Identity Statements

Resumen: En "¿Puede Frege formular el puzzle de Frege?", Stavroula Glezakos argumenta que Frege no puede formular su puzzle sin apelar a algo como la noción teórica de Sinn y, así, el denominado puzzle no afecta a los no-fregeanos, y los fregeanos no deberían desconcertarse por este, puesto que es su marco de referencia el que lo genera y explica. Sin embargo, contrariamente a lo que Glezakos piensa, en este artículo argumento que tanto los fregeanos como los no-fregeanos por igual enfrentan un puzzle acerca de los enunciados verdaderos de identidad concernientes a los nombres propios que puede y debería formularse dadas algunas idiosincrasias de los lenguajes naturales. En efecto, parece que una teoría exitosa de los nombres propios del lenguaje natural debe apelar a entidades como el Sinn para capturar las diferencias cognitivas en los enunciados verdaderos de identidad.

Classical Trinitarians claim that Jesus—the Son of God—is truly God and that there is only one God and the Father is God, the Spirit is God, and the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct. However, if the identity statement that ‘the Son is God’ is understood in the sense of numerical identity, logical incoherence seems immanent. Yet, if the identity statement is understood according to an ‘is’ of predication then it lacks accuracy and permits polytheism. Therefore, we argue that there is another sense of ‘is’ needed in trinitarian discourse that will allow the Christian to avoid logical incoherence while still fully affirming all that is meant to be affirmed in the confession ‘Jesus is God.’ We suggest a sense of ‘is’ that meets this need.

an anonymous referee, and audiences at Simon Fraser University, the Society for Exact Philosophy, the Western Canadian Philosophical Association, and the Russell vs. Meinong Conference for helpful comments on various aspects of this paper. 2 In our quotations, we leave Bedeutung, Sinn, and Bezeichnung (and cognates) untranslated in order to avoid the confusion that would be brought on by using 'nominatum', 'reference', and 'meaning' for Bedeutung, and 'meaning' or 'sense' for Sinn. We got this idea from Russell's practice in his reading notes (see Linsky 2004). Otherwise we generally follow Black's translation of "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (in the 3rd Edition), Furth's translation of Grundgesetze, and Austin's tranlsation of Grundlagen.

an anonymous referee, and audiences at Simon Fraser University, the Society for Exact Philosophy, the Western Canadian Philosophical Association, and the Russell vs. Meinong Conference for helpful comments on various aspects of this paper. 2 In our quotations, we leave Bedeutung, Sinn, and Bezeichnung (and cognates) untranslated in order to avoid the confusion that would be brought on by using 'nominatum', 'reference', and 'meaning' for Bedeutung, and 'meaning' or 'sense' for Sinn. We got this idea from Russell's practice in his reading notes (see Linsky 2004). Otherwise we generally follow Black's translation of "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (in the 3rd Edition), Furth's translation of Grundgesetze, and Austin's tranlsation of Grundlagen.

an anonymous referee, and audiences at Simon Fraser University, the Society for Exact Philosophy, the Western Canadian Philosophical Association, and the Russell vs. Meinong Conference for helpful comments on various aspects of this paper. 2 In our quotations, we leave Bedeutung, Sinn, and Bezeichnung (and cognates) untranslated in order to avoid the confusion that would be brought on by using 'nominatum', 'reference', and 'meaning' for Bedeutung, and 'meaning' or 'sense' for Sinn. We got this idea from Russell's practice in his reading notes (see Linsky 2004). Otherwise we generally follow Black's translation of "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (in the 3rd Edition), Furth's translation of Grundgesetze, and Austin's tranlsation of Grundlagen.

In “On Denoting” and to some extent in “Review of Meinong and Others, Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie” published in the same issue of Mind in 1905, Russell presents not only his famous elimination (or contextual definition) of definite ...

