judicial selection

In the literature associated with judicial selection reform, "merit selection" refers to schemes that rely on independent commissions for recruiting and screening candidates. Such commissions recommend candidates to the Chief Executive, who makes judicial appointments based on the Commission's findings. Proponents of such plans suggest that commissions should be nonpartisan bodies, composed of lawyers and non-lawyers. Nelson, Carter's Merit Plan: A GoodFirst Step, 61 JUDICATURE 105, 107 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Nelson]. 5. Williams, Federal Merit Selection Takes Root, 61 JUDICATURE 104 (1977). 6. The Act contains a merit provision requiring the President to promulgate "standards and guidelines" for the selection of the new district court judges on the basis of merit. The original House version required that formal merit selection procedures be established and followed. The House version was intended to prompt the President to establish a formal mechanism to fill district court vacancies similar to that already instituted to fill circuit court vacancies. The compromise legislation omits any reference to establishing specific merit selection procedures. As a result, the district positions are being filled by merit commissions only where such bodies are voluntarily established by United States Senators.

In the literature associated with judicial selection reform, "merit selection" refers to schemes that rely on independent commissions for recruiting and screening candidates. Such commissions recommend candidates to the Chief Executive, who makes judicial appointments based on the Commission's findings. Proponents of such plans suggest that commissions should be nonpartisan bodies, composed of lawyers and non-lawyers. Nelson, Carter's Merit Plan: A GoodFirst Step, 61 JUDICATURE 105, 107 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Nelson]. 5. Williams, Federal Merit Selection Takes Root, 61 JUDICATURE 104 (1977). 6. The Act contains a merit provision requiring the President to promulgate "standards and guidelines" for the selection of the new district court judges on the basis of merit. The original House version required that formal merit selection procedures be established and followed. The House version was intended to prompt the President to establish a formal mechanism to fill district court vacancies similar to that already instituted to fill circuit court vacancies. The compromise legislation omits any reference to establishing specific merit selection procedures. As a result, the district positions are being filled by merit commissions only where such bodies are voluntarily established by United States Senators.

Welcome to this afternoon's session: The Court and the Changing Constitution: A discussion. By discussion we mean something more akin to a free-for-all. We have various different topics here: we have appointments, we have separation of powers, we have disincorporation (I have no idea what that might be), and we have the exclusionary rule. And among the common denominators I see here are complaints about court of appeals' jurisprudence and complaints about all kinds of stuff, even complaints about one another. I just told Professor Carl Swidorskil at the break that his dissertation on the court of appeals' appointment process, the changeover from elections to the so-called merit selection system, was the first I had ever read. So, Carl, go to it.

For several decades, the American Bar Association has received special treatment and enjoyed special access to judicial nominees. In some administrations, the ABA received notice of nominees before a nomination was announced to the public. Some administrations would even decide whether to nominate an individual based on a rating assigned by the ABA.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Unfortunately, the ABA no longer functions as a fair arbiter of nominees' qualifications, and its ratings invariably and demonstrably favor nominees put forth by Democratic administrations. The ABA's steadfast refusal to fix the bias in its ratings process, despite criticism from Congress, the Administration, and the academy, is disquieting.
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Accordingly, while the ABA is free to comment on judicial nominations along with other activist organizations, there is no justification for treating the ABA differently from such other activist organizations and the Department of Justice will not do so. Specifically, the Office of Legal Policy will no longer direct nominees to provide waivers allowing the ABA access to non public information, including bar records. Nominees will also not respond to questionnaires prepared by the ABA and will not sit for interviews with the ABA.

