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Marco Nathan

University of Denver, Philosophy, Faculty Member

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Marco J. Nathan is Professor and Chair in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Denver, which he joined after completing his PhD in Philosophy at Columbia University. Nathan’s Research focuses on the philosophy of science, with particular emphasis on biology, neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and economics. Nathan is the author of The Quest for Human Nature: What Science and Philosophy Have Learned (Oxford University Press, 2024) and Black Boxes: How Science Turns Ignorance into Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2021). He has published numerous articles, chapters, and edited volumes in philosophical and scientific venues.

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Papers by Marco Nathan

Mob Rules: Toward a Causal Model of Social Structure

American Philosophical Quarterly

This essay enriches causal models capturing the propagation of prejudice, bias, and other aggrega... more This essay enriches causal models capturing the propagation of prejudice, bias, and other aggregative social mechanisms, negative or positive. These explananda include the reinforcement of economic inequality, “mob-like” behavior, peer pressure, and the establishment of social norms. The stage is set by introducing various forms of redundant causation and discussing some difficulties with mainstream preemption. Next the main proposal extends current representations of aggregative social mechanisms in two respects. First, it is more nuanced, as it identifies three distinct kinds of inferences: relevance of causes to effects, degree of redundancy of an effect, and the influence that causes exert on other causes. Second, it offers a quantitative—as opposed to merely qualitative—distinction between the causal contribution of preempting and preempted causes.

format_quoteOmissions in social interactions can exacerbate discriminatory remarks, suggesting passive complicity in prejudice.format_quote

Textbooks and other popular venues commonly present science as a progressive “brick-by-brick” acc... more Textbooks and other popular venues commonly present science as a progressive “brick-by-brick” accumulation of knowledge and facts. Despite its hallowed history and familiar ring, this depiction is nowadays rejected by most specialists. Then why are books and articles, written by these same experts, actively promoting such a distorted characterization? The short answer is that no better alternative is available. There currently are two competing models of the scientific enterprise: reductionism and antireductionism. Neither provides an accurate depiction of the productive interaction between knowledge and ignorance, supplanting the old metaphor of the “wall” of knowledge. This book explores an original conception of the nature and advancement of science. The proposed shift brings attention to a prominent, albeit often neglected, construct—the black box—which underlies a well-oiled technique for incorporating a productive role of ignorance and failure into the acquisition of empirical...

Prediction, Explanation, and the “Toolbox” Problem

The Tools of Neuroscience Experiment

Once upon a time, in a land far away-well, not all that spatially or temporally distant, to tell ... more Once upon a time, in a land far away-well, not all that spatially or temporally distant, to tell you the truth, but that's how fairy tales go-there was a small ourishing country: the kingdom of Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science was governed by a monarch, King Hempel, who ruled by the covering-law model, a code affectionately referred to as "CLM." King Hempel was a fair, wise, and just leader. He viewed all his subjects as equals. The country was split in two, oft bickering, counties, Prediction and Explanation. But the law of the land, the CLM, treated both as two sides of the same coin. The entire kingdom lived in unity, simplicity, and harmony. Philosophy of Science, in a nutshell, was thriving and growing by the year. Alas, nothing lasts forever, not even in fables. One gloomy day, King Hempel was found mysteriously murdered as the rooster crowed the crack of dawn. The assassin had lured the king into a dark alley and mercilessly gored him with a agpole, before dissolving like a shadow. Things were never quite the same in good ole Philosophy of Science. After a period of mourning, incredulity, and intellectual turmoil, a new sovereign was nally found. The choice fell upon Sir Thomas McKuhn, who had been coyly plotting a revolution to be appointed Caesar. The paradigm shifted, as logic was no longer heralded as the sole canon of rationality. There was a new sheriff in town, Dr. van der Quine, who promoted a naturalistic attitude, drawing more attention to the details of scienti c practice. No more CLM. A new law of the land-the causal-mechanistic model, the notorious "CMM"-was enforced by General DeSalmon. The new leaders brought a breath of fresh air. Mechanism-driven "special" sciences, such as biology, neuroscience, and psychology, were now viewed as inherently distinct from mathematized, law-based, theory-driven physics. The old CLM was soon forgotten and became a relic of a bygone past, con ned to dusty textbooks. Stories recounting the glory days of King Hempel were sung around the camp re on chilly nights.

