defended against four families of objection: functionalist assimilation (Jackson, Block, Levine, Kim, Haldane); the Wittgensteinian rule-following challenge (Kripke, Braine); the extended mind thesis (Clark-Chalmers, Adams-Aizawa, Rupert); and the distributed-knower objection from collective cognitive production. A formal two-step demonstration of AI's double remove from reality is developed: AI performs no cognitive acts (the categorical remove), and the objects of its processing are linguistically mediated products of human cognitive acts from which the originating acts have been dissolved by statistical aggregation (the structural remove). Sokolowski's phenomenology of the dative of manifestation, permanently nested assertion, and genuine negation is integrated as a convergent first-personal analysis. Prudential diagnostics for AI-mediated discourse are formally derived from the integral parts of prudentia rather than appended externally. AI systems are revealed as instruments whose epistemic value depends entirely on the human intellectual agency that appropriates, evaluates, and governs their use.

This is a review of a reprint of Etienne Gilson's History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, published by the Catholic University of America Press in 2019.  An outstanding work of deeper insight into the issues than most histories of medieval philosophy, Gilson 'gets it'.  I did read every word of this formidable volume, already tried and true, and recommend it heartily.  Published in the Sixteenth Century Journal.

Étienne Gilson juxtaposes what he calls Aquinas's "existentialism" to what he calls Scotus's "essentialism." 1 For Gilson, "existentialism" is philosophical truth, the only view compatible with an authentically Christian metaphysic, while "essentialism" is a Hellenic mistake that seduces Christian philosophers by appealing to the idolatrous desire to reduce reality to what is intelligible. In this paper, I will describe the difference between "essentialism" and "existentialism" as defined by Gilson. Thus understood, they are contradictories. Then, I will assess the case for attributing "essentialism" to Scotus, based on an assessment of Scotus texts and secondary scholarship. I will argue that if we adhere to the most straightforward characterization of the dispute between "essentialism" and "existentialism," we see that Scotus actually endorsed the view that Gilson calls "existentialism"-consciously accepting it, as an implication of his views. Therefore, he also would have rejected the view that Gilson calls "essentialism." This shows that Scotus is closer to Aquinas, than Gilson thinks he is; and indeed, that

Il presente  documento costituisce il nucleo ontologico indispensabile alla proposta filosofica del movimento culturale dell'Illumanesimo. Se il volume introduttivo L'Illumanesimo traccia le coordinate generali del paradigma e Esperienze ne sviluppa l'antropologia filosofica, La Realtà fornisce al movimento ciò che ogni autentica svolta culturale richiede: una visione coerente e argomentata della struttura fondamentale della Realtà universale, del CEFA e dell’Assoluto.
L'opera si articola attorno ai tre pilastri dell'architettura ontologica illumanista: la Realtà universale, intesa come totalità dinamica fondata sulle "idee semplici" — elementi primi perfetti e indivisibili che costituiscono i mattoni fondamentali dell'esistente; lo Spirito (CEFA), sostanza autocosciente e libera che evolve qualitativamente attraverso l'esperienza, nella dialettica tra parte potenziale e parte manifesta; Dio, concepito come realtà impersonale e assoluta che opera attraverso principi universali, origine dell'emanazione da cui scaturisce la Realtà senza esaurirsi in essa.
Centrale è la concezione dei principi universali: l’equilibrio, la giustizia, la libertà, proposti non più come elementi teorici astratti ma come principi architettonici universali, non astrazioni morali ma strutture attive dell'Essere che permeano ogni livello della Realtà. La perfezione divina non è stato statico ma processo dinamico di manifestazione, e l'evoluzione dello Spirito procede come riscoperta progressiva del proprio potenziale infinito attraverso la Realtà quale campo esperienziale.
Il documento e il libro collegato offrono al movimento illumanista un fondamento teoretico che legittima la proposta culturale come visione coerente e aderente alla Realtà universale.

