Kantian ethics

This paper reconsiders Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy through the lens of early modern European encounters with Chinese ethics. Against the standard view that Kantian ethics excludes ritual and embodied practice, it argues that Kant's formalism represents a critical transformation of a problem long addressed by Confucian moral philosophy: how stable moral judgment can be cultivated without reliance on revelation or external authority. By tracing the transmission of Confucian ethics through Jesuit mediation and Christian Wolff's rational reconstruction, the paper situates Kant in a shared problem-space of moral formation, repetition, and regulation. It analyses the abstraction of ritual into form and the role of relational alignment in both Confucian li and Kant's categorical imperative. The paper concludes by suggesting that Confucian models of cultivated action can illuminate the practical limits of modern moral formalism. This study distinguishes between intellectual history and comparative reconstruction: the former provides the historical context of early modern engagements with Chinese philosophy, while the latter interprets Kant not as an opponent of ritual, but as a philosopher who reformulates its stabilising function under the conditions of modern moral autonomy.

This paper addresses a philosophical lacuna in Kantian practical philosophy: the obscure status of the “subject of action.” I argue that practical apperception, manifested as the “I will,” serves as the foundation of Kantian agency. Just as the theoretical “I think” renders cognition possible by synthesizing the manifold of intuition, the “I will” “functions as the original spontaneity that unifies the manifold of desires, thereby ascribing them to a single individual. By reconstructing this concept, the inquiry offers a solution to the impasse between Henry Allison’s Incorporation Thesis and Richard McCarty’s hydraulic model. Ultimately, this inquiry reveals that Kantian ethics is grounded in a metaphysics of the transcendental self, establishing the “subject as a person” capable of moral imputation.

This paper explores the intersection of the death drive and mystical tendency within Immanuel Kant's ethics. By examining Nietzsche's critical perspective, the paper aims to uncover the underlying motivations in Kant's moral philosophy. The paper argues that Kant's division of human beings into phenomenal and noumenal selves, and his concept of practical reason, reflect a deeper mystical tendency. This tendency aligns with the death drive, suggesting that Kantian ethics may be a tool for the living being to achieve its original, inanimate state. The analysis integrates psychoanalytic and philosophical discourses to offer a more complex interpretation of Kant's ethics, proposing that it embodies a form of mysticism driven by the death drive.

When working on the Prolegomena, Kant remarked that there was a "striking similarity" between the central problem of his transcendental philosophy and that of moral philosophy, adding that he would present the solution to the latter shortly. Given that the Prolegomena deals with transcendental philosophy and his next book, the Groundwork, deals with moral philosophy, one might reasonably expect striking parallels between the two. At first glance, however, they appear quite dissimilar, and in the literature, they are not treated as closely related. In this essay, I argue that there are, in fact, remarkable similarities between the two works. They concern not only their central problems but also the method Kant uses to solve them, the types of arguments he develops in doing so, and even the terminology he uses to mark his steps. These similarities highlight both that Kant's transcendental philosophy in the Prolegomena lays the groundwork for a metaphysics of nature and that his Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals is the moral counterpart to his transcendental philosophy. Moreover, they shed new light on crucial arguments of the Groundwork, especially on the beginning of the second section and the aim and argument of the third, thereby illuminating the structure of the argument of the book as a whole.

This essay examines Mike Leigh’s Naked (1993) through the figure of Johnny, one of the most unsettling protagonists in contemporary cinema. Drawing upon the work of Gilles Deleuze, Roland Barthes, Immanuel Kant, Sigmund Freud, Leonard Berkowitz, and Anthony Storr, the study explores the relationship between desire, cruelty, aggression, solitude, and sovereignty as they emerge in Johnny’s wandering through the nocturnal landscape of London. Rather than treating Johnny as either a simple nihilist or a conventional antihero, the essay argues that he occupies a liminal position between victim and aggressor, beast and sovereign, compassion and destructiveness. Particular attention is given to the collapse of romantic discourse, the rejection of redemptive narratives, and the film’s persistent interrogation of emotional authenticity. Ultimately, the essay proposes that Naked presents a tragic anti-messianic vision in which neither love nor violence provides transcendence, leaving its protagonist suspended between the desire for communion and the impossibility of attaining it.