format_quotePhilosophers of science largely neglected prediction, focusing instead on descriptions and explanations framed in causal-mechanistic terms.format_quote

Counterfactual Reasoning in Molecular Medicine

Counterfactual reasoning is just as commonplace in scientific theory and practice as it is in our... more Counterfactual reasoning is just as commonplace in scientific theory and practice as it is in our ordinary lives. Understanding the significance of such inferences requires paying close attention to the nature and foundations of conditionals, an important—albeit thorny—endeavor that philosophers of science typically (and happily) delegate to metaphysicians, philosophers of language, and linguists. This, I argue, is a mistake. The aim of this essay is to discuss the role of counterfactual reasoning in science, focusing specifically on molecular medicine. I suggest that subjunctive conditionals play a key part in the diagnosis and prognosis of molecular diseases and other pathological conditions. Yet, understanding the prominence of these sui generis statements in medical decision making requires some radical departures from traditional semantic analyses.

The Mind-Body Problem 3.0

This essay identifies two shifts in the conceptual evolution of the mindbody problem since it was... more This essay identifies two shifts in the conceptual evolution of the mindbody problem since it was molded into its modern form. The "mind-body problem 1.0" corresponds to Descartes' ontological question: what are minds and how are they related to bodies? The "mind-body problem 2.0" reflects the core issue underlying much discussion of brains and minds in the twentieth century: can mental states be reduced to neural states? While both issues are no longer central to scientific research, the philosophy of mind ain't quite done yet. In an attempt to recast a classic discussion in a more contemporary guise, I present a "mind-body problem 3.0." In a slogan, this can be expressed as the question: how should we pursue psychology in the age of neuroscience?

Redundant Causality and Robustness

This essay examines the stabilizing effect of redundant causality. The first part argues that ine... more This essay examines the stabilizing effect of redundant causality. The first part argues that inert, preempted backups play an irreducibly causal role in the sciences by making systems counterfactual-supporting and robust. The second part develops a notion of redundant causal process, which combines the insights of differencemaking theories of causation with a process-based or mechanistic perspective.

Bridge Laws and the Psycho-Neural Interface ∗ †

Recent advancements in the brain sciences have enabled researchers to determine, with increasing ... more Recent advancements in the brain sciences have enabled researchers to determine, with increasing accuracy, patterns and locations of neural activation associated with various psychological functions. These techniques have revived a longstanding debate regarding the relation between the mind and the brain: while many authors now claim that neuroscientific data can be used to advance our theories of higher cognition, others defend the so-called ‘autonomy’ of psychology. Settling this significant question requires understanding the nature of the bridge laws used at the psycho-neural interface. While these laws have been the topic of extensive discussion, such debates have mostly focused on a particular type of link: reductive laws. Reductive laws are problematic: they face notorious philosophical objections and they are too scarce to substantiate current research at the interface of psychology and neuroscience. The aim of this article is to provide a systematic analysis of a different ...

Mechanistic Explanations and Deliberate Misrepresentations

Proceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2020

The philosophy of mechanisms has developed rapidly during the last 30 years. As mechanisms-based ... more The philosophy of mechanisms has developed rapidly during the last 30 years. As mechanisms-based explanations (MBEs) are often seen as an alternative to nomological, law-based explanations, MBEs could be relevant in IS. We begin by offering a short history of mechanistic philosophy and set out to clarify the contemporary landscape. We then suggest that mechanistic models provide an alternative to variance and process models in IS. Finally, we highlight how MBEs typically contain deliberate misrepresentations. Although MBEs have recently been advocated as critical realist (CR) accounts in IS, idealizations (deliberate misrepresentations) seem to violate some fundamental tenets of CR and research method principles for CR. Idealizations in MBEs, therefore, may risk being regarded as flawed in IS. If it turns out that CR cannot account for idealizations, naturalism can, and it does so without extra-philosophical baggage.

