Semantic Internalism

L'objectif du présent article est d'étudier les tenants et les aboutissants de la « sémasiologie » (Semasiologie), le modèle psychoaffectif du langage proposé par Heinrich Gomperz dans le second volume de sa Weltanschauungslehre (1908). Pour Gomperz, les états affectifs, en tant que composantes essentielles de l'énoncé (Aussage), sont au fondement tout à la fois de la signification conceptuelle (« sentiments logiques matériels »), de la signification grammaticale (« sentiments logiques formels ») et du signe linguistique (« sentiment de médiateté »). Il s'agit ici de réhabiliter une théorie restée unique dans l'histoire des sciences du langage, en la resituant dans son contexte historique et en montrant en quoi elle est susceptible d'entrer en résonance avec la recherche linguistique et philosophique d'aujourd'hui.

This note explores Identity, the thesis that well-formedness coincides with meaningfulness in natural language. Threats to Identity are posed by claims from both linguists and philosophers which include the following: (A) grammar can deceive us into thinking of a meaningless expression that it is meaningful; (B) only sentences are meaningful; (C) trivialities are ill-formed. I critically examine each of these claims and suggest responses to them which support Identity. I also discuss how Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Language provides a way to reconcile Identity with empirical data that motivate (C).

An old paper from my third semester as an undergraduate, left more or less unedited. The class was PHIL 391: Philosophy of Language. Fall 2009. Professor Bryan Register. This version includes Professor Register's comments in red, which offer some helpful insight and clarification.

Though my philosophical interests shifted into the Continental tradition later in my academic career, a good deal of my early training was in analytic and ancient Greek philosophy, both of which I still find interesting and worthwhile.

Abstract:

There are two claims that will be attacked throughout this paper:  (1) that a person’s psychological state determines the meaning of a term (where the meaning of a term is its intension), and (2) that the intension (sense) of a term determines its extension (reference). The traditional Fregean theory of meaning relies predominately on these two assumptions. Two important implications follow from these assumptions: the first is that two terms can have separate intensions while having the same extension; the second is that two terms cannot have the same intension while having separate extensions. The purpose of this paper will be direct. In accordance with Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment, I will first show that assumptions (1) and (2) are incompatible. This will be accomplished, in part, through the use of examples from Putnam’s essay “The Meaning of ‘Meaning.’” I will then use this to support my argument that two terms can have separate extensions while having the same intension.

An old paper from my third semester as an undergraduate, left more or less unedited. The class was PHIL 391: Philosophy of Language. Fall 2009. Professor Bryan Register. I've included the version with Professor Register's comments under the PHIL 391 - Philosophy of Language (fall 2009) section on my academia.edu page, which has some helpful and incisive commentary.

Though my philosophical interests shifted into the Continental tradition later in my academic career, a good deal of my early training was in analytic and ancient Greek philosophy, both of which I still find interesting and worthwhile.

Abstract:

There are two claims that will be attacked throughout this paper:  (1) that a person’s psychological state determines the meaning of a term (where the meaning of a term is its intension), and (2) that the intension (sense) of a term determines its extension (reference). The traditional Fregean theory of meaning relies predominately on these two assumptions. Two important implications follow from these assumptions: the first is that two terms can have separate intensions while having the same extension; the second is that two terms cannot have the same intension while having separate extensions. The purpose of this paper will be direct. In accordance with Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment, I will first show that assumptions (1) and (2) are incompatible. This will be accomplished, in part, through the use of examples from Putnam’s essay “The Meaning of ‘Meaning.’” I will then use this to support my argument that two terms can have separate extensions while having the same intension.

An old paper from my third semester as an undergraduate, left more or less unedited. The class was PHIL 391: Philosophy of Language. Fall 2009. Professor Bryan Register. I've included the version with Professor Register's comments under the PHIL 391 - Philosophy of Language (fall 2009) section on my academia.edu page, which has some helpful and incisive commentary.