Επιστρέφοντας τελικά στον αναστοχασμό μας πρέπει να παραδεχτούμε ότι το ζήτημα του έρωτα είναι αγκάθι για την σκέψη, και δεν είναι τυχαίο ότι μόνο ο πλατωνικός Σοπενχάουερ το διαπραγματεύθηκε ex professo από όλους τους φιλόσοφους της νεωτερικότητας. Η θεωρία του αν και έχει κάποια σημασία είναι υπερβολικά μηχανιστική και πεζή αλλά όχι λανθασμένη. «Ο έρωτας δεν είναι τίποτε άλλο από το να βρει ο κάθε Γιάννης την Γιάννα του» λέει πεζά και σαρκαστικά ο Σοπενχάουερ.
Ο γάμος λοιπόν είναι κατά πολύ κατηγορική προσταγή και κοινωνική επιταγή – θα έλεγα κατά 9/10. Ο Καντ δεν συζητάει το θέμα επειδή είναι ακανθώδες και με μια διαπραγμάτευση του μόνο θα μπέρδευε τους αναγνώστες τους. Τελικά εδώ ως φιλόσοφος σηκώνω τα χέρια ψηλά και δηλώνω ότι εμπιστεύομαι την ελληνική Εκκλησία για το ζήτημα του γάμου – και δεν έχω να προσθέσω τίποτε άλλο για αυτό το ακανθώδες ζήτημα.

In this paper, I explore the concept of disentanglement and its close alliance with positive autonomy, examining how the very ideals of scientific progress and individual freedom can lead to unintended consequences. By examining two sci-fi films (Ridley Scott's Prometheus and Alien: Covenant) I show how narrative themes highlight the dangers of disentanglement from nature, and how high modernity has fostered an aesthetic mindset of distancing and control.

Building on Kant's idea of the 'free play of the imagination', we argue that sexual fantasy reveals both deep insights into our desires and emotional wounds as well as the impact of oppressive conditions on our sexual selves. After clarifying Kant's distinctions between experience, dreams, and fantasy, insofar as they are important to defining the unique character of sexual fantasy, and incorporating feminist theories of fantasy and pornography into our reading of Kant and sexual fantasy, we examine the intersection of aesthetic expression and moral significance, suggesting that fantasy is not morally neutral but deeply formative; indeed, viewed comprehensively, sexual fantasy can become a site for wise personal resistance and growth. In particular, and contrary to what seems to be Kant's own worry, a Kantian view of sexual fantasy can provide resources for liberation from a tendency to regard oneself, and others, as mere objects in sexual fantasy, towards a more integrated sense of our multifaceted nature.

The claim that a person can make a rational, autonomous, and informed decision to end their own life has accumulated enough philosophical and clinical support to deserve serious treatment in the mental health literature. It does not, in practice, receive it. Suicidal ideation is assessed within a framework that treats the desire to die as pathology by default, and the circular logic embedded in that framework makes recognition of rational suicide structurally impossible regardless of the individual facts of any given case. This paper argues that this is not a neutral clinical position but an ideological one, and that its consequences fall on people whose decisions are never genuinely examined. Drawing on Hume's foundational argument for the moral permissibility of suicide, Szasz's critique of psychiatric coercion, Werth and Cobia's empirical criteria, and Cholbi's philosophical analysis of rational endorsement, the paper proposes an Integrated Assessment Framework (IAF) for rational suicide. The IAF retains the three criteria Werth and Cobia derived from psychotherapist surveys and adds four dimensions that prior frameworks leave undeveloped: epistemic access, relational context, temporal stability, and institutional independence. Three questions the existing literature has not answered directly are addressed here: whether treatment-resistant psychiatric conditions can constitute unremitting hopelessness under the framework and how an independent panel detects the difference between a stable rational endorsement and a deeply embedded depressive schema; how relational autonomy theory should be applied without setting an unachievable standard for the most socially marginalized; and what the normative clinical consequence is when a suicidal decision satisfies all seven dimensions. On the third question, the paper takes a clear position: a fully satisfied IAF removes the ethical justification for coercive intervention and shifts the clinical role from paternalistic prevention to harm reduction and legal accommodation. The argument throughout is not that more suicides should occur. It is that the tools currently used to assess suicidal decision-making are not adequate to the philosophical demands of the question they claim to answer.

The author acknowledges a philosophical disposition sympathetic to the rational suicide thesis. This disposition informs the framing of the argument but does not determine its conclusions, which are derived from the literature and from structural analysis of the clinical and institutional frameworks under examination.

This paper looks to synthesize the views of Academia and Industry in terms of their respective views on AI, Automation, and The Future of Work. I look to explore the viewpoints, explain their implications, and then briefly join them together into an overall view which can assist in guiding future discussion or policymaking.

