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Sarah Byers

Boston College, Philosophy, Faculty Member

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I did my PhD at Toronto. I publish on ancient and medieval philosophy, especially Augustine’s reception of Stoic ethics, psychology, and epistemology, as well as Neoplatonic metaphysics (Plotinus, Apuleius and Marius Victorinus). My current monograph projects aim to correct common narratives in the fields of ancient and medieval philosophy. One argues for the use of Aristotelian epistemology and metaphysics (i.e., not just the Categories) in 4th-5th century Latin Christian texts, long before the rise of medieval scholasticism. The other resolves interpretative debates about Aquinas by demonstrating the role played by Roman Stoic philosophy in medieval moral epistemology, ethics, and legal theory, including as these were taken up by Albert the Great and thence Aquinas. I have a monograph with Cambridge: Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis.
http://www.amazon.com/Perception-Sensibility-Moral-Motivation-Augustine/dp/1107017947
Supervisors: Brad Inwood

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Books by Sarah Byers

“Will” (Voluntas) as Impulse toward Action (cf. Stoic Hormē) in Augustine

A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis, 2012

“Will” (Voluntas) as Impulse toward Action (cf. Stoic Hormē) in Augustine

Perception Sensibility and Moral Motivation: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis, 2012

Augustine uses the term voluntas for dispositional and occurrent forms of horme ¯ of a rational b... more Augustine uses the term voluntas for dispositional and occurrent forms of horme ¯ of a rational being, horme ¯ being the Stoic concept of "impulse" toward action. 1 In what follows I shall first demonstrate this, using mainly books twelve and fourteen of the City of God. There is need of such a demonstration, for although much ink has been spilt over the sense of "will" in Augustine's texts, interpretations have varied greatly. Next I shall draw attention to a number of corroborating texts from works spanning thirty years of his writing career, highlighting how this Stoic concept, together with Stoic epistemology, makes sense of the uses of voluntas in book eight of the Confessions and of "free will" (libera voluntas, liberum arbitrium voluntatis) in the On Free Choice. I conclude with suggestions about specific texts and authors influencing Augustine's usage. Augustine explicitly mentions the Stoic concept of horme ¯ in book nineteen of the City of God, where he tentatively translates it by impetus vel appetitus actionis. 2 We see that he understands it as an impulse, which does not need reason in order to effect action, but which does reflect rationality in a healthy human who is beyond the age of reason: "the insane say or do many absurd things that are for the most part alien to their own aims and characters . . . horme ¯ . . . is included among the primary goods of nature -is it not responsible for those pitiable movements and actions (facta) of the insane that shock us, when sensation is distraught and reason is asleep?" 3 1 See Stobaeus, Eclogues 2.88, 2-6 (LS 33I) and the texts printed in LS 53 and LS 57; cf. Inwood (1985) 20, 53. 2 civ. 19.4: "Impetus porro vel appetitus actionis, si hoc modo recte Latine appellatur ea quam Graeci vocant horme ¯n." The use of impetus or appetitus to translate horme ¯ is Senecan and Ciceronian. 3 civ. 19.4: "Phrenetici multa absurda . . . dicunt vel faciunt, plerumque a bono suo proposito et moribus aliena . . . horme ¯n . . . primis naturae deputant [Stoici] bonis, nonne ipse est, quo

Motivation (Ch 2 of monograph: Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation)

A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis, 2012

Augustine's account of motivation: a synthesis of Stoic epistemology and Platonic eros-theory

Emotions (Ch 3 of monograph, Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation)

A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis, 2012

Augustine's theory of the various kinds and constituents of emotions; his critical engagement wit... more

Preliminary Passions (Ch 4 of Monograph, Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation)

A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis, 2012

5 ira 2.4.2. 6 ira 2.3.1-5. 7 civ. 14.15. 8 On his use of the term "passio" for a preliminary, se... more

Cognitive Therapies (Ch 6 of Monograph, Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation)