Though my philosophical interests shifted into the Continental tradition later in my academic career, a good deal of my early training was in analytic and ancient Greek philosophy, both of which I still find interesting and worthwhile.

Abstract:

There are two claims that will be attacked throughout this paper:  (1) that a person’s psychological state determines the meaning of a term (where the meaning of a term is its intension), and (2) that the intension (sense) of a term determines its extension (reference). The traditional Fregean theory of meaning relies predominately on these two assumptions. Two important implications follow from these assumptions: the first is that two terms can have separate intensions while having the same extension; the second is that two terms cannot have the same intension while having separate extensions. The purpose of this paper will be direct. In accordance with Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment, I will first show that assumptions (1) and (2) are incompatible. This will be accomplished, in part, through the use of examples from Putnam’s essay “The Meaning of ‘Meaning.’” I will then use this to support my argument that two terms can have separate extensions while having the same intension.

In 'The Nature of Content: A Critique of Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne', Sarah Sawyer argues that we failed to attend to the fundamental distinction between indexical and non-indexical thought in Narrow Content, and for that reason the efficacy of our arguments against the narrow content theorist is seriously impaired. Sawyer is right that that distinction does not figure prominently in our book. However, for reasons we made manifest, that distinction does not offer a promising basis for developing a theory of narrow content. In what follows we will speak to this theme, as well as addressing some important matters of detail.

In the 1950s Peter Strawson analyzed the works of Bertrand Russell regarding fundamental definitions of meaning, sentences and truth
value. The debate between them uncovered many issues that Fregean,
truth-functional logics have when defining concepts from natural language. To reconcile the Fregean paradigm with the reality of language use, Strawson proposed the concept of presuppositions  necessary preconditions for the truth of other sentences. We believe that his proposition stemmed primarily from the problem caused by the fact that Fregean, truth-functional logics are not sensitive to the contents of sentences and reduce them to their logical values. This is bound to produce a mismatch between the way logic models reasoning and the way language users reason since real-life reasoning is performed on the contents of sentences and not their logical values. Inspired by the ideas of Strawson and Roman Suszko, who initiated the paradigm of non-Fregean logics, we propose a new solution to the debate between Strawson and Russell. In our solution, the content implication connective is used to express content relations between sentences. We move away from truth and falsehood as the sole two semantic correlates of sentences and instead work in a system where the contents of sentences are their semantic correlates.

Faria's recent publication aims to show that "if anti-individualism is correct, then the obscurity of validity is more widespread than we need to assume for present purposes." In rejecting "a variety of exculpating moves, designed to shield the rationality of the possibly unlucky reasoner," Faria suggests that content externalism can drastically affect our self-understanding as rational beings. I am afraid I have to disagree. Faria overintellectualizes reasoning, always performed from the firstperson perspective and is subject to reflexive control by the reasoner. To be sure, content externalism shows that sound reasoning is contingent on the broad environment and therefore does not depend exclusively on the logical abilities of the living being but is a matter of logical luck. Nonetheless, content externalism is no threat to rationality. My diagnosis: By adopting Wittgenstein's strategy of "bringing words back home," Faria overlooks the achievements of cognitive science: in its simplest form, "transitive inference," rationality pervades the animal kingdom.

The Neo-Fregean view individuates concepts at the level of Fregean senses. It is an internalist view according to which concepts can be described as ways of thinking that imply classifications and epistemic/normative inferences. In this paper, I argue that the Neo-Fregean view of concepts adequately characterises the targets of conceptual engineering (CE), which I depict as the activity of purposefully changing our concepts in order to change classifications and/or concept-implicit inferences. I discuss and reject rival views that either reduce the targets of CE to linguistic meanings or classification procedures or characterise concepts in a psychological or concept-externalist manner. I argue that the Neo-Fregean view is a more encompassing and adequate characterisation of the targets of CE.