Nell’ambito della riflessione antropologico-cristiana parlare di “creazione” significa affermare che la vita, il mondo, l’Essere nella sua totalità esistono perché Dio li ha voluti e, a seguito di ciò, è possibile intelligere in essi una Sua impronta; il tema della conoscibilità naturale di Dio ha qui la sua fonte: Dio è conoscibile per via naturale, oltre che per la Rivelazione, perché ciò che esiste ha identità tale che a Lui è collegata. Tuttavia, in una cultura, come quella coeva, ove pare sufficiente un approccio scientifico per dar conto di tutte le domande di senso che l’uomo si pone, tale prospettiva appare quantomeno sofferente. In tal senso la presenza di un logos nella natura come riverbero del Logos creatore è un tema, a mio avviso affascinante, che è stato oggetto di studio da parte di Joseph Ratzinger e che occupa una posizione preminente all’interno della suo sistema teologico. In questo lavoro mi propongo, dunque, di evidenziare il significato di tale tema, focalizzando poi l’attenzione su come Ratzinger colga l’intrinseca razionalità del creato come propedeutica a quella “conoscenza naturale” di cui sopra e come essa sia un dato ineludibile per la scienza perché: «l’esperienza dello scienziato quale essere umano è quella di percepire una costante, una legge, un logos che egli non ha creato, ma che ha invece osservato: infatti, esso ci porta ad ammettere l’esistenza di una Ragione onnipotente, che è altro da quella dell’uomo e che sostiene il mondo». Si tratta di un argomento che ricorre nella teologia di Ratzinger, soprattutto nell’ambito della sua predicazione episcopale, dunque il materiale bibliografico si presenta sufficiente, seppure non vi siano testi che sviluppino esclusivamente il tema, soprattutto nel novero della bibliografia secondaria. Da un punto di vista metodologico non ho fatto differenza tra il materiale riguardante il lavoro teologico di Ratzinger da quello del suo magistero pontificio, potendosi, comunque, cogliere in questo ambito una sostanziale continuità di pensiero.
Per quanto riguarda l’organizzazione degli argomenti, il capitolo 1, dopo una generale presentazione della formazione, delle fonti e dei fondamenti della teologia ratzingeriana, presta particolare attenzione allo sviluppo della categoria di Logos nel pensiero del teologo bavarese, evidenziando come essa sia di fatto strutturante la sua teologia ed illustrandone il significato/ruolo nell’ambito del tema in trattazione. Il capitolo 2 analizza più in profondità la riflessione di Ratzinger sulla creazione, considerando l’insieme dei testi pubblicati in Italia col titolo: In principio Dio creò il cielo e la terra. Riflessioni sulla creazione e il peccato, sintesi di quattro prediche quaresimali, tenute dal teologo tedesco nel 1981 nella cattedrale di Monaco, nell’ambito del suo ministero episcopale, nonché alcuni testi successivi, interventi nelle vesti di pontefice, per lo più raccolti nell’antologia, a cura di Umberto Casale, Fede e Scienza. Un dialogo necessario.
Infine si presentano le conclusioni utili, se vogliamo pratiche, riguardo la considerazione dell’intrinseca razionalità nel creato: guardando ad una prospettiva generale prima fra tutte è la riappropriazione di una visione metafisico-trascendente della natura, quanto mai attuale considerando l’inesauribile apertura dell’uomo ad una completezza di senso che non trova soddisfazione da una mera visione scientista dell’Essere.

