Gerard O'Brien

Philosophy at the University of Adelaide

1876–2012, 2009

The role of representation in computation

Reformers urge that representation no longer earns its explanatory keep in cognitive science, and... more Reformers urge that representation no longer earns its explanatory keep in cognitive science, and that it is time to discard this troublesome concept. In contrast, we hold that without representation cognitive science is utterly bereft of tools for explaining natural intelligence. In order to defend the latter position, we focus on the explanatory role of representation in computation. We examine how the methods of digital and analog computation are used to model a relatively simple target system, and show that representation plays an in-eliminable explanatory role in both cases. We conclude that, to the extent that biologic systems engage in computation, representation is destined to play an explanatory role in cognitive science.

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Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledge

Philosophical Studies, 1987

Page 1. GERARDJ. O'BRIEN ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM AND OUR PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-KNOWLEDGE (Recei... more

Language and thought

Language & Communication, 2002

Radical connectionism: thinking with (not in) language

Language & Communication, 2002

In this paper we defend a position we call radical connectionism. Radical connectionism claims th... more

The role of representation in computation

Cognitive Processing, 2009

Reformers urge that representation no longer earns its explanatory keep in cognitive science, and... more Reformers urge that representation no longer earns its explanatory keep in cognitive science, and that it is time to discard this troublesome concept. In contrast, we hold that without representation cognitive science is utterly bereft of tools for explaining natural intelligence. In order to defend the latter position, we focus on the explanatory role of representation in computation. We examine how the methods of digital and analog computation are used to model a relatively simple target system, and show that representation plays an in-eliminable explanatory role in both cases. We conclude that, to the extent that biologic systems engage in computation, representation is destined to play an explanatory role in cognitive science.

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Finding a place for experience in the physical-relational structure of the brain

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1999

In restricting his analysis to the causal relations of functionalism, on the one hand, and the ne... more In restricting his analysis to the causal relations of functionalism, on the one hand, and the neurophysiological realizers of biology, on the other, Palmer has overlooked an alternative conception of the relationship between color experience and the brain – one that liberalizes the relation between mental phenomena and their physical implementation, without generating functionalism's counter-intuitive consequences. In this commentary we rely on Palmer's earlier work (especially from 1978) to tease out this alternative.

What's really doing the work here? Knowledge representation or the Higher-Order Thought theory of consciousness?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1999

Dienes & Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise... more Dienes & Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the “Higher-Order Thought” theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that consensus on the explicit/implicit knowledge distinction is still a fair way off.

The role of representation in computation

Cognitive Processing, 2009

Reformers urge that representation no longer earns its explanatory keep in cognitive science, and... more Reformers urge that representation no longer earns its explanatory keep in cognitive science, and that it is time to discard this troublesome concept. In contrast, we hold that without representation cognitive science is utterly bereft of tools for explaining natural intelligence. In order to defend the latter position, we focus on the explanatory role of representation in computation. We examine how the methods of digital and analog computation are used to model a relatively simple target system, and show that representation plays an in-eliminable explanatory role in both cases. We conclude that, to the extent that biologic systems engage in computation, representation is destined to play an explanatory role in cognitive science.

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How do Connectionist Networks Compute?

by Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opie

Although connectionism is advocated by its proponents as an alternative to the classical computat... more Although connectionism is advocated by its proponents as an alternative to the classical computational theory of mind, doubts persist about its computational credentials. Our aim is to dispel these doubts by explaining how connectionist networks compute. We first develop a generic account of computation—no easy task, because computation, like almost every other foundational concept in cognitive science, has resisted canonical definition. We opt for a characterisation that does justice to the explanatory role of computation in cognitive science. Next we examine what might be regarded as the ‘‘conventional’’ account of connectionist computation. We show why this account is inadequate and hence fosters the suspicion that connectionist networks are not genuinely computational. Lastly, we turn to the principal task of the paper: the development of a more robust portrait of connectionist computation. The basis of this portrait is an explanation of the representational capacities of connection weights, supported by an analysis of the weight configurations of a series of simulated neural networks.