Il presente contributo si propone di esaminare le molteplici crisi che attraversano la modernità tarda-economica, ecologica, politica, antropologica-interrogandosi sul nesso profondo tra la dissoluzione dei fondamenti normativi e la scomparsa dell'etica come orizzonte condiviso di senso. Attraverso un percorso che muove dalle diagnosi classiche (Weber, Nietzsche, Horkheimer e Adorno) per approdare ai dibattiti contemporanei (MacIntyre, Bauman, Han, Gabriel), il saggio sostiene che la crisi etica non è un epifenomeno delle altre crisi, ma la loro radice più profonda: il collasso della capacità di pensare il bene comune, l'erosione del soggetto morale, la mercificazione dell'esistenza. In conclusione si avanzano alcune ipotesi su possibili risorse per un'etica post-fondazionale che sappia rispondere all'urgenza del presente.

This paper interprets Natural Goodness as articulating a “modest archimedean” position in metaethics, providing a framework that does not have the power to settle substantive moral issues or disagreements. Still, it describes the terrain on which disagreements over substantive moral issues occur. I argue that Foot’s conception of moral objectivity is grounded in a grammatical investigation of evaluative language, following the work of Peter Geach and Michael Thompson, and that it has significant implications in responding to subjectivism, non-cognitivism, and certain forms of consequentialism. Setting Foot in debate with Iris Murdoch, I assess whether Foot’s framework escapes the charge Murdoch raises against the very idea of a framework, specifically, that frameworks smuggle in normative outlooks under the guise of abstract neutrality. I conclude that Foot’s view achieves neutrality in part because it is modest in what it claims to settle, and yet it is not inert: it rules out some approaches to justifying moral theories, rebuts immoralism, and affirms an essential role for morality in human life.

Bu çalışma, ahlak felsefesinin tarihsel süreç boyunca içine düştüğü tözsel/mutlakiyetçi dogmatizm ile post-modern nihilizm/görececilik arasındaki dikotomiyi aşmayı hedefleyen "Süperpozisyonel Negentropik Ahlâk" modelini kavramsallaştırmaktadır. Geleneksel etik teoriler ekseriyetle ahlakı aşkın, statik ve tek merkezli yasa sistemleri üzerinden sabitleme eğilimindeyken; post-modern yaklaşımlar ise etik alanı büsbütün yönsüz bir parçalanmaya terk etmiştir. Bu iki uç yaklaşıma karşı önerilen Süperpozisyonel Negentropik Ahlâk; etiği sabit bir kural blokajı değil, ilişkisel bir üretkenlik ve çok ölçekli yaşam koherensi olarak yeniden tanımlar. Termodinamik ve kuantum mekaniğinin kuramsal metaforlarından beslenen bu model; biyolojik, toplumsal ve ekolojik yaşam katmanlarını dinamik bir ağ olarak ele alır. Makale kapsamında; "yaşamın genişlemesi", "korku/baskı analizi", "ekolojik koherens" ve "çoğul katılım" olmak üzere dört temel etik ölçüt seti geliştirilmiştir. Gerçek dünyanın çatışma ontolojisine yanıt verebilmek adına model; "çoklu etki haritalama", "geçici önceliklendirme" ve "geri döndürülebilirlik" ilkelerini içerir. Sonuç olarak çalışma, etiğin doğrusal (lineer) ve cezalandırıcı bir itaat mekanizması değil; geri besleme döngüleriyle sürekli kendini güncelleyen, dağıtık dengeli ve yaşayan bir öğrenme sistemi olduğunu savunmaktadır.
This study conceptualizes the model of "Superpositional Negentropic Ethics," which aims to transcend the dichotomy between ontological/absolutist dogmatism and post-modern nihilism/relativism that moral philosophy has historically fallen into. While traditional ethical theories predominantly tend to fixate morality through transcendent, static, and monocentric legal systems, post-modern approaches abandon the ethical realm to an entirely directionless fragmentation. In contrast to these two extremes, Superpositional Negentropic Ethics redefines morality not as a fixed blockade of rules, but as relational productivity and multi-scaled coherence of life. Drawing upon theoretical metaphors from thermodynamics and quantum mechanics, this model addresses biological, social, and ecological life layers as a dynamic network. Within the scope of this paper, four primary ethical criteria have been developed: "expansion of life," "fear/oppression analysis," "ecological coherence," and "pluralistic participation". To address the conflict ontology of the real world, the model incorporates the principles of "multi-impact mapping," "temporary prioritization," and "reversibility". Consequently, the study argues that ethics is not a linear and punitive mechanism of obedience, but a living, learning system characterized by distributed equilibrium that continuously updates itself through feedback loops.