This paper is about the meaning and function of identity statements involving proper names. There are two prominent views on this topic, according to which identity statements ascribe a relation: the object-view, on which identity statements ascribe a relation borne by all objects to themselves, and the name-view, on which an identity statement ‘a is b’ says that the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ codesignate. The object- and name-views may seem to exhaust the field. I make a case for treating identity statements as sui generis instead of attempting to explain them by means of the idea that they ascribe a relation. My contention is that once we do this, no analysis is required.

Francaises sg aussi architectural ;i) et de plus, il n'est pas vrai qu'il n'ajamais employe la comparaison entre la musique et 1'architecture : par exemple, en 1888 dans " Scolie }> faisant suite 5 sa traduction des Pob'mes d'Ecigar Poe2). Il faut, cependant, constater une diff6rence entre les deux poetes : c'est que le discours de Mallarme est moins accessible que celui de Valery, et de plus on trouve cette comparaison moins chez le premier que chez le second.

un emploi pronominal inconnu ou mal connu du verbe laissier et de son equivalent occitan laissar La Chanson de Guillaume, ceuvre du milieu du 12e sieclei), conservee dans un seul rnanuscrit posterieur d'un sibcle (British Museum Add. 38663), presente plusieurs traits caract6ristiques du dialecte anglonormand. Parmi ces traits, Monsieur Gaston Zink, dans un livre que j'ai traduit en japonais, range la prefixation : G Les copistes prennent parfois des libertes avec les pr6fixes, soit qu'ils les 6changent (notamment a-et en-), soit qu'ils les suppriment "2). Il releve un exemple de suppression dans cette chanson de geste : Tost se laissed (m eslaisse: il galope vite) e ben se tient e deet't. (Ch. de Guillaume, ed. McMillan, 6323)) C'est toute la r6ponse que donne Girard a Vivien qui, sur le champ de bataille de l'Archamp, vient de 1'interroger sur 1'etat de son cheval. L'explication et la traduction entre parentheses sont celles de M. Zink qui voit dans taissed une forme coajugu6e de eslaisst'er privee de son prefixe es-; en effet, le verbe eslaissier signifie a la voix pronominale es'61ancer )>,'"prendre le galop ", Gse precipiter ", etc. D. McMillan, 1'editeur du texte cit6 ne pense pas autrement, car il parle ti propos de 1) On a forme i propos de la date de sa Mlle sie'cleJ, 3e ed., PUF, Collection QUE redaction plusieurs hypotheses entre la fin SAIS-JE ?, 1993, p. 91. Traduction japodu 1le siecle (H. Suchier) et le dernier tiers naise:Tokyo, Hakusuisha, 1994, du 12e siacle (D. McMillan). La date que 3) Pour les references bibliographij'ai retenue est celle que propose F. Suard, ques des editions des (euvres quej'ai con- le dernier editeur de la Chanson. sultees, on se reportera a la fin de ces 2) G, Zink, LZIncien Frangais (XIL pages.

Nous pouvons consid6rer cette possibilit6 de d6velopper un paradigme comme un aspect permettant une formation productive. Parmi Ies compos6s de ce type, certains d'entre eux sont inscrits comme tels dans le dictionnaire, mais la plupart des autres ne le sont pas (Koga, 2012). Cependant, meme s'il est possible de reperer un paradigme dans I'un des constituants de compos6s, la productivite n'est-en faitpas n6cessairement garantie. En effet, bien que les composes dans (5b) partagent le meme NI que celui dans le compos6 existant (cf. 5a), il semble difficile de les admettre en tant que nouveaux composes binominaux. (5) a. centre-ville b. *centre-village, *centre-commune Alors, dans quelle situation pouvons-nous observer une productivit6 des composes du type pause-cnjg ? Et avec quel mecanisme ce type de compos6s devient-il productif ? En analysant les 933 exemples attest6s dans notre echantillon, nous isolons tout d'abord les situations dans La SocieteJaponaise deLangue et Mtterature Francaises Formation productive des compos6s du type pause-cojU 55