A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis, 2012

We are indebted to Sorabji for bringing to light the almost comical fastidiousness that character... more We are indebted to Sorabji for bringing to light the almost comical fastidiousness that characterizes Evagrius of Pontus' concern for moral progress in the emotions. 1 Though Evagrius was not an important influence on Augustine, there is this similarity between the two: the one progressing is continually watching herself, so as to avoid every minute slip in thought or desire. 2 It is a fastidiousness that Sorabji suggested was characteristic of Jewish and Christian accounts in particular, because they focused on "first thoughts." 3 In fact, this interior watchfulness was not peculiar to Judaism and Christianity. The Stoics' epistemological account of impressions as propositional lends itself to the practice of monitoring one's automatic thoughts, so as not to give assent to false presentations. We should critically examine the sayables subsisting in our impressions, and practice decatastrophizing in order to prevent passions. 4 Furthermore, as others have pointed out, Pythagorean practices of self-examination and purification predate and may lie behind the 6 Cognitive Therapies 1 Sorabji (2000) 362, citing Evagrius' On the Eight Spirits of Wickedness Ch. 14. 2 civ. 22.23: "We are always alert at our post lest the appearance of truth deceive, lest ingenious arguments ensnare us, lest some cloud of error befog us, lest we believe that good is evil, or evil good, lest fear make us refrain from what should be done, or desire plunge us headlong into what should not be done, lest the sun go down on our anger, lest enmities provoke us to return evil for evil, lest unworthy or immoderate sorrow overwhelm us . . . lest the desire for revenge overcome us, lest sight or thought linger on that which gives sinful delight, lest a vile or unbecoming word be heard with pleasure. . . ." Trans. Levine adapted. 3 He sees a decisive change from first movements to bad thoughts in Origen, who influenced Evagrius: (2002) 346-347, 359. 4 "Decatastrophizing" is a present-day cognitive-therapeutic technique for correcting overreactions to events, reminiscent of the Stoic practice of training oneself to think that the loss of preferred indifferents is not actually destructive of human happiness: "Decatastrophizing involves aiding them [people who exaggerate the harmfulness of anticipated events] in balancing out their focus on the worst anticipated state by reestimating the situation and asking, 'So what's the worst thing that might occur? And if so, would this be so horrible?'" (Dattilio and Freeman [1992] 7).

Inspiration (Ch 7 of Monograph, Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation)

A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis, 2012

with the locus classicus, Burns (1980), who also had summarized earlier positions (see Burns [198... more with the locus classicus, Burns (1980), who also had summarized earlier positions (see Burns [1980] 9-12). 3 On this debate, see recently Stump (2003), 389-404; cf. Stump (2001)136-142. As is seen below, Augustine has a view that is similar to but significantly different from Stump's "quiescence of the will" solution to the difficulty, which she develops from Aquinas. 4 Cf. Nussbaum on Epicureanism ([1996] 165). 5 ep. 75.11. 6 The allegory of the cave alludes to "pain of the eyes" as part of the difficulty of trading false opinions for true beliefs; this pain results from a lifestyle of feasting and other pleasures, Plato rep. 541a.

Progress in Joy (Ch 5 of Monograph, Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation)

A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis, 2012

Genesis chapter seventeen describes Abraham's receipt of a promise: he will have a son, whose nam... more Genesis chapter seventeen describes Abraham's receipt of a promise: he will have a son, whose name is to be Isaac, from Sarah. 3 When Abraham hears the promise, he falls on his face and laughs, and asks himself in his mind (Augustine: animus), "Shall a son be born to me at one hundred, and shall Sarah conceive at the age of ninety?" 4 God then reasserts that Sarah will bear a son. 5 Later, in chapter eighteen, this promise is repeated to Abraham by messengers while Sarah is in the tent, listening in on the conversation; 6 then she also laughs, and asks herself secretly, "Shall I really give birth? But I am old." 7 In response, one of the messengers demands of Abraham why Sarah asked this question, and points out that nothing is difficult for God. 8 Amusingly, Sarah then denies having laughed, but the messenger knows better: "That's not true; you did laugh." 9 Finally in chapter twenty-one, Sarah gives birth to Isaac, at which time she says that God has given her laughter, and that henceforth anyone who hears of it will rejoice with her (congaudebit mihi). 10 Note that the story contains an element which could be compared to Stoic accounts of preliminary passions. The immediate laughter of both Abraham and Sarah, in response to the shocking announcement that she will have a son, is reminiscent of the reflexlike psychophysical reactions to surprising events described by Seneca and Gellius. Notice, too, that both are said to react by "speaking in the mind" or "speaking inside themselves," which could suggest to Augustine a Stoic epistemological model. Augustine does indeed go on to situate this story in an affective-cognitive context. He goes beyond the literal scriptural text by treating their physical laughter as evidence of interior joy (exultatio, 11 gaudium 12), but contrasts their affective states, asserting that Abraham's reaction is superior on cognitive grounds. "[H]er laughter, though joyous, was not founded on complete 3 Genesis 17:16. The spelling of Sara's second name (see Genesis 17:15) that is used by Augustine is actually Sarra (from the LXX), but I use Sarah because it is the common English usage (from the Hebrew Sarah). 4 Genesis 17:17: "Et procidit Abraham super faciem suam, et risit, et dixit in animo suo, dicens: Si mihi centum annos habenti nascetur? Et si Sarah annorum nonaginta pariet?" This is the Latin text (Augustine is using a translation of the LXX) as quoted in civ. 16.26; cf. loc. Hept. 1.57. 5 Genesis 17:19. 6 Genesis 18:10. My use of the term "messengers" is deliberately ambiguous, in order to accommodate the facts that while the text of Genesis says "three men," Augustine interprets the "men" as angels, on which see Section 1b of this chapter. 7 This is the formulation of her questions that Augustine uses in qu. Hept.; it is the messenger's recapitulation of her question in Genesis 18:13.