Since my appointment to fill a vacancy on the Texas Supreme Court, I have been a candidate in three judicial elections, each introducing me to the problematic, often confounding, world of judicial politics. In a judicial campaign, the road to victory begins with the solicitation of money. The "ask" is undignified, and the "give" is fairly compelled. To illustrate, consider one common, if not unavoidable, scenario in the campaign of a state court judge: sorry, Mr. Jefferson, but Mr. Smith is on the phone with a client. May I take a message? Chief Justice Jefferson: Would you let him know that I am Chief Justice Jefferson of the Supreme Court of Texas? Mr. Smith: Good afternoon, Chief Justice Jefferson. I am so sorry to keep you waiting. My receptionist didn't recognize your name. Chief Justice Jefferson: No need to apologize, Mr. Smith. I am calling because I am on the ballot this year, and I could really use your help. Mr. Smith: Well, I did not intend to get involved in judicial elections this year, but you are doing a fantastic job as chief justice. Chief Justice Jefferson: No one likes the politics in these elections, but we are compelled to engage. Now, you have appeared in my court many times. You would agree, I hope, that I am always prepared for oral argument? Mr. Smith: Certainly. † Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson was appointed to the Texas Supreme Court in March 2001 and won his first election in 2002. In 2004, he was appointed chief justice and was confirmed unanimously by the Texas Senate. He was elected to that position in 2006 and re-elected to a full term in 2008. In 2010, he will begin serving as elected President of the Conference of Chief Justices, an association of chief justices from each of the fifty states and the U.S. territories.

The confirmation process is like the weather: everyone complains, but no one seems able to do anything about it. In fact, there has been a lot about which to complain. Within the past decade, the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations have each had confirmation mishaps that have been the subject of countless commentaries, including President Reagan's failed Supreme Court nominees Robert Bork and Judge Douglas Ginsburg; President Bush's barely successful nomination of Justice Clarence Thomas, whose confirmation hearings were dominated by fierce racial and sexual politics; and President Clinton's protracted, leak-ridden searches for two Supreme Court nominees and forced withdrawals of his nominations of Zoe Baird as Attorney General, Bobby Inman as Secretary of Defense, and Lani Guinier as head of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. Even though each of these incidents and many other troubled nominations' may make sense in retrospect, the confirmation process still mysti-

7 In his final year in office, President Clinton nominated Roger Gregory and Barrington Parker, Jr. to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and for the Second Circuit, respectively. The Senate never acted on those nominations. Consequently, President Clinton in his last month in office designated both people as recess appointees to their respective courts of appeals. These appointments would have expired at the end of the next congressional session. In March of his first year in office, President George W. Bush announced his first set of nominees to the federal courts of appeals, including Gregory to the Fourth Circuit and Parker to the Second Circuit. 8 See Walter Dellinger, Broaden the Slate, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2003, at A23. 9 Estrada, Kavanaugh, and Griffith are three people on whose nominations by President Bush to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia the Senate never acted on. Democrats successfully blocked a floor vote on Estrada's nomination, while the Judiciary Committee never acted on either Kavanaugh's or Griffith's nomination. I do not know Estrada personally, but I do know both Kavanaugh and Griffith. They have very kindly and generously given their time to lecture, more than once, to my classes.

This Symposium allows me the opportunity to reconsider the analogy that best fits judicial selection. In a series of essays, I previously considered analogizing judicial selection to war.' This was an especially apt analogy because confirmation contests often resemble military conflicts in their deployment of guerrilla tactics and the take-no-prisoners approaches of the contending sides. 2 A major reason for the intensifying combat over judicial selection is that we are in the midst of the second longest period in our history without a vacancy arising on the Supreme Court. 3 National political leaders are terribly anxious over who will get to make the next appointment to the Court and thus perhaps be able to determine, for some time to come, how the Court will decide the many divisive questions of constitutional law that it and it alone is empowered to decide. 4 It is no accident that President Reagan's and President George H.W. Bush's appointees continue to domi-