L'opposizione tra teoria e prassi, tra contemplazione e azione, tra filosofia come gnosi (e diagnosi) e filosofia come terapia attraversa la storia. Si tratta di due modi incompatibili di impostare il discorso, oppure (per dirla con Guardini) di una "opposizione polare", una tensione generatrice di vita? L'esperienza francescana può risultare illuminante al riguardo. Con la sua conversione, Francesco d'Assisi aveva messo al centro il desiderio di "vivere secondo la forma del santo Vangelo"; pur considerandosi "illetterato" e dissuadendo i suoi frati dal voler diventare "letterati" 1 , aveva però autorizzato Antonio a "insegnar teologia ai frati", ma in funzione della predicazione e a condizione di salvaguardare lo "spirito di orazione e devozione" 2. Per giunta, aveva messo in guardia dall'ambizione intellettuale: "se anche tutti i maestri dell'università di Parigi fossero entrati nell'Ordine", non sarebbe stata quella la "perfetta letizia" 3 .

The diagnosis concerning the end of a "régime de Chrétienté" seems today to enjoy broad consensus within the Magisterium, from the French episcopate to the highest levels of the universal Church. The present contribution traces, through a number of key expressions, the historical and theological genealogy of this consensus. Starting from the Cardinal Suhard's pastoral letter Essor ou déclin de l'Église (1947), the article reaches back to the Parisian intellectual milieu of the 1920s and 1930s-from Nikolaj Alexandrovič Berdjaev to Jacques Maritain, from Emmanuel Mounier to Étienne Gilson-in which the critical distinction between Christianity and Christendom was elaborated, before tracing its trajectory through to Marie-Dominique Chenu's formula on the "end of the Constantinian era" (1961) and the conciliar declaration Dignitatis humanae (1965).

Molti credono, sbagliando, che la Storia sia una materia. La Storia è anche una materia, anzi è un numero infinito di materie (Storia della filosofia, del diritto, della medicina etc.). Ma è in primo luogo un metodo; più esattamente è il modo di vedere la Vita al di là dei momenti contingenti.

Un frammento anonimo di età ellenistica riporta le parole “di ogni cosa buon giudice è il Tempo”: il Tempo era il parametro, il riferimento delle riflessioni. Oggi è stato sostituito dal parametro “denaro”. Ma il denaro, come il mercato, è un’entità mobile, instabile. Alla saldezza del Tempo si è anteposta l’instabilità indeterminata. Ci si compiace della fluidità sociale. Manca però il giudice.
È una società, quindi, quella del XXI secolo, che fatica a giudicare.

This collection of lectures is a "spruced-up" version of my old Yale lectures (described below), augmented by some later lecture notes to round out my take on some salient points in the Western history of ideas; hence the '+' in the title. The lectures presented here are the by-product of my teaching in Yale's Directed Studies program from 1991 through 1993 (hence the title, for want of a better). In fact, being what they are, lecture notes for an introductory philosophy course, they present rather elementary material. Yet I flatter myself, they do not lack certain originality in the treatment of some of the basic questions of traditional metaphysics and epistemology. In any case, over the past couple of years they proved to be quite useful in teaching my several other courses, especially in medieval philosophy. Thus, being too elementary for transforming them into scholarly papers, on the one hand, yet, containing what I think to be both philosophically interesting and pedagogically useful ideas, on the other, I decided to publish them here, in the Net's formally less stringent medium. Here they can easily be accessed by people who think what they need is a clear and simple discussion of the intriguing philosophical points themselves, rather than the meticulous and sometimes cumbersome scholarly discussions of the texts that raised them (a description which fits, at least, the majority of my students). Given these considerations (as well as the author's lack of time), the lectures are presented here basically unedited, in the form as they were actually delivered, without any notes or references (disregarding the occasionally inserted page numbers, serving as reminders for myself, referring to the texts we used in class). However, anyone who is interested in the more detailed scholarly discussion of some of the topics touched upon here may wish to check some of the papers listed on my list of publications. 1.

