Incomes Policy

, without whom this study would not have been possible, is strongly acknowledged. The authors would also like to thank the national statistical institutes for providing the data, and the many members of the IPN and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.

This paper examines the determinants of economic growth in North Carolina using Autoregressive Distributed lag (ARDL) model approach, Co-integration, and Bounds tests. The state’s gross domestic product, gross investment, labor force, literacy rate, and foreign direct investments data were estimated. The bounds test revealed that all of the variables in the models are co-integrated, meaning that they have long-run relationships with economic growth of the state. The estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 5% level, and have the expected positive signs. Gross investment, labor force, literacy rate and foreign direct investments variables are strong determinants of economic growth in the state of North Carolina. The implications from the study are that government policies encouraging increased gross investment spending, lowering unemployment rate of the labor force, encouraging inflow of foreign direct investments, and increasing investments in human capital should be ...

Convention specifies the relationship between price and unemployment in terms of the Phillips curve (PC) where inflation and the rate of unemployment are correlated. This paper uses a variant of the PC that is more consistent with the relationship between price and output as depicted in the aggregate supply (AS) curve. The relationship between price and unemployment using convention and its variant is tested on Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the pooled data. The Expectations Augmented (EA) is able to track a negative relation between inflation and unemployment better than the New Keynesian (NK) is able. Within the EA runs, the convention is able to track the same negative relation better than the variant, but one has to be cautious given the implied results.

The purpose of these working papers is to promote the circulation of research results (Research Series) and analytical studies (Documents Series) made within the National Bank of Belgium or presented by external economists in seminars, conferences and conventions organised by the Bank. The aim is therefore to provide a platform for discussion. The opinions expressed are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bank of Belgium. For orders and information on subscriptions and reductions: National Bank of Belgium,

The purpose of these working papers is to promote the circulation of research results (Research Series) and analytical studies (Documents Series) made within the National Bank of Belgium or presented by external economists in seminars, conferences and conventions organised by the Bank. The aim is therefore to provide a platform for discussion. The opinions expressed are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bank of Belgium. For orders and information on subscriptions and reductions: National Bank of Belgium,

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to assess the role of the Protocol '93 bargaining model in favouring the slow‐down of the Italian economy and to design a correction.Design/methodology/approachThe impact of the Protocol on factor income distribution is assessed through a deterministic dynamic model, and tested for the 1993‐2008 period. The paper explores theoretically and empirically the weakening of the incentives for both workers and employers to engage in fostering productivity.FindingsIn a macroeconomic setting with structural imbalance between the product and the labour markets reforms, the bargaining model has automatically increased up to 2002 the capital share in income, reducing the incentives for both social partners to accelerate productivity, as the labour share in income and the propensity to invest are co‐integrated (Johansen test). An analytical solution for correcting the bargaining distributive bias is proposed.Research limitations/implicationsFurther researc...

Endast sammandrag. Inbundna avhandlingar kan sökas i Helka-databasen (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Elektroniska kopior av avhandlingar finns antingen öppet på nätet eller endast tillgängliga i bibliotekets avhandlingsterminaler.Only abstract. Paper copies of master’s theses are listed in the Helka database (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Electronic copies of master’s theses are either available as open access or only on thesis terminals in the Helsinki University Library.Vain tiivistelmä. Sidottujen gradujen saatavuuden voit tarkistaa Helka-tietokannasta (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Digitaaliset gradut voivat olla luettavissa avoimesti verkossa tai rajoitetusti kirjaston opinnäytekioskeilla.Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Göteborgissa ja Genovassa kesällä 2001 mellakoiksi riistäytyneiden globalisaatiokriittisten mielenosoitusten uutisointia suomalaisessa sanomalehdistössä. Sen ensisijaisena tavoitteena on selvittää, miten suomalainen valtamedia kuvasi, selitti ja jäsensi globalisaa...

