Books by Julien A. Deonna
Desires matter. What are desires? Many believe that desire is a motivational state: desiring is b... more Desires matter. What are desires? Many believe that desire is a motivational state: desiring is being disposed to act. This conception aligns with the functionalist approach to desire and the standard account of desire's role in explaining action. According to a second influential approach, however, desire is first and foremost an evaluation: desiring is representing something as good. After all, we seem to desire things under the guise of the good. Which understanding of desire is more accurate? Is the guise of the good even right to assume? Should we adopt an alternative picture that emphasizes desire's deontic nature? What do neuroscientific studies suggest? Essays in the first section of the volume are devoted to these questions, and to the puzzle of desire's essence. In the second part of the volume, essays investigate some implications that the various conceptions of desire have on a number of fundamental issues. For example, why are inconsistent desires problematic? What is desire's role in practical deliberation? How do we know what we want? This volume will contribute to the emergence of a fruitful debate on a neglected, albeit crucial, dimension of the mind.
Le plaisir est-il une valeur ? La vertu requiert-elle l’exercice de la raison ? Le goût est-il ob... more Le plaisir est-il une valeur ? La vertu requiert-elle l’exercice de la raison ? Le goût est-il objectif ? Peut-on mettre un prix à la vie d’une personne ? Une chose peut-elle être drôle si elle ne fait rire personne ? En quoi l’amitié diffère-t-elle de l’amour ? Est-il immoral d’être impartial ? L’esclave est-il libre si son maître bienveillant n’interfère jamais dans ses choix ? Voici quelques unes des questions abordées dans ce Petit Traité des valeurs, composé de trente-cinq essais brefs et originaux consacrés à la présentation d’une notion particulière.
Si nous invoquons sans cesse notre attachement à certaines valeurs, leur existence ne va néanmoins pas de soi. Les valeurs ne sont-elles que le reflet de nos attitudes ? À l’inverse, les choses pourraient-elles être belles, utiles, intéressantes ou plaisantes en l’absence de quiconque pour les apprécier ou en faire l’expérience ?
Chaque valeur retenue fait l’objet d’une étude menée par un philosophe qui s’efforce d’en déployer le sens et les enjeux et de présenter l’attrait des controverses qu’elle soulève.
The Emotions: a Philosophical Introduction
"The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of th... more "The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us?
The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics:
the diversity and unity of the emotions
the relations between emotion, belief and desire
the nature of values
the relations between emotions and perceptions
emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes
the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge
the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits.
Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences."
See Review here: http://www.disputatio.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Smith-Joel_Are-Emotions-Embodied-Evaluative-Attitudes.pdf
In Defense of Shame: the Faces of an Emotion
"Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in discipli... more "Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the nature of shame and why are claims regarding its social nature and moral standing interesting and important? Do they tell us anything worthwhile about the value of shame and its potential legal and political applications?
In this book, Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original philosophical account of shame aimed at answering these questions. The book begins with a detailed examination of the evidence and arguments that are taken to support what they call the two dogmas about shame: its alleged social nature and its morally dubious character. Their analysis is conducted against the backdrop of a novel account of shame and ultimately leads to the rejection of these two dogmas. On this account, shame involves a specific form of negative evaluation that the subject takes towards herself: a verdict of incapacity with regard to values to which she is attached. One central virtue of the account resides in the subtle manner it clarifies the ways in which the subject's identity is at stake in shame, thus shedding light on many aspects of this complex emotion and allowing for a sophisticated understanding of its moral significance.
This philosophical account of shame engages with all the current debates on shame as they are conducted within disciplines as varied as ethics, moral, experimental, developmental and evolutionary psychology, anthropology, legal studies, feminist studies, politics and public policy."
Review: http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/42308-in-defense-of-shame-the-faces-of-an-emotion/
Qu'est-ce qu'une émotion?
Cet ouvrage répond à la question « Qu’est-ce qu’une émotion? » à la lumière des débats les plus c... more Cet ouvrage répond à la question « Qu’est-ce qu’une émotion? » à la lumière des débats les plus contemporains en philosophie des émotions tout en s’appuyant sur les recherches empiriques les plus récentes au sujet de l’affect. Une fois exposée la manière dont les émotions se distinguent d’autres phénomènes affectifs tels que les humeurs, les sentiments et les dispositions affectives, l’étude propose une élucidation originale du problème majeur auquel fait face aujourd’hui la philosophie des émotions : comment comprendre la spécificité de l’intentionnalité affective? A travers une discussion à la fois fouillée et didactique des théories contemporaines les plus abouties concernant les relations entre émotion et désir d’une part, et entre émotion et valeur d’autre part, les auteurs défendent l’idée selon laquelle le corps ressenti peut fonctionner comme présentation intentionnelle en première personne d’un monde de valeurs.