The concept of natura pura has been criticized often enough on historical grounds-as a late scholastic invention, absent from patristic sources, a post-Tridentian artifact that de Lubac exposed with considerable documentary force. That critique is correct but limited: it establishes that the concept lacks ancient warrant without establishing that it is itself unintelligible. The argument advanced here is stronger. Natura pura is not merely historically unauthorized. It is architectonically incoherent-and it is so from two distinct but convergent directions: from within the Thomist tradition most defensibly received, and from the convergent analyses of rational consciousness developed by David Bentley Hart and Bernard Lonergan through entirely independent methodological routes. These two critiques are not the same argument stated twice. They engage different resources, operate at different registers, and arrive at their conclusions by different paths. But they are homologous in structure, and together they constitute a genuine pincer: natura pura cannot be coherently derived from the tradition that invented it, and it cannot be positively specified from any phenomenological or transcendental direction. A purely natural rational intellect, selfstanding and formally independent of its constitutive ground in divine knowing and divine being, is not a leaner version of the creature we actually are. It is not a creature at all. It is an absence given a name.

Il saggio ricostruisce la storia del concetto di intelletto dalla filosofia greca classica fino al dibattito medievale tra Averroè e Tommaso d'Aquino, con una nota conclusiva sul suo rapporto con il Cogito cartesiano.
Il percorso prende avvio da Socrate, la cui affermazione «so di non sapere» non è una resa intellettuale ma la fondazione di un rapporto riflessivo e dinamico con la conoscenza. Segue la trattazione degli Stoici — con Seneca come voce principale — che elaborarono la nozione di logos come principio razionale insieme cosmico e individuale, valorizzando l'interiorità come luogo privilegiato della verità. Aristotele fornisce poi il quadro psicologico sistematico nel De Anima, ma introduce con la distinzione tra intelletto possibile e intelletto agente un'ambiguità destinata ad alimentare secoli di dibattito.
È attorno a questa ambiguità che si confrontano i due protagonisti medievali. Averroè sostiene che l'intelletto materiale è un'unica sostanza separata e universale, comune a tutta l'umanità (monopsichismo): posizione filosoficamente coerente ma incompatibile con la dottrina cristiana dell'immortalità personale. Tommaso d'Aquino, nel De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas, risponde che l'intelletto è la forma propria dell'anima individuale: è questo uomo che pensa, non una sostanza cosmica esterna.
Il saggio conclude individuando in questa lunga tradizione una continuità sotterranea con il Cogito ergo sum cartesiano: la certezza riflessiva dell'atto intellettivo come proprio, da Socrate a Seneca fino a Tommaso, prepara la formulazione moderna del soggetto pensante — pur con la differenza cruciale che il soggetto antico e medievale rimane sempre, a differenza di quello cartesiano, un soggetto incarnato.

Étienne Gilson es conocido sobre todo como el filósofo que, al rastrear las fuentes medievales del pensamiento cartesiano en su tesis doctoral, abrió el camino para el redescubrimiento de la filosofía medieval como tradición viva y rigurosa. Resulta por eso notable que, en la última etapa de su carrera, dedicara tres libros a la filosofía del arte — Painting and Reality (1957), The Arts of the Beautiful (1965) y Forms and Substances in the Arts (1966)—, obras que constituyen una de las reflexiones más originales y menos estudiadas de su pensamiento. Este ensayo analiza esos tres libros con el propósito de rescatar la centralidad de lo bello en la estética gilsoniana. La tesis principal sostiene que, en la filosofía de Gilson, el arte pertenece al orden del hacer (poiesis) y no al del conocer, lo cual le confiere una autonomía que no lo subordina a la religión ni a ninguna otra disciplina. Se establece un contraste con la teoría especulativa del arte descrita por Jean-Marie Schaeffer en L'art de l'âge moderne, donde las artes quedan sometidas a una exigencia cognoscitiva: se les pide que produzcan conocimiento, que sean vehículo de una verdad superior. Frente a esa tradición, Gilson propone una filosofía del arte fundada en la distinción entre calología (el estudio de la belleza como trascendental del ser), estética (la percepción de las obras) y filosofía del arte propiamente dicha (la teoría de cómo se producen las obras). Esta triple distinción permite pensar la creación artística como una actividad autónoma orientada a la producción de la belleza por la belleza misma.