I outline and defend a limited realism in socio-political conceptual amelioration (RSCA). RSCA claims that, in some cases, socio-political concepts are ameliorated to represent parts of a concept-independent reality more accurately. My main aim is to dissolve a seeming dilemma for RSCA: Whereas social kinds are mind-dependent (i.e. depending on human thought and action), realism implies that the kinds represented are ontologically independent of the concepts representing them. To dissolve this dilemma, I suggest considering two different roles concepts play concerning social kinds. Concepts can both generate social kinds and represent social kinds. Once a concept has generated a social kind, this social kind is part of a concept-independent reality that can be represented by different concepts. Thereby, RSCA allows ameliorated concepts to represent social kinds (e.g., rape, marriage) more accurately while acknowledging that human actions or concepts have generated these social kinds.

In many works, Noam Chomsky has argued that there is a clear-cut distinction between common sense notions and scientific notions, and that only the latter can enter in the conceptual domain of scientific inquiry. This distinction has been used by Chomsky to criticize the scientific status of many notions used in philosophy of language: according to Chomsky, many of these notions stay in the middle between common sense notions and scientific notions, so that they are useless for the naturalistic inquiry on language and mind. Focusing on Chomsky's criticisms to Hilary Putnam's semantic externalism and linguistic labor division theory, I will point out that Chomsky's criticism is in contrast with his own assumption that some common sense notions (i.e., those used in I-linguistics: faculty of language, language, generative procedure, etc.) can become scientific notions once that a specific definition is associated to them. In proposing this assumption, Chomsky implicitly follows Rudolf Carnap's notion of explication, a notion that makes Chomsky's objection to Putnam irrelevant. After that, I will directly examine Chomsky's assumption, and I will point out some crucial problems affecting it.

An explanation of how we acquire concepts of kinds if they are socially constructed (e.g., man or bachelor) is a desideratum both for a successful account of concept acquisition and a successful account of social constructionism. Both face the so-called "mismatch problem" that is based on the observation that that there is often a mismatch between the descriptions proficient speakers associate with a word and the properties that its referents have in common. I argue that externalist theories of reference provide a plausible and attractive account of concept acquisition, including the acquisition of concepts of social constructs, that avoids the mismatch problem. However, externalist theories are ontologically and psychologically highly demanding, which places strong constraints on accounts of the metaphysics of socially constructed kinds. In particular, they require a rather strong form of realism that is incompatible with some but not all theories of social constructionism. Finally, I show that these demands can be met by means of adopting a homeostatic property cluster view of natural kinds.

Both science and theology involve philosophy. They both involve reasoned argument, evaluation of possible explanations, clarification of concepts, ways of interpreting experience, understanding the present significance of what has gone before us, and other such eminently philosophical tasks. They both involve philosophy especially when they enter into dialogue with each other. In fact, they involve philosophical thinking even when they may not be aware of it. In this paper I will explore a specific area of philosophy that is particularly important as a bridge between theology and science. I am referring to the area of meaning. Questions regarding meaning are fundamental because whatever is said about the nature of life, by scientists, by theologians, or by anyone else, must be expressed in meaningful words. Meaning is like the ground we walk on. It constitutes what we need so as to proceed with our activity. Without solid ground under our feet, we cannot go anywhere.

In the following paper I propose an argument against internalism about thought content. After a brief preview of the recent debate between Sarah Sawyer and Åsa Wikforss, the paper outlines the central issue in their discussion. I show that, even if Wikforss' objections against Sawyer are granted, externalism about thought content can still prevail. For my argument, I use Wikforss` own objection against externalism and show how, if accepted, it binds one to the mythical figure of the perfect speaker-an infallible creature that possesses complete understanding of all of her concepts.

