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RARI Chain embeds royalties on the node level to guarantee royalty payments. A secure, low-cost, decentralized Ethereum L3 blockchain powered by Arbitrum.
RARI Chain embeds royalties on the node level to guarantee royalty payments. A secure, low-cost, decentralized Ethereum L3 blockchain powered by Arbitrum.
Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
2024 Jan 20 — 2026 Aug 07
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to
Celestia.
2024 Dec 18 — 2026 Aug 07
RARI re-enables proof system
2025 May 20th
The proof system and blobstream reference are fully re-enabled.
RARI disables proof system
2025 May 5th
Proof system and reference to Blobstream are disabled due to an incompatibility with Pectra.
| SEQUENCER FAILURE | STATE VALIDATION | DATA AVAILABILITY | EXIT WINDOW | PROPOSER FAILURE | |
| Arbitrum One L2 | Self sequence | Fraud proofs (INT) | Onchain | None | Self propose |
| RARI Chain L3 • Individual | Self sequence | Fraud proofs (INT) | External (DAC) | None | Self propose |
| RARI Chain L3 • Combined | Self sequence | Fraud proofs (INT) | External (DAC) | None | Self propose |
No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.
Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.
Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data.
There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack, and the committee members are not publicly known.
There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer.
The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability.
There is no delay in the upgradeability of the bridge. Users have no time to exit the system before the bridge implementation update is completed.
The relayer role is permissioned, and the DA bridge does not have a Security Council or a governance mechanism to propose new relayers. In case of relayer failure, the DA bridge will halt and be unable to recover without the intervention of a centralized entity.