concentration risk

Banks are fundamental to economic growth, yet their profitability remains intrinsically linked to the efficacy of their credit risk management (CRM). History, from the 2008 global financial crisis to recent high-profile failures like Silicon Valley Bank (2023) and Investrust Bank (2024), underscores that weak CRM can destabilize institutions and erode financial performance. This study examines the impact of CRM practices on the profitability of Indo-Zambia Bank, employing an explanatory sequential mixed-methods design. Quantitative analysis of financial records and staff perceptions was integrated with qualitative insights from bank personnel to provide a holistic assessment. The findings reveal a significant positive relationship between effective CRM and profitability, with the integrated CRM lifecycle, particularly monitoring and recovery, emerging as the strongest predictor. While the bank operates within a structurally sound CRM framework, its performance is mediated by critical implementation gaps, including deficiencies in staff training and inconsistent monitoring practices. Furthermore, the bank's non-performing loan (NPL) trajectory, although below the industry average, mirrors troubling sector-wide trends, suggesting that systemic challenges can potentially overwhelm internal controls. The study concludes that translating a robust risk framework into sustained profitability requires a strategic shift from policy design to operationally seamless execution. It offers actionable recommendations for strengthening post-approval monitoring, investing in early-warning technologies, and enhancing recovery mechanisms to fortify the bank's financial resilience.

Recently, banking literature has had a quest for appropriate pricing of bank loans under the new Basel II rules and has been in pursuit of possible outcomes for undertaking such credit risk. In this paper, we propose a simplified formula to price bank's corporate loans, aiming at making bank managers aware of the creation/destruction of shareholder value. We show that the mathematical treatability of the proposed formula and its easy feeding with internal and market inputs allow simple implementation by the final user.

In late 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued the Basel III document enumerating measures focused on improvements in the definition of regulatory capital, introduction of a leverage ratio as a backstop for risk-based capital requirement, capital buffers, enhancement of risk coverage through improvements in the methodology to measure counterparty credit risk and liquidity measurement standards. This study investigates the impact of the new capital requirements introduced under the Basel III framework on bank lending rates and loan growth. Higher capital requirements, by raising banks' marginal cost of funding, lead to higher lending rates. The data presented in the paper suggest that assuming a 1.3 percentage point increase in the equity-to-asset ratio to meet the Basel III regulations, the country-by-country estimations imply a reduction in the volume of loans by an average 4.97 percent in the long run for the banks in countries that experienced a crisis and by 18.67 percent for the banks in countries that did not experience a crisis. The wide variance in the results reflects crosscountry differences in the elasticity of loan demand with respect to loan interest rateand bank's net cost of raising equity.

The aim of this research is to identify the determinants of excess liquidity defined as excess reserves in the banking sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H). The empirical analysis is carried out through the use of the dynamic panel analysis based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) methodology on a dataset of 19 commercial banks operating in B&H in the period from 2006 to 2015. The estimated relationships between excess liquidity and selected variables in models' specifications are as expected. The findings indicate that the size of the bank, non-performing loans and total loans are the key determinants of excess liquidity amongst internal factors. The results also reveal that among the domestic macroeconomic variables CPI is statistically significant indicator of excess liquidity. The commercial banks also rely on foreign markets and the finding arising from this study confirms a significant influence of Eonia on excess liquidity position in B&H. The presented research results and their economic interpretation may have valuable implications on the optimal liquidity management in the commercial banks in B&H and appropriate liquidity supervision. It will also provide beneficial foundation for more thorough liquidity analysis and its possible linkages with other risks within the banking sector.

The phenomenon of credit risk is one of the main distresses for the bank portfolio. If it becomes nonviable to gather claims from various main clients, a bank could persist in being insolvent. The latest financial crises have distinguished the necessity for a bank to identify, measure, assess, and control credit risk, in addition to providing an acceptable degree of capital to protect against possible decline in case of loan defaults. Accordingly, risk management depends steadily on the straight implementation of mathematical and statistical methods and models and the application of their outcomes for business goals. The aim of this paper is to present the disclosures that are related to bank credit risk, bearing in mind that credit risk management is one of the indicators of the results of banking operations.

This paper empirically investigates the existence of a bank lending channel and its determinants in the Republic of Macedonia. The results suggest that there is robust statistical evidence in favour of the existence of a bank lending channel. The most influential bank-specific characteristic is the non-performing loans (NPL) ratio which might be a proxy for banks' risk preferences. This would imply that banks' risk preferences are among the most influential factors in determining banks' lending activities. However, an alternative interpretation of the NPL ratio suggests that it might serve as an indicator of the ex-post quality of the loan portfolio and, hence, may indicate an increase in banks' external financing premium. Regarding the rest of the bank-specific characteristics, empirical results show that bank liquidity has the opposite sign from what the theory suggests, while there is no strong evidence that bank capital has impact on the loan supply function as the results are sensitive to different estimation methods and the number of instruments created. Regarding the asset size, the results do not imply any statistically significant impact.

