Papers by Shigeru Taguchi
Frontiers in Psychology
Human consciousness is characterized by constant transitions in time. On the other hand, what is ... more Human consciousness is characterized by constant transitions in time. On the other hand, what is consciously experienced always possesses the temporal feature of “now.” In consciousness, “now” constantly holds different contents, yet it remains “now” no matter how far it goes. This duality is thematized in Husserlian phenomenology as “the standing-streaming now.” Although this phrase appears contradictory in everyday language, it has a structure that can be clearly understood and formalized. In this paper, we show that this structure can be described as a monoid in category theory. Furthermore, monoids can be transformed into the coslice category, which corresponds to the way of perceiving present moments as juxtaposed in succession. The seemingly contradictory nature of the “now” as both flowing and standing can be precisely structured and comprehended through the monoid, while the perspective of the “now” as discrete points on a timeline can be effectively formalized using the cos...
『危機の時代と田辺哲学』所収, 2022
田辺元は、生涯にわたって独自の「媒介」概念を彫琢し、彼の哲学の随所で活用している。田辺は「一切は媒介されている」という絶対媒介の立場をとる。その「媒介」概念は、「切ることによって繋ぐ」という言葉... more 田辺元は、生涯にわたって独自の「媒介」概念を彫琢し、彼の哲学の随所で活用している。田辺は「一切は媒介されている」という絶対媒介の立場をとる。その「媒介」概念は、「切ることによって繋ぐ」という言葉で特徴づけられている。切れていること＝断絶もまた媒介の一種である。それゆえ、田辺の言う「媒介」は、一切を吸収する同一性の思想を表現するものではなく、媒介される個の自立性、いいかえれば個と個の絶対的差異を不可欠の契機とする関係を意味する。このような田辺の「媒介」概念は、差異と分断に満ちた現実を分析するツールとなりうる。それは、差異や分断があるところで、思考を停止させることなく、分析的思考を駆動する機能を果たしうる。たとえば「他者」や「意識」の問題は、しばしば思考を空回りさせる困難を伴っているが、「媒介」に着目するなら、「分断」は分析可能な「つながり」に転換される。また、田辺の「媒介」概念は、政治的・文化的・宗教的対立に関しても、差異を均した統一ではなく、対立が対立のままで媒介であるような観点を開くことで、ある種のインパクトをもちうるだろう。
Psychotherapy is a comprehensive biological treatment modifying complex underlying cognitive, emo... more Psychotherapy is a comprehensive biological treatment modifying complex underlying cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and regulatory responses in the brain, leading patients with mental illness to a new interpretation of the sense of self and others. Psychotherapy is an art of science integrated with psychology and/or philosophy. Neuroscience is a multidisciplinary science of the neuron, the glial cells including oligodendrocytes, ependymal cells, and astrocytes and the neural circuits to understand learning, memory, behavior, perception, and consciousness. Both psychotherapy and neuroscience deal with the brain; nevertheless, they continue to stay polarized far. Existential phenomenological psychotherapy (EPP) has been in the forefront of meaning-centered counseling for almost a century. The phenomenological approach in psychotherapy originated in the works of Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Binswanger, Medard Boss and Viktor Frankl, and it has been committed to account for the existential possibilities and limitations of one's life. EPP provides philosophically rich interpretations and empowers counseling techniques to assist mentally suffering individuals by finding meaning and purpose of life. The approach has proven to be effective in treating mood and anxiety disorders. This review article demonstrates the development of EPP, the therapeutic methodology, evidence-based accounts of its curative techniques, current understanding of mood and anxiety disorders in neuroscience, and a possible converging path to translate and integrate meaning-centered psychotherapy and neuroscience, concluding that the existential phenomenological approach in psychotherapy is a viable and potent alternative to the currently prevailing medication-based approaches.
Reformalizing the notion of autonomy as closure through category theory as an arrow-first mathematics
The 2023 Conference on Artificial Life
Life continuously changes its own components and states at each moment through interaction with t... more Life continuously changes its own components and states at each moment through interaction with the external world, while maintaining its own individuality in a cyclical manner. Such a property, known as "autonomy," has been formulated using the mathematical concept of "closure." We introduce a branch of mathematics called "category theory" as an "arrow-first" mathematics, which sees everything as an "arrow," and use it to provide a more comprehensive and concise formalization of the notion of autonomy. More specifically, the concept of "monoid," a category that has only one object, is used to formalize in a simpler and more fundamental way the structure that has been formalized as "operational closure." By doing so, we show that category theory is a framework or "tool of thinking" that frees us from the habits of thinking to which we are prone and allows us to discuss things formally from a more dynamic perspective, and that it should also contribute to our understanding of living systems.