Although for Aquinas universals are “better known” than particulars, the problem of universals is fraught with many problems of its own. The narrow but important aspect of the problem of universals that I focus on here is the status of common natures as a principle for human knowing. I argue that the common nature for Aquinas is distinct from the nature absolutely considered. This conceptual distinction sheds surprising light in our understanding of Aquinas’s treatment of universals.

El artículo de Desmond J. FitzGerald rinde homenaje a Gerald B. Phelan como figura central del renacimiento tomista en Norteamérica. Destaca su papel en el Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, su colaboración con Etienne Gilson y Jacques Maritain, y su defensa del realismo tomista, especialmente en “Verum Sequitur Esse Rerum”, donde afirma que la verdad sigue al ser de las cosas. Más que por sus publicaciones, sobresalió como maestro y formador de generaciones de tomistas.

Semblanza intelectual y espiritual del destacado tomista Gerald B. Phelan, figura clave en la consolidación de los estudios medievales en Norteamérica. El texto de Anton C. Pegis presenta a Gerald B. Phelan como figura decisiva en la consolidación del tomismo en Norteamérica, especialmente en el Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Aunque metafísico por vocación y profundamente centrado en el esse de Tomás de Aquino, dedicó su vida a la construcción institucional y a la formación de estudiantes, dejando una huella más como maestro y orientador intelectual.

Instituto de Autoeducação Este artigo examina o conceito de "ser" na tradição filosófica, suas determinações e distinções fundamentais, e propõe conexões com a autoeducação, entendida como o alinhamento entre o ser e o saber. São preservadas as referências a autores clássicos como Hegel, Duns Scotus, Tomás de Aquino e Kleutgen, integrando suas ideias ao debate contemporâneo sobre formação pessoal e autoeducação.

Étienne Gilson juxtaposes what he calls Aquinas's "existentialism" to what he calls Scotus's "essentialism." 1 For Gilson, "existentialism" is philosophical truth, the only view compatible with an authentically Christian metaphysic, while "essentialism" is a Hellenic mistake that seduces Christian philosophers by appealing to the idolatrous desire to reduce reality to what is intelligible. In this paper, I will describe the difference between "essentialism" and "existentialism" as defined by Gilson. Thus understood, they are contradictories. Then, I will assess the case for attributing "essentialism" to Scotus, based on an assessment of Scotus texts and secondary scholarship. I will argue that if we adhere to the most straightforward characterization of the dispute between "essentialism" and "existentialism," we see that Scotus actually endorsed the view that Gilson calls "existentialism"-consciously accepting it, as an implication of his views. Therefore, he also would have rejected the view that Gilson calls "essentialism." This shows that Scotus is closer to Aquinas, than Gilson thinks he is; and indeed, that

The aim of this essay is to examine Francisco Suárez's criticism to the Thomistic notion of materia signata quantitate as a principle of individuation, proving the theoretical significance of the arguments within the broader context of Suárez's metaphysical framework. Before delving into the core of the criticism, I explore the philosophical concept of individuality and its semantic implications, establishing a solid foundation for interpreting Suárez's discussion accurately. Subsequently, I expound arguments against the three interpretative paradigms of the concept of signate matter Suárez draws from Thomistic tradition, namely quantity as an intrinsic property of matter, quantity as a relational property of matter, and finally quantity as a basis for epistemologically differentiating material substances. In conclusion, I emphasize Suárez's view that the third interpretation of signate matter lacks textual support in Aquinas' works, even though he acknowledges its theoretical worth.

