The secret π-calculus extends the π-calculus by adding an hide operator that permits to declare c... more The secret π-calculus extends the π-calculus by adding an hide operator that permits to declare channels as secret. The main aim is confidentiality, which is gained by restricting the access of the object of the communication. Communication channels protected by hide are more secure since they have static scope and do not allow the context's interaction, and can be implemented as dedicated channels. In this paper, we present static semantics of secret channel abstractions by introducing a type system that considers two type modalities for channels (scope): static and dynamic. We show that secret π-calculus channels protected by hide can be represented in the π-calculus by prescribing a static type modality. We illustrate the feasibility of our approach by introducing a security API for message-passing communication which works for a standard (π-calculus) middleware while featuring secret channels. Interestingly, we just require the programmer to declare which channels are meant to be secret, leaving the burden of managing the security type abstractions to the API compiler.
Developing the Semantic Web via the Resolution of Meaning Ambiguities
Springer eBooks, 2022
Chatgpt Prospective Student at Medical School
SSRN Electronic Journal
Alan Turing and the Cognitive Foundation of the Concept of Algorithm
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research), Mar 24, 2023
Mathematical Dynamical Systems and Computational Systems
Computation, Dynamics, and Cognition
The main thesis of this chapter is that a dynamical viewpoint allows us to better understand some... more The main thesis of this chapter is that a dynamical viewpoint allows us to better understand some important foundational issues of computation theory. Effective procedures are traditionally studied from two different but complementary points of view. The first approach is concerned with individuating those numeric functions that are effectively calculable. This approach reached its systematization with the theory of the recursive functions (Gödel, Church Kleene).This theory is not directly concerned with computing devices or computations. Rather, the effective calculability of a recursive function is guaranteed by the algorithmic nature of its definition. In contrast, the second approach focuses on a family of abstract mechanisms, which are then typically used to compute or recognize numeric functions, sets of numbers, or numbers. These devices can be divided into two broad categories: automata or machines (Turing and Post), and systems of rules for symbol manipulation (Post). The m...
Cognitive Systems and the Scientific Explanation of Cognition
Computation, Dynamics, and Cognition
A cognitive system is any real system that has some cognitive property. Therefore, cognitive syst... more A cognitive system is any real system that has some cognitive property. Therefore, cognitive systems are a special type of K-systems (see chapter 3, section 3). Note that this definition includes both natural systems such as humans and other animals, and artificial devices such as robots, implementations of AI (artificial intelligence) programs, some implementations of neural networks, etc. Focusing on what all cognitive systems have in common, we can state a very general but nonetheless interesting thesis: All cognitive systems are dynamical systems. Section 2 explains what this thesis means and why it is (relatively) uncontroversial. It will become clear that this thesis is a basic methodological assumption that underlies practically all current research in cognitive science. The goal of section 3 is to contrast two styles of scientific explanation of cognition: computational and dynamical. Computational explanations are characterized by the use of concepts drawn from computation ...
Galilean Models and Explanations
Computation, Dynamics, and Cognition
Given a natural kind K (for example, mechanical, chemical, biological, cognitive, etc.), I say th... more Given a natural kind K (for example, mechanical, chemical, biological, cognitive, etc.), I say that a real system is a K -system if and only if it has some K-property. The main goal of this chapter is to analyze a particular type of scientific explanation, which I call a Galilean explanation. This analysis is based on a more general view of scientific explanation, according to which scientific explanations are solutions of problems of a special type. This type of problem essentially consists of two parts: first, considering a certain K-system and, second, setting the goal of scientifically explaining some K -property of this system. A scientific explanation of a K -property of a K -system is an explanation obtained by studying a model of the K -system, and the type of scientific explanation we construct in general depends on the type of model that we are going to study. Galilean explanations are a particular type of scientific explanations, for they are based on the study of models ...
