Disarmement of PKK and Kurdish Issue July 2025, 2025
Since October 2024, Türkiye has been conducting a highly important process.
The developments tha... more Since October 2024, Türkiye has been conducting a highly important process.
The developments that began with MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli walking over to the DEM
Party’s parliamentary rows and shaking hands with its co-chairs and MPs on October 1 in
the Turkish Grand National Assembly gradually evolved; first into a stable political initia-
tive, then into a political process, and finally into a determined state project.
Fundamentally, the process aims to disarm the PKK via Öcalan, in response to potential
threats (and opportunities) for Türkiye arising from developments in the Middle East after
October 7, 2023. In the past ten months, important progress has been made toward this goal.
The process entered a concrete phase with Bahçeli’s call on October 22 for Öcalan to
take on a role in persuading the PKK to disarm. It reached a major turning point with
Öcalan’s February 27 call for the PKK to dissolve and disarm, followed by the PKK's public
announcement on May 12 of its decision to do so. The PKK is now expected to act on this
decision and disarm. The intense activity observed this week suggests that the first steps
toward disarmament will be taken without delay.
Although the process began with the concrete objective of disarming the PKK, it will not re-
main limited to this goal. This is quite natural, given that both the choices made during the
Republic's nation-building process and the spiral of violence and terror that has spanned
nearly half a century have produced a deeply layered issue. It is not necessary here to elab-
orate on the dynamics of the Kurdish issue or the interaction between the PKK and the
Kurdish issue. However, it is clear from both public perception and discourse that we are
facing a multifaceted, complex problem, even if its scope occasionally expands or contracts.
Therefore, while the current process proceeds with a specific and limited goal, guided in
part by lessons learned from the 2009–2015 "opening/solution" period, it will inevitably
intersect with the century-long foundations of the Kurdish issue and Türkiye’s broader
democratization challenges.
Indeed, from the very start of the process, signs such as its framing in terms of concepts
like strengthening domestic unity, achieving internal peace, and Kurdish-Turkish coexis-
tence; and later, as the process became more concrete, the expected administrative, legal,
and constitutional steps to implement the PKK's decision to dissolve and disarm; the ideas
and proposals voiced by political actors regarding a vision for Türkiye in a post-PKK era;
the political activity surrounding the Parliamentary Commission and a new Constitution- indicate that the process will necessarily extend beyond disarmament to engage with
political goals related to the Kurdish issue and democratization.
This study was designed with an awareness of this broad and layered context, without
neglecting the concrete topics debated specifically within the scope of the process.
The first section reflects public opinion on the issue: from the ties that hold different
identities together in Türkiye, to perceptions of equality and discrimination, to views on
the existence and framing of the Kurdish issue.
The second section is dedicated to evaluating the current process for disarming the PKK,
focusing on public perceptions and opinions about the process, its success, and its poten-
tial political outcomes.
The third section examines public opinion regarding potential administrative, legal, and
constitutional steps that may be taken both for the success of the current process and for
resolving the Kurdish issue.
The fourth section assesses public perceptions of the process’s geopolitical dimension,
through the lens of Türkiye’s relations with Kurdish entities in Iraq and Syria.
The fieldwork for this study, designed and analyzed by the Ankara Institute, was con-
ducted by PANORAMATR between June 25 and July 5. To observe changes in perception
on certain topics, monthly surveys previously conducted for PANORAMATR subscribers
were also utilized.
We believe that this research, conducted on the eve of one of the most critical moments
in the disarmament process, and the report prepared with comprehensive analysis, will
contribute meaningfully to political and public discussions.
In the coming period, as the process advances, we plan to reassess public sentiment and
share any possible shifts in perception with you.
The Kurdish question in Turkey has a long history which was viewed within the framework of nation... more The Kurdish question in Turkey has a long history which was viewed within the framework of nation building, integration and underdevelopment until it was perceived as a security issue with the emergence of the PKK in the 1980s. During the 1990s, dominated by the security perspective, the scope of the question was reduced to terrorist acts alone under a state of emergency rule. A number of changes transformed the nature of question, such as the Kurdish political movement since the 1990s, forced migration, the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 and the emergence of autonomous Kurdish government in northern Iraq. A permanent settlement of the Kurdish question must be based on developing new and alternative strategies vis-à-vis existing policies. In this context, a comprehensive package of measures should include not only security measures, but more importantly democratic reforms and economic investments.