The first part of this article presents the historical and philosophical conditions for understanding the problem of human corporeality and sexuality, which led to the shift of this issue to the domain of practical philosophy. It was admitted that sexuality is an accidental element of human nature, as the division into sexes is common to all more complex living beings. Consequently, theoretical philosophy, which does not deal with accidents but only with what is essential and necessary in existing reality, has neglected to develop an adequate theory of sexuality. In modern times, characterized by technological development and significant transformations in social life, the traditional understandings of gender, based primarily on the fulfillment of social roles, have also been questioned. This has led to the need to develop new ways of functioning for women and men in society. This has contributed to the emergence of feminist movements and gender ideologies. Influenced by these movements, thinkers recognized that sexual difference is, after all, essential to being human. Hence, a paradigm shift in thinking about human sexuality was needed. Additionally, realist philosophy emphasized the suggestion that being female and being male are two modes of human existence. This led to the thesis that human sexuality is determined by the soul, which itself must be sexual. The second part of this article will present the metaphysical arguments supporting this thesis.

The starting point of my considerations in this article is the debate among historians of philosophy about the existence of such a thing as Christian philosophy. Within this debate, the question of the very legitimacy of the use of such a term in historical-philosophical discourse has arisen. The purpose of my article is to show how the use of the term Christian philosophy can be justified by using the example of the thought of Saint Augustine of Hippo, who, in many respects, can be considered the historical model of the Christian philosopher. Christianity is not a censoring factor for him but facilitates his reflections by showing a way out of intellectual problems of pagan culture.

This paper is a response to Mariusz Tabaczek’s critique of Michal Chaberek’s previous paper “Where Do Substantial Forms Come From? – A Critique of the Theistic Evolution of Mariusz Tabaczek.” It begins with general remarks on the limits of science and the status of evolutionary theory in the biological sciences. Then Tabaczek’s main argument for the compatibility of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics with evolution is presented along with a reiteration of the first response by Chaberek. In the following sections, the paper debunks subsequent claims of Tabaczek by showing inconsistencies in his arguments. The conclusion is that Tabaczek not only has not explained how evolutionary transitions in evolution would come about (specifically where the new substantial forms would come from) but that his writing cannot be deemed compatible with the metaphysics adopted by Thomas Aquinas.

Part one of this two-part paper described the historically problematic status of multiplicity per se within the order of being throughout the tradition of classical metaphysics, as framed by Ferdinand Ulrich’s Homo Abyssus (HA). The present part of this paper introduces Ulrich’s interpretation of Aquinas into the ongoing debate among contemporary Thomists over the reality of essence as existential limit. Against the background of the parameters for a possible solution set out in the paper’s first part (focused on history), this second part engages in a critical reconstruction of the opposed extant positions on existential limit defended by John Wippel (“thick essence”) and William Carlo (“thin essence”). After reviewing the place of transcendental aliquid and multitudo for Aquinas, and after tracing Aquinas’s doctrine of the ultimate formal principles of diversity in being, the account offered in HA is compared and contrasted with the competing views of Wippel and Carlo. Rereading this debate through the lens of HA demonstrates the dialectical superiority of Ulrich’s conception of existential limit as a reading of Aquinas, and as an available and attractive metaphysical approach to the problem of multiplicity in being.

The article analyzes the notion of philosophical education in Étienne Gilson’s essay History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education. The French thinker presents philosophy not as a collection of doctrines but as a life devoted to the pursuit of wisdom, requiring a personal act of knowledge and inner formation. The teaching of philosophy makes sense only insofar as it leads to authentic philosophizing rather than merely the transmission of knowledge. A key role in this process is played by the history of philosophy, which makes it possible to encounter great masters and enter into dialogue with their works. The master–disciple relationship, also through the reading of the classics, constitutes the foundation of philosophical formation. Gilson emphasizes the communal dimension of philosophy, understood as participation in the community of philosophers built over the centuries.