Under the Supervision of Professor Mohsen Bahmani-Oskooee Economic growth and income inequality are two prominent topics in development economics due to their close relation to social stability. The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the shortrun and long-run dynamics between income inequality and income growth. Additionally, it is important to consider the dynamic between income inequality and income volatility. This investigation fills a gap in the literature by examining whether changes in income, as well as changes in income volatility, have asymmetric effects on income distribution. The study of asymmetric impacts is critical because it might not be always true that economic booms and busts have similar effects in terms of magnitudes and signs on income disparity.

Under the Supervision of Professor Mohsen Bahmani-Oskooee Economic growth and income inequality are two prominent topics in development economics due to their close relation to social stability. The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the shortrun and long-run dynamics between income inequality and income growth. Additionally, it is important to consider the dynamic between income inequality and income volatility. This investigation fills a gap in the literature by examining whether changes in income, as well as changes in income volatility, have asymmetric effects on income distribution. The study of asymmetric impacts is critical because it might not be always true that economic booms and busts have similar effects in terms of magnitudes and signs on income disparity.

Reasoning within the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) we previously recommended that price stability should be the primary objective of monetary policy. We called this a neutral policy because it keeps output at its potential, de…ned as the outcome of an imperfectly competitive real business cycle model with a constant markup of price over marginal cost. We explore the foundations of neutral policy more fully in this paper. Using the principles of public …nance, we derive conditions under which markup constancy is optimal monetary policy. Price stability as the primary policy objective has been criticized on a number of grounds which we evaluate in this paper. We show that observed in ‡ation persistence in U.S. time series is consistent with the absence of structural in ‡ation stickiness as is the case in the benchmark NNS economy. We consider reasons why monetary policy might depart from markup constancy and price stability, but we argue that optimal departures are likely to be minor. Finally, we argue that the presence of nominal wage stickiness in labor markets does not undermine the case for neutral policy and price stability.

This paper estimates an imperfect competition model of price and wage adjustment for Australia. The results suggest the Australian economy can be characterised as one where firms are trying to achieve their desired long-run income share while workers are primarily concerned with maintaining their real wage. The estimation of the price-wage model is complicated by two problems; namely the substantial and persistent changes in income shares and the changing means in the inflation series over the sample. The first problem was overcome by extending the estimation period to include the wage shocks in the early 1970s which allows the income shares to be characterised as stationary. The second problem was addressed by imposing a restriction to the wage equation. This allowed a range of possible steady state inflation rates in the model over the estimated sample.

This paper develops a microsimulation model to simulate the distributional impact of price changes using Household Budget Survey data, income survey data and an Input Output Model. The primary purpose is to describe the model components. The secondary purpose is to demonstrate one component of the model by assessing the distributional and welfare impact of recent price changes in Pakistan. Over the period of November 2020 to November 2022, headline inflation 41.5%, with food and transportation prices increasing most. The analysis shows that despite large increases in energy prices, the importance of energy prices for the welfare losses due to inflation is limited because energy budget shares are small and inflation is relatively low. The overall distributional impact of recent price changes is mildly progressive, but household welfare is impacted significantly irrespective of households' position along the income distribution. The biggest driver of welfare losses at the bottom of the income distribution was food price inflation, while inflation in other goods and services was the biggest driver at the top. To compensate households for increased living costs, transfers would need to be on average 40% of pre-inflation expenditure, assuming constant incomes. Behavioural responses to price changes have a negligible impact on the overall welfare cost to households.

This paper develops a microsimulation model to simulate the distributional impact of price changes using Household Budget Survey data, income survey data and an Input Output Model. The primary purpose is to describe the model components. The secondary purpose is to demonstrate one component of the model by assessing the distributional and welfare impact of recent price changes in Pakistan. Over the period of November 2020 to November 2022, headline inflation 41.5%, with food and transportation prices increasing most. The analysis shows that despite large increases in energy prices, the importance of energy prices for the welfare losses due to inflation is limited because energy budget shares are small and inflation is relatively low. The overall distributional impact of recent price changes is mildly progressive, but household welfare is impacted significantly irrespective of households' position along the income distribution. The biggest driver of welfare losses at the bottom of the income distribution was food price inflation, while inflation in other goods and services was the biggest driver at the top. To compensate households for increased living costs, transfers would need to be on average 40% of pre-inflation expenditure, assuming constant incomes. Behavioural responses to price changes have a negligible impact on the overall welfare cost to households.