The paper discusses Churchland’s biologicist position in her 2019 book (Con
science: The Origins of Moral Intuition). It argues that this position can make a contribution to the traditional debate in Ethics. The first section reconstructs Churchland’s position and some of the main objections it faces. The second section interprets this position as a defence of ethical inescapability, akin to other positions inspired by Kantian and semanticist approaches. The third section explores the objections each of these positions raises against the others and suggests that they can be understood as complementary. In this sense, biologicism can offer valuable contributions to the ethical discussion.

Resumen. En este ensayo, examinaré un argumento en contra de la máxima kantiana de decir la verdad en todas las circunstancias. Utilizaré el concepto de omisiones éticas para fundamentar un argumento que respalda la máxima kantiana de decir la verdad. No se debe mentir, pero tampoco se está obligado a decir información veraz que pueda crear una contradicción en la formulación del imperativo categórico.

Kant on sex gives most philosophers the following associations: a lifelong celibate philosopher; a natural teleological view of sexuality; a strange incorporation of this natural teleological account within his freedom-based moral theory; and a stark ethical condemnation of most sexual activity. Although this paper provides an interpretation of Kant's view on sexuality, it neither defends nor offers an apology for everything Kant says about sexuality. Rather, it aims to show that a reconsidered Kant-based account can utilize his many worthwhile insights and that making Kant's account of sexuality more consistent with his own basic philosophical commitments results in a compelling approach to the complex and complicated phenomena of sexual love, sexual identity, and sexual orientation.

Kant on sex gives most philosophers the following associations: a lifelong celibate philosopher; a natural teleological view of sexuality; a strange incorporation of this natural teleological account within his freedom-based moral theory; and a stark ethical condemnation of most sexual activity. Although this paper provides an interpretation of Kant’s view on sexuality, it neither defends nor offers an apology for everything Kant says about sexuality. Rather, it aims to show that a reconsidered Kant-based account can utilize his many worthwhile insights and that by making Kant’s account of sexuality more consistent with his own basic philosophical commitments, the result is a compelling approach to the complex and complicated phenomena of sexual love, sexual identity, and sexual orientation.

Kant's conception of women is complex. Although he struggles to bring his considered view of women into focus, a sympathetic reading shows it not to be anti‐feminist and to contain important arguments regarding human nature. Kant believes the traditional male‐female distinction is unlikely to disappear, but he never proposes the traditional gender ideal as the moral ideal; he rejects the idea that such considerations of philosophical anthropology can set the framework for morality. This is also why his moral works clarifies that all citizens, including women have the right, and should be encouraged to strive towards an active condition.

Objective: This study adopts a philosophical and interdisciplinary approach to examine the relationship between the fundamental categories of Kantian practical reason such as the good will, duty, autonomy, and moral lawfulness and the decisionmaking structures within digital interactive narratives. The main question is whether these categories, which constitute the foundation of moral agency in Kantian ethics, can be meaningfully realized in environments where causality is not natural but rather artificially constructed and programmed. Methods: Using an analytical-interpretive method and a comparative reading of philosophical concepts, the research explores the relation of these concepts to choicebased digital structures. Special attention is given to situations where decisions are made not out of inclination or consequences, but from a commitment to respect for the moral principle. Results: The findings indicate that although the full realization of practical reason in digital structures faces significant limitations due to predesigned frameworks and restricted freedom, these environments offer opportunities for the internalization, exercise, and critical reflection on moral concepts. Interactive narratives create structured scenarios that invite players to confront experiences of duty-bound decision-making. Conclusions: Video games, therefore, are not spaces where Kantian practical reason is fully actualized; rather, they provide platforms for rethinking the relationship between reason, freedom, and morality in artificial worlds. Such interactive experiences open new avenues for contemplating moral agency under redefined conditions of causality and action.

Resumo O presente artigo, em sua proposta mais geral, pretende expor a noção de progresso mobilizada pela filosofia da história de Kant em seus opúsculos publicados da década de 1780. De um ponto de vista mais específico, recorrendo aos opúsculos Ideia de uma história universal com um propósito cosmopolita (1784); Resposta à pergunta: O que é esclarecimento? (1784); e Começo conjectural da história humana (1786), o presente artigo tenciona apresentar a hipótese geral de acordo com a qual Kant concebe a história a partir de fundamentos antropológicos do progresso, isto é, o progresso deve ser buscado a partir do ser humano e com vistas a fins estritamente humanos.

