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Alexander Bird

Univeristy Of Cambridge, Philosophy, Faculty Member

University of Bristol, Philosophy, Honorary member

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For details of my research and papers and other details see:
<http://www.sowerbyprofessor.philosophyandmedicine.org>
Supervisors: David Papineau

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Papers by Alexander Bird

Fundamental Powers, Evolved Powers, and Mental Powers

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2018

Powers have, in recent years, become a central component of many philosophers' ontology of proper... more Powers have, in recent years, become a central component of many philosophers' ontology of properties. While I have argued that powers exist at the fundamental level of properties, many other theorists of powers hold that there are non-fundamental powers also. In this paper I articulate my reasons for being sceptical about the existing reasons for holding that there are non-fundamental powers. However, I also want to promote a different argument for the existence of a certain class of non-fundamental powers: properties whose existence and nature have natural selection to thank. Such properties will include functional properties of organisms and so may include their mental properties also.

Essences and Natural Kinds

Routledge eBooks, Apr 2, 2009

Is Evidence Non-Inferential?

The Philosophical Quarterly, Apr 1, 2004

Evidence is often taken to be foundational, in that while other propositions may be inferred from... more Evidence is often taken to be foundational, in that while other propositions may be inferred from our evidence, evidence propositions are themselves not inferred from anything. I argue that this conception is false, since the non-inferential propositions on which beliefs are ultimately founded may be forgotten or undermined in the course of enquiry. 1 P. Maher, 'Subjective and Objective Confirmation', Philosophy of Science,  (), pp. -, at p. .

format_quoteNew information can undermine previously held non-inferential knowledge, impacting its status as evidence.format_quote

Evidence and Inference

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Jul 4, 2016

I articulate a functional characterisation of the concept of evidence, according to which evidenc... more

format_quoteAll evidence is capable of supporting knowledge-producing inferences, supporting foundational epistemic principles.format_quote

The Illusion of Nomic Contingency

Oxford University Press eBooks, Jun 1, 2007

Kuhn and Twentieth Century Philosophy of Science

Annals of the Japan Association For Philosophy of Science, 2004

Review. The metaphysics of science. C Dilworth

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1997

Kuhn'sThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions revisited

Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 1995

The present paper argues that there is an affinity between Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Rev... more The present paper argues that there is an affinity between Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is maintained, in particular, that Kuhn's notion of paradigm draws on such Wittgensteinian concepts as language games, family resemblance, rules, forms of life. It is also claimed that Kuhn's incommensurability thesis is a sequel of the theory of meaning supplied by Wittgenstein's later philosophy. As such its assessment is not fallacious, since it is not an empirical hypothesis and it does not have the relativistic implications Kuhn's critics repeatedly indicated. Although concepts are indeed relative to a language game or paradigm, interparadigmatic intelligibility is preserved through the standard techniques of translation or praxis. The impossibility of radical translation which is captured by the claim of incommensurability lies with that which cannot be said but only shown.

Creativity without value

Routledge eBooks, Feb 21, 2018

The standard definition of creativity takes is to be essential to creativity that it is disposed ... more

LANGE AND LAWS , KINDS , AND COUNTERFACTUALS Alexander Bird

In this paper I examine and question Marc Lange’s account of laws, and his claim that the law del... more

format_quoteThe connection between modal robustness and necessity is questioned, indicating potential independence rather than hierarchy.format_quote

Manifesting Time and Space: Background-Free Physical Theories

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2017

Temporal and spatial relations are often regarded as paradigmatic categorical properties that pro... more Temporal and spatial relations are often regarded as paradigmatic categorical properties that pro-vide a counterexamples to the claim that all fundamental natural properties powers (potencies)—properties that are dispositional in nature/essence. In this chapter, I consider the consequences for this debate of thinking that a good physical theory should be background-independent. I propose that the conception of time and space not as a background but as an active component of the physical universe help show that temporal and spatial properties and relations need not be considered as necessarily categorical.