A second critique argues that merit selection, coupled with retention elections, removes public input by "taking away the right to vote." 1 8 In other words, some argue that retention elections do not foster the same kind of meaningful public choice that contestable elections offer. The first charge relies on an assumption that elections are only serving their intended function when they remove incumbents from office. It is true that most incumbent judges who are subject to retention will win another term in office. Of the 6306 state court judges who were up for retention between 1964 and 2006, only fifty-six (less than 1%) were defeated. 19 But there is nothing inherently wise or virtuous about removing sitting judges from office. Nor is the value of an election dictated by the outcome. It is worth remembering the high rates of reelection for U.S. House incumbents. By constitutional design, members of the U.S. House are supposed to be the most direct representatives of the public will. In the case of House incumbents, there are no philosophical conflicts between the function of the office and the accountability to the public's policy wishesthe two are directly and explicitly related. Yet House incumbents are often reelected at a rate that is nearly comparable to state judges standing in retention elections. In the 1998 congressional elections, for example, only 6 of 401 House incumbents (1.5%) lost their seat. 20 Although this high rate of reelection for House incumbents 17. It is worth noting that, even among some supporters of merit selection and retention, a failure to adhere to public opinion is often assumed (implicitly or explicitly) to be a valid reason for voting against a sitting judge. 18. This language is often used by opponents of merit selection. Leading up to the 2000 elections that included local ballot initiatives to institute merit selection for Florida district court judges, an article in the Florida Bar News, for example, was titled Don't Eliminate the Right to Elect Florida's Trial Judges. See http://www.childrensjustice.org/electedjudges.htm. One activist in Louisiana writes that any attempts to change from an elected system of selecting our judges to a merit selection system will require a vote of the people. So in order to come about, the voters of this state would have to voluntarily relinquish their right to vote for judges. Why would we do that? See http://centrallapolitics.blogspot.com/2008/09/merit-selection-of-judges-is-notway-to.html. Similarly, the Associate Editor of the Capital Times in Madison, Wisconsin, argues, "Advocates for the backroom appointment of judgesa scheme that goes by the misnomer 'merit selection'claim that taking away the power of the people to elect jurists will 'remove politics' from the process." See http://www.madi son.com/tct/columnl/460146. 19. Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends 1964-2006, 90 JUDICATURE 208, 210 (2007). Of the fifty-six judges who were defeated in retention elections, 51.8% of them served in Illinois, which is the only state to require a 60% threshold to retain a judicial seat. Id. 20. On average, over 95% of House incumbents are reelected every two years. See PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME AND IN WASHINGTON (2007). While 1998 was particularly favorable to incumbent lawmakers, it is not an extreme outlier. See id.

Law. I would like to thank my colleague Thomas E. Baker for the benefit of his wisdom and vast knowledge as I prepared to write this article. I would also like to thank linda f. harrison (lowercase preferred) of Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center for her comments, criticisms and encouragement. 1. In 1997, Tom Delay, then Majority Whip, introduced legislation to limit the terms of federal judges and to restrict their review in death penalty and voter referendum cases, asserting that Article II of the United States Constitution gives Congress appellate jurisdiction. DeLay announced to a group of reporters that, "Judges need to be intimidated.. . ." In a speech about judicial independence on February 1, 2001, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg responded to Delay's comment calling him an exterminator. Justice Ginsburg said columnist Bob Herbert of the Washington Post got it right when he said in a December 2000 column that, "[a]n intimidated judge is a worthless judge."

A second critique argues that merit selection, coupled with retention elections, removes public input by "taking away the right to vote." 1 8 In other words, some argue that retention elections do not foster the same kind of meaningful public choice that contestable elections offer. The first charge relies on an assumption that elections are only serving their intended function when they remove incumbents from office. It is true that most incumbent judges who are subject to retention will win another term in office. Of the 6306 state court judges who were up for retention between 1964 and 2006, only fifty-six (less than 1%) were defeated. 19 But there is nothing inherently wise or virtuous about removing sitting judges from office. Nor is the value of an election dictated by the outcome. It is worth remembering the high rates of reelection for U.S. House incumbents. By constitutional design, members of the U.S. House are supposed to be the most direct representatives of the public will. In the case of House incumbents, there are no philosophical conflicts between the function of the office and the accountability to the public's policy wishesthe two are directly and explicitly related. Yet House incumbents are often reelected at a rate that is nearly comparable to state judges standing in retention elections. In the 1998 congressional elections, for example, only 6 of 401 House incumbents (1.5%) lost their seat. 20 Although this high rate of reelection for House incumbents 17. It is worth noting that, even among some supporters of merit selection and retention, a failure to adhere to public opinion is often assumed (implicitly or explicitly) to be a valid reason for voting against a sitting judge. 18. This language is often used by opponents of merit selection. Leading up to the 2000 elections that included local ballot initiatives to institute merit selection for Florida district court judges, an article in the Florida Bar News, for example, was titled Don't Eliminate the Right to Elect Florida's Trial Judges. See http://www.childrensjustice.org/electedjudges.htm. One activist in Louisiana writes that any attempts to change from an elected system of selecting our judges to a merit selection system will require a vote of the people. So in order to come about, the voters of this state would have to voluntarily relinquish their right to vote for judges. Why would we do that? See http://centrallapolitics.blogspot.com/2008/09/merit-selection-of-judges-is-notway-to.html. Similarly, the Associate Editor of the Capital Times in Madison, Wisconsin, argues, "Advocates for the backroom appointment of judgesa scheme that goes by the misnomer 'merit selection'claim that taking away the power of the people to elect jurists will 'remove politics' from the process." See http://www.madi son.com/tct/columnl/460146. 19. Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends 1964-2006, 90 JUDICATURE 208, 210 (2007). Of the fifty-six judges who were defeated in retention elections, 51.8% of them served in Illinois, which is the only state to require a 60% threshold to retain a judicial seat. Id. 20. On average, over 95% of House incumbents are reelected every two years. See PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME AND IN WASHINGTON (2007). While 1998 was particularly favorable to incumbent lawmakers, it is not an extreme outlier. See id.