Rethinking ageing: introduction

History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences

Causation vs. Causal Explanation: Which Is More Fundamental?

Foundations of Science

This essay examines the relation between causation and causal explanation. It distinguishes two p... more This essay examines the relation between causation and causal explanation. It distinguishes two prominent roles that causes play within the sciences. On the one hand, causes may work as metaphysical posits. From this standpoint, mainstream in contemporary philosophy, causation provides the 'raw material' for explanation. On the other hand, causes may be conceived as explanatory postulates, theoretical hypotheses lacking any substantial ontological commitment. This unduly neglected distinction provides the conceptual resources to revisit longstanding philosophical issues, such as overdetermination and causal pluralism. It also inspires a provocative reframing of Russell's famous, if notoriously elusive, remarks on the nature of causation.

Pluralism is the Answer! What is the Question?

Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology

This essay provides a critical assessment of species pluralism, a popular strategy to explain the... more This essay provides a critical assessment of species pluralism, a popular strategy to explain the discordance characterizing contemporary systematics. Specifically, my aim is to present and scrutinize species pluralism, and to discuss whether it provides a fruitful concept in biology. The article begins by distinguishing two independent theses often associated with pluralism: 'heterogeneity' and 'theory dependence.' Next, it examines how these theses have been developed in the scientific and philosophical literature. I conclude by suggesting that the overarching expression 'species pluralism' be dropped in favor of more perspicuous labels.

format_quoteSpecies pluralism posits heterogeneity, arguing that multiple species concepts reflect nature's diversity, essential for biological classification.format_quote

Remarks on Emergence and Dynamic Interactions

Southwest Philosophy Review

Of Thoughts and Tunes: Music and Performance on Both Sides of the Atlantic

Journal of European Popular Culture

This article is the product of an 'unorthodox' interdisciplinary collaboration between a philosop... more This article is the product of an 'unorthodox' interdisciplinary collaboration between a philosopher and a musician. The starting point is the nature of jazz performance. Jazz is a quintessential American form of artistic expression. What are some of the challenges and opportunities confronting an American musician performing in Europe, a continent with a rich-and, on the surface, rather different musical tradition? This rapidly brings us to more general questions about the contextualization of music. What affects musical performance? Does it change depending on the venue? Do audiences vary across different cultures? This leads us to the relation between music and our contemporary society. Recent technological developments have clearly affected not just the production, but also the fruition of music. Some changes are surely welcome. But does progress come at a cost? What do we gain by using new technology and what do we lose? The final exchanges of our conversation invite us to question the future of music, the performing arts and the humanities in general. The fundamental underlying issue becomes: what can we, as educators, do to promote the creativity, originality and innovativeness of the bright young minds that will shape the future?

format_quoteThe conversation questions how technology shapes creativity in music, impacting education and innovation in the arts.format_quote

An Ecological Approach to Modeling Disability

Bioethics, Jan 14, 2018

This article develops an analysis of disability according to which disabling conditions are prope... more This article develops an analysis of disability according to which disabling conditions are properties of organisms embedded in sets of environments. We begin by presenting the three mainstream accounts of disability-the medical, social, and interactionist models-and rehearsing some known limitations. We argue that, because of their primary focus on etiology, all three models share, more or less implicitly, a problematic assumption. This is the tenet that disabilities are individual properties. The second part of the essay presents an "ecological" interpretation of disability, inspired by classic and contemporary research on biological niches. Our proposal preserves many insights underlying extant approaches, while allowing a more accurate characterization of the nature and experience of disability. We conclude by drawing some general implications of our analysis.