Papers by Julien A. Deonna
I am sad, and youwatching mecan feel this. What does becoming aware of someone else's emotions co... more I am sad, and youwatching mecan feel this. What does becoming aware of someone else's emotions consist of? In this dissertation, I articulate and defend the claim that other people's emotions are, in the ordinary case, transparent to us. By this I mean that, on the whole, they are not more difficult or more problematic to become aware of in the case of others than in our own casethe transparency intuition. I argue for this claim against a purported asymmetry, existing at many different levels, between feeling one's own emotions and feeling other people's emotions, one alleged difference being that one does not experience other people's emotions as if they were our ownthe ownership intuition. First, I set up the problem raised by these (supposedly) incompatible claims in the context of early phenomenalist theories of empathy, and suggest a way to reconcile them with respect to our awareness of sensations. Second, having examined some crucial aspects of the nature of the emotions and the way they (may) differ from sensations, I apply the suggestion made concerning the latter to the case of the former, and argue that both the transparency intuition and ownership intuition can be met if we distinguish between different layers of emotional engagement with the world, and in particular, with other people. Third, in the context of the recent literature on mind-reading, I assess the manner in which my account of the awareness of the emotions in others and ourselves bears upon the question of our understanding of other people's emotions. Finally, I examine the impact of my account on the possibility of knowing about other people's emotions in the context of contemporary (externalist) epistemologies. My idea of philosophy is very much that of a collaborative endeavour (taking place mainly in public spaces) in which intuitions are probed and arguments put to the test. I have always had the privilege of having friends who would indulge me in this activity, and to all of them willing and unwilling interlocutors -I am more grateful that I can ever properly express. Friends, philosophers or otherwise, whom I wish to thank for the short or long hours of philosophical conversation I have had over the years, either related to this dissertation or on other philosophical matters, and who have influenced my thinking in ways I cannot describe, are:
The project of this book took shape in 2012 as we organized the conference The Nature of Desire a... more The project of this book took shape in 2012 as we organized the conference The Nature of Desire at the University of Geneva, which most of the contributors to this volume participated in. While Federico was writing his dissertation on this topic, it had become apparent that there was no serious contemporary debate on what desires are. Hence the conference. To our eyes and ears, it was a great success: the papers presented were challenging, exemplified very different perspectives, and revealed that there was much more to desire than lots of stale dogmas receiving cursory treatment in the literature. This naturally spurred us to collect the papers for a special volume and add a few more to the mix, forming an ensemble that would bring fresh insight and stimulate further explorations on the nature of desire. We were delighted that Oxford University Press shared our enthusiasm, and we feel elated today to finally have our desire for the finished product gratified.
Handbücher zur Sprach- und Kommunikationswissenschaft / Handbooks of Linguistics and Communication Science [HSK] 46/1
In this chapter, we start by spelling out three important features that distinguish expressives-u... more In this chapter, we start by spelling out three important features that distinguish expressives-utterances that express emotions and other affects-from descriptives, including those that describe emotions (Section 1). Drawing on recent insights from the philosophy of emotion and value (2), we show how these three features derive from the nature of affects, concentrating on emotions (3). We then spell out how theories of non-natural meaning and communication in the philosophy of language allow claims that expressives inherit their meaning from specificities of emotions-namely, from being felt, evaluative attitudes toward propositional or non-propositional contents (4). Supposing that utterances (1)-( ) and ( )-( ) respectively refer to the same phenomena, compare groups A and B.
Form Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements
[Review of:] Autism and the Development of Mind / R. Peter Hobson
Developmental Medicine & Child Neurology, 1996
Darker sides of guilt: The case of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
Desire has not been at the center of recent preoccupations in the philosophy of mind. Consequentl... more Desire has not been at the center of recent preoccupations in the philosophy of mind. Consequently, the literature settled into several dogmas. The first part of this introduction presents these dogmas and invites readers to scrutinize them. The main dogma is that desires are motivational states. This approach contrasts with the other dominant conception: desires are positive evaluations. But there are at least four other dogmas: the world should conform to our desires (world-tomind direction of fit), desires involve a positive evaluation (the "guise of the good"), we cannot desire what we think is actual (the "death of desire" principle), and, in neuroscience, the idea that the reward system is the key to understanding desire. The second part of the introduction summarizes the contributions to this volume. The hope is to contribute to the emergence of a fruitful debate on this neglected, albeit crucial, aspect of the mind.
Evolution, émotion et morale: les exemples de la honte et la culpabilité
La culpabilite est une emotion morale, la honte ne l'est pas. Cette idee, a quelques exceptio... more La culpabilite est une emotion morale, la honte ne l'est pas. Cette idee, a quelques exceptions notoires, traverse l'histoire de la theorisation de ces deux emotions. Dans cet article, apres une breve discussion de la notion d'« emotion morale », j'expose les raisons avancees en sa faveur et les rejette. Ma critique a deux volets distincts : (1) Elle consiste d'abord a rejeter les criteres qui militent en faveur d'une comprehension de la honte comme amorale et la culpabilite comme morale. Ces objections passent, comme nous le verrons, par un rejet des theses selon laquelle(a) la honte est de nature sociale et (b) qu'elle tend a engendrer des comportement anti-sociaux. Elle consiste ensuite a esquisser une morale personnelle de la honte et de la culpabilite qui illustre les limites des demarches contemporaines, notamment de la psychologie evolutionniste, qui concoivent l'ethique purement en termes du « vivre en commun » ou autrement dit purement en ter...