This article explores the tension between the antithetical philosophies of empiricism and innatism underlying Chomskyan linguistics. It first follows the trail of empiricism in North American linguistics, starting from the work of Leonard Bloomfield at the beginning of the Twentieth century, and its influence on the Chomskyan paradigm, after which the Kantian trail of innatism initiated by Chomsky himself is reconnoitered. It is argued that the Chomskyan approach to natural language represents a paradigmatic example of the unsavory consequences of the divorce between mind and matter instituted by Kant, in particular because human language involves an intimate relation between both types of reality. In Chomsky's Generative Grammar, on the other hand, the material side of language is treated as completely autonomous from its mental correlate and analyzed in terms of a priori conceptual structures and computational operations; for its part, the mental side of language is treated as innate; the relation between the two is thus made utterly obscure and incomprehensible. The conclusion of the article argues in favour of a more balanced approach inspired by Aristotelianism and Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutics.

This article explores the tension between the antithetical philosophies of empiricism and innatism underlying Chomskyan linguistics. It first follows the trail of empiricism in North American linguistics, starting from the work of Leonard Bloomfield at the beginning of the Twentieth century, and its influence on the Chomskyan paradigm, after which the Kantian trail of innatism initiated by Chomsky himself is reconnoitered. It is argued that the Chomskyan approach to natural language represents a paradigmatic example of the unsavory consequences of the divorce between mind and matter instituted by Kant, in particular because human language involves an intimate relation between both types of reality. In Chomsky's Generative Grammar, on the other hand, the material side of language is treated as completely autonomous from its mental correlate and analyzed in terms of a priori conceptual structures and computational operations; for its part, the mental side of language is treated as innate; the relation between the two is thus made utterly obscure and incomprehensible. The conclusion of the article argues in favour of a more balanced approach inspired by Aristotelianism and Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutics.

The present article aims to revisit the concept of image schemas, as it has been traditionally defined in cognitive semantics, in light of the notion of epistemic feeling. I advocate the view that epistemic feelingsthat is, affective states that express a definite form of cognizanceare good candidates for psychologically underpinning image-schematic structures and explaining the semantic processes in which they are involved, and I call for a paradigmatic shift from a "cognitive" to an "affective"-or, more exactly, "psychoaffective"approach to linguistic meaning. After briefly presenting the notion of (psycho)affective semantics, I examine successively: (a) the idea that both image schemas and epistemic feelings are subjective and ubiquitous properties of the mind; (b) the experiential commonalities between image schemas and epistemic feelings as semantic factors (abstractness, typicality, epistemic immediacy, polar opposition); (c) the idea that epistemic feelings may be a unique means of psychologically grounding image schemas; (d) five significant types of epistemic feelings that may be involved in the making of image-schematic structures. The article proposes a new theoretical/epistemological perspective on image schemas and semantics, at the interface between linguistics, philosophy, psychology, and affective science.

Semantics: Intuition, Experiment or Illusion? Peter Slezak ([email protected]) Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities University of New South Wales, Sydney NSW 2052 Australia Abstract Externalist theories in natural language semantics have become the orthodoxy since Kripke is widely thought to have refuted descriptive theories involving internal cognitive representation of meaning. This shift may be seen in developments in philosophy of language of the 1970s – the direct reference “revolution against Frege” (Wettstein 2004, 66). Almog (2005, 493) writes of the “uprising against Frege’s doctrines” that “spread like fire” based on the work of Kripke, Donnellan, Putnam and Kaplan. However, I consider Fodor’s (2004) heretical thought that something has gone “awfully wrong” in this philosophical consensus, perhaps confirming Chomsky’s (1992) view that the whole field of philosophical semantics is “utterly wrongheaded” and “crazy” by virtue of its non-naturalist assumptions and...

Everettians generally argue that their view recommends just the same rational choices as orthodoxy. In this note, however, we will show that Everettians should advocate non-standard choices in one specific kind of situation, namely situations where different people have unequal claims to an indivisible good.

In this paper I examine the foundations of physical externalism and social externalism and argue that these foundations are incompatible. Physical externalism is based on a direct reference theory of natural-kind terms, while social externalism is based on a description theory of natural-kind terms. Thus, physical externalism and social externalism are incompatible just in the same way that the direct reference theory of proper names is incompatible with the description theory of proper names. My argument will proceed as follows. In Section One, I shall explain what the two theses say and spell out my suspicion. In Section Two, I shall take a look at the initial setups for physical externalism and social externalism by examining Putnam's and Burge's original arguments. Finally in Section Three, I shall explain that the real incompatibility comes to lie in the different assumptions on which the two theories are based. I will present some thought experiments to highlight this incompatibility.