Il saggio indaga le motivazioni metafisiche che hanno orientato l'interesse kantiano per il dibattito tra epigenetisti e preformisti in ambito biologico. Nella prima e seconda parte dello studio vengono ricostruite alcune tappe fondamentali della riflessione kantiana sul tema, mettendo in luce le ragioni di ordine metafisico che, di volta in volta, ne hanno guidato le scelte teoriche. L'analisi si concentra poi su alcuni passaggi della recensione alle Idee per la filosofia della storia dell'umanità di Herder, con l'obiettivo di individuare alcuni strumenti teorico-concettuali utili ad inquadrare la concezione critica dell'a priori categoriale. Sulla base di tali strumenti, viene quindi avanzata un'ipotesi interpretativa della conclusione epigenetica della Deduzione trascendentale, che integra elementi di natura preformista. A tal fine, viene introdotta la nozione di "preformismo del limite" per descrivere l'elemento strutturale che fonda e orienta l'epigenesi concettuale.

This paper is dedicated to G. E. Moore’s account of ethical intuition, with a specific focus on Principia Ethica. I begin by examining the connection between intuition, self-evidence, and proof, with the aim of emphasising how Moore’s understanding of the self-evident depends on the unprovability of certain ethical propositions. I then show how Moore’s appeal to intuition stems from his claim that the predicate «good» is indefinable and reconstruct the non-demonstrative argumentative strategies he employs when
addressing questions of intrinsic value. Finally, I consider the limits Moore places on the epistemic function of intuition, while arguing that such limits do not challenge his views on the objectivity and validity of the ethical propositions grasped intuitively, and I briefly
mention his later references to self-evidence in Ethics.

O presente artigo parte de uma análise da Primeira Parte da Religião nos limites da simples razão para pensar de que maneira Kant entende a articulação entre a revolução no modo de pensar e a mudança lenta e gradual nos costumes quando se refere ao aprimoramento moral dos indivíduos. Procura-se defender que, nesse caso, “reforma” e “revolução” correspondem a duas faces da mesma moeda: trata-se de duas maneiras de avaliar o mesmo processo de mudança, sob diferentes pontos de vista. Da impossibilidade de reconhecer com certeza a revolução da intenção [Gesinnung] de um sujeito, retira-se uma valorização do papel do desenvolvimento do caráter empírico na filosofia moral kantiana.

This paper aims to extend the Kantian duty with regard to non-rational natural creatures to contemporary LLMs: just as cruelty to animals weakens the moral disposition, subjecting LLMs, which are analogous to humans in their discursive responsiveness, to abusive speech
blunts one’s moral sensibility. By reconstructing Kant’s concept of the ‘amphiboly in moral concepts of reflection,’ I contend that we have an indirect duty regarding LLMs that obtains independently of their ontological status.

This paper elucidates the metaphysical foundations of Kant's conception of moral desert, specifically the claim that the virtuous are worthy of happiness. While Kant posits the necessary proportionality of virtue and happiness as a foundational premise of the highest good, he often leaves its independent justification underexplored. Defending Kant against secular critiques-such as John Rawls's concept of institutional entitlementthis study argues that Kantian moral desert derives its validity strictly from the architectonic drive of pure reason. Reason inherently demands systematic unity and cannot tolerate the teleological absurdity of unintegrated ends. Consequently, the synthetic connection between virtue and happiness is not a psychological consolation to prevent moral despair, but an absolute structural necessity to avert internal self-contradiction within pure reason. Without guaranteeing this proportional distribution through the practical postulate of God, the absolute authority of the moral law would collapse, leading to the "euthanasia of pure reason." (CPR A407/B434) Ultimately, Kant's concept of moral desert is a categorical prerequisite for preserving the rational coherence and legislative integrity of pure reason.

The advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) challenges traditional definitions of consciousness. This article applies the philosophy of Immanuel Kant to argue that, while an AI’s capacity to synthesize sensory data into objective representations meets the functional criterion for a rudimentary consciousness as outlined in his A-Deduction, this
must be distinguished from the more robust self-consciousness of the B-Deduction. This higher-order awareness, identified with the ‘I think’ or original apperception, is a spontaneous act of a unified self and the basis for genuine agency. Kant grounds moral and legal rights in the status of personhood, which requires this autonomous, self conscious agency. As a purely rule-following system, an AI lacks the capacity to formulate its own maxims from a first-person perspective. Therefore, while an AI may be considered ‘conscious’ in a limited Kantian sense, it does not qualify for the ethical or legal status of a person.