This paper empirically investigates the existence of a bank lending channel and its determinants in the Republic of Macedonia. The results suggest that there is robust statistical evidence in favour of the existence of a bank lending channel. The most influential bank-specific characteristic is the non-performing loans (NPL) ratio which might be a proxy for banks' risk preferences. This would imply that banks' risk preferences are among the most influential factors in determining banks' lending activities. However, an alternative interpretation of the NPL ratio suggests that it might serve as an indicator of the ex-post quality of the loan portfolio and, hence, may indicate an increase in banks' external financing premium. Regarding the rest of the bank-specific characteristics, empirical results show that bank liquidity has the opposite sign from what the theory suggests, while there is no strong evidence that bank capital has impact on the loan supply function as the results are sensitive to different estimation methods and the number of instruments created. Regarding the asset size, the results do not imply any statistically significant impact.

This paper examines whether lending structure can lower credit risk by employing econometric techniques of panel data for the Vietnamese banking system at the bank level used by economic sectors from 2011 to 2016. New light is being shed on assessing the impact of each industry's debt outstanding on credit risk. Adopting findings from previous studies, we assess credit risk from two different sources, including loan loss provision and non-performing loan. Moreover, we also focus on observing lending structure in many different aspects, from concentrative levels to the short-term and long-term stability levels of lending structure. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator was applied to analyze the relationship between concentration and banking risks. In general, the results show that lending concentration may decrease credit risk. It is interesting to observe that the Vietnamese commercial bank lending portfolios have, on average, higher levels of diversity across different sectors. In particular, the increase in hotel and restaurant lending contributes to decrease credit risk while the lending portfolios of banks in agriculture, electricity, gas and water increase credit risk. This study suggests the need for further analysis and research about portfolio risks in lending activities for maintaining efficiency and stability in the commercial banking system.

In late 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued the Basel III document enumerating measures focused on improvements in the definition of regulatory capital, introduction of a leverage ratio as a backstop for risk-based capital requirement, capital buffers, enhancement of risk coverage through improvements in the methodology to measure counterparty credit risk and liquidity measurement standards. This study investigates the impact of the new capital requirements introduced under the Basel III framework on bank lending rates and loan growth. Higher capital requirements, by raising banks' marginal cost of funding, lead to higher lending rates. The data presented in the paper suggest that assuming a 1.3 percentage point increase in the equity-to-asset ratio to meet the Basel III regulations, the country-by-country estimations imply a reduction in the volume of loans by an average 4.97 percent in the long run for the banks in countries that experienced a crisis and by 18.67 percent for the banks in countries that did not experience a crisis. The wide variance in the results reflects crosscountry differences in the elasticity of loan demand with respect to loan interest rateand bank's net cost of raising equity.

In late 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued the Basel III document enumerating measures focused on improvements in the definition of regulatory capital, introduction of a leverage ratio as a backstop for risk-based capital requirement, capital buffers, enhancement of risk coverage through improvements in the methodology to measure counterparty credit risk and liquidity measurement standards. This study investigates the impact of the new capital requirements introduced under the Basel III framework on bank lending rates and loan growth. Higher capital requirements, by raising banks' marginal cost of funding, lead to higher lending rates. The data presented in the paper suggest that assuming a 1.3 percentage point increase in the equity-to-asset ratio to meet the Basel III regulations, the country-by-country estimations imply a reduction in the volume of loans by an average 4.97 percent in the long run for the banks in countries that experienced a crisis and by 18.67 percent for the banks in countries that did not experience a crisis. The wide variance in the results reflects crosscountry differences in the elasticity of loan demand with respect to loan interest rateand bank's net cost of raising equity.

We show that risk mitigating incentives dominate risk shifting incentives in fragile banks. Risk shifting could be particularly severe in banking since it is the most opaque industry and banks are one of the most leveraged corporations with very low skin in the game. To analyze this question, we exploit security trading by banks during financial crises, as banks can easily and quickly change their risk exposure within their security portfolio. However, in contrast with the risk shifting hypothesis, we find that less capitalized banks take relatively less risk after financial market stress shocks. We show this using the supervisory ISIN-bank-month level dataset from Italy with all securities for each bank. Our results are over and above capital regulation as we show lower reach-for-yield effects by less capitalized banks within government bonds (with zero risk weights) or within securities with the same rating and maturity in the same month (which determines regulatory capital). Effects are robust to controlling for the covariance with the existence portfolio, and less capitalized banks, if anything, reduce concentration risk. Further, effects are stronger when uncertainty is higher, despite that risk shifting motives may be then higher. Moreover, three separate tests-based on different accounting portfolios (trading book versus held to maturity), the distribution of capital and franchise value-suggest that bank own incentives, instead of supervision, are the main drivers. Results are confirmed if we consider other sources of balance sheet fragility and different measures of risk-taking. Finally, evidence from the recent COVID-19 shock corroborates findings from the Global Financial Crisis and the Euro Area Sovereign Crisis.

