Hawk Dove Game

This paper explores the Philippines’ dilemma under the One-China Policy amid rising cross-strait tensions. It traces the policy’s roots in the 1949 Chinese Civil War and explains how Manila formally recognizes the People’s Republic of China (PRC) while maintaining strong economic and labor ties with Taiwan. The analysis highlights three key factors: the U.S. role in shaping the policy through the Taiwan Relations Act, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s acknowledgment that the Philippines cannot avoid involvement due to proximity and overseas workers, and the country’s economic dependence on both China and Taiwan. The study recommends sustaining strategic neutrality, working through ASEAN for collective security, and strengthening protections for Filipino workers in Taiwan. Overall, the Philippines must balance its diplomacy to safeguard national interests while supporting regional peace and stability.

We present a novel hybrid modelling framework that takes into account two aspects which have been largely neglected in previous models of spatial evolutionary games: random motion and chemotaxis. A stochastic individual-based model is used to describe the player dynamics, whereas the evolution of the chemoattractant is governed by a reaction-diffusion equation. The two models are coupled by deriving individual movement rules via the discretisation of a taxis-diffusion equation which describes the evolution of the local number of players. In this framework, individuals occupying the same position can engage in a two-player game, and are awarded a payoff, in terms of reproductive fitness, according to their strategy. As an example, we let individuals play the Hawk-Dove game. Numerical simulations illustrate how random motion and chemotactic response can bring about self-generated dynamical patterns that create favourable conditions for the coexistence of hawks and doves in situations ...

AWe are very grateful to USAID for funding the data collection. We thank the Addis Ababa University survey team for fantastic data collection work, and John Maluccio, Elen Payongayong and Oscar Neidecker$Gonzales for their assistance in preparing the data for analysis. The support of ...

A genetic algorithm incorporating mutation and crossing-over was used to investigate the evolution of social behaviour in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken (Hawk-Dove), Battle of the Sexes, and Leader games. The results show that the strategic structure of an interaction has a crucial determining effect on the type of social behaviour that evolves. In particular, simulations using repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken (Hawk-Dove) games lead to the emergence of genes coding for symmetric reciprocity and the evolution of mutual cooperation, whereas simulations using repeated Battle of the Sexes and Leader games lead to nearfixation of genes coding for asymmetric strategic choices and the evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity. A mechanism is suggested whereby, in games with asymmetric equilibrium points, coordinated alternating reciprocity might evolve without insight or communication between players.

In situations where people have an incentive to coordinate their behavior, law can provide a framework for understanding and predicting what others are likely to do. According to the focal point theory of legal compliance, the law's articulation of a behavior can sometimes create self‐fulfilling expectations that it will occur. Existing theories of legal compliance emphasize the effect of sanctions or legitimacy; we argue that, in addition to sanctions and legitimacy, law can also influence compliance simply by making one outcome salient. We tested this claim in two experiments where sanctions and legitimacy were held constant. Experiment 1 demonstrated that a mandatory legal rule operating in a property dispute influenced compliance only when there was an element of coordination. Experiment 2 demonstrated that a default rule in a contract negotiation acted as a focal point for coordinating negotiation decisions. Both experiments confirm that legal rules can create a focal point...

We study the relationship between smallholder milk market participation and women`s intra-household bargaining position in Ethiopia, using a quasi-experiment and propensity score matching. In market participant households, milk income is higher and its control has shifted from women to men. Our data also indicate that men transfer this income partly to their wives. Qualitative findings indicate that men see this as recognition for their wife's household maintenance responsibility. Women argue however that transferring income is also men`s tactic for reducing intra-household conflict. Overall, dependency between husbands and wives seems higher and a woman's bargaining position stronger in participant households.

In evolutionary algorithms that evolve populations of strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, higher levels of cooperation evolve when the strategies engage in longer contests. When IPD-playing organisms are segregated into clans, with different strategies for contests with members of the same and other clans, populations evolve higher levels of cooperation for contests within clans. Cooperation between members of different clans increases with the length of their contests, but decreases when there are more clans. When organisms use the same strategy for contests with friends and with strangers, the difference between cooperation within and between clans is smaller, but persists.

In evolutionary algorithms that evolve populations of strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, higher levels of cooperation evolve when the strategies engage in longer contests. When IPD-playing organisms are segregated into clans, with different strategies for contests with members of the same and other clans, populations evolve higher levels of cooperation for contests within clans. Cooperation between members of different clans increases with the length of their contests, but decreases when there are more clans. When organisms use the same strategy for contests with friends and with strangers, the difference between cooperation within and between clans is smaller, but persists.

Given the importance of the household as a resource allocation mechanism, considerable interest exists in its efficiency. Most of the non-experimental evidence for inefficiency comes from West African farm households in which husbands and wives pursue separate productive activities. Using experiments, we test for efficiency of spouses' resource allocation decisions in a range of household types. In North India, we selected households that are unified, in northern Nigeria households characterised by separate spheres of economic decision making. Our other sites occupy carefully selected intermediate positions on the spectrum from unitary to separate-spheres household types. We find that, the more separate is decision making in real life, the less efficient is resource allocation in the experiments. Moreover, female control of resource allocation tends to lower efficiency, in contrast to male control. The exception is a site in northern Nigeria where female control of resource allocation is well established.

We use a randomized controlled trial and behavioral game to study the extent and determinants of income hiding in rural Vietnam. We focus on a training program that aims to promote gender equality and entrepreneurship among women in poverty who are engaged in running a small business. In one treatment arm, we allow husbands to participate in the training as well. While the impact of the training on income hiding is not significant at usual significance levels if only women are allowed to follow the training, we provide some evidence that the training invites women to hide income. Our study also suggests that allowing husbands to be present at the training intensifies this effect. We discuss several mechanisms that may explain these findings, including an increase in expected income and a decrease in information asymmetry between the spouses.