Reformalizing the notion of autonomy as closure through category theory as an arrow-first mathematics
Artificial Life Conference Proceedings, 2023
Life continuously changes its own components and states at each moment through interaction with t... more Life continuously changes its own components and states at each moment through interaction with the external world, while maintaining its own individuality in a cyclical manner. Such a property, known as “autonomy,” has been formulated using the mathematical concept of “closure.” We introduce a branch of mathematics called “category theory” as an “arrow-first” mathematics, which sees everything as an “arrow,” and use it to provide a more comprehensive and concise formalization of the notion of autonomy. More specifically, the concept of “monoid,” a category that has only one object, is used to formalize in a simpler and more fundamental way the structure that has been formalized as “operational closure.” By doing so, we show that category theory is a framework or “tool of thinking” that frees us from the habits of thinking to which we are prone and allows us to discuss things formally from a more dynamic perspective, and that it should also contribute to our understanding of living systems.
How to Become Conscious of Consciousness: A Mediation-Focused Approach
Geniusas, S. (eds) Varieties of Self-Awareness. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 121, 2023
Why is it difficult to understand what consciousness is? I will argue that this is because consci... more Why is it difficult to understand what consciousness is? I will argue that this is because consciousness is not a straightforward, independent entity, but rather an essentially mediated phenomenon. First, it should be noted that we can conceptualize consciousness only through its (temporary) loss. To become aware of the existence of consciousness that is too obvious to notice, we must contrast it with its negations, such as the experience of sleep, fainting, and anaesthesia, or the consciousnesses of others to which I have no direct access. Furthermore, the concept of consciousness is also mediated by reflection on it. Consciousness is prior to its reflection, but this antecedence itself can only be realized through reflection. Husserl addresses this “circular” phenomenon in his later manuscripts with his concept of the “phenomenologizing ego” and the “primal I.” Finally, I will critically discuss our tendency to “substantialize” or “reify” consciousness. In our practical life, it is necessary to conceptualize and objectify consciousness at certain levels. However, what corresponds to the concept of consciousness is not a stand-alone object but a complex and intricate web of mediations. A mediation-focused approach can transform the “hard problem of consciousness” into a concrete phenomenon of multiple mediations that can be specifically and phenomenologically explored.
The monoid-now: a category theoretic approach to the structure of phenomenological time-consciousness
Frontiers in Psychology, 2023
Human consciousness is characterized by constant transitions in time. On the other hand, what is ... more Human consciousness is characterized by constant transitions in time. On the other hand, what is consciously experienced always possesses the temporal feature of “now.” In consciousness, “now” constantly holds different contents, yet it remains “now” no matter how far it goes. This duality is thematized in Husserlian phenomenology as “the standing-streaming now.” Although this phrase appears contradictory in everyday language, it has a structure that can be clearly understood and formalized. In this paper, we show that this structure can be described as a monoid in category theory. Furthermore, monoids can be transformed into the coslice category, which corresponds to the way of perceiving present moments as juxtaposed in succession. The seemingly contradictory nature of the “now” as both flowing and standing can be precisely structured and comprehended through the monoid, while the perspective of the “now” as discrete points on a timeline can be effectively formalized using the coslice category. This framework helps us more precisely understand the differences between ordinary consciousness and meditative consciousness, specifically the experience of the “eternal now.” We illustrate how the meditative states of consciousness presented in the early Buddhist scriptures (Pali Canon) and Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō remarkably reflect a monoid structure.
Ur-Ich in Husserl
Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, 2023
Definition:
“Ur-Ich” is Husserl’s term for the problem dimension concerning the “I” that appears... more Definition:
“Ur-Ich” is Husserl’s term for the problem dimension concerning the “I” that appears when we go deeper than transcendental phenomenology at the first stage. It is disclosed mainly in two contexts: the radicalized reduction to the primal streaming in the theory of temporalization and the radicalized epoché regarding the validity of intersubjectivity. It is an apparent misunderstanding to interpret it as a trans-individual metaphysical ego beyond empirical egos or as a solipsistic ego that creates other egos out of itself. Instead, it signifies a fundamental phenomenon of being I, without which the transcendental self-disclosure of the primal life and the experience of “being with others” would not be possible.
arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.15279, 2023
Life continuously changes its own components and states at each moment through interaction with t... more Life continuously changes its own components and states at each moment through interaction with the external world, while maintaining its own individuality in a cyclical manner. Such a property, known as "autonomy," has been formulated using the mathematical concept of "closure." We introduce a branch of mathematics called "category theory" as an "arrow-first" mathematics, which sees everything as an "arrow," and use it to provide a more comprehensive and concise formalization of the notion of autonomy. More specifically, the concept of "monoid," a category that has only one object, is used to formalize in a simpler and more fundamental way the structure that has been formalized as "operational closure." By doing so, we show that category theory is a framework or "tool of thinking" that frees us from the habits of thinking to which we are prone and allows us to discuss things formally from a more dynamic perspective, and that it should also contribute to our understanding of living systems.