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This paper investigates the compatibility of inflation targeting and Post Keynesian economics by examining the macroeconomic consequences of a variety of policy reaction functions for an economy that is explicitly Post Keynesian in character. It is shown that in this Post Keynesian environment, it is possible for the policy authorities to both set and achieve an inflation target without adverse consequences for the real economy, as long as an appropriate policy mix is chosen. One of the key results of the paper is that orthodox policy regimes do not provide appropriate policy mixes. Indeed, the more orthodox the policy regime becomes, the less viable is inflation targeting in a Post Keynesian economy.

We examine the frequency of price changes for 350 categories of goods and services covering about 70% of consumer spending, based on unpublished data from the BLS for 1995 to 1997. Compared with previous studies we find much more frequent price changes, with half of prices lasting less than 4.3 months. The frequency of price changes differs dramatically across categories. We exploit this variation to ask how inflation for "flexible-price goods" (goods with frequent changes in individual prices) differs from inflation for "sticky-price goods" (those displaying infrequent price changes). Compared to the predictions of popular sticky price models, actual inflation rates are far more volatile and transient, particularly for sticky-price goods.

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Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

Problemstellung und Empfehlungen Währungsunion ohne Politische Union? Eine klare und und dauerhafte Zuständigkeitsverteilung in der EU, aber auch alle Vorstellungen von der Schaffung eines Gravitationskerns föderationswilliger Mitgliedstaaten haben eine gemeinsame Voraussetzung: daß die Mitgliedstaaten der EU die Kontrolle über den Umfang des weiteren Transfers von Kompetenzen auf die EU-Ebene behalten und diesem Transfer an einem Punkt ihrer Wahl auch eine Grenze setzen können. Erst das bewahrt dann auch die Wahlfreiheit bestimmter Mitgliedstaaten, zu einem gegebenen Zeitpunkt zu entscheiden, ob sie die Integration im Kreise eines Gravitationskerns weiter vertiefen wollen. Der Wirtschafts-und Währungsunion sagen nun unzählige Experten, Kommentatoren und Politiker nach, daß sie eine weitgreifende Dynamik zusätzlicher Integration in Gang setzen würde, die man nicht aufhalten könne, oder die man nicht aufhalten dürfe, wolle man nicht die künftige Funktionsfähigkeit des gemeinsamen Geldes gefährden. Viele der WWU-Gründungsväter wollten eine solche Dynamik sogar ausdrücklich. Müssen die europapolitischen Entscheidungsträger diese These ernst nehmen? Vor dem Hintergrund der bisherigen Erfahrungen mit der WWU, mit der gemeinsamen Geldpolitik und mit der Koordinierung der Wirtschaftspolitik seit Beginn der 2. Stufe überprüft der Autor den kritischen Zusammenhang zwischen gemeinsamem Geld und weiterer Integration. Ein bedeutsames Feld ist in diese Untersuchung nicht eigens aufgenommen worden, nämlich Wechselkurspolitik und Außenvertretung der Eurozone. Nach den Ergebnissen der Untersuchung gibt es aus dem sachlichfunktionalen Zusammenhang heraus keine zwingenden Gründe, die auf das gemeinsame Geld bezogenen Politiken der Wirtschafts-und Währungsunion über das im Jahr 2001 erreichte Maß hinaus zu vertiefen. Zusätzliche Kompetenzen brauchen in diesen Feldern nicht übertragen zu werden. Gegenüber der weiteren Entwicklung dieses Integrationsfeldes bewahren die Mitgliedstaaten Wahlfreiheit. Die vorhandenen