3 Who, one may ask, is included in or excluded from this abstracted "we"? Many constituencies have a potential interest in judicial temperament: legal scholars, lawyers, legislators and executive officials, court consumers, various segments of the public, historians, and social scientists. Each might mean something different by the term and hold different normative expectations thereof. I use the conceit of "we" cognizant of its indeterminacy, claiming an operative "we" of legal scholars, practitioners, and judgesthose with the most direct theoretical stake.

Other than the earned doctorate, the highest recognition the University can award is the honorary degree. An Honorary Doctorate Degree is granted to honor those who exemplify the ideals of the University through significant achievements and contributions to society. The awarding of Honorary Doctoral Degrees by the University is an extension of its role as a unique institution in our society devoted to the discovery, transmission, and preservation of knowledge.

House aides were quoted as saying "14 judicial nominees have been before the Senate at least 18 months ... without being brought to a vote." 8 Stall tactics by both parties prompted admonishments by Chief Justice William Rehnquist in year-end reports in both 1997 and 2001. 9 The Chief Justice noted slowdowns by both the Republican controlled Senate in 1997 and the Democratic run Senate in 2001.10 Rehnquist stated that the "Senate ought to act with reasonable promptness and to vote each nominee up or down." ' 1 Stall tactics normally reserved for federal appellate court nominees are even trickling down to the district court level. 12 The waiting period for Arkansas attorney Leon Holmes, who was nominated January 29, 2003 and confirmed on July 6, 2004,13 for the Eastern District of Arkansas, was over seventeen months from the time the Senate Judiciary Committee forwarded his nomination to the full Senate. 14 While such waiting periods are standard for appellate court nominees subjected to higher scrutiny, reporter Kevin Freking points out that "the longest any other district judge has had to wait this year was three weeks."' 15 The Holmes nomination serves as a useful study of just how politically convoluted and inefficient the federal judicial appointment process has become. Despite home-state backing, 16 including support by Arkansas's Democratic senators, 17 Holmes met strong ideological opposition from national special interest groups who questioned his willingness to follow the law when ruling on abortion.' 8 Adherence to established law and ideological

See infra notes 29-42 and accompanying text. Missouri continues to choose its outstate trial judges through partisan elections. The adoption of nonpartisan, merit selection of judges has been described as "the single greatest event in the history of judicial reform in this century." Hall, The