Il saggio indaga le motivazioni metafisiche che hanno orientato l'interesse kantiano per il dibattito tra epigenetisti e preformisti in ambito biologico. Nella prima e seconda parte dello studio vengono ricostruite alcune tappe fondamentali della riflessione kantiana sul tema, mettendo in luce le ragioni di ordine metafisico che, di volta in volta, ne hanno guidato le scelte teoriche. L'analisi si concentra poi su alcuni passaggi della recensione alle Idee per la filosofia della storia dell'umanità di Herder, con l'obiettivo di individuare alcuni strumenti teorico-concettuali utili ad inquadrare la concezione critica dell'a priori categoriale. Sulla base di tali strumenti, viene quindi avanzata un'ipotesi interpretativa della conclusione epigenetica della Deduzione trascendentale, che integra elementi di natura preformista. A tal fine, viene introdotta la nozione di "preformismo del limite" per descrivere l'elemento strutturale che fonda e orienta l'epigenesi concettuale.

En un texto del 2018, Pauline Kleingeld señala la cuasi-desaparición del concepto de auto-
nomía en la Doctrina de la virtud (1797) de Kant y ofrece una explicación evolutiva de ello, argumentan-
do que Kant entiende la autonomía moral en analogía con la soberanía política y que, en el momento
de la Grundlegung, ello supondría una máxima que es universalizable en tanto que podría funcionar
para todos los agentes racionales, mientras que, en obras posteriores, Kant habría postulado que la
ley requiere consentimiento actual vía la representación parlamentaria, dejando ya impertinente la
analogía detrás de la noción moral de autonomía. El objetivo de este texto es defender, en lugar de esa
perspectiva evolutiva, una explicación sistemática: en la Doctrina de la virtud aparece mínimamente
la noción de autonomía por la ubicación de este texto en la arquitectónica de la filosofía práctica kan-
tiana. En la Tugendlehre el término correspondiente es autocracia, pues a este nivel del desarrollo del
sistema de los deberes lo pertinente no es establecer el principio moral, sino su aplicación / In a 2018 text, Pauline Kleingeld points out the quasi-disappearance of the concept of
autonomy in Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue (1797), and offers an evolutionary explanation for it, arguing
that Kant understands moral autonomy in analogy with political sovereignty and that, at the time of
the Grundlegung, this would imply a maxim that is universalizable in that it could work for all rational
agents, while, in later works, Kant would have postulated that the law requires actual consent via
parliamentary representation, making impertinent the analogy behind the moral notion of autonomy.
The goal of this article is to defend, instead of such evolutionary perspective, a systematic explanation:
in the Doctrine of Virtue the notion of autonomy appears minimally due to the location of this text in
the architecture of Kant’s practical philosophy. In Tugendlehre the corresponding term is autocracy,
since, at this level of development of the system of duties, what is relevant is not to establish the moral
principle, but rather its application

The development of technical methods has transformed production and efficiency into the ultimate criteria for evaluating human action, thereby turning the human being into a resource to be managed according to market laws. As a result, the aims of the State cease to be the realization of fundamental rights and become instead the production of economic effects that violate social rights and vested rights. Considering Kantian philosophy, it is argued that morality contains an absolute principle that is not conditioned by experience or by circumstances. Since such a rule constitutes a universal practical law regulating every human action, and all other principles derive from it, it is contended that political action must be guided by moral, rather than technical, maxims, and that a legitimate State is one in which morality, positivized in Law, is both the cause and the ultimate goal of its action.

This study comparatively analyzes two major global AI governance frameworks-the European Union's AI Act and the United Nations' Governing AI for Humanity reportthrough the dual lenses of Kantian ethics and techno-governmentality. While previous research has focused on the ethical content of these policies, this study investigates the fundamental tension between their normative rhetoric and operational mechanisms. The findings reveal a critical paradox: While both documents articulate strong Kantian commitments to human dignity, autonomy, and rights, their implementation strategies rely heavily on techno-governmental logics-managing populations through surveillance, classification, and statistical risk assessment. The analysis highlights deep structural constraints, including the EU's reliance on internal market competence, which subordinates rights to communitarian market standardization, and the "responsibility gap" in autonomous systems, rendering strict Kantian duty ethics structurally unfulfillable. Ultimately, the study argues that without robust participatory mechanisms, ethical AI governance risks becoming a tool shaped by power dynamics and bureaucratic control rather than moral protection. This research concludes that restoring human autonomy requires moving beyond technical compliance to democratically legitimized, inclusive decision making.