Koordinationsmechanismen funktionieren. Zusammen mit dem umfangreichen Acquis in den übrigen wirtschaftspolitischen Integrationsfeldern bilden sie ein ausreichend solides Gerüst für Erhaltung und Funktionsfähigkeit des gemeinsamen Geldes. Verbleibende Lücken und Schwächen der Koordinierung sind kaum grundsätzlich zu beseitigen, wenn man auch Raum für nationale Konkurrenz um die besten Wirtschaftspolitiken erhalten will. Will man eine noch sicherere Kontrolle öffentlicher Defizite, sollten die fiskalpolitisch disziplinierenden Mechanismen des Finanzmarkts gestärkt werden, etwa indem die Regeln für den Status öffentlicher Anleihetitel und die Bewertung ihrer Bonität weiterentwickelt werden. Die Aussichten Problemstellung und Empfehlungen SWP-Berlin Währungsunion ohne Politische Union? Aptil 2001 6 auf deutliche Wohlstandsgewinne durch mehr wirtschaftspolitische Integration sind nicht sehr groß. Will man sie trotzdem weiter ausschöpfen, sollte man das im Rahmen des Möglichen, durch verstärkte Zusammen arbeit zwischen solchen Mitgliedsländern versuchen, die sich wirtschaftspolitisch und strukturell besonders nahestehen. Der Vertrag erlaubt das. Dynamische Prozesse in Richtung einer weiteren Integrationsvertiefung ergeben sich primär aus der institutionellen Struktur von WWU und EU und aus externen Herausforderungen, nicht aus dem sachlichen Zusammenhang mit dem Geld. Das zunehmend konkurrenzhafte Nebeneinander von Europäischem Rat, Ecofin-Rat und Europäischer Kommission bei der Definition der gemeinsamen Wirtschafts-und Beschäftigungspolitik ist eine erste Quelle von Dynamik. Die Konkurrenz schafft Unsicherheit über die Grundsätze und die Grenzen der gemeinschaftlichen Politik in diesen Feldern in einer formativen Periode der WWU, in der gerade Sicherheit, Klarheit und Voraussehbarkeit angestrebt werden sollten. Ein zweites Problem könnte entstehen, wenn die verstärkte Zusammenarbeit aller Euroländer auf der Ebene der Eurogruppe (früher Euro-11) wesentlich über das bestehende Maß hinaus ausgebaut würde. Ihre bisher konstruktive Einbindung in die Gesamt-WWU und damit die wichtige Koordination auf WWU-Ebene könnten darunter leiden. Ein weiterer solcher Prozeß wirkt in der Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik der EU, in welcher ihre Entscheidungsträger sich zur Unterstützung außenpolitischer Ziele aller ihnen verfügbaren außenwirtschaftspolitischen Instrumente der Gemeinschaft bedienen. Dazu gehört seit 1999 auch die gemeinsame Währung und das damit verbundene internationale finanzpolitische Instrumentarium. Weniger Dynamik als zunächst gedacht ergibt sich bisher aus dem sogenannten demokratischen Defizit. Künftige Konflikte könnten trotzdem über eine stärkere Einbeziehung des Europäischen Parlaments auch zu einer ungewollten Ausweitung der Gemeinschaftskompetenzen in der Wirtschaftspolitik in der WWU führen. Hier ist eine Konsolidierung am ehesten durch eine gewisse Konstitutionalisierung der WWU und eine möglichst weitgehende Festschreibung der wirtschaftspolitischen Kompetenzteilung des Vertrags zu erwarten. Braucht man mehr politische Union zur internationalen Stärkung des Euro? Dazu noch ein Satz: Im Grunde hat man mit der Gemeinschaftswährung eine für die internationale Wirtschaft neue Größe neuer Qualität geschaffen. Selbst bei aller Mühe wird es nicht möglich sein, sie in die klassischen Kleider einer nationalen Währung einzukleiden, um sie für die internationalen Finanzinstitutionen leichter berechenbar zu machen. Es ist auch nicht ratsam. Der Lernprozeß mit dieser neuen Währung wird ein zweiseitiger sein müssen: für die Euroländer selbst und für die übrigen externen Mitspieler.