ESSENCES OF NATURAL KINDS: DISCOVERED OR STIPULATED? Remarks on Joseph LaPorte's Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change

LaPorte gives a range of interesting and informative examples. Most of these are in biology but s... more LaPorte gives a range of interesting and informative examples. Most of these are in biology but some come from chemistry. I shall start with the latter. LaPorte starts with the example of jade and argues that contrary to the tradition following Putnam, jade present an example very similar to his Twin Earth thought experiment, but with a different outcome. For many centuries the jade that the Chinese work with and called 'yü' was just nephrite. Only towards the end of the eighteenth century was jadeite from Burma introduced into China. Chinese jade experts were aware that it was a different material, but nonetheless decided also to regard it as 'yü'. LaPorte argues that the terms 'jade' and 'yü' have a certain kind of vagueness, such that it was not determinate whether the new jade, jadeite, was within the extension of those terms. A decision was made to include the new material, thus introducing a change to the concepts 'jade' and 'yü', rater than an application of previous, unchanging concepts. Furthermore, that decision went in a different direction to the direction that is alleged in the Twin Earth story. There we are supposed to reject XYZ as water despite superficial similarity. With jade the chemically different but superficially similar jadeite was included, not rejected. If LaPorte's understanding of this case is right, then the extension of 'yü' is not fully determinate but is vague. Given that for centuries the Chinese only ever knew nephrite, one might have expected, from Putnam's Twin Earth story, that they would reject jadeite, on the grounds that is is different kind of substance. But, they eventually decided against that. LaPorte then contrasts the cases of topaz and ruby. Topaz was initially identified by its yellow colour, but the discovery that some blue minerals have the same chemical composition led to their inclusion under the extension of 'topaz'. Ruby is also identified by its colour, this time red, but in this case the existence of blue minerals with the same underlying structure were not included within the term's extension. The contrasting cases seems to suggest that it is a matter of choice whether we take the extension of a term to include newly discovered items that share some of the features of established sample but not others. Since it is a matter of choice that topaz is the mineral with formula Al 2 SiO 4 (F,OH) 2-presumably the discovery of blue minerals with the same formula could, as in the case of ruby, have led to a restriction of 'topaz' just to the yellow variety of the mineral-that essence is a matter of stipulation. The story here, I think, may be a little more complicated. For in the case of ruby there was already a term available for the mineral species of which ruby is a variety, viz. corundum, and furthermore, there was already a name available for blue corundum, viz. sapphire. So it is not clear how much choice played a part in the case of ruby. In which case it would not offer a fair contrast to the case of topaz, which in turn may then look less like a case of choice too. However, the real problem with the cases of jade, topaz, and ruby is that we are dealing here with gemstones and so there are interests competing here with the scientific ones. It would not be a surprise to find that when there is tension between the two that the former predominate. It is not that the scientific concept is forgotten completely but rather that some compromise is sought. And so one could take the view that jade really was just nephrite but that the makers of jade artifacts decided that it was in their interests to allow jadeite also to count as jade. As LaPorte makes clear, not just any old

Incommensurability Naturalized

Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison, 2008

In this paper I argue that we can understand incommensurability in a naturalistic, psychological ... more In this paper I argue that we can understand incommensurability in a naturalistic, psychological manner. Cognitive habits can be acquired and so differ between individuals. Drawing on psychological work concerning analogical thinking and thinking with schemata, I argue that incommensurability arises between individuals with different cognitive habits and between groups with different shared cognitive habits.

Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On

Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, 2015

If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination... more If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.

format_quoteKripke argues that necessary truths can be known only a posteriori, challenging the view that all necessary propositions are knowable a priori.format_quote

A Dispositional Account of Causation, with Some Remarks on the Ontology of Dispositions

Synthese Library, 2020

I outline and consider the prospects for (and significance of) an account of causation in terms o... more I outline and consider the prospects for (and significance of) an account of causation in terms of dispositions. The basic idea is (roughly) that C causes E when C is the stimulus of some disposition of which E is the manifestation. Such an account suggests that causes are conditionally sufficient (rather than necessary) for their effects. I consider what semantics for subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals this requires, and examine the consequences for making a distinction between causes and mere conditions and between collective or complete causes and mere parts of causes. Finally, I review the significance of this account of causation for a metaphysics of powers (potencies, essentially dispositional properties). I argue that it would be a mistake to see a successful dispositional account of causation (whether this or another account) as vindicating an ontology of powers.

Philosophy of Science and Epistemology

format_quoteKuhn argues that theories resist rejection despite accumulating anomalies, highlighting the distinction between scientific practice and traditional inductive logic.format_quote

Against Creativity

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018

If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination... more If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.

Limitations of Power

Powers and Capacities in Philosophy, 2013

Monistic Dispositional Essentialism

In this paper I explain why I favour a metaphysics in which all fundamental natural properties ar... more In this paper I explain why I favour a metaphysics in which all fundamental natural properties are essentially dispositional. First, by considering what a world might be like that has no laws, I argue that properties can necessitate laws, and that this is best explained by dispositional essentialism concerning those properties. I then argue that we should not regard any properties as being exceptions in this respect: and so all fundamental natural properties are essentially dispo-

format_quoteNatural properties are metaphysically necessary for the existence of laws; existence entails some nomic facts about properties.format_quote