Perception, Affectivity, and Volition in Husserl’s Phenomenology
Phaenomenologica, 2017
This collection of essays by scholars from Europe, Asia, North America, and Latin America offers ... more This collection of essays by scholars from Europe, Asia, North America, and Latin America offers new perspectives of the phenomenological investigation of experiential life on the basis of Husserl’s phenomenology. Not only well-known works of Husserl are interpreted from new angles, but also the latest volumes of the Husserliana are closely examined. In a variety of ways, the contributors explore the emergence of reason in experience that is disclosed in the very regions that are traditionally considered to be “irrational” or “pre-rational.” The leading idea of such explorations is Husserl’s view that perception, affectivity, and volition are regarded as the three aspects of reason. Without affectivity, which is supposedly irrational, no rationality can be established in the spheres of representation and volition, whereas volitional and representational acts consistently structure the process of affective experience. In such a framework, it is also shown that theoretical and practical reason are inseparably intertwined. Thus, the papers collected here can be regarded as a collaborative phenomenological investigation into the entanglement and mutual dependency of the supposedly “rational” and the “irrational” as well as that of the “practical” and the “theoretical.”
A transformed view of reality resulting from Bayesian theory: Comments on Asai’s article
The aim of this article is to propose a universal method to fundamentally understand what “samene... more The aim of this article is to propose a universal method to fundamentally understand what “sameness” means, and how it is possible to subsist. We could not perceive anything if there were no difference at all in our experience. Our experience of the same thing is essentially mediated by multiple differences. Given that differences are ubiquitous and fundamental, “sameness” can be interpreted as “nulled difference.” To perceive something as a same thing means that in our experience, there occur counteractions to certain differences. The same is the effect of such counteractions to differences, which makes a contrast with straightforward differences. This contrast — which is a sort of difference again — distinguishes the same from its background differences. Accordingly, I claim that sameness can be defined by (and reduced to) difference. To support this claim, I refer to empirical experimental knowledge concerning fixational eye movement, vision of toads, neural adaptation, and the n...
The Brain & Neural Networks, Sep 5, 2018
Scientific Reports, 2022
Social cognition has received much attention in fields such as neuroscience, psychology, cognitiv... more Social cognition has received much attention in fields such as neuroscience, psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy. Theory-theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST) provide the dominant theoretical frameworks for research on social cognition. However, neither theory addresses the matter of how the concepts of “self” and “other” are acquired through the development of human and nonhuman agents. Here, we show that the internal representations of “self” and “other” can be developed in an artificial agent only through the simple predictive learning achieved by deep neural networks with the superposition mechanism we herein propose. That is, social cognition can be achieved without a pre-given (or innate) framework of self and other; this is not assumed (or is at least unclear) in TT and ST. We demonstrate that the agent with the proposed model can acquire basic abilities of social cognition such as shared spatial representations of self and other, perspective-taking, and mirror-neuron-like activities of the agent’s neural network. The result indicates that the superposition mechanism we propose is a necessary condition for the development of the concepts of “self” and “other” and, hence, for the development of social cognition in general.
Metodo, 2019
In this paper, I propose a possible reinterpretation of phenomenology using a newly defined conce... more In this paper, I propose a possible reinterpretation of phenomenology using a newly defined concept of 'mediation.' First, I address the question: What are the 'things themselves' that are given as the result of the phenomenological epoché? I would answer that they are neither material objects nor merely subjective experiences, but rather specific occurrences of 'mediations.' Second, under the influence of the Japanese philosopher Hajime Tanabe, I will define 'mediation' as a non-separable occurrence of differentiating and connecting. Third, I shall claim that the concept of 'phenomenon' itself should be reinterpreted in terms of its character of mediation. Then, I will discuss central issues in phenomenology such as intentionality, time, and intersubjectivity in order to test the applicability of the proposed concept of mediation. To conclude, I shall summarize the potential of the idea that phenomenology can be reinterpreted using the concept of mediation.
Philosophies, 2019
In this essay we critically evaluate the progress that has been made in solving the problem of me... more In this essay we critically evaluate the progress that has been made in solving the problem of meaning in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. We remain skeptical about solutions based on deep neural networks and cognitive robotics, which in our opinion do not fundamentally address the problem. We agree with the enactive approach to cognitive science that things appear as intrinsically meaningful for living beings because of their precarious existence as adaptive autopoietic individuals. But this approach inherits the problem of failing to account for how meaning as such could make a difference for an agent's behavior. In a nutshell, if life and mind are identified with physically deterministic phenomena, then there is no conceptual room for meaning to play a role in its own right. We argue that this impotence of meaning can be addressed by revising the concept of nature such that the macroscopic scale of the living can be characterized by physical indeterminacy. We consider the implications of this revision of the mind-body relationship for synthetic approaches.