Appendix: Consistency of the Axiomatic Theory
supervenience; hard problem; explanatory gap; zombie; logical possibility; conceivability; ontolo... more supervenience; hard problem; explanatory gap; zombie; logical possibility; conceivability; ontology; physicalism; materialism; dualism; qualia; concept of consciousness On the basis of the distinction between phenomenal and psychological consciousness, I propose a formal framework where we can express and analyze a strong form of Chalmers ’ zombie argument. By employing such formal framework, I make clear the kind of problem that this argument poses to anyone who is willing to (i) construct a theory of phenomenal consciousness and (ii) maintain the reductive explainability of phenomenal consciousness by physics. I then extend such formal framework so as to provide a theory of consciousness in axiomatized form. The explanation of phenomenal consciousness provided by this theory is by no means inconsistent with a physicalist perspective. In fact, once the theory is supplemented with a minimal physicalist assumption, we can prove the 1 reductive explainability of phenomenal consciousne...
Model Types and Explanatory Styles in Cognitive Theories
Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology, 2019
In this paper we argue that the debate between representational and anti-representational cogniti... more In this paper we argue that the debate between representational and anti-representational cognitive theories cannot be reduced to a difference between the types of model respectively employed. We show that, on the one side, models standardly used in representational theories, such as computational ones, can be analyzed in the context of dynamical systems theory and, on the other, non-representational theories such as Gibson’s ecological psychology can be formalized with the use of computational models. Given these considerations, we propose that the true conceptual difference between representational and anti-representational cognitive descriptions should be characterized in terms of style of explanation, which indicates the particular stance taken by a theory with respect to its explanatory target.
Filosofia-Matematica andata e ritorno
[This presentation is also available on ResearchGate at https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.30704.588... more [This presentation is also available on ResearchGate at https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.30704.58883] Uno dei caratteri più tipici della filosofia, che la distingue dalla scienza, è l'aspirazione a produrre rappresentazioni sintetiche di ampi settori della realtà, mediante concetti che ne colgano gli elementi essenziali. L'analisi, la precisazione e la chiarificazione concettuale sono quindi attività centrali e imprescindibili di ogni indagine filosofica. È merito di Carnap aver riconosciuto che tali attività non possono veramente compiersi se non riconducendo concetti intuitivi e inesatti (explicanda) a corrispettivi esatti (explicata), formulati all'interno di opportune teorie formali. Tuttavia, la predilezione neopositivista per una concezione meta-matematica delle teorie formali ha sviato tale riconoscimento dal suo contenuto più significativo. Se, al contrario, le teorie formali sono intese in senso matematico, ovvero come teorie assiomatizzate all'interno della teoria degli insiemi mediante definizioni di predicati teorici, si apre una prospettiva nuova e particolarmente avvincente. Secondo questa prospettiva, infatti, ciascuna teoria matematica risulta essa stessa l’explicatum di un ben preciso explicandum principale, mentre le ulteriori definizioni della teoria risultano anch'esse esplicazioni di altri concetti, collegati all'explicandum principale. È inoltre interessante notare il diverso status della definizione di un predicato teorico rispetto alle altre definizioni di una teoria matematica. La definizione base di una teoria, ovvero la definizione del suo predicato teorico, risulta infatti una definizione per genere e specie, cosa che invece non si verifica per le altre definizioni. Ciò suggerisce di interpretare il concetto corrispondente al predicato teorico come un'essenza da cui gli altri concetti dipendono. Infine, è suggestivo analizzare i rapporti di dipendenza fra i diversi concetti di una teoria matematica e il modo in cui essi sono via via introdotti, secondo un ordine di generalità decrescente (dall'astratto al concreto) e mediante processi generativi che, forse, potrebbero essere detti dialettici.
Mente e macchine: dalla filosofia della mente all'Intelligenza Artificiale
Slides for an invited lecture al Liceo Siotto, Cagliari, 2019-11-13. Also available on ResearchGa... more Slides for an invited lecture al Liceo Siotto, Cagliari, 2019-11-13. Also available on ResearchGate at <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.24190.31042/1>.
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