The Longest Year of Turkish Politics: 2014
Insight Turkey, 2014
Like all long political years, the year 2014 did not begin on January 1st; rather, 2014 political... more Like all long political years, the year 2014 did not begin on January 1st; rather, 2014 politically began at the end of May with the Taksim events. Nevertheless, the year may end on an optimistic note. It could be said that, unless the date of the upcoming general elections change, the long political year of 2014 will extend to June 2015. Had the government been overthrown by the police-judiciary coup in December 17th., Turkey would have been sentenced to a neo-tutelage regime for many years to come. The first phase of the tripartite elections race in Turkey ended with Erdogan’s victory. The upcoming presidential elections in August 2014 will be the second phase. The March 30 elections clearly demonstrated that the AK Party will continue to play an important part in Turkey’s political scene for years to come. The Longest Year of Turkish
New Egypt versus the Felool: Struggle for Democracy
THE TRANSFORMATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 2002 Turkish foreign p... more THE TRANSFORMATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 2002 Turkish foreign policy has experienced a significant transformation since the AK Party came to power in 2002. The pro-status quo, passive and reactive foreign policy with a limited regional perspective transformed into an active foreign policy that aims to change international relations in the region as a whole. This change was analyzed in many different studies in recent years, and scholars from different fields of political science have tried to make sense of this major shift and understand its causes and outcomes. In this study, this foreign policy change will be explained as a gradual development that came as a result of the transformation of Turkey’s state identity. The process of change was started with the Neighboring Countries of Iraq Conference in 2003. The Conference was the first of such an attempt to engage the countries of the region in order to resolve problems in a neighboring nation. This...
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Papers by Taha Ozhan
The developments that began with MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli walking over to the DEM
Party’s parliamentary rows and shaking hands with its co-chairs and MPs on October 1 in
the Turkish Grand National Assembly gradually evolved; first into a stable political initia-
tive, then into a political process, and finally into a determined state project.
Fundamentally, the process aims to disarm the PKK via Öcalan, in response to potential
threats (and opportunities) for Türkiye arising from developments in the Middle East after
October 7, 2023. In the past ten months, important progress has been made toward this goal.
The process entered a concrete phase with Bahçeli’s call on October 22 for Öcalan to
take on a role in persuading the PKK to disarm. It reached a major turning point with
Öcalan’s February 27 call for the PKK to dissolve and disarm, followed by the PKK's public
announcement on May 12 of its decision to do so. The PKK is now expected to act on this
decision and disarm. The intense activity observed this week suggests that the first steps
toward disarmament will be taken without delay.
Although the process began with the concrete objective of disarming the PKK, it will not re-
main limited to this goal. This is quite natural, given that both the choices made during the
Republic's nation-building process and the spiral of violence and terror that has spanned
nearly half a century have produced a deeply layered issue. It is not necessary here to elab-
orate on the dynamics of the Kurdish issue or the interaction between the PKK and the
Kurdish issue. However, it is clear from both public perception and discourse that we are
facing a multifaceted, complex problem, even if its scope occasionally expands or contracts.
Therefore, while the current process proceeds with a specific and limited goal, guided in
part by lessons learned from the 2009–2015 "opening/solution" period, it will inevitably
intersect with the century-long foundations of the Kurdish issue and Türkiye’s broader
democratization challenges.
Indeed, from the very start of the process, signs such as its framing in terms of concepts
like strengthening domestic unity, achieving internal peace, and Kurdish-Turkish coexis-
tence; and later, as the process became more concrete, the expected administrative, legal,
and constitutional steps to implement the PKK's decision to dissolve and disarm; the ideas
and proposals voiced by political actors regarding a vision for Türkiye in a post-PKK era;
the political activity surrounding the Parliamentary Commission and a new Constitution- indicate that the process will necessarily extend beyond disarmament to engage with
political goals related to the Kurdish issue and democratization.
This study was designed with an awareness of this broad and layered context, without
neglecting the concrete topics debated specifically within the scope of the process.
The first section reflects public opinion on the issue: from the ties that hold different
identities together in Türkiye, to perceptions of equality and discrimination, to views on
the existence and framing of the Kurdish issue.
The second section is dedicated to evaluating the current process for disarming the PKK,
focusing on public perceptions and opinions about the process, its success, and its poten-
tial political outcomes.
The third section examines public opinion regarding potential administrative, legal, and
constitutional steps that may be taken both for the success of the current process and for
resolving the Kurdish issue.
The fourth section assesses public perceptions of the process’s geopolitical dimension,
through the lens of Türkiye’s relations with Kurdish entities in Iraq and Syria.
The fieldwork for this study, designed and analyzed by the Ankara Institute, was con-
ducted by PANORAMATR between June 25 and July 5. To observe changes in perception
on certain topics, monthly surveys previously conducted for PANORAMATR subscribers
were also utilized.
We believe that this research, conducted on the eve of one of the most critical moments
in the disarmament process, and the report prepared with comprehensive analysis, will
contribute meaningfully to political and public discussions.
In the coming period, as the process advances, we plan to reassess public sentiment and
share any possible shifts in perception with you.