Neuroscience research, Jan 31, 2015
One of the most mysterious phenomena in science is the nature of conscious experience. Due to its... more One of the most mysterious phenomena in science is the nature of conscious experience. Due to its subjective nature, a reductionist approach is having a hard time in addressing some fundamental questions about consciousness. These questions are squarely and quantitatively tackled by a recently developed theoretical framework, called integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. In particular, IIT proposes that a maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS) is identical to conscious experience. However, there has been no principled way to assess the claimed identity. Here, we propose to apply a mathematical formalism, category theory, to assess the proposed identity and suggest that it is important to consider if there exists a proper translation between the domain of conscious experience and that of the MICS. If such translation exists, we postulate that questions in one domain can be answered in the other domain; very difficult questions in the domain of consciousness can be resolved in the domain of mathematics. We claim that it is possible to empirically test if such a functor exists, by using a combination of neuroscientific and computational approaches. Our general, principled and empirical framework allows us to assess the relationship between the domain of consciousness and the domain of mathematical structures, including those suggested by IIT.
Biomedicines 2021, Mar 27, 2021
Psychotherapy is a comprehensive biological treatment modifying complex underlying cognitive, emo... more Psychotherapy is a comprehensive biological treatment modifying complex underlying cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and regulatory responses in the brain, leading patients with mental illness to a new interpretation of the sense of self and others. Psychotherapy is an art of science integrated with psychology and/or philosophy. Neurological sciences study the neurological basis of cognition, memory, and behavior as well as the impact of neurological damage and disease on these functions, and their treatment. Both psychotherapy and neurological sciences deal with the brain; nevertheless, they continue to stay polarized. Existential phenomenological psychotherapy (EPP) has been in the forefront of meaning-centered counseling for almost a century. The phenomenological approach in psychotherapy originated in the works of Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Binswanger, Medard Boss, and Viktor Frankl, and it has been committed to accounting for the existential possibilities and limitations of one’s life. EPP provides philosophically rich interpretations and empowers counseling techniques to assist mentally suffering individuals by finding meaning and purpose to life. The approach has proven to be effective in treating mood and anxiety disorders. This narrative review article demonstrates the development of EPP, the therapeutic methodology, evidence-based accounts of its curative techniques, current understanding of mood and anxiety disorders in neurological sciences, and a possible converging path to translate and integrate meaning-centered psychotherapy and neuroscience, concluding that the EPP may potentially play a synergistic role with the currently prevailing medication-based approaches for the treatment of mood and anxiety disorders.
Taguchi, S.; Altobrando, A. (eds.). Tetsugaku Companion to Phenomenology and Japanese Philosophy, 2019
We often think of consciousness as if it were a capsule surrounded by a boundary. In this paper, ... more We often think of consciousness as if it were a capsule surrounded by a boundary. In this paper, I will show in a phenomenological way that such an image of consciousness does not match the reality given to us. In fact, we cannot find any borderline of our own consciousness. This peculiarity of consciousness makes it difficult to understand how we can experience the otherness of the other. How can there be any otherness if there are no boundaries between consciousnesses? I shall make clear how Husserl and Nishida struggled with this fundamental problem. First, I interpret the “unbounded” character of consciousness as “non-contexutuality.” On the basis of this discussion, I present the basic question concerning the other experienced in consciousness. Second, I examine how Husserl addressed this question. The early Husserl tried to deal with this problem on the basis of the idea of “pure consciousness” which was construed as something “indefinite.” The collapse of this idea motivated Husserl to develop his later concept of “primal I” (Ur-Ich). Third, I discuss how Nishida dealt with the same question. After he tackled this problem in his early theory of “pure experience,” he would overcome this attempt in his later article “I and Thou,” which seems to stress the non-contextual encounter with otherness.
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Papers by Shigeru Taguchi
“Ur-Ich” is Husserl’s term for the problem dimension concerning the “I” that appears when we go deeper than transcendental phenomenology at the first stage. It is disclosed mainly in two contexts: the radicalized reduction to the primal streaming in the theory of temporalization and the radicalized epoché regarding the validity of intersubjectivity. It is an apparent misunderstanding to interpret it as a trans-individual metaphysical ego beyond empirical egos or as a solipsistic ego that creates other egos out of itself. Instead, it signifies a fundamental phenomenon of being I, without which the transcendental self-disclosure of the primal life and the experience of “being with others” would not be possible.