In this paper I will propose a new approach to certain semantic puzzles due to Frege, Kripke and others, and the question of propositional attitudes, via the notion of belief revision. The principal logical tool used for setting up the solution is the notion an individual theory. I shall suppose that each individual has his or her own theory consisting of the sentences the individual accepts. It is this theory, which together with the individual's preferences leads to a choice of some actions over others; it is this theory out of which the individual communicates; and it is this theory which is revised when a communication, in the form of a sentence uttered by another, is heard or otherwise received. The theory may also be revised as a result of an experience with the "world" as might happen when someone without an umbrella gets wet and adds "It is raining" to his theory. There is also a community theory T c which consists of sentences which we all accept and which, in the varous puzzles, has a different notion of possibility from that of the individual's theory. Thus there is conflict between these two theories not only about what is true or what is known, but even about what is possible. It turns out that most of the puzzles considered in the literature are puzzles about reconciling these two theories. A crucial aspect of this way of looking at the puzzles is that the central role of truth conditions as the determinants of meaning is rejected and more flexible, purely syntactic tools are used. It will be argued that the truth theoretic view of meaning is not an adquate tool for semantics, and abandoning it makes the problems much more amenable. This need not imply abandoning truth, but merely dethroning it from its central role as a foundation for semantics.

In a famous passage of the Meditations, Descartes writes: At this moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I am looking at this paper; that this head which I move is not asleep, that it is deliberately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it. .. . But in thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have been deceived by similar illusions, and in dwelling on this reflection I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now dream. 1 In his skeptical arguments, Descartes is claiming not merely that it is possible that all his thoughts about the world are false but that it is possible for him to have these very thoughts and that they be false. It is possible that he is dreaming that there is a world outside his mind though none exists. Descartes's radical skepticism also involves his view that he can know the contents of his thoughts, even though he knows nothing of the world, or knows even if there is a world.

Theological engagement with quantum mechanics has been dominated by the Copenhagen interpretation, failing to reflect the fact that philosophers and physicists alike are increasingly moving away from the Copenhagen interpretation in favor of other approaches. One such approach, Hugh Everett's so-called Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI), is being taken increasingly seriously. As the MWI's credibility grows, it is imperative that metaphysicians, theologians, and philosophers of religion engage with its ideas and their implications. This article does just that, setting out some implications of Everettian Quantum Mechanics that are particularly relevant to theism. It argues that taking seriously the radical consequences of the Everett interpretation means facing at least three major worries for theism pertaining to personal identity, the problem of evil, and salvation. The article concludes by calling on theologians and philosophers of religion to address these worries, in order that these matters of religious significance remain both coherent and credible if the MWI turns out to be correct.

In the present article, I aim to revisit the feeling-based model of semantics and semiotics proposed in 1908 by the Austrian philosopher Heinrich Gomperz (1873-1942) within the framework of his "semasiology" (Semasiologie). I discuss how Gomperz regarded epistemic ("intellectual") feelings as the foundations of both conceptual and grammatical meanings, but also of the "semiotization" of the statement (Aussage). Special emphasis is placed on how, for him, affective states help make the statement a global meaningful structure. Analysis of Gomperz's psychoaffective model leads me to wonder about the soundness of the provocative view that epistemic feelings may be the core psychological components of linguistic meaning.