"si no vas al senado, no te eligen magistrado". instituciones informales y criterios de selección de los magistrados de la Corte Constitucional colombiana en el senado (1992-2009) RESUMEN Los nombramientos judiciales son procesos políticos que no sólo se definen por las reglas formales, sino también por los desarrollos y prácticas informales. Este artículo se pregunta por qué se eligen ciertos candidatos, y no otros, como magistrados de la Corte Constitucional en el Senado, desde 1992 hasta 2009. Con base en la triangulación de diferentes fuentes de información, se pudo identificar que, tal como sucede en Estados Unidos, los nombramientos de los jueces están dominados por consideraciones ideológicas y políticas, y en algunos casos, por otros criterios, tales como características sociodemográficas y cualificaciones profesionales. El hallazgo central es que el cabildeo directo realizado por los candidatos, e indirecto, mediante el padrinazgo político, son los factores con mayor incidencia. A partir del análisis cuantitativo y cualitativo, se argumenta que el cabildeo es una institución informal determinante en la elección de los magistrados de la Corte Constitucional porque es una condición necesaria, la regla de entrada, para que los demás criterios interactúen en la decisión final de los senadores. PALABRAS CLAVE nombramiento judicial • selección de jueces • Corte Constitucional • lobby • instituciones informales "if you do not Go to the senate, you Will never be a Judge" informal institutions and selection Criteria for Judges of the Constitutional Court in the Colombian senate (1992-2009) ABSTRACT Judicial appointments are political processes shaped by both formal and informal practices. This article asks why certain candidates are elected as judges to the High Courts while others are not. More specifically, what have been the criteria in the election of judges to the Colombian Constitutional Court in the Senate, from 1992 to 2009. Using qualitative and quantitative analysis, I argue that, like in the United States, ideological and political considerations guide the appointment of these Judges. Other criteria, like their demographic characteristics or their professional qualifications, also play a role. Nonetheless, the main finding is that lobbying directly by candidates or through a political promoter is a determinant informal institution in the selection of the Judges of the Constitutional Court. It is a necessary condition for the other aspects to come together in the final senatorial choice.

The most popular metaphor for describing the process by which Supreme Court Justices are selected is war. The voluminous commentary on and records of Supreme Court appointments are replete with characterizations of events in different phases of the process in militaristic terms. 1 One need look no further for confirmation of the continuing pull of the metaphor than to a recent article in the New York Times on the likely dynamic in the next Supreme Court confirmation proceeding: Neil Lewis' headline reads, From Quiet Nomination to Noisy Test for Future Battles and he employs the term "battles" five times, besides the headline, to describe what to expect when the next vacancy on the Court arises. 2 It is tempting to think that, after September 11, the bellicose rhetoric about Supreme Court selection as war would dissipate. At the outset of George W. Bush's presidency, some prominent Democratic Senators, strategists, and commentators had Drake Law Review [Vol. 50 substantial deference so that he is not forced to squander on them the time and political capital he needs to wage the war effort successfully. The structure of the Constitution is plainly, however, designed to invite conflict. Anyone familiar with the Supreme Court appointments process knows just how combative, brutal, nasty, and vitriolic it can be. The structure of the Constitution pits Presidents and Senators against each other in the federal appointments process, and the framers fully expected (even hoped) conflicts would ensue from this design. Their expectation was that the checks and balances of the Constitution, including the distribution of authority on judicial appointments, were designed, in Madison's famous phrasing, so that "ambition must be made to counteract ambition. " 5 The framers viewed conflicts over appointments as inevitable and even desirable, as the branches each sought to aggrandize their respective powers at the expense of the other. The likelihood if not inevitability of friction would prevent one branch from becoming tyrannical. Yet, the structure of the Constitution invites not only conflict but also accommodation. In relatively short order, Presidents and Senators developed informal accommodations or informal arrangements to reduce the inevitability of conflict and yet preserve some realm of discretion with respect to each Supreme Court appointment. These accommodations, expectations, or arrangements are what I call norms. 6 Following the norms of the Supreme Court appointments process promises not sanctions but peaceful coexistence between the branches. My thesis is relatively simple: I suggest hostilities break out in the Supreme Court selection process when the President, Senators, and/or nominees violate some longstanding practices or expectations (some but not all of which constitute institutional norms), or the governing norms are in flux. 7 I suggest this is true

This article looks at the appointment and confirmation politics of President Obama's nominees during the 114th Congress in which unprecedented obstruction and delay of Obama's nominees including the Supreme Court nomination of Merrick Garland occurred. This is placed within the overall context of Obama's impact on the judiciary. The demographic portrait of the Obama judiciary is sketched with special attention to the historic record of diverse nontraditional appointees. We conclude with a look at what lies ahead with the Trump administration and judicial appointments/confirmation. The authors wish to thank all those who made themselves available for interviews. Some have no problem with being mentioned by name, and we are happy to publicly acknowledge them. Other prefer to remain unidentified, a preference we have honored. Sheldon Goldman wishes to thank Nicholas Frasso

