Psychology

Re-enactment phototherapy (Martin, 2001; Martin & Spence, 1985) belongs to the group of psychotherapeutic techniques that attempt to shortcut the defensive verbal layers of rationalization, confabulation, proscription, prohibition, or outright denial. Instead, they focus on the story that the body has to tell. If these are to be accepted as valid treatment methods within the therapeutic community, it is essential that they aim at integrating pre- and nonverbal bodily sensations and emotional expressions with symbolic and verbal levels of representation, in order to create a cognitively coherent understanding of the therapeutic process itself. Re-enactment phototherapy is a powerful and potentially transformative method, which should be handled with utmost care in a safe professional setting. In re-enactment phototherapy, the exploration of personal history takes the form of staging past episodes of interacting with significant others, somewhat alike to psychodrama, but focusing more on visual aspects of role-taking, and recording the re-enactment photographically. The integration is accomplished by reflection on the experience itself and on the captured photographic images of the event, which form a poignant and expressive permanent record. This article exemplifies such an exploration of early traumatic memories by presenting an excerpt from a case study, and discusses the implications of the therapeutic process from the points of view of trauma theory, mentalization theory, and the works of Freud, Lacan, and Matte Blanco.


Key words: re-enactment phototherapy, traumatic memories, unconscious processes

Η εργασία που ακολουθεί επιχειρεί να ανασυνθέσει την ζωή και το έργο του πατέρα της ψυχανάλυσης, Sigmund Freud. Επιχειρείται μια σύντομη ανασκόπηση των βασικών στοιχείων που συγκροτούν μια τόσο σπουδαία φυσιογνωμία σαν και αυτή του πρώτου μεγάλου ψυχαναλυτή. Η ανασκόπηση αυτή φιλοδοξεί να δημιουργήσει μια πιο σαφή εικόνα για την προσωπικότητα του Freud, αλλά και για την συστηματική εργασία του στους τομείς της ψυχιατρικής και της ψυχανάλυσης, την οποία και εδραίωσε. Ο Freud αποτελεί, δίχως αμφιβολία, από τα πρώτα κιόλας χρόνια της καριέρας του έως και τις μέρες μας, μια πολυσυζητημένη φιγούρα στον κλάδο της ψυχιατρικής, έχοντας στο ενεργητικό του πολλά άρθρα, βιβλία, μελέτες άμεσα σχετιζόμενα με τα προσωπικά του ενδιαφέροντα που εκτείνονταν, κυρίως, στο χώρο των νευρώσεων. Τα παραπάνω στοιχεία σχετικά με την καθοριστική συμβολή του Freud, σε συνδυασμό με το ερευνητικό ενδιαφέρον της γράφουσας για την ιστορία της ψυχιατρικής, αλλά και της ψυχανάλυσης, οδήγησαν στη συγγραφή της παρούσας εργασίας.  Η εργασία αυτή, λοιπόν, προτίθεται να καταστήσει, με έναν τρόπο λιτό, περισσότερο κατανοητό, το έργο που μας κληροδότησε ο Freud.

This paper argues that the epistemic gap in philosophy of mind stems from the fact that our awareness of our subjective experiences is categorically different from our knowledge of external phenomena. Our knowledge of external objects is always mediated through empirical observation or theoretical descriptions, and does not afford us knowledge of the intrinsic nature of the thing referred to, whereas our awareness of our experiences is immediate and affords us knowledge of the intrinsic nature of our experiences. Finally, it is argued that the thing itself referred to as " neural correlate of consciousness " is constituted by consciousness.

In this paper, I argue that the causal and description theories of natural kind term reference involve certain psychological elements. My main goal is to refine these theories with the help of empirical psychology of concepts, and to argue that the refinement process ultimately leads to the dissolution of boundaries between the two kinds of theories. However, neither the refined theories nor any other existing theories provide an adequate answer to the question of what makes natural kind terms rigid. To provide an answer to this question I conclude my paper by introducing a framework of a unified theory of natural kind term reference that is built on the empirical psychology of concepts.

It has been argued that prototypes cannot compose, and that for this reason concepts cannot be prototypes (. In this paper I examine the intensional and extensional approaches to prototype compositionality, arguing that neither succeeds in their present formulations. I then propose a hybrid extensional theory of prototype compositionality, according to which the extension of a complex concept is determined as a function of what triggers its constituent prototypes. I argue that the theory escapes the problems traditionally raised against extensional theories of compositionality.

The conceivability argument against materialism, originally raised by Saul Kripke and then reformulated, among others, by David Chalmers holds that we can conceive of the distinctness of a phenomenal state and its neural realiser, or, in Chalmers' variation of the argument, a zombie world. Here I argue that both phenomenal and natural kind terms are ambiguous between two senses, phenomenal and natural, and that the conceivability argument goes through only on one reading of a term. Thus, the antimaterialist has to provide some reasons independent of anti-materialism itself to favour that reading of a term that supports his or her argument. Given that there are no such independent reasons, I conclude that we should put more weight on empirical considerations than on a priori discussion in resolving the question concerning the identity between a phenomenal state and its neural realiser.

Fodor’s theory of concepts holds that the psychological capacities, beliefs or intentions which determine how we use concepts do not determine reference. Instead, causal relations of a specific kind between properties and our dispositions to token a concept are claimed to do so. Fodor does admit that there needs to be some psychological mechanisms mediating the property–concept tokening relations, but argues that they are purely accidental for reference. In contrast, I argue that the actual mechanisms that sustain the reference determining concept tokening relations are necessary for reference. Fodor’s atomism is thus undermined, since in order to refer with a concept it is necessary to possess some specific psychological capacities.

Some experimental studies have recently claimed to undermine semantic externalism
about natural kind terms. However, it is unclear how philosophical accounts of reference
can be experimentally tested. We present two externalistic adaptations of psychological
placeholder essentialism, a strict externalist and a hybrid externalist view, which are
experimentally testable. We examine Braisby, Franks, and Hampton’s (1996) study
which claims to undermine externalism, and argue that the study fails in its aims. We
conducted two experiments, the results of which undermine internalism and the hybrid
theory, and support strict externalism. Our conclusion is that lay speakers’ natural kind
concepts involve a belief in an external category essence, which determines reference.