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Chomsky, Cognitive Science, Naturalism and Internalism Pierre Jacob

What account of meaning is sufficient for understanding expressions? Using numbers and number-words as familiar forms of expression, I shall try to make an apology of Wittgenstein’s treatment of meaning. My apology is of two parts. The first part attempts to address two questions: Firstly, how do we account for our knowledge of mathematical objects such as those of numbers, numerals, and number-words? Secondly, how do we account for the meaningfulness of their application outside the domain of mathematics? As a reply to the f irst, I shall say no more than affirm, following Wittgenstein, the simple fact that our knowledge of mathematical objects such as those of numbers, numerals, and number-words is accounted for by how we learn a given language. As a reply to the second, I shall argue that said meaningfulness may be explained solely by an appeal to Wittgenstein’s account of languagegames and consequently of grammar. The second part puts forward, albeit in a general way, the idea t...

The purpose of the paper is to show that semantic externalism-the thesis that contents are not determined by "individualistic" features of mental states-is mistaken. Externalist thinking, it is argued, rests on two mistaken assumptions: the assumption that if there is an externalist way of describing a situation the situation exemplifies externalism, and the assumption that cases in which a difference in the environment of an intentional state entails a difference in the state's intentional object are cases in which environmental factors determine the state's content. Exposing these mistakes leads to see that the conditions that are required for the truth of externalism are inconsistent.

In a famous passage of the Meditations, Descartes writes: At this moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I am looking at this paper; that this head which I move is not asleep, that it is deliberately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it. .. . But in thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have been deceived by similar illusions, and in dwelling on this reflection I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now dream. 1 In his skeptical arguments, Descartes is claiming not merely that it is possible that all his thoughts about the world are false but that it is possible for him to have these very thoughts and that they be false. It is possible that he is dreaming that there is a world outside his mind though none exists. Descartes's radical skepticism also involves his view that he can know the contents of his thoughts, even though he knows nothing of the world, or knows even if there is a world.

Stalnaker argues that, while the two-dimensional framework can be used to give expression to the claims associated with rigidified descriptivism, it cannot be used to support that position. He also puts forward some objections to rigidified descriptivism. I agree that rigidified descriptivism cannot be supported by appeal to the two-dimensional framework. But I think that Stalnaker's objections can be avoided under a descriptivism that introduces a causal as well as a descriptive element-a descriptivism in which the relevant descriptions are allowed to be, not only rigidified, but anchored in causal exposure to referents.

The existing theories of meaning are classifiable into semantic and foundational categories. After a brief overview of these categories, the current paper will dwell on a discussion of what has urged pragmaticists to endorse a dovetailing of semantics and pragmatics in their attempts at presenting a comprehensive and exhaustive account of meaning. The paper then uses Balkhi’s analogy of ‘the elephant in the dark room’ to argue that (a) all of the existing theories of meaning are inadequate, and that (b) the Gricean vicious cycle is also the product of pragmaticists’ mistaking complimentary distribution for inclusional distribution. Arguing in favor of a physiological theory of meaning, the paper concludes that a comprehensive theory of meaning has to be a theory of human brain and/or mind and should be foundational.

Word meaning has played a somewhat marginal role in early contemporary philosophy of language, which was primarily concerned with the structural features of sentence types and showed less interest in the format of lexical representations and in the nature of the word-level input to compositional processes. Nowadays, it is well-established that the way we account for word meaning is bound to have a major impact in tipping the balance in favor or against a given picture of the fundamental properties of human languages. This entry provides an overview of the way issues related to lexical meaning have been explored in analytic philosophy and a summary of relevant research on the subject in neighboring scientific domains. Though the main focus will be on philosophical problems, contributions from linguistics, psychology, neuroscience and artificial intelligence will also be considered as research on word meaning is highly interdisciplinary.

In componential analysis, word meanings are (partly) decomposed into other meanings, and semantic and syntactic markers. Although a theory of word meaning based on such semantic decompositions remains compatible with the linguistic labor division thesis, it is not compatible with Kripke/Putnamstyle indexical externalism. Instead of abandoning indexical externalism, a Separation Thesis is defended according to which lexical meaning need not enter the truth-conditional content of an utterance. Lexical meaning reflects beliefs about word meaning shared in a speaker community, and these may rest on possibly erroneous world-level theories. It is argued that this type of lexical meaning is indispensable for explaining word composition processes and the rationality of metalinguistic disputes.

