Investment game

We experimentally examine how group identity affects trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment, group identity is induced purely by minimal groups. In other treatments, group members are additionally related by outcome interdependence established in a prior public goods game. Moving from the standard investment game (where no group identity is prompted) to minimal group identity to two-dimensional group identity, we find no significant differences in trust decisions. However, trust is significantly and positively correlated with contribution decisions, suggesting that "social" trust is behaviorally important.

In one-shot investment games where each player’s payoff is a convex combination of own and other’s profit, we measure trust by the amount given to the trustee and trustworthiness by the amount returned to the trustor by the trustee. Does the degree of payoff interdependence increase both trust and trustworthiness or one but not the other or neither of them? According to our experimental data, trust remains unaffected by the extent of interdependence whereas trustworthiness reacts positively to it.

There is evidence that American economics undergraduates are more likely than others to act self-interestedly and less likely to behave cooperatively. In two experiments, differences between Americans and Canadians and between economics students and psychology students were examined. Data from simple bargaining and a prisoner's dilemma game are presented, which suggest that Canadian students may be more co-operative than American students, and psychology students less selfish than either economics students or students from other disciplines. However, these results suggest also that these relationships are not simple, and that other variables – such as gender – need to be taken into account.

We experimentally examine how group identity affects trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment, group identity is induced purely by minimal groups. In other treatments, group members are additionally related by outcome interdependence established in a prior public goods game. Moving from the standard investment game (where no group identity is prompted) to minimal group identity to two-dimensional group identity, we find no significant differences in trust decisions. However, trust is significantly and positively correlated with contribution decisions, suggesting that "social" trust is behaviorally important.

The economic literature has discussed the links between trust and gender, and trust and social capital. Given that some empirical evidence shows also that gender and trust are somehow related and specifically women tend to trust less than men, I try to investigate the effect of social capital on generalized trust, controlling also for the "gender effect". This latter could be due to the fact that women are less prone to invest in social capital than men, as the literature highlights. Using the tools of experimental economy, I performed the same experiment in Oslo, Leuven and Torino, in order to obtain a mixed Western European sample. In this one I included Scandinavia, Central and Mediterranean Europe. My measure of social capital is more complete than the usual one: I add informal networks (such as phone conversations, time spent with friends, etc.) to formal ones (basically voluntary associations). Analysing the obtained results through both comparisons of conditional means and econometrics, I find out some influence of social capital on trust. Furthermore, also after controlling for social capital, gender differences persist still. Thus I can conclude that behavioural differences due to gender are not a mere reflex of different investments in social capital. I also found evidence that some kinds of formal and informal networks exert positive influence on generalized trust.

This paper reports the results of experiments designed to isolate the impact of various combinations of the following motives on trustworthiness: (i) unconditional other-regarding preferences-like altruism, inequality aversion, quasi-maximin, etc.; (ii) deal-responsiveness-reacting to actions that allow for a mutual improvement by adopting behavior that implies a mutual improvement; (iii) gift-responsiveness-reacting to choices that allow the trustee to obtain an improvement by adopting actions that benefit the trustor; and (iv) vulnerability-responsiveness-reacting to the vulnerability of the trustor by adopting actions that do not hurt the trustor. Our results indicate that-besides unconditional other-regarding preferences-vulnerability-responsiveness is an important determinant of trustworthiness even in cases where the vulnerability of the trustor does not come together with a gift to the trustee. Motivated by our empirical findings we provide formal definitions of trust and trustworthiness based on revealed willingness to accept vulnerability and the response to it.

This paper reports the results of experiments designed to investigate behavior in games when subjects must make an inference about how they arrived at a decision node. Specifically, we investigate a trust game where a random drawing determines if the first mover's decision is implemented or if instead the first mover trembles and the other action is undertaken. The results indicate that many second movers are willing to give the first mover the benefit of the doubt, but some use the uncertainty to justify more selfish behavior. This pattern is anticipated by first movers who are significantly less likely to trust the other person in this situation than in the typical sequential trust game.

We use a simple trust-game to elicit trusting and trustworthy behavior among students majoring in economics and other disciplines. We also administer a Social Values Orientation (SVO) survey to evaluate any possible correlation between an individual's levels of trust indicated in the survey and his/her action in the game. Our results suggest that although students pursuing a major in economics appear to be no different than other students in choosing trusting actions, when it comes to being trustworthy, the former group ...

We use a simple trust-game to elicit trusting and trustworthy behavior among students majoring in economics and other disciplines. We also administer a Social Values Orientation (SVO) survey to evaluate any possible correlation between an individual's levels of trust indicated in the survey and his/her action in the game. Our results suggest that although students pursuing a major in economics appear to be no different than other students in choosing trusting actions, when it comes to being trustworthy, the former group always chooses the self payoff maximizing action rather than the trustworthy action. Scores from the SVO survey do not help in predicting trusting or trustworthy behavior in our experiment.