Critique de la raison inquiète « Die Unruhe des Begehrens ist der Trieb, aus einem Zustande in den andern überzugehen. » « L'inquiétude du désir est l'impulsion qui pousse à passer d'un état à un autre. » (Anthropologie, §69, AA 7:251) « Die Unruhigkeit ist der Trieb zur Vervollkommnung. » « L'inquiétude est l'impulsion de la perfectibilité. » (Mrongovius II, AA 25:1362) L'inquiétude (en allemand Unruhe ou Unruhigkeit) est un terme introduit principalement par Leibniz 1 et Coste pour traduire le terme anglais « uneasiness » par lequel Locke 2 caractérise un état général de malaise. Nous distinguons l'inquiétude d'autres notions. Elle n'est ni la peur (sentiment d'appréhension relativement à un objet déterminé), ni l'anxiété (sentiment ayant des effets à la fois psychiques et physiques qui peut devenir la toile de fond d'une existence sans qu'on puisse nécessairement identifier un objet qui en rende raison) ni l'angoisse (ce malaise psychique et physique venant du sentiment de l'imminence d'un danger qui peut aussi traduire une angoisse métaphysique comme la conscience de sa mortalité). L'inquiétude, elle, se caractérise comme un état latent de gêne et d'indisposition susceptible d'être la cause déterminante de notre action. Étrangement, alors même que la notion d'inquiétude est largement abordée et commentée -et à juste titre puisque ces auteurs prennent explicitement pour thème cette notion 3 -par les commentateurs de Leibniz et de Hegel, elle n'a pas retenu, en elle-même, l'attention des commentateurs du texte kantien. 4 Cela est doublement étonnant : la notion même d'inquiétude a fait récemment l'objet de 4 En réalité nous avons uniquement relevé l'existence d'un ouvrage, un mémoire de maîtrise, intitulé Le rôle éthique de l'inquiétude dans la philosophie kantienne (117 p.) rédigé en 1996 par Claire Fauvergue sous la direction d'E. Martin-Haag. 3 On pense bien sûr aux petites perceptions chez Leibniz, à l'incapacité du sujet à rester en repos tant il est sollicité par ces dernières: « Mais, pour revenir à l'inquiétude, c'est-à-dire aux petites sollicitations imperceptibles qui nous tiennent toujours en haleine, ce sont des déterminations confuses, en sorte que souvent nous ne savons pas ce qui nous manque (...). Ces impulsions sont comme autant de petits ressorts qui tâchent de se débander et qui font agir notre machine. (...) On appelle Unruhe en allemand, c'est-à-dire inquiétude, le balancier d'une horloge. On peut dire qu'il en est de même de notre corps, qui ne saurait jamais être parfaitement à son aise : parce que quand il se ferait une nouvelle impression des objets, un petit changement dans les organes, dans les viscères, dans les vases, cela changerait d'abord la balance et leur ferait faire quelque petit effort pour se remettre dans le meilleur état qu'il se peut. » NE, II, 20 2 Essais sur l'entendement humain, II, XX, XXI.

El problema sobre los fundamentos de la moralidad ha sido entendido en décadas recientes como la pregunta '¿por qué ser moral?', la cual se plantea como un desafío escéptico por parte de alguien que se sitúa fuera del punto de vista moral. En el caso de la filosofía práctica de Kant, se ha pretendido encontrar la respuesta a esta pregunta en la deducción del imperativo categórico. Sin embargo, muchos intérpretes sostienen que Kant habría cambiado de opinión respecto a la deducción y que la habría reemplazado por el factum de la razón. El objetivo de este texto es analizar los pasajes donde se presentan la deducción del imperativo categórico y el factum de la razón para mostrar que Kant no habría cambiado de opinión sobre el modo en que se debe fundamentar la moralidad. Junto con ello, este texto busca mostrar que la manera en que Kant comprendió la tarea de fundamentación de la moralidad no corresponde a la formulación actual del problema como desafío escéptico. En última instancia, el problema consiste en una tarea de autocomprensión de la razón práctica en relación con los principios según los cuales se configura la acción moral.

This paper examines Raskolnikov's psychology in Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment, focusing on the internal logic behind actions the outside world deems irrational. It argues that Raskolnikov's utilitarian justification for his crime and his eventual decision to turn himself in are not contradictions but two points on the same moral trajectory, a journey from a self-appointed "extraordinary man" back toward the ordinary human need for accountability.