This note is a brief reply to Watts (2021), who has been critical of the conceptual foundations and methodology in a discussion of the impact of different interest rate policy rules on inflation in Smithin (2020). The reply concludes that the case for a 'zero real policy rate of interest' (ZRPR), rather than a 'zero interest rate policy' (ZIRP), emerges unscathed.

The present paper has the objective to develop three new approaches to Macrodynamics. In the first one, we design a new model where capacity utilization is defined by the difference between population (represented by the sum of activity and unemployed labor force), and capital stock growth rates. Second, we spread unemployment into both, the natural one and the other caused by external reasons. Third, we incorporate the SIR's (Susceptible, Infectious, or Recovered) approach into the second framework to understand how Pandemics can affect economic behavior. Then, we proved the stable condition of all three cases and also consider a numerical simulation to ensure their economic efficiency. As a result, the first model acts exactly like a post-Keynesian (neo-Kaleckian) expects it to behave (in the short and medium runs it is possible to assume unemployment, but in a long-period full employment is arrived). Despite the convergence of capacity utilization to its normal level, it seems that, in the second case, we will have a time lag of involuntary unemployment. In the third case, when the epidemiological model is considered (if, and only if, the Pandemic is the only reason for unemployment caused by external motives), the model will converge to full employment of factors like in the first case. These models serve as an inspiration to guide policymakers on how to deal with epidemiological crises and their consequences in the labor market.

The Taylor rule has returned as a significant policy guide amid increasingly overt political pressures for its official (and not just its implicit) adoption at the US Fed as inflation fears have come to dominate monetary policy actions both in the US and internationally in recent times. Our paper analyzes the effect of monetary policy on the functional distribution of income by reconstructing how the post-1970s “inflation first” policy commitments of central banks came to be crystallized in the Taylor rule. While there are differences among the various specifications of this “rule”, the Taylor relation is merely an offshoot of what can be described generically as the family of Wicksellian reaction functions whose implications support rentier income over time. Because of the internal logic of the Taylor rule, this has led to different interpretations such as, for example, the more Keynesian Yellen rule, which depart from the strict sense of the Taylor rule. The paper also interprets ...

This paper investigates the compatibility of inflation targeting and Post Keynesian economics by examining the macroeconomic consequences of a variety of policy reaction functions for an economy that is explicitly Post Keynesian in character. It is shown that in this Post Keynesian environment, it is possible for the policy authorities to both set and achieve an inflation target without adverse consequences for the real economy, as long as an appropriate policy mix is chosen. One of the key results of the paper is that orthodox policy regimes do not provide appropriate policy mixes. Indeed, the more orthodox the policy regime becomes, the less viable is inflation targeting in a Post Keynesian economy.

This paper investigates the compatibility of inflation targeting and Post Keynesian economics by examining the macroeconomic consequences of a variety of policy reaction functions for an economy that is explicitly Post Keynesian in character. It is shown that in this Post Keynesian environment, it is possible for the policy authorities to both set and achieve an inflation target without adverse consequences for the real economy, as long as an appropriate policy mix is chosen. One of the key results of the paper is that orthodox policy regimes do not provide appropriate policy mixes. Indeed, the more orthodox the policy regime becomes, the less viable is inflation targeting in a Post Keynesian economy.

Conventional wisdom suggests that the Great Moderation was caused by either good policy, good luck (favourable shocks), more efficient private sector behaviour (such as better inventory management), or more effective financial innovations. We show that it may, instead, have originated from the complementarity of an erroneous reading of the economy by central bankers and evolutionarily time-varying heterogeneity in inflation expectations formation within the private sector. One general finding of our analysis is that seemingly inadequate stabilization policies may, in fact, work. We comment on the broader ramifications for stabilization policy of this finding.

