Papers by Alexander Minimus
Hechos, evidencia y estándares de prueba. Ensayos de epistemología jurídica, 2015
El presente artículo pretende echar luces sobre un problema crucial al interior de la ciencia, el... more El presente artículo pretende echar luces sobre un problema crucial al interior de la ciencia, el cual se resume en la siguiente pregunta: cuando tenemos una serie de evidencias cuya interpretación nos lleva a dos (o más) conclusiones diferentes, ¿en qué autoridad podemos confiar para dirimir los conflictos generados por estas diferentes posturas científicas? Como bien se sabe, la carga probatoria de muchos argumentos reside en la explicación causal de las ciencias, en lo que podemos denominar "hechos objetivos" o "experiencias consensuales". Sin embargo, la existencia de esos hechos es escasa o nula, pues como bien argumentan muchos filósofos de la ciencia-Brown, Kuhn, Lakatos, entre otros 1-, todo hecho lleva detrás una carga teórica convencional que lo determina e identifica como tal. Esta circunstancia podría carecer de importancia dada la consensualidad de los marcos teóricos bajo los cuales se admiten esas experiencias, que se expresan en los colegios y las comunidades científicas de cada ciencia o disciplina. Empero, nuevamente, no siempre la visión de los científicos o la armonía entre las teorías mentadas es de tal índole que se pueda tener una misma "opinión" de los hechos. Es aquí donde se presenta la situación problemática de una toma de decisión más allá de la experiencia factual.
The present study argues against a traditional view that describes Aquinas’ epistemology as direc... more The present study argues against a traditional view that describes Aquinas’ epistemology as direct realism. This view arises from the fact that Aquinas denies any type of representation or indirect realism and a knower is able to grasp the essence of extramental things. According to Aquinas, however, there is mediation between the individual extramental thing’s form and the mind: the species intelligibilis. The species’ role is to transmit information in a way that allows an extramental thing’s essence to be known, but not the species itself. Therefore, what Aquinas means by representation is that the ultimate object of knowledge is an extramental thing known through an immediate object of knowledge, the species. Likewise, because knowledge is about essence, it is assumed that the species is either a copy of the individual extramental thing’s form or it delivers the thing’s form to the mind. Nevertheless, the species differs ontologically from the extramental thing’s form, and does not “carry” the extramental thing’s form; indeed, none of this is possible, because the extramental thing’s form is a principle of the composite, the causa essendi of a thing, while the abstracted thing’s form, considered as essence or nature, is an intelligible structure suitable for knowledge, not a being. Consequently, a species only represents the thing’s essence by conveying essential information to the mind.
Thesis Chapters by Alexander Minimus
The present study argues against a traditional view that describes Aquinas’ epistemology as direc... more The present study argues against a traditional view that describes Aquinas’ epistemology as direct realism. This view arises from the fact that Aquinas denies any type of representation or indirect realism and a knower is able to grasp the essence of extramental things. According to Aquinas, however, there is mediation between the individual extramental thing’s form and the mind: the species intelligibilis. The species’ role is to transmit information in a way that allows an extramental thing’s essence to be known, but not the species itself. Therefore, what Aquinas means by representation is that the ultimate object of knowledge is an extramental thing known through an immediate object of knowledge, the species. Likewise, because knowledge is about essence, it is assumed that the species is either a copy of the individual extramental thing’s form or it delivers the thing’s form to the mind. Nevertheless, the species differs ontologically from the extramental thing’s form, and does not “carry” the extramental thing’s form; indeed, none of this is possible, because the extramental thing’s form is a principle of the composite, the causa essendi of a thing, while the abstracted thing’s form, considered as essence or nature, is an intelligible structure suitable for knowledge, not a being. Consequently, a species only represents the thing’s essence by conveying essential information to the mind.
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Papers by Alexander Minimus
Thesis Chapters by Alexander Minimus