CHAPITRE PREMIER. - DE LA RENAISSANCE CAROLINGIENNE
AU XI'' SIËCLE 3
^ Uï 2 3 19^ ^ philosophie médiévale 3
z. La philosophie au temps de Charlemagne. 8
3. Jean Scot Érigène Il
4. Le problème des universaux au IX® siècle. 27
5. Le X® siècle. Gerbert d'Aurillac 29
CHAPITRE IL — LA PHILOSOPHIE AU XI" SIÈCLE 33
1 . Dialecticiens et théologiens 33
2. Roscelin et le nominalisme 38
3. S. Anselme de Cantorbéry 41
CHAPITRE III. — LA PHILOSOPHIE AU XII' SIÈCLE 57
1 . L'école de Chartres 57
2. Abélard. Les Victorins 69
3. L'esprit du XII= siècle 88
CHAPITRE IV. — LES PHILOSOPHIES ORIENTALES 96
1 . La philosophie arabe 96
2. La philosophie juive 1 09
CHAPITRE V. — L'INFLUENCE D'ARISTOTE ET LA FONDATIONDES
UNIVERSITÉS 118
1 . L influence d'Aristote 118
2. La fondation des universités 126
CHAPITRE VI. — SAINT BONAVENTURE 141

LE SENS DU EATIONALISME CHRETIEN 15 20 ÉTUDES DE PHDLOSOPHIE MEDIEVALE ' Cf. Descartes, VIII, 358, 6 -11. Mersenne, p. 185, note 1. Notons d'ailleurs que si Descartes parle ici comme Mersenne, il ne lui emprunte pas l'expression. C'est Regius qui la lui fournit dans son objection. 2 « Non enim unquam scripsi vcl judicavi, inentem indigere ideis innatis, quae sint aliquid diversum ab ejus facultate cogitandi. » VIII, 357, 26-28. 3 Cf. plus haut, p. 151, note 2. * Troisièmes obj., IX, 147. î> Cf. plus haut, p. 186, note 1.

El presente escrito se enmarca en mi trabajo de investigación
que culmina en la escritura de mi Tesis de Maestría en Psicoa
nálisis intitulada “Relaciones entre la topología nodal de Lacan
y la ontología” dirigida por el Dr . Pablo D . Muñoz . En este caso
tomo la crítica lacaniana a la Metafísica de Aristóteles, su re
chazo a la ontología y su apuesta por una henología, trabajo
contemporáneo a la emergencia en la enseñanza de Lacan de
la topología nodal, a la que no me dedicaré en esta oportunidad

Il presente studio esplora il profondo legame di amicizia spirituale tra Raïssa Maritain e il cardinale Charles Journet, un rapporto che si colloca al crocevia tra filosofia, teologia e vita spirituale. Attraverso una corrispondenza ricca di riflessioni e condivisioni, i due intellettuali hanno intrecciato un dialogo unico, alimentato dalla ricerca della verità e dal desiderio di una santità vissuta nel quotidiano. Questo legame, basato sulla stima reciproca e sulla comune aspirazione alla trascendenza, rappresenta un esempio luminoso di come l’amicizia possa diventare uno spazio di crescita interiore e di approfondimento della fede. Lo studio proposto analizza il contesto storico, i temi centrali della loro relazione e il significato che questa ha assunto nella loro vita e nelle loro opere.

Recently, Mariusz Tabaczek published Theistic Evolution: A Con tempo rary Aristotelian-Thomistic Perspective 1-a book which the Author seemed to consider a definitive work on the topic. However, a few months later, he published a paper to present "several minor yet important further clarifications, developments, and answers." 2 Even though my adversary's views keep evolving, I believe I should write a re

The paper focuses on a central juncture in the long crisis that touches Eucharistic doctrine in the Middle Ages, namely the alleged dispute between Paschasius Radbertus and Ratramnus of Corbie in the ninth century regarding the presence of Christ in the sacrament: in figure or in truth? Starting from the observation that the visions of the two monks are not opposed, as was believed from the 10th-11th centuries onward, we intend first to show that theirs are complementary attempts to translate within clear and unambiguous categories the vagueness of patristic doctrine. In order to explain the origin of this need for clarification, we show how the Corbian context was permeated by the influence of the first return of Aristotelianism (the logica vetus) on the basis of a broader Carolingian program of modernization of society and rationalization of doctrine. The Eucharistic crisis, the first signs of which can be seen in Corbie, thus appears as a bargaining over the meaning of patristic doctrine in order to preserve a balance between symbolism and realism, made necessary as the effect of a logical-ontological paradigm shift in order to preserve the unity of the faith and thus of the Christian community. This crisis will close only with the doctrine of transubstantiation, at the end of a long process of rationalization taken over by a class of experts of theology.