The Future of Cognitive Neuroscience? Reverse Inference in Focus

Philosophy Compass

This article presents and discusses one of the most prominent inferential strategies currently em... more This article presents and discusses one of the most prominent inferential strategies currently employed in cognitive neuropsychology, namely, reverse inference. Simply put, this is the practice of inferring, in the context of experimental tasks, the engagement of cognitive processes from locations or patterns of neural activation. This technique is notoriously controversial because, critics argue, it presupposes the problematic assumption that neural areas are functionally selective. We proceed as follows. We begin by introducing the basic structure of traditional 'location?based' reverse inference (§1) and discuss the influential lack of selectivity objection (§2). Next, we rehearse various ways of responding to this challenge and provide some reasons for cautious optimism (§3). The second part of the essay presents a more recent development: 'pattern?decoding reverse inference' (§4). This inferential strategy, we maintain, provides an even more convincing response to the lack of selectivity charge. Due to this and other methodological advantages, it is now a prominent component in the toolbox of cognitive neuropsychology (§5). Finally, we conclude by drawing some implications for philosophy of science and philosophy of mind (§6). * The authors would like to express their gratitude to Edouard Machery and to an anonymous reviewer for constructive comments on various versions of this article.

Can there be science without philosophy?

Nephrology, dialysis, transplantation : official publication of the European Dialysis and Transplant Association - European Renal Association, Dec 1, 2016

Over the last few decades, philosophy has gained an increasingly bad reputation among working sci... more Over the last few decades, philosophy has gained an increasingly bad reputation among working scientists. Prominent researchers have suggested, in various forms and degrees of mockery, that philosophy has little or nothing positive to contribute to science. This essay provides a response to these allegations. We begin by examining, and ultimately questioning, an influential argument purporting to undermine the significance of a philosophical approach to science. Next, we offer some biomedical examples where philosophical speculation plays a prominent role. We conclude by arguing that, when understood in the appropriate context, philosophical reflection is an important-indeed, integral-ingredient of healthy scientific inquiry.

Causation and Explanation in Molecular Developmental Biology

Causality at the dawn of the ‘omics’ era in medicine and in nephrology

Nephrology Dialysis Transplantation, 2016

Causality is a core concept in medicine. The quantitative determinacy characterizing today's biom... more Causality is a core concept in medicine. The quantitative determinacy characterizing today's biomedical science is unprecedented. The assessment of causal relations in human diseases is evolving, and it is therefore fundamental to keep up with the steady pace of theoretical and technological advancements. The exact specification of all causes of pathologies at the individual level, precision medicine, is expected to allow the complete eradication of disease. In this article, we discuss the various conceptualizations of causation that are at play in the context of randomized clinical trials and observational studies. Genomics, proteomics, metabolomics and epigenetics can now produce the precise knowledge we need for 21st century medicine. New conceptions of causality are needed to form the basis of the new precision medicine.

format_quoteContemporary medicine prioritizes individual patient causal relations over population-level observations, challenging traditional empiricism.format_quote

The Idealization of Causation in Mechanistic Explanation

Philosophy of Science, 2015

Causal relations among components and activities are intentionally misrepresented in mechanistic ... more Causal relations among components and activities are intentionally misrepresented in mechanistic explanations found routinely across the life sciences. Since several mechanists explicitly advocate accurately representing factors that make a difference to the outcome, these idealizations conflict with the stated rationale for mechanistic explanation. We argue that these idealizations signal an overlooked feature of reasoning in molecular and cell biology-mechanistic explanations do not occur in isolation-and suggest that explanatory practices within the mechanistic tradition share commonalities with model-based approaches prevalent in population biology. * Acknowledgements: Both authors contributed equally to this work. Earlier versions were presented at the 2014 Philosophy of Biology at Madison workshop and the 2014 PSA Biennial Meeting in Chicago. We are grateful to both audiences and to an anonymous reviewer for helpful feedback.

Unificatory Explanation

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2015

Philosophers have traditionally addressed the issue of scientific unification in terms of theoret... more Philosophers have traditionally addressed the issue of scientific unification in terms of theoretical reduction. Reductive models, however, cannot explain the occurrence of unification in areas of science where successful reductions are hard to find. The goal of this essay is to analyze a concrete example of integration in biology-the developmental synthesis-and to generalize it into a model of scientific unification, according to which two fields are in the process of being unified when they become explanatorily relevant for each other. I conclude by suggesting that this methodological conception of unity, which is independent of the debate on the metaphysical foundations of science, is closely connected to the notion of interdisciplinarity. 2 But see Sklar ([1993]) for some difficulties and qualifications