Papers by Jean Pascal Zanders
Non-conventional weapons – biological, chemical, nuclear and ballistic missiles – continue to pos... more Non-conventional weapons – biological, chemical, nuclear and ballistic missiles – continue to pose chal-lenges to Middle Eastern security. Not only are they present, or believed to be present, in the region, but some of those weapon categories have actually been used in war. Internal political instability in many Middle Eastern countries and the opening of new geopolitical ?ssures in some sub-regions over the past few years have rekindled fears about possible nuclear weapon proliferation and regional competition in longer-range ballistic missiles. The recurrent use of chemical weap-ons (CWs) against civilians in the Syrian civil war car-ries echoes of Iraq’s chemical attacks against Iranian troops and its Kurdish minority during the 1980s. The region, however, faces a deep-seated paradox: Arab governments and Iran almost singularly focus on re-moving Israel’s nuclear capacity, whereas all actual use of unconventional weapons in the Middle East targeted fellow Arabs or Muslims.
Analysis of documents relating to the dismantling of the Muthanna complex in the 1990s and subseq... more Analysis of documents relating to the dismantling of the Muthanna complex in the 1990s and subsequent monitoring of the site, however, demonstrates that it would be all but impossible for the insurgents to acquire and use Iraq’s former CW, or for that matter, the toxic residues of warfare agents.
The Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclea... more The Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) calls for a conference 'on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction' (NPT, 2010, para. 7a). The passage aims for regional inclusiveness and discerns a role for the five permanent members ol'the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) who are also the only possessors of nuclear weapons defined under the NPT. The call brings chemical and biological weapons (CBW) into future arms control discussions for the Middle East. Consequently, a key issue for the conference w ill be to determine what role, if any, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) can play in furthering the ambition laid out in the NPT Review Conference document. Egypt and Israel are party to neither convention; Syria still needs to join the BTWC. Considering that they have thus far resisted international pressure to join those treaties, a crucial question will be how the diplomatic process that would follow a Middle East conference, assuming a successful conference, could change their position. The S tatu s o f C B W T reaties in th e M id d le E a st The Middle East is often depicted as the region with low participation in global, multilateral arms control and disarmament treaties. This assessment was definitely correct when the previous forum that tried to control the acquisition of non-conventional weaponry, the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) of the Madrid peace process, met between 1992 and 1995. During that period, the CWC had not yet entered into force. Today, however, the overwhelming majority of Middle Eastern states are full party to the BTWC and the CW C.1 Only three core states are absent from the roster: Egypt, Israel, and Syria. While Syria acceded to the CWC in October 2013, it still has not ratified the BTWC. Egypt is a signatory to the BTWC, but refuses to accede to the CWC until Israel becomes a party to the NPT. Israel has signed the CWC, but not the BTWC. All three states are party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of CBW in armed conflict. Oman and the United Arab Emirates never became party to the Geneva Protocol, but have assumed the full obligations and responsibilities of the CBW disarmament treaties. 1 S ee C h a p te r 7 in th is v o lu m e .
Introduction • Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on 14 September 2013 and fo... more Introduction • Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on 14 September 2013 and formally became a state party on 14 October. This was the outcome of a framework agreement on the elimination of Syria's chemical warfare capacities between Russia and the United States reached in Geneva on 14 September. This accord averted military strikes by France, the United Kingdom and the United States as reprisal for the use of chemical weapons (CW) in the Syrian civil war. In particular the attacks against the Damascus suburb of Ghouta on 21 August represented a major escalation in the conflict. The sarin nerve agent killed hundreds of people and injured many more. At the time of the attacks a UN team comprising experts from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) were in Da-mascus in response to an earlier request by the Syrian government to investigate alleged CW use during the spring of 2013. After modification of its mandate, it investigated the Ghouta attacks and issued their preliminary report on 16 September, two days after the Geneva accord. The findings all but blamed the Syrian government. The team submitted its final report covering all chemical warfare allegations from the original mandate as well as some additional attacks after the Ghouta incident on 12 December. • After becoming a party to the CWC the verification activities have consisted of four types of activities: • Syrian declarations on CW holdings, CW-relevant infrastructure (production and storage sites), and on the history of its chemical warfare programme since 1 January 1946. Given the special circumstances that have led the country to accede to the convention, Syria was requested and has (or is in the process of) providing information on the destruction of CW before becoming a CWC party.
This paper lays some foundations for understanding the dynamics of biological and chemical armame... more This paper lays some foundations for understanding the dynamics of biological and chemical armament in a terrorist entity. The first section deepens the understanding of terrorism with chemical and biological weapons (CBW). The second section introduces the assimilation model to explain how a decision by a terrorist entity to acquire CBW affects its internal organisation and creates dynamics over which the leadership may lose control. The next three sections respectively discuss some key factors influencing the structure of the armament, analyse their implica-tions, and consider the challenges a terrorist entity might still encounter even if it managed to successfully produce CBW. The final part looks at how the assimilation model and the insights derived from the study of terrorism with CBW could be applied to the analysis of the threat of terrorism with nuclear devices.
This Policy Forum issue analyses both progress made by and challenges facing the Chemical Weapons... more This Policy Forum issue analyses both progress made by and challenges facing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). It does so in order to explore under what conditions and to what extent these two conventions might help build a zone in the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles (DVs). Finally, the issue presents some options for the future and a major long-term initiative towards this ambitious goal.
Conference Presentations by Jean Pascal Zanders
The current CW disarmament process in Syria is unique in the sense that never before have operati... more The current CW disarmament process in Syria is unique in the sense that never before have operations to secure and dismantle a non-conventional weapon capacity (research, development, production and storage of agents and delivery systems), as well as the destruction of warfare and precursor agents been undertaken in an active war zone.
Article VII of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) addresses emergency assistance ... more Article VII of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) addresses emergency assistance in the case of a violation of the convention. It received new interest because of recent experiences with natual disease outbreaks (especially Ebola in West Africa) and heightened threat perceptions of possible terrorist use of pathogens.
To assist State Party consideration of issues under this provision, the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) held a tabletop exercise (TTX) on 8–9 November 2016 to understand better the elements that would have to be in place to trigger Article VII and the consequences such action may have on the organisation of international assistance. Moreover, the TTX also aimed to achieve a deeper appreciation of the unique contribution of the BTWC in addition to the expected assistance efforts by international organisations, relief associations and individual countries. The TTX put into sharper relief certain questions BTWC States Parties will have to address even before the first item of assistance is shipped to the disaster area. Failing to do so, the TTX suggested that States, depending on their individual assessment of the risks following the outbreak and the cause of the epidemic, may decide on totally different courses of action, an outcome that might severely hamper the international coordination of efforts to stem the outbreak and assist victims.
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Papers by Jean Pascal Zanders
Conference Presentations by Jean Pascal Zanders
To assist State Party consideration of issues under this provision, the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) held a tabletop exercise (TTX) on 8–9 November 2016 to understand better the elements that would have to be in place to trigger Article VII and the consequences such action may have on the organisation of international assistance. Moreover, the TTX also aimed to achieve a deeper appreciation of the unique contribution of the BTWC in addition to the expected assistance efforts by international organisations, relief associations and individual countries. The TTX put into sharper relief certain questions BTWC States Parties will have to address even before the first item of assistance is shipped to the disaster area. Failing to do so, the TTX suggested that States, depending on their individual assessment of the risks following the outbreak and the cause of the epidemic, may decide on totally different courses of action, an outcome that might severely hamper the international coordination of efforts to stem the outbreak and assist victims.