In several of his writings Hegel suggests an identification of his absolute idea/spirit with Aristotle's God in the Metaphysics. This suggestion is remarkable since it indicates that Hegel regarded his philosophy in line with classical positions in ancient metaphysics. Although there is increasing discussion of the relation between Hegel and Aristotle it is still doubtful what it was that Hegel seemed to find at the highest point of Aristotle's philosophy. To clarify this relation within the realm of first philosophy I will first give a short reconstruction of Aristotle's conception of God in order, second, to confront this conception with the absolute idea/spirit in Hegel. Against Ferrarin, I will not primarily discuss the conception of actuality/activity and infinite subjectivity; rather I will focus on Aristotle's and Hegel's ontological understanding of truth. The new thesis in my paper is that Hegel can relate his theory of the absolute idea/spirit to Aristotle's God on the basis of their shared understanding of truth. This understanding allows both of them to find the highest realization and thus the fulfillment of truth in the self-thinking thinking of God (Aristotle) or the self-thinking thinking of the absolute idea/spirit (Hegel). When Hegel seems to return to Aristotle at the end of his system, this return has its systematic link in the idea of a fulfilled truth which is God or the Absolute in the sense of self-thinking thinking. Although Hegel's return to Aristotle's theology has a certain plausibility, it is also limited by the fact that for Aristotle God's self-thinking thinking is not a process of selfdetermination, as Hegel finds it to be and which leads him to miss a crucial feature of Aristotle's theology. It is no exaggeration to say that Hegel was one of the most influential of those who rediscovered Aristotle's philosophy in the early nineteenth century. In the second (1827) and the third (1830) editions of his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, he ends the Philosophy of Spirit, and thus the conclusive part of his mature system, with an untranslated and uncommented quotation that is taken from the seventh chapter of book Λ in Aristotle's Metaphysics. In book Λ, as is well known, Aristotle formulates some of the most speculative sentences about God and the human

In several of his writings Hegel suggests an identification of his absolute idea/spirit with Aristotle's God in the Metaphysics. This suggestion is remarkable since it indicates that Hegel regarded his philosophy in line with classical positions in ancient metaphysics. Although there is increasing discussion of the relation between Hegel and Aristotle it is still doubtful what it was that Hegel seemed to find at the highest point of Aristotle's philosophy. To clarify this relation within the realm of first philosophy I will first give a short reconstruction of Aristotle's conception of God in order, second, to confront this conception with the absolute idea/spirit in Hegel. Against Ferrarin, I will not primarily discuss the conception of actuality/activity and infinite subjectivity; rather I will focus on Aristotle's and Hegel's ontological understanding of truth. The new thesis in my paper is that Hegel can relate his theory of the absolute idea/spirit to Aristo...

St. Thomas did not bequeath any special expositions on aesthetics but expressed his contemplations and discourses on beauty and art within his theological writings specifically on how the beautiful differs (and yet is related) from goodness and truth. In the light of his reason, St. Thomas ultimately believed that the beauty of God is not “the point of departure” but rather the ‘terminus’, nor the starting point be the beauty of the works of art1.

To St. Thomas, there are threefold roots of the beautiful: “integritas sive perfetio, debita proportio sive consonancia, et iterum claritas”. Integritas is translated as wholeness or completeness, and by extension also unity or undividedness. Proportion or harmony is, in so far as “its confluent parts are arranged in accordance with its intrinsic end” determined by its form. Claritas, on the other hand is “the intelligible radiance permeating the whole being” that flows from the form2.