Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2014
It is known that altruism can be sustained in an evolving population by a process of group select... more It is known that altruism can be sustained in an evolving population by a process of group selection. There is also existing research on the role that punishment can play in inducing selfish agents to behave more cooperatively or in preventing selfish agents from evolving, and the limitations upon this mechanism. This paper embeds a simple model of a punishment system within an indirect cultural evolution framework. The use of punishment is shown to reduce the potency of the group selection mechanism, and thus the level of evolved altruism. This presents a novel reason why the use of punishment may have negative dynamic welfare implications. Keywords altruism • punishment • social preferences • group selection • multilevel selection • indirect evolution • cultural evolution 1 Overview The central problem of economic and social policy, indeed the essential prerequisite of the social order itself, is that of bestowing upon the individual agent the incentive to act in a manner which is beneficial for society as a whole. Such incentives can be intrinsic to the individual (altruistic preferences) or extrinsic (threats of punishment). This paper analyses the interaction between these two alternative "technologies". We explore the possibility that they cannot be freely mixed, since the use of extrinsic incentives can undermine the evolution of intrinsic incentives. Group selection provides a framework for modelling this perverse dynamic effect. Societies evolve through imitation and propagation of the mores of their own most successful members (and those of other societies). This process of cultural evolution offers a functional explanation both for the individual "social preferences" which evolve (i.e. altruistic motivations) and for the institutional frameworks which are The final publication is available at
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Papers by Richard Povey