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Cognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma, and How to Avoid It

by Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opie

Philosophical Psychology, Jan 1, 1997

When it comes to applying computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, cognit... more When it comes to applying computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive scientists appear to face a dilemma. The only strategy that seems to be available is one that explains consciousness in terms of special kinds of computational processes. But such theories, while they dominate the field, have counter-intuitive consequences; in particular, they force one to accept that phenomenal experience is composed of information processing effects. For cognitive scientists, therefore, it seems to come down to a choice between a counter-intuitive theory or no theory at all. We offer a way out of this dilemma. We argue that the computational theory of mind does not force cognitive scientists to explain consciousness in terms of computational processes, as there is an alternative strategy available: one that focuses on the representational vehicles that encode information in the brain. This alternative approach to consciousness allows us to do justice to the standard intuitions about phenomenal experience, yet remain within the confines of cognitive science.

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A Defense of Cartesian Materialism

by Jon Opie and Gerard O'Brien

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1999

One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in Consciousness Explained is to demolish the Car... more One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in Consciousness Explained is to demolish the Cartesian theatre model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind. Our response is quite different. We believe that, once properly formulated, Cartesian materialism is no straw man. Rather, it is an attractive hypothesis about the relationship between the computational architecture of the brain and phenomenal consciousness, and hence one that is worthy of further exploration. Consequently, our primary aim in this paper is to defend Cartesian materialism from Dennett's assault. We do this by showing that Dennett's argument against this position is founded on an implicit assumption (about the relationship between phenomenal experience and information coding in the brain), which while valid in the context of classical cognitive science, is not forced on connectionism.

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A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience

by Jon Opie and Gerard O'Brien

There are two fundamentally distinct computational approaches to phenomenal consciousness: either... more There are two fundamentally distinct computational approaches to phenomenal consciousness: either consciousness depends on the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is a product of special processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories, respectively. Process theories dominate the recent literature, but this orthodoxy is imposed on cognitive science largely by the classical computational theory of mind. Connectionists, on the other hand, are in a position to explore a vehicle theory of phenomenal experience. In this paper we develop and defend this vehicle theory. We show that while it leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, it does so in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways.

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Intentionality Lite or Analog Content?

by Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opie

Philosophia, 2015

Radical Connectionism: Thinking With (Not In) Language

by Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opie

In this paper we defend a position we call radical connectionism. Radical connectionism claims th... more In this paper we defend a position we call radical connectionism. Radical connectionism claims that cognition never implicates an internal symbolic medium, not even when natural language plays a part in our thought processes. On the face of it, such a position renders the human capacity for abstract thought quite mysterious. However, we argue that connectionism is committed to an analog conception of neural computation, and that representation of the abstract is no more problematic for a system of analog vehicles than for a symbol system. Natural language is therefore not required as a representational medium for abstract thought. Since natural language is arguably not a representational medium at all, but a conventionally governed scheme of communicative signals, we suggest that the role of internalised (i.e., self-directed) language is best conceived in terms of the coordination and control of cognitive activities within the brain.

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The multiplicity of consciousness and the emergence of the self

by Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opie

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The role of representation in computation

by Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opie

Cognitive processing, Jan 1, 2009

Reformers urge that representation no longer earns its explanatory keep in cognitive science, and... more Reformers urge that representation no longer earns its explanatory keep in cognitive science, and that it is time to discard this troublesome concept. In contrast, we hold that without representation cognitive science is utterly bereft of tools for explaining natural intelligence. In order to defend the latter position, we focus on the explanatory role of representation in computation. We examine how the methods of digital and analog computation are used to model a relatively simple target system, and show that representation plays an in-eliminable explanatory role in both cases. We conclude that, to the extent that biologic systems engage in computation, representation is destined to play an explanatory role in cognitive science.

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Disunity defended: A reply to Bayne

by Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opie

We have recently argued [8] that phenomenal consciousness is not a unity, in the sense of being a... more

Putting content into a vehicle theory of consciousness

by Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opie

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Jan 1, 1999

The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies consci... more The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies consciousness with the brain's explicit representation of information in the form of stable patterns of neural activity. Commentators raise concerns about both the conceptual and empirical adequacy of this proposal. On the former front they worry about our reliance on vehicles, on representation, on stable patterns of activity, and on our identity claim. On the latter front their concerns range from the general plausibility of a vehicle theory to our specific attempts to deal with the dissociation studies. We address these concerns, and then finish by considering whether the vehicle theory we have defended has a coherent story to tell about the active, unified subject to whom conscious experiences belong. Putting Content into a Vehicle Theory of Consciousness 1 ===================================================================== Table 1. Outline of Response Part I: Conceptual Foundations

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Vehicles of Consciousness

by Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opie

Despite its puzzling and elusive nature, contemporary theories almost universally associate consc... more

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