Notes on the Text

A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis, 2012

Perception and the Language of the Mind (Ch 1 of monograph, Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation)

A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis, 2012

Augustine's adoption of the Stoic theory of 'language of thought' (lekta/dicibilia) and epistemol... more

“Will” (Voluntas) as Impulse toward Action (cf. Stoic Hormē) in Augustine

A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis, 2012

Text of Confessions 8.11.26–27 in English and Latin

A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis, 2012

Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis

format_quoteByers interprets the appearance of Lady Continence in Confessions as a Stoic motivating impression, linking it to Augustine's epistemology.format_quote

Appendix 2 “Will” (Voluntas) and Free Choice (Liberum Arbitrium)

Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine, 2013

Goes beyond my earlier article ("The Meaning of Voluntas in Augustine"), analyzing additional tex... more

MONOGRAPH: Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis

This book argues that Augustine assimilated the Stoic theory of perception and mental language (l... more This book argues that Augustine assimilated the Stoic theory of perception and mental language (lekta/dicibilia), and that this epistemology underlies his accounts of motivation, affectivity, therapy for the passions, and moral progress. (Since Augustine thought that moral progress is effected by grace, his use of Stoic epistemology extends to his descriptions of how grace influences motivation.) Byers elucidates seminal passages which have long puzzled commentators, such as Confessions 8, City of God 9 and 14, Replies to Simplicianus 1, and confusing sections of the later ‘anti-Pelagian’ works. Tracking the Stoic terminology, and using his sermons to supplement his treatises, Byers analyzes Augustine’s engagement with Cicero, Seneca, Ambrose, Jerome, Origen, and Philo of Alexandria, demonstrating that Augustine appropriated Stoicism with greater comparative sophistication than other religious writers. She also shows how he moved beyond the Stoics in a number of ways by enriching Stoic cognitivism with Platonism, and she argues that he did so in such a way as to create a coherent synthesis. This newly discovered Augustinian moral psychology has elements that contemporary philosophers and psychologists have identified as important. Finally, Byers makes a substantive contribution to the scholarly debate concerning the chronological development of Augustine’s theory of grace, and provides a fresh evaluation of the early modern controversy about grace and free choice (Bañez vs. Molina), in which both sides claimed to be descended intellectually from Augustine.

Papers by Sarah Byers

The Origin of Medieval "Synderesis" is the Stoic Theory of Self-Affiliation (Oikeiōsis): Evidence from Origen, Epictetus, Hierocles, and Chrysippus on (Sun)tērēsis

History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis, 2026

This paper shows that the medieval concept synderesis comes from Origen's endorsement of the Stoi... more This paper shows that the medieval concept synderesis comes from Origen's endorsement of the Stoic theory of rational "self-affiliation" (oikeiōsis). Synderesis is a term that medieval authors inherited from Jerome, who was reporting Origen. Most famously, Aquinas made synderesis central to his moral epistemology, claiming that it is a natural mental habit whereby all humans have an implicit and vague understanding of axiomatic norms of morality. However, the identity of the original Greek word and its conceptual content have been debated since the ninth century. I show that the word must have been suntērēsis ("safeguarding"), employing as evidence recently (2012) discovered texts by Origen. I compare Origen to Chrysippus, Hierocles, and Epictetus. I also compare Aquinas to Origen. I point out three implications. First, the latest critical edition of Jerome (CCL) is incorrect, because it prints suneidēsis ("conscience") instead of suntērēsis. Second, some of Aquinas' core assertions about the characteristics of synderesis and its "place" within the mind are consistent with Origen's account. Third, Stoic suntērēsis and Aquinas' synderesis share certain metaethical associations.

Trinity and Aristotelianism in 4th c: Augustine and Victorinus