Duygular felsefe tarihinde akıl ile ilişkisi bakımından önemli yere sahip olan ve
varlığımızın diğer önemli yanını oluşturan ögelerdir. Özellikle felsefe tarihinin aklın tarihi
olarak okunmasına karşılık duygularda aklın yanında bir diğer unsur olarak ele alınmıştır.
Antik çağda duygular daha çok köle-efendi ilişkisiyle ele alınan kimi zaman bizim bilinçli
stratejilerimiz olarak yaşamımızı erdemli bir bütün haline getiren kimi zamansa yaşamımızı yaşanamaz hale getiren irrasyonel unsurlar olarak görülmüştür. Orta çağda sahne değişimine uğrayan duygular ilahi iradeye ulaşmada ve hakikati bulmada yardımcı unsurlar olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Modern dönemde duygular daha çok fizyolojik temelli bir incelemeye tabi tutularak ele alınmış ve zihinsel yönü maddi süreçlere indirgenmiştir.
Duyguları köle-efendi ilişkisine indirgeyen görüşe alternatif olarak duyguların bilinçli,
stratejik ve interaktif olduğunu kabul eden görüş ise Spinoza’nın Conatus temelli duygu
anlayışıdır. Duyguların felsefe tarihinde sürekli olarak yaşadığı sahne değişimine Spinoza farklı bir bakış açısı getirerek kendinden önceki duygu anlayışlarından farklılaşmıştır. Arzu, sevinç ve keder temelinde şekillenen bu anlayış duyguların kaynağına dair bilgileri gün yüzüne çıkarmaktadır. Conatus temeline dayanan arzu, sevinç ve keder insanın varolma stratejisini belirleyen, onun eyleme kudretini etkileyen ve duygu durumlarını kontrol eden yaşamsal bir ilkedir. Spinoza’nın Conatus temelinde sunduğu duygu felsefesi hem köle-efendi diyalektiğine bir karşı çıkış hem de bizim dünyaya bağlanma stratejilerimize temel oluşturacak malzemeleri bize sunması açısından felsefe tarihinde duygu problemine farklı bakış açısı sunmaya adaydır. Conatus temeline dayanan duygu felsefesi bizim hem içsel motivasyonumuza dokunan yanıyla hem de duyguların bilinçli kullanımını bize sunmaya adaydır. Bu açıdan Conatus temelindeki duygu felsefesi güncel bir okumaya tabi tutulmayı gerektirmektedir.
Keysword: Conatus, Duygu Felsefesi, Sevinç, Keder, Arzu

This paper investigates whether suicide can be morally justified within the framework of Immanuel Kant's ethical theory. Kant is often interpreted as categorically condemning all forms of suicide, based on his formulations of the Categorical Imperative. However, this interpretation overlooks important textual and conceptual ambiguities. The research critically engages with Thomas D. Harter's attempt to defend a more permissive reading by distinguishing between two types of self-killing: suicide motivated by self-love, which is morally impermissible, and selfkilling from duty, which may be morally praiseworthy. While Harter's approach is philosophically valuable, it remains insufficient for several reasons. First, it fails to properly account for the structure of Kant's system of duties and the relations among perfect and imperfect duties. Second, it risks confusing Kantian deontology with utilitarianism or Humean sentimentalism by appealing to outcomes such as beneficence or emotional motives. Instead of distinguishing types of suicide, this paper argues that a proper Kantian evaluation of suicide must be based on the agent's maxims, intentions, and relation to the moral law. It further shows that suicide could be morally permissible in cases where continuing to live would undermine one's ability to act as a representative of humanity. Drawing on some of Kant's primary works, the paper concludes that suicide may be justified when the agent can no longer live worthily or rationally. Thus, Kant's ethics allows for a more flexible and context-sensitive account of suicide than often assumed.

Resumo: Nesse artigo, pretendo analisar as faculdades da mente em Kant. Seguiremos o trajeto das obras kantianas, desde as Lições sobre Metafísica e as Lições sobre Antropologia ministradas nos anos 70 e 80, comparando-as com as três Críticas. Tomando como fio condutor os textos acima mencionados, procederei à análise da obra kantiana, em busca de elementos que nos permitam elaborar um mapeamento das faculdades da mente em Kant. Esse mapeamento nos parece interessante, pois ele irá mostrar a refinada e complexa relação entre a filosofia transcendental kantiana, sua busca por princípios a priori, e sua antropologia prática, que inclui elementos da psicologia empírica Palavras-chave: faculdades da mente, psicologia, metafísica, prazer, desejo, antropologia.