Saison en linfor a 6t6 vouee cemme par une sorte de fatalit6 b des modes particuliers de lecture. D'un c6t6, il y a sa logique interne, son intention de rupture, que semble venir confirmer le mythe d'un abandon immediat de la litt6rature, abandon suivi d'une vie d'errance. D'un autre, tout un faisceau aussi bien de circonstances concernant la genese et 1'impression de 1'oeuvre que de legendes portant sur la personne de 1'auteur, a in6vitablement orient6 les lectures. Un des facteurs principaux de 1'ceuvre, dont tout le monde reconnait 1'importance, est le probleme du christianisme. L'ceuvre a et6 exposee b une a contami-nationD ou une r6cuperation de Ia part des lecteurs catholiques comme Paul Claudel, pour qui Ia rencontre avec 1'eeuvre de Rimbaud marque le moment crucial de sa vie2}. Vient s'y ajouter le fameux t6moignage d'Isa- belle Rimbaud b propos de la K conversion D de son frere sur le lit de mort3} , t6moignage qui a fait couler beaucoup d'encre. Un autre type de lecture largement r6pandu est une Iecture biographique qui, en consid6rant 1) Cettecommunicatiens'appuiesurIa these de 3e cycle que j'ai seutenue en decembre 1985 a l'Universit6 de Paris III : Combat spirituel ou immense De'rist'on.2 Essai d'analyse textuelle d'Une Salson en Enfer tle Rimbaud. 2) Lire surtout Ma Conversion:KLa premiere lueur de v6tit6 me fut donn6e par la rencentre des livres d'un grand poete, i qui je dois une Eternelle reconnaissance, et qui a eu dan$ la formation de ma pensee une part preponderante, Arthur Rimbaud. La lecture des Illaminatiens, puis, quelques [ mois apres, d' Uhe saison en eeqfer, fut pour moi un 6venement capital. Pour la premiere fbis, ces livres ouvraient une fissure dans mon bagne mat6rialiste et me donnaient 1'impression vivante et presque physique du surnaturel." ((Euvres en prose, Galli- mard, KBibliotheque de la PIEiade", p. 1009) 3) Lettre d'Isabelle Rimbaud b sa mere du 28 octebre 1891 (Rimbaud, CEuvres complDtes, Gallimard, c Bibliotheque de la Pleiade), pp. 704707).

In “On Denoting” and to some extent in “Review of Meinong and Others, Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie” published in the same issue of Mind in 1905, Russell presents not only his famous elimination (or contextual definition) of definite ...

Diderot aimait conter : tout Ie monde le dit. Diderot causeur, bavard, au point d'exceder la tsarine : on 1'a maintes fois rep6t6. Mais qu'est-ce que conter, lorsqu'il s'agit d'un 6crivain comme Diderot ? La SocieteJaponaise deLangue et Mtterature Francaises S2 en accordant la propriet6 du fonds et vingt-cinq ans d'exemption de tout imp6ti). Qu'on m'excuse de la segmentation assez arbitraire. Le texte original ne constitue en effet qu'un.seul paragraphe sans alin6a ; celui-ci comporte au total neuf s6quences2), que j'ai numerotees (1, 2, 3, etc.) et r6parties par la suite en trois sections (I, II et III). Qu'y voyons-nous? Rien de plus qu'une anecdote banale, bonne b attendrir un voyageur philanthrope comme Diderot. R6cit anodin, manifestement insignifiant, destine seulement ti distraire... Diderot n'ignore pas non plus cette innocence du r6cit, il compte sur elle et il reste lb, b nous rapporter, na:vement et 12coniquement, ce qui s'est passe entre lui et le Hollandais Van Caulen. C'est pourquoi ces lignes meritent qu'on s'y arrate un peu. Le recit n'est pas gratuit, il veut dire quelque chose. Encore que ce quelque chose ne se manifeste pas toujours au niveau de l'enonce. Deux remarques s'imposent b propos de la structure syntaxique du texte: 1: Les trois sections contiennent chacune une