Since it was first introduced in the UK in 1984, an increasing number of countries have introduced price cap regulation for telecommunications. But to what extent have the promised benefits of the scheme actually materialized when it has been applied? This paper concludes that price cap regulation has been effective in containing price increases for non-competitive services and in controlling the nature, extent and speed of price rebalancing. However, it finds that attempts to fine tune the price cap scheme in the UK, the USA and Australia have resulted in a complicated, more intrusive, less transparent system than was originally intended.

Theoretical considerations suggest that as market institutions are developing in Russian regions, the divergence of regional consumer price levels, which has been caused by the price liberalization of 1992, should give way to price level convergence. Using price dynamics data (overall consumer price indices, food price indices, manufactured goods price indices, service price indices) across 7 regions of West Siberia over 1992-1998, the tendency of such convergence is studied. The speed in which regional price levels converge to the national price level and to the price levels of other regions is estimated. Besides that, the price differential thresholds, below which interregional arbitrage becomes unprofitable, are also estimated. Acknowledgements. The author is greatly indebted to a number of EERC experts, especially to Zvi Griliches, Stephen Yeo, Daniel Berkowitz, James Leitzel, Judith Thornton, and Lucrezia Reichlin for fruitful discussions and comments. Thanks also to Alan M. Taylor for generously providing details of the Obstfeld-Taylor model, to Peter Rostovtsev for coding this model, and to Alexander Tsyplakov for useful consultations.

We document an asymmetry in the rigidity of 9-ending prices relative to non-9ending prices. Consumers have difficulty noticing higher prices if they are 9-ending, or noticing price-increases if the new prices are 9-ending, because 9-endings are used as a signal for low prices. Price setters respond strategically to the consumer-heuristic by setting 9-ending prices more often after price-increases than after price-decreases. 9-ending prices, therefore, remain 9-ending more often after price-increases than after price-decreases, leading to asymmetric rigidity: 9ending prices are more rigid upward than downward. These findings hold for both transactionprices and regular-prices, and for both inflation and no-inflation periods.

This paper focuses on the future of economic policies with regard to inflation. The dominant approach to inflation over the past two decades or so has been inflation targeting. The global environment of the decade circa 1995 to 2005 with the ?China effect? pushing down prices of manufactured goods and with primary commodity prices being subdued was conducive to low inflation. It is argued that inflation targeting has not been a great success story and is unable to address inflation arising from global forces or from struggles over the distribution of income. It is argued that a more sophisticated analysis than that contained in the Phillips curve is required. Further, and from our analysis, counter inflation policies should include the achievement of an inflation barrier consistent with full employment without inflationary pressures. This can be addressed by ensuring that there is sufficient productive capacity to underpin full employment, where sufficient is to be interpreted in te...

This paper updates earlier estimates that show the existence of a range of equilibrium rates of unemployment in Australia. Within the range of equilibria framework, the paper goes on to test the effectiveness of incomes policies, enterprise bargaining and inflation-target based monetary policy for influencing the rate of inflation in Australia in the period 1965 to 2001. Incomes policies, especially the Accord, and enterprise bargaining are shown to have caused permanent reductions in the rate of inflation. The inflation-target based monetary policy is shown to be associated with, but is not shown to have caused, a reduced impact on inflation of changes in the level of activity.

La serie de Documentos de Trabajo en versión PDF puede obtenerse gratis en la dirección electrónica: http://www.bcentral.cl/esp/estpub/estudios/dtbc. Existe la posibilidad de solicitar una copia impresa con un costo de $500 si es dentro de Chile y US$12 si es para fuera ...