Discussing Word Meaning: The Question of Internalism vs. Externalism was a talk given on May 20, 2022, at the conference Metalinguistic Disagreement and Semantic Externalism, May 19-20, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon. It is based on Rast, Erich H. (forthcoming). Metalinguistic Disputes, Semantic Decomposition, and Externalism. Linguistics & Philosophy 2022.

Copredication is the phenomenon whereby two or more predicates seem to require that their argument denotes different things. The denotation of words that copredicate has been broadly discussed. In this paper, I investigate the metaphysics behind this question. Thus, mereological theories of dot objects claim that these nouns denote complex entities; Asher (Lexical meaning in context, Cambridge University Press, 2011, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793936) thinks that they denote bare particulars; and the Activation Package Theory contends that they stand for multiple denotations. According to the Activation Package Theory, copredicative nouns stand for complex knowledge structures that offer a range of multiple potential denotations. In this paper, I claim that the Activation Package Theory contributes to solve some of the metaphysical questions that arise from copredication.

Within the current philosophical landscape surrounding consciousness and mind, certain figures would have us reinterpret Sartre's early philosophy in order to locate an enduring insight relevant to contemporary academic discourse. Such a project, however, inherently involves the age-old problem of pre-reflective consciousness as regards the foundation of consciously mental states. This chapter lays out logical and diachronic groundwork for an attempted turn towards early Sartre, locates Sartre's position and import within this framework, and seeks to offer yet another open-ended question to the productive interchange among both American and European philosophers of mind which a return to the early Sartre has recently come to inspire.

In his post-Tractatus work on natural language use, Wittgenstein defended the notion of what he dubbed the autonomy of grammar. According to this thought, grammar - or semantics, in a more recent idiom - is essentially autonomous from metaphysical considerations, and is not answerable to the nature of things. The argument has several related incarnations in Wittgenstein?s post-Tractatus writings, and has given rise to a number of important insights, both critical and constructive. In this paper I will argue for a potential connection between Wittgenstein?s autonomy argument and some more recent internalist arguments for the autonomy of semantics. My main motivation for establishing this connection comes from the fact that the later Wittgenstein?s comments on grammar and meaning stand in opposition to some of the core assumptions of semantic externalism.

In recent works, Chomsky has once more endorsed a computational view of rulefollowing, whereby to follow a rule is to operate certain computations on a subject's mental representations. As is well known, this picture does not conform to what we may call the grammatical conception of rule-following outlined by Wittgenstein, whereby an elucidation of the concept of rule-following is aimed at by isolating grammatical statements regarding the phrase 'to follow a rule'. As a result, Chomskyan and Wittgensteinian treatments of topics immediately connected with rule-following, namely linguistic competence and understanding, are utterly different from one another. There are two possible stances that computationalists like Chomsky may adopt with regard to the discrepancy between the two aforementioned modes of dealing with rule-following, namely a conciliatory and a non-conciliatory attitude. According to the former attitude, grammatical remarks on and computationallyoriented theories of rule-following investigate one and the same topic although admittedly at different levels, namely a conceptual and an empirical one. According to the latter attitude, grammatical remarks are just a preliminary step in the investigation of rule-following which scientific advancement, presently represented by computationally-oriented theories on this matter, is well entitled to put aside. In what follows, however, I will try to show that both stances are problematic. The conciliatory attitude simply does not work, for it hardly copes with the fact that the concept of rule-following does not supervene, even weakly, on the property of rule-following, namely the property instantiated in the mental/cerebral phenomena that computationally-oriented theories of rule-following study. To take the contrary attitude, on the other hand, is to end up with another disappointing result, namely that the computational treatment of rule-following ultimately deals with something different from that which we wished to gain knowledge of when we began our inquiry into rule-following. I In Chomsky's recent work, what a scientific study of language must focus on are not E-languages (external languages), artificial constructions whose interpretation is determined by the interaction between subjects and their (physical and social)