My aim in the following observations is simply to remind Frege’s motivations for introducing the Sinn, and some important facts about his use of ‘=’. I think they are relevant at the time of scrutinizing what has been called “Frege’s puzzle”. First, Frege does not use the identity sign ‘=’ exactly as we do; second, his notion of object is not a substantive one (physical or mereological), but a schematic one; and third, Frege’s notion of proper name is quite different from ours or that of common sense. At the end, I tackle Glezakos’ problem about the individuation of names. I conclude, like Glezakos, that Frege’s puzzle is not that puzzling, but for slightly different reasons. Frege’s theory of intentionality and the rules that govern the use we make of schematic sentences in the process of formalization are keys to understand why Frege posed the problem the way he did. However, I do not believe that Frege’s solution holds for ordinary proper names. I think that Frege’s solution work...

For Russell, a denoting phrase is any phrase (other than a proper name) that can stand as the grammatical subject of a sentence – e.g., "the author of Waverley," "the King of France," "a man," "some man," "every man," "the center of mass of the solar system at the first instant of the twentieth century," "the revolution of the earth round the sun," "the revolution of the sun round the earth," etc. (93). Russell distinguishes three types of denoting phrases: (1) a denoting phrase that does not denote anything ("the present King of France"); (2) a denoting phrase that denotes one definite object ("the present Queen of England"); and (3) a denoting phrase that denotes ambiguously ("a man") (93). The first two types of denoting phrases come in for special attention in Russell's essay.

In 'On Denoting' and to some extent in 'Review of Meinong and Others, Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie', published in the same issue of Mind (Russell, 1905a,b), Russell presents not only his famous elimination (or contextual defi nition) of defi nite descriptions, but also a series of considerations against understanding defi nite descriptions as singular terms. At the end of

In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' opinions as to the Sinn may differ. It might, for instance, be taken to be the following: the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. Anybody who does this will attach another Sinn to the sentence 'Aristotle was born ...

The opening passage of Frege's best-known paper is hard to understand. On a straightforward reading what Frege does in the passage is this. He first details an argument which had once convinced him that 'a=b' does not express a relation between a and b: if it does, it says nothing more, if true, than 'a=a; ' but 'a=b' is often significant and 'a=a ' never is. This argument, he says, had led him in Begriffschrift to conclude that 'a=b ' expressed a relation between 'a' and 'b,' namely: they have the same reference. He next, however, presents against the latter view what looks like an argument that he now accepts: the relation between a name and what it refers to is arbitrary; but whether 'a=b' is true may be a significant question of fact. Finally, he offers his distinction between sense and reference. This distinction enables him to take up the view he had rejected in Begriffschrifl: 'a=b ' expresses a relation between a and b. But it says more than 'a=a.' For though 'a' and 'b' have the same reference if a=b, they differ in sense. So the sentence remains significant. This is a common reading of Frege's words) It is in many ways the most natural. It is not, however, if we can assume that Frege knew what he was doing, satisfactory. If we so read the passage we attribute to Frege a belief that directly contradicts the view that names have, besides reference, sense. I mean the belief that the relation between a name and its reference is arbitrary. The contradiction arises

How proper names refer to objects" and "Do proper names have senses", and the most important problem "How non referring names work" have always been problems in the philosophy of language. There are two important philosophical approaches to the semantics of names; they are descriptivism and direct reference. Descriptivism originates in the work of Frege. Frege's semantics is almost exclusively bound up with the relations of linguistic

The story we've been telling has it that a name denotes an individual and an open sentence represents a property, and the sentence obtained by substituting a name for free occurrences of a variable in an open sentence is true if and only if the individual designated by the name has the property. That can't be all there is to the story, as the following example shows: The Waverley novels were published anonymously, and their authorship was a matter of lively speculation among the British ruling classes. The following sentence was true:

In "Practical Knowledge of Language", C.-h. Tsai criticizes the arguments in "Swimming and Speaking Spanish" (this issue, pp. 331-341), on the grounds that its account of knowledge of language as knowledge-how is mistaken. In its place, he proposes an alternative account in terms of Russell's concept "knowledge-byacquaintance". In this paper, I show that this account succeeds neither in displacing the account in Swimming and Speaking Spanish nor in addressing Tsai's main concern: solving the "delivery problem".