Table S1-Major element glass geochemical data. Data are listed here by sample/depth from seven analytical days in 2018 and one in 2019. Only one sample (CL-48) was analysed on multiple days. Analyses of reference material for given eruptions are included here below relevant/correlated CL samples. It is noted if these were analysed concurrently (not always possible given small glass populations of some samples). Reasons for rejection of analyses are listed-these are most commonly low analytical totals (<94%), non-glass silicate and mineral inclusion or contamination (i.e. glass with some mineral input, ormostly mineral analysed). Analyses highlighted in red text have analytical totals between 94-96%; reject analyses highlighted in red show elemental values used to identify them as anomalous. Analytical conditions: 5 micron beam (exception: Nov 16th, 10 micron beam), 15 KeV and 6 nA current Data normalised to 100%. St. Dev. = standard deviation. Rejected analyses Sample # Run # UA # SiO2 TiO2 Al2O3 FeOt MnO MgO CaO Na2O K2O Cl Total H2Od n Comments Run # SAMPLE SiO2 TiO2 Al2O3 FeOt MnO MgO CaO Na2O K2O Cl Total H2Od Comments CL-0 Oct Casc13-12-27 71.

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

HICP inflation in Austria increased from below 2% in the first half of 2007 to 3.5% in December 2007, and stood at 3.1% in both January and February2 2008. As in other countries, this increase can be mostly attributed to the surge in international energy and agricultural commodity prices. Whereas the increase in the price of crude oil was passed on to fuels very quickly, electricity and gas prices exhibit a delayed reaction. The increase in global prices of agricultural commodities fed through to the prices of dairy products and oils and fats more strongly than it did to bread and cereal product prices. Rates of inflation exceeding 5% were also recorded for clothing and footwear from September to December 2007. The inflation expectations of consumers and professional forecasters for 12 months ahead have risen in light of this; however, professional forecasters generally agree that inflation will decrease to around 2% again in 2009. For the first half of 2008, the Oesterreichische Na...

In 1951 the United States began moving toward an incomes policy, an attempt to end postwar wage and price inflation by linking changes in these prices to gains in productivity. Other countries later followed suit; some countries had already adopted wage and price control policies. The Netherlands moved toward an incomes policy immediately after World War II. Initially, the Dutch program involved wages only, but in the 1970s it became an accepted principle that private professional income should be comparable with the salaries of government officials and civil servants with comparable training and responsibilities. In the Netherlands (as in the United States and, before medicine was socialized, the United Kingdom) health professionals operate on a fee-forservice basis and their incomes escalated as a result of both inflation and monopoly power. So they were subjected to the incomes policy. The policy's effectiveness in curbing income escalation cannot be determined with certaintyreliable data are lacking. However, the evidence indicates that the policy failed to achieve its original purpose.

Using a large data set for Germany, we show that both the raw and the unexplained gender earnings gap are higher in self-employment than in paid employment. Applying an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, more than a quarter of the difference in monthly self-employment earnings can be traced back to women working fewer hours than men. In contrast variables like family background, working time flexibility and career aspirations do not seem to contribute much to the gender earnings gap, suggesting that self-employed women do not earn less because they are seeking work-family balance rather than profits. Differences in human capital endowments account for another 13 percent of the gap but segregation does not contribute to the gender earnings gap in a robust way. Zusammenfassung: Mit einem großen Datensatz für Deutschland zeigen wir, dass sowohl der gesamte geschlechtsspezifische Verdienstunterschied als auch dessen unerklärter Teil bei Selbständigen größer ausfallen als bei abhängig Beschäftigten. Gemäß einer Oaxaca-Blinder-Zerlegung ist über ein Viertel des Unterschieds im Monatsverdienst von Selbständigen darauf zurückzuführen, dass Frauen kürzere Arbeitszeiten haben als Männer. Dagegen scheinen Variablen wie Familienhintergrund, Arbeitszeitflexibilität und Karriereaspiration nicht substanziell zum Geschlechter-Verdienstdifferenzial beizutragen. Dies legt nahe, dass selbständige Frauen nicht deshalb weniger verdienen, weil sie eher an der Vereinbarkeit von Arbeit und Familie und weniger an Gewinnerzielung interessiert sind. Unterschiede in der Humankapitalausstattung erklären weitere 13 Prozent des Differenzials, doch Segregation spielt keine eindeutige Rolle.