Group cooperation is fundamental to human society. The public goods game is often used to describe the difficulty of group cooperation. However, there are other structures of institutions to maintain group cooperation such as Rotating savings and credit associations (ROS-CAs). ROSCAs are informal financial institutions that exist worldwide, in which all participants contribute to a common fund and take turns to receive a return. ROSCAs are common in developing countries and among migrant groups in developed countries. There are various types of ROSCAs, and they share a crucial problem in that participants whose turn to receive a return has passed have an incentive to default on their contributions. We conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the mechanisms that can prevent default in a fixed ROSCA, in which the order of receipt of returns is determined before starting and is also known to members. The findings are as follows. (i) Excluding low contributors from ROSCA groups by voting increased contribution rates both before and after the receipt of returns. (ii) ROSCA members exhibited reciprocity and a sense of revenge: that is, members contributed to the returns payments of other members who had contributed to them, and did not contribute to the returns payments of non-contributors. Voluntary behaviors thus sustained ROSCAs. Meanwhile, an exogenous punishment whereby subjects were prevented from receiving returns payments unless they had themselves contributed previously did not increase contribution rates.

We use a randomized controlled trial and behavioral game to study the extent and determinants of income hiding in rural Vietnam. We focus on a training program that aims to promote gender equality and entrepreneurship among women in poverty who are engaged in running a small business. In one treatment arm, we allow husbands to participate in the training as well. While the impact of the training on income hiding is not significant at usual significance levels if only women are allowed to follow the training, we provide some evidence that the training invites women to hide income. Our study also suggests that allowing husbands to be present at the training intensifies this effect. We discuss several mechanisms that may explain these findings, including an increase in expected income and a decrease in information asymmetry between the spouses.

We have used gender-disaggregated household panel data from 2007 and 2012 in combination with dictator games and hawk-dove games to assess the effects of joint land certification of husbands and wives on wives' involvement in land-related decisions within households. We find that joint land certification has enhanced wives' knowledge of their rights and their influence in land-related decisions, while about a third of husbands attempt to retain their dominant positions, preferring that women retain only their traditional weak rights. Better market integration is associated with stronger influence by women in land-related decisions. More generous husbands, as revealed by dictator game experiments between husbands and wives, had wives who were more aware of their land rights. The hawk-dove games reveal that wives play tougher and are more hawkish than their husbands when they play against each other. This may indicate that wives dare to stand up and claim their rights within households. Husbands and wives in households that had received joint land certificates were less hawkish towards one another.

Lab-in-the-field Hawk-Dove game experiments were played by spouses in a rural sample of households in Southern Ethiopia where women/wives traditionally have a weak position. Randomized treatments included a 3x3 design with simultaneous, one-way signaling and sequential games as the first dimension and Pareto-efficient, Pareto-inferior and Pareto-superior (Dove;Dove) payout treatments as the second dimension, with a sequence of six game rounds per household. The experiments allow for the assessment of the presence of alternative player types, such as players that prioritize household income maximization, players that prioritize personal income, players that are Hawkish and punish their spouse at their own expense, and cooperative reciprocators (Doves) who cooperate even at the expense of household and personal income. The experiments revealed that all player types were present in the sample. Husbands played significantly less Hawkish than their wives and played gradually less Hawkish over the six game rounds, whereas wives remained Hawkish.

To understand the meaning of evolutionary equilibria, it is necessary to comprehend the ramifications of the evolutionary model. For instance, a full appreciation of Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation requires that we identify assumptions under which conditionally cooperative strategies, like Tit For Tat, are and are not evolutionarily stable. And more generally, when does stability fail? To resolve these questions

The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium in which players in one population play "hawk" and players in the other population play "dove," and a symmetric mixed equilibrium. The existing literature on dynamic evolutionary models shows that populations will converge to playing one of the asymmetric pure equilibria from any initial state. By contrast, we show that plausible sampling dynamics, in which agents occasionally revise their actions by observing either opponents' behavior or payoffs in a few past interactions, can induce the opposite result: global convergence to a symmetric mixed equilibrium.

In this paper we consider the hawk-dove game played by a finite population formed by two types of individual who fail to recognize their own type but do observe the type of their opponent. In this game we find two evolutionarily stable strategies and show that in each of them one type of individuals suffers more aggression than the other. When a continuum of individuals is considered there are no evolutionarily stable strategies but neutrally stable strategies.

We report results from an experiment that explores the empirical validity of correlated equilibrium, an important generalization of the Nash equilibrium concept. Specifically, we seek to understand the conditions under which subjects playing the game of Chicken will condition their behavior on private, third-party recommendations drawn from known distributions. In a "goodrecommendations" treatment, the distribution we use is a correlated equilibrium with payoffs better than any symmetric payoff in the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoff vectors. In a "badrecommendations" treatment, the distribution is a correlated equilibrium with payoffs worse than any Nash equilibrium payoff vector. In a "Nash-recommendations" treatment, the distribution is a convex combination of Nash equilibrium outcomes (which is also a correlated equilibrium), and in a fourth "very-good-recommendations" treatment, the distribution yields high payoffs, but is not a correlated equilibrium. We compare behavior in all of these treatments to the case where subjects do not receive recommendations. We find that when recommendations are not given to subjects, behavior is very close to mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium play. When recommendations are given, behavior does differ from mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, with the nature of the differences varying according to the treatment. Our main finding is that subjects will follow third-party recommendations only if those recommendations derive from a correlated equilibrium, and further, if that correlated equilibrium is payoff-enhancing relative to the available Nash equilibria.

Human players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the same game. These �ndings support a distinctive prediction of evolutionary game theory.