In 'On Denoting' and to some extent in 'Review of Meinong and Others, Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie', published in the same issue of Mind (Russell, 1905a,b), Russell presents not only his famous elimination (or contextual defi nition) of defi nite descriptions, but also a series of considerations against understanding defi nite descriptions as singular terms. At the end of

At the beginning of the article “Der Gedanke”, Frege disposes of a long-standing philosophical doctrine in less than a paragraph. The discarded doctrine is nothing less than the so-called classical definition of truth, which makes it consist in the correspondence of a representation of reality with reality itself. Frege’s argument for this strong conclusion seems bizarre because it seems to be too simple. Nevertheless, I shall contend that Frege’s argument ceases to seem bizarre when it is viewed on the background of his whole logical semantics—something that Frege himself makes clear neither in “Der Gedanke” nor in any other work. On this background, the thesis of the indefinability of truth will appear to be not only plausible, but actually unavoidable.

In classical identity theory, variables range over simple units, devoid of ontological structure, with no bearing on the logical dimensions of identity.  In this paper, the ontology-free thematizations of identity in vogue among linguistically-oriented analytical philosophers are confronted with an identity-relation whose dimensions are engendered by its terms--I call these complexes--which unlike their classical counterparts are ontologically differentiated and logically complex.  Complexes scaffold a minimal identity-relation, transitive and symmetric but not reflexive. This minimal relation is euclideanized by a postulate that makes identity reflexive--and de-euclideanized by this postulate's contradictory negation.  Particulars are then identified with complexes, giving rise to euclidean particulars for which identity is reflexive--and to non-euclidean
particulars, whose properties (arguably) mirror those of non-existents, for which identity is irreflexive.

A detailed interpretation is provided of the 'Gray's Elegy' passage in Russell's 'On Denoting' . The passage is sufficiently obscure that its principal lessons have been independently rediscovered. Russell attempts to demonstrate that the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms is untenable. The thesis demands a distinction be drawn between content and designation, but the attempt to form a proposition directly about the content (as by using an appropriate form of quotation) inevitably results in a proposition about the thing designated instead of the content expressed. In light of this collapse, argues Russell, the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms must accept that all propositions about a description's content represent it by means of a higher-level descriptive content, so that knowledge of a description's content is always 'by description', not 'by acquaintance'. This, according to Russell, renders our cognitive grip on definite descriptions inexplicable. Separate responses on behalf of Fregeans and Millians are offered.

Call a semantics for singular terms extensionalist if it embraces (1) and classical if it embraces (2).
    1.  The meaning of a singular term is its reference.
    2.  The reference of a singular term is logically simple.
Call such a semantics adequate if
    3. It sets formal and material identity apart.
Frege reacts to the inadequacy of classical extensionalist semantics by rejecting (1).  This he does without a sideways glance at (2),

In contrast, my account of the difference between formal and material identity rejects (2):  I propose instead that variables range over, and singular terms denote, entities which by their nature are ontologically differentiated and logically complex. 
The semantics I urge for singular terms, while extensionalist in the sense of (1), is thus a non-classical semantics in which singular terms take structured individuals, or complexes (as I will say), as their referents.  For complexes--unlike particulars -devoid of logical complexity--set material and formal identity apart.

It is argued that the semantic difference between sentences of the form “a = a” and “a = b” reflects a difference in their truth-makers. My account of these truth-makers combines a referential semantics--singular terms contribute nothing but their reference to the meaning of sentences in which they occur--with an ontology of logically structured individuals. Against analyses in which Fregean senses are invoked to account for the difference in meaning between (sentences of the form) “a = a” and “a = b”, this ontology invokes an Aristotelian ontology of identity as oneness in substance as the source of this difference.