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Purpose of the Study: Credit risk is the risk of default by the borrower. The major cause of a bank's failure is the lack of proper credit risk management (CRM). The study examined the impact of the credit risk on the profitability of the public and private sector banks in Bangladesh. Materials and Methods: A total of 20 public and private commercial banks (CB) were selected for a period of 5 years (

Loan portfolio problems have historically been the major cause of bank losses because of inherent risk of possible loan losses (credit risk). The study of Bank Loan Fraud Detection and IT-Based Combat Strategies in Nigeria which focused on analyzing the loan assessment system was carried out purposely to overcome the challenges of high incidence of Non- Performing Loan (NPL) that are currently being experienced as a result of lack of good decision making mechanisms in disbursing loans. NPL has led to failures of some banks in the past, contributed to shareholders losing their investment in the banks and inaccessibility of bank loans to the public. Information Technology (IT) is a critical component in creating value in banking industries. It provides decision makers with an efficient means to store, calculate, and report information about risk, profitability, collateral analysis, and precedent conditions for loan. This results in a quicker response for client and efficient identific...

The 2004 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Accord (known as Basel II) provides a common framework for banks to determine their minimum capital requirements for solvency purposes. For credit risk (the most important one for banking) Basel II uses an asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model and, as we demonstrate in the paper, assumes two fundamental hypotheses: Firstly, that there is only one risk factor common to all banks; and secondly, that the number of debtors in bank portfolios is high enough to ensure that no single debtor's behaviour can have a significant impact on the portfolio value as a whole. This allows capital requirements to be estimated by using a model based on the percentage of defaulting borrowers (x). The model only requires values for two variables: the probability of default and loss if default occurs. Using a 99% likelihood and assuming that all sectors are equally correlated, the model estimates x through the cumulative distribution function for the Gaussian distribution. But many bank portfolios do not fit these hypotheses, and therefore the ASRF model underestimates actual capital requirements. Thus, a surcharge for concentration risk is required. There are two kinds of concentration risk (sector and name concentration risk), each one corresponding to the violation of one of the above mentioned hypotheses. Supervisory authorities are currently developing models to incorporate this surcharge into banking solvency rules. In Spain, the Spanish Central Bank bases its surcharge proposal for sectorial concentration on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). In this paper we show that HHI treats all sectors as equally risky and propose an alternative index (CI) in which sectors are weighted according to risk. Moreover, our index also incorporates the relations between each pair of sectors (in the HHI framework no sectorial relationship is considered). Our proposal is based on an adjusted variance-covariance matrix, in which negative covariances have been equalled to 0. We demonstrate the HHI is a particular case of our proposed index, by means of simplifying hypotheses. As we will show, the proposed index has two fundamental properties: it is lower and upper bounded; and it decreases as concentration and/or risk decreases. These properties allow the index to be incorporated into bank risk management models. In this way bank estimations can improve upon those based on the supervisory model and, according to banking rules, can also be used for determining the capital surcharge for sectorial concentration.

The 2004 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Accord (known as Basel II) provides a common framework for banks to determine their minimum capital requirements for solvency purposes. For credit risk (the most important one for banking) Basel II uses an asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model and, as we demonstrate in the paper, assumes two fundamental hypotheses: Firstly, that there is only one risk factor common to all banks; and secondly, that the number of debtors in bank portfolios is high enough to ensure that no single debtor's behaviour can have a significant impact on the portfolio value as a whole. This allows capital requirements to be estimated by using a model based on the percentage of defaulting borrowers (x).

We show that risk-mitigating incentives dominate risk-shifting incentives in fragile banks. We study security trading by banks, as banks can easily and quickly change their risk exposure within their security portfolio. For identification, we exploit different crisis shocks and supervisory ISIN-bank-month-level data. Less capitalized banks take relatively less risk after financial stress shocks. Results hold within identical regulatory capital risk weights categories. Moreover, additional tests suggest that banks’ own incentives, rather than supervision, are the main drivers. Results hold for the different crisis shocks since 2007/08, including the COVID-19 one. A model of bank behavior rationalizes our findings.