The authors would like to thank the dedicated staffs of Senators Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter at the Senate Judiciary Committee. We deeply appreciate their taking the time to speak with us. In addition, members of the Bush administration, and several people outside government gave generously of their time and offered valuable help. We are especially thankful to

This article looks at the appointment and confirmation politics of President Obama's nominees during the 114th Congress in which unprecedented obstruction and delay of Obama's nominees including the Supreme Court nomination of Merrick Garland occurred. This is placed within the overall context of Obama's impact on the judiciary. The demographic portrait of the Obama judiciary is sketched with special attention to the historic record of diverse nontraditional appointees. We conclude with a look at what lies ahead with the Trump administration and judicial appointments/confirmation. The authors wish to thank all those who made themselves available for interviews. Some have no problem with being mentioned by name, and we are happy to publicly acknowledge them. Other prefer to remain unidentified, a preference we have honored. Sheldon Goldman wishes to thank Nicholas Frasso

The authors would like to thank the dedicated staffs of Senators Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter at the Senate Judiciary Committee. We deeply appreciate their taking the time to speak with us. In addition, members of the Bush administration, and several people outside government gave generously of their time and offered valuable help. We are especially thankful to

Affirmative action programs in the public and private sector, that is, positive efforts to recruit members of underrepresented groups in American society to positions long closed to them, have been surrounded by great controversy for more than a decade. Advocates of such programs -have asserted that they are ameliorative and benign in nature while opponents label such efforts &quot;reverse discrimination&quot; and ascribe to them a quota mentality which is viewed as objectionable and unconstitutional. The problems raised are clearly most dramatic when affirmative action is taken by the government itself because, from the perspective of the program&#39;s advocates, it is in the governmental sector that the consequences of institutionalized discrimination are most graphic. Concurrently, however, the opponents of such programs are bound to perceive governmental involvement as the heart of the constitutional questions that are being raised.

A major legacy of the Obama presidency was the mark he left on the federal courts with respect to increasing judicial diversity. In particular, President Obama's appointments of women to the federal judiciary exceeded all previous presidents in terms of both absolute numbers and as a share of all judges; he also appointed a record-setting number of women of color to the lower federal courts. In this Article, I take an intersectional approach to exploring variation in the professional backgrounds, qualifications, and Senate confirmation experiences of Obama's female appeals court appointees, comparing them with George W. Bush and Bill Clinton appointees. These data reveal that women of color appointed by Obama differ from both white women and minority men in terms of ABA ratings, the types of professional experiences they bring with them, and whether they were confirmed by a roll call vote.

"si no vas al senado, no te eligen magistrado". instituciones informales y criterios de selección de los magistrados de la Corte Constitucional colombiana en el senado (1992-2009) RESUMEN Los nombramientos judiciales son procesos políticos que no sólo se definen por las reglas formales, sino también por los desarrollos y prácticas informales. Este artículo se pregunta por qué se eligen ciertos candidatos, y no otros, como magistrados de la Corte Constitucional en el Senado, desde 1992 hasta 2009. Con base en la triangulación de diferentes fuentes de información, se pudo identificar que, tal como sucede en Estados Unidos, los nombramientos de los jueces están dominados por consideraciones ideológicas y políticas, y en algunos casos, por otros criterios, tales como características sociodemográficas y cualificaciones profesionales. El hallazgo central es que el cabildeo directo realizado por los candidatos, e indirecto, mediante el padrinazgo político, son los factores con mayor incidencia. A partir del análisis cuantitativo y cualitativo, se argumenta que el cabildeo es una institución informal determinante en la elección de los magistrados de la Corte Constitucional porque es una condición necesaria, la regla de entrada, para que los demás criterios interactúen en la decisión final de los senadores. PALABRAS CLAVE nombramiento judicial • selección de jueces • Corte Constitucional • lobby • instituciones informales "if you do not Go to the senate, you Will never be a Judge" informal institutions and selection Criteria for Judges of the Constitutional Court in the Colombian senate (1992-2009) ABSTRACT Judicial appointments are political processes shaped by both formal and informal practices. This article asks why certain candidates are elected as judges to the High Courts while others are not. More specifically, what have been the criteria in the election of judges to the Colombian Constitutional Court in the Senate, from 1992 to 2009. Using qualitative and quantitative analysis, I argue that, like in the United States, ideological and political considerations guide the appointment of these Judges. Other criteria, like their demographic characteristics or their professional qualifications, also play a role. Nonetheless, the main finding is that lobbying directly by candidates or through a political promoter is a determinant informal institution in the selection of the Judges of the Constitutional Court. It is a necessary condition for the other aspects to come together in the final senatorial choice.