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This paper focuses on the future of economic policies with regard to inflation. The dominant approach to inflation over the past two decades or so has been inflation targeting. The global environment of the decade circa 1995 to 2005 with the ?China effect? pushing down prices of manufactured goods and with primary commodity prices being subdued was conducive to low inflation. It is argued that inflation targeting has not been a great success story and is unable to address inflation arising from global forces or from struggles over the distribution of income. It is argued that a more sophisticated analysis than that contained in the Phillips curve is required. Further, and from our analysis, counter inflation policies should include the achievement of an inflation barrier consistent with full employment without inflationary pressures. This can be addressed by ensuring that there is sufficient productive capacity to underpin full employment, where sufficient is to be interpreted in te...

The 1990s, specially in the United States, have witnessed an unprecedented change in income distribution, with a large redistribution towards rentiers on the one hand, and towards the upper ranks of the managerial bureaucracy on the other hand, as became ever more obvious after the financial scandals affecting large corporations such as Enron and Worldcom. This has also been accompanied by large capital gains that benefited top-file managers as well as shareholders. Ordinary employers and workers, as a counterpart, have seen their real purchasing power stagnate. Despite all this, and in contrast to the predictions of the canonical Kaleckian growth model, many countries achieved respectable growth rates of capital and output. The purpose of the present paper is to explain this paradox and to provide a consistent Kaleckian model of growth that would model the main features identified above, making a distinction between managerial labour, basically overhead labour, and workers, essentially direct labour. The model is based on target-return pricing procedures. We then study the implications of cadrisme, a managerial-friendly regime based on large pay packages for the managerial class. For instance, the average remuneration of CEOs in the USA, as a ratio of average workers's 1 wages has increased from 96 in 1990 to 458 in 2000 (Petit 2006: 51), a period that most observers associate to the demise of managerial capitalism. One would presume that other upper and middle rank managers also benefited from this bonanza. Cadrisme within a Kaleckian model of growth and distribution In a recent paper that was presented at the conference honouring Joan Robinson, held at the University of Vermont, Tom Palley (2005) argued that class conflict, in its traditional Marxist sense, is absent from Cambridge theories of growth and income distribution. As a remedy, Palley (2005) presents a Kaleckian growth model, where income is split between capital and labour income, with the latter being split again between salaries being paid to the managerial classes and wages being paid to workers. As to capital income, part of it is retained by firms, while the rest is distributed to households, according to capital ownership. The 1990s, specially in the United States, have witnessed an unprecedented change in income distribution, with a large redistribution towards wealth owners (rentiers) on the one hand (Epstein and Jayadev 2005: 65), and towards the upper ranks of the managerial bureaucracy on the other hand (Petit 2006: 47), as became ever more obvious after the financial scandals affecting large corporations such as Enron and Worldcom. This has also been accompanied by large capital gains that benefited top-file managers as well as shareholders up until 2001. This managerial-friendly regime based on large pay packages for upper-level managers and the overall managerial class has been called cadrisme by Duménil and Lévy (2004, ch. 7). Ordinary 1 employees and workers, as a counterpart, have seen their real purchasing power stagnate. Despite all this, many countries achieved high profit rates and respectable growth rates of capital and output-a rather paradoxical fact seen from a canonical Kaleckian point of view. The purpose of the present paper is to explain this paradox and to provide a consistent Kaleckian model of growth that could explicitly take into account at least most of the features identified above. The model will focus on the distinction between: upper and middle management, or white-collar or supervisory labor, on the one hand; and workers, or blue-collar or non-supervisory labor, on the other hand, being understood that most blue-collar workers today are to be found in the service industries. The model to be built relies on a staff/worker