Despite abundant attention to the judicial selection of U.S. Supreme Court justices, most federal legal disputes are resolved in the lower federal courts. Who the judges are and how they make their decisions matters enormously in a democracy that values the fair and equitable treatment of its citizens under the rule of law. Our focus in this study is on the demographic diversity of President Obama's appointments to the lower federal bench. It is clear from the various methods of examining the numbers that Obama valued diversityperhaps more so than any previous president. When we examine all lower courts in the aggregate, and then district and circuit courts separately, the total number of successful nominees, the replacement patterns for departing judges, and comparisons between active and senior status judges, we see a concerted and largely successful effort to increase symbolic representation on the federal judiciary. Under different political circumstances, the data would lead us to consider novel complexities in diversifying the federal bench in the next several years. But a Trump presidency and its expected focus on ideology over diversity is likely to lead the study of judicial selection in a different direction, at least for the time being.

I never felt so much like a hooker down by the bus station in any race I've ever been in as I did in a judicial race. Everyone interested in contributing has very specific interests. They mean to be buying a vote. Whether they succeed or not, it's hard to say.

Increasing the diversity of political institutions is believed to improve the quality of political discourse and, subsequently, the quality of political outcomes. Moreover, the presence of diverse officials in positions of power signals the openness and fairness of political institutions. These benefits of diversity should be particularly acute in the judiciary, where judges are tasked with the symbolically and substantively powerful duty of interpreting and defending constitutional values. Extant scholarship suggests that well-designed appointment process can promote diversity without explicitly gendered goals, much less quotas. If correct, these proposals raise the possibility of promoting greater diversity without having to resolve politically charged debates about quotas. Yet, scholars disagree about the effects of particular design choices. Worse, estimating causal effects of institutions in observational data is particularly difficult. We develop a research design linked to the empirical implications of existing theoretical arguments to evaluate the effect of institutional change on the gender diversity of peak courts cross-nationally. Specifically, we consider the effect of an increase (or a decrease) in the number of actors involved in the appointment process. We find mixed results for any existing claim about the role of appointment institutions play in increasing diversity. Yet we also find that any institutional change seems to cause an increase in the gender diversity of peak courts.

The Bush Administration will likely have the opportunity to make a number of appointments to the Supreme Court; however, such nominations may lead to contentious confirmation hearings in the Senate. When such an appointment opportunity does present itself, questions are bound to arise concerning the appropriate role of the United States Senate in the confirmation of Supreme Court nominees under the &quot;advice and consent&quot; provisions of article H of the Unite States Constitution. Disputes over the Senate &#x27;s proper role and scope of inquiry seem to emerge whenever a nominee has faced the confirmation process and have been a timeworn subject of legal debate. In this Article, we assess the proposition that the Senate should have an active role in the confirmation process, which includes investigation into a nominee&#x27;s ideological beliefs and constitutional philosophy. We begin by examining the background of the Constitution&#x27;s &quot;advice and consent&quot; phraseolo...

• Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. In a separate article, I consider Supreme Court selection as war, while in this article I focus on the selection of lower court judges as war. I completed this article six months before the midterm elections of 2002. Together, I trust these articles will serve as a useful overview of the general phenomenon of judicial selection as war. In these and other works, I have benefited enormously from the empirical studies of judicial selection done by other scholars, including three participants in this Symposium-Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, and Carl Tobias. I am especially grateful to John Oakley and Carl Tobias for the opportunity to participate in this Symposium.

The American Bar Association plays a formal, unique, and consequential role in the selection of federal judges. More specifically, the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, a group of fifteen lawyers appointed by the president of the ABA, rates all potential nominees for federal judicial appointments. The work of the Standing Committee has been a subject of some study and public debate, but the professional orientation of the members of the committee has been largely ignored. My research shows that lawyers who represent business interests in state and federal courts are vastly overrepresented on the committee, and that most of those lawyers practice in this country's largest law firms. This imbalance is inconsistent with any legitimate justification for the ABA's special role in judicial selection and is contradicted by the ABA's public statements about the composition of the committee. Unless the ABA commits to reform its process so that a more representative swath of the profession evaluates prospective federal judges, it should not retain its privileged status.

Mekanisme pemilihan hakim agung sempat mengalami inkonstitusional berdasarkan kehendak ekspilisit UUD 1945. DPRD hanya bertugas memberikan pernah penyimpang dari aturan konstitusional tersebut, dengan melakukan uji kelayakan dan kepatuhan terhadap calon hakim agung, walaupun KY. Namun faktanya, DPR pernah menyimpang dari aturan konstitusional tersebut, dengan melakukan uji kelayakan dan kepatuhan terhadap calon hakim agung, Walaupun KY sudah melakukannya. Tindakan inkonstitusional DPR tersebut sudah di luruskan oleh MK melalui putusan nya Nomor. 27/PUU-XI /2013. MK mengembalikan proses pemilihan hakim agung di DPR tersebut sesuai dengan amanat UUD 1945. Yaitu DPR hanya berwenang memberikan persetujuan calon hakim agung yang di ajukan KY, dan tidak lagi melakukan uji kelayakan dan kepatutan. Proses inilah yang dimaksud rekrontuksi mekanisme pemilihan hakim agung. Putusan MK tersebut masih menyisakan sejumlah persoalan , sehingga pertimbangan putusan MK tersebut patut di analisis. Meski sudah ada perbaikan, mekanisme pemilihan Hakim Agung masih jauh dari konsep idealnya. Dalam rangka mencari konsep ideal tersebut, maka dirasa perlu melakukan studi perbandingan dengan beberapa Negara.

In its latest Year in Review , for 2021, the Supreme Court of Canada affirms that “Canadians can have confidence that the Supreme Court of Canada is impartial and independent.” Chief Justice Richard Wagner’s insensitivity to the crisis in public confidence in the Court and our court system generally is deeply troubling. Public dissatisfaction with the failure of the judicial system to deliver on the professed values of the Court – justice, independence, integrity, transparency, and bilingualism –has been documented for years, if not decades.
This article appeared in The Lawyer's Daily, January 5, 2023.
https://www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/42605

Bush's comments on the campaign trail accusing his presidential rival of wanting "activist judges who will rewrite the law from the bench," and the rejoinder from the Kerry campaign taking the President to task for "playing politics in stumping for judicial nominees who would roll back the freedoms that make America great"). Senator Kerry was already on record as stating: "I am prepared to filibuster, if necessary, any Supreme Court nominee who would turn back the clock on a woman's right to choose or the Constitutional right to privacy, on civil rights and individual liberties, and on the laws protecting workers and the environment." Adam Nagourney,

Achieving a representative bureaucracy that reflects the attitudes, values, and policy choices of women and racial minorities is imperative, as the gap in the representation of those groups in the federal workforce is growing. We examine to what extent female and minority representation in political appointments, Senior Executive Service (SES), and General Schedule (GS) 1-15 levels reflect presidents’ commitment to diversity. We use data from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management to compare the tenures of presidents William J. Clinton (1993 to 2000), George W. Bush (2001-2008), and Barack H. Obama (2009-2013), and examine the employment trends from 1993 to 2013.

Empirical data show that, despite the significant electoral success of state court judges, elections still impact judicial decision making. Using the State of Wisconsin as an example, this Essay suggests that Wisconsin and other state legislatures, with the support of bar associations and academics, should revisit the historical underpinnings of judicial elections and consider both whether electing judges conforms with the historical goals of having an elected judiciary and whether the available empirical data support the belief that elected judges can be systematically consistent and independent in the decision making process.