The Emotion of Being Moved
Shadows of the Soul, 2018
“That’s Deep!”: The Role of Being Moved and Feelings of Profundity in the Appreciation of Serious Narratives
The Palgrave Handbook of Affect Studies and Textual Criticism, 2017
Why do we enjoy sad and serious narratives? According to recent research in communication theory ... more Why do we enjoy sad and serious narratives? According to recent research in communication theory and media psychology, it is because such narratives provide us with an occasion to reflect on deep and meaningful truths about human lives. However, this “eudaimonic” appreciation of sad narratives is not purely cognitive. Here, we connect this literature to recent research in affective sciences on feelings of “being moved.” Drawing on both philosophical analysis and psychological data, we argue that, because it is elicited by the contemplation of important positive values, the positive emotion of “being moved” plays a major role in the “eudaimonic” appreciation of sad narratives. Not only is it part of the pleasure they give us, but it leads us to reflect deeper about them.
On the Good that Moves Us
The Monist, 2020
In this article, I provide a detailed characterization of being moved, which I claim is a distinc... more In this article, I provide a detailed characterization of being moved, which I claim is a distinct emotion. Being moved is the experience of being struck by the goodness of some specific positive value being exemplified. I start by expounding this account. Next, I discuss three issues that have emerged in the literature regarding it. These concern respectively the valence of being moved, the scope of the values that may constitute its particular objects, and the cognitive sophistication required for experiencing it. My main contention is that when we understand that the presence of the specific positive value must be apprehended as finally, importantly, and impersonally good to trigger being moved, these issues do not arise.
Les animaux ont-ils des émotions?
Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 2013
"In this article, I ask whether it is possible to reconcile the claim that animals have emot... more "In this article, I ask whether it is possible to reconcile the claim that animals have emotions with the attractive and widespread idea that emotions are relations between a subject and a value. I start by explaining that the challenge requires that we avoid ascribing to animals cognitive capacities that are too complex and I close by putting forward a theory which, through its specific articulation of the relation between emotion and value, is ideally placed to meet this challenge. Before that, I present the grounds for the claim that emotions are forms of evaluations. I stress the fact that!this idea has traditionally led to a theory of emotions according to which emotions are nothing but judgments of value, the consequence being that animals are construed as devoid of emotions. I then consider whether a particular theory – the perceptual theory – is apt to resolve the problem. According to it, emotions constitute experiences of evaluative properties which could be enjoyed by members of many different species. Given that there are compelling reasons to reject this theory, I finally present an original alternative – the attitudinal theory of emotions – that has the virtue, among others, of being able to account for animal emotions."
The tangled web of agency
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2018
We characterize Doris's anti-reflectivist, collaborativist, valuational theory along two dime... more We characterize Doris's anti-reflectivist, collaborativist, valuational theory along two dimensions. The first dimension is social entanglement, according to which cognition, agency, and selves are socially embedded. The second dimension is disentanglement, the valuational element of the theory that licenses the anchoring of agency and responsibility in distinct actors. We then present an issue for the account: the problem of bad company.
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Books by Julien A. Deonna
Si nous invoquons sans cesse notre attachement à certaines valeurs, leur existence ne va néanmoins pas de soi. Les valeurs ne sont-elles que le reflet de nos attitudes ? À l’inverse, les choses pourraient-elles être belles, utiles, intéressantes ou plaisantes en l’absence de quiconque pour les apprécier ou en faire l’expérience ?
Chaque valeur retenue fait l’objet d’une étude menée par un philosophe qui s’efforce d’en déployer le sens et les enjeux et de présenter l’attrait des controverses qu’elle soulève.
The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics:
the diversity and unity of the emotions
the relations between emotion, belief and desire
the nature of values
the relations between emotions and perceptions
emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes
the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge
the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits.
Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences."
See Review here: http://www.disputatio.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Smith-Joel_Are-Emotions-Embodied-Evaluative-Attitudes.pdf
In this book, Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original philosophical account of shame aimed at answering these questions. The book begins with a detailed examination of the evidence and arguments that are taken to support what they call the two dogmas about shame: its alleged social nature and its morally dubious character. Their analysis is conducted against the backdrop of a novel account of shame and ultimately leads to the rejection of these two dogmas. On this account, shame involves a specific form of negative evaluation that the subject takes towards herself: a verdict of incapacity with regard to values to which she is attached. One central virtue of the account resides in the subtle manner it clarifies the ways in which the subject's identity is at stake in shame, thus shedding light on many aspects of this complex emotion and allowing for a sophisticated understanding of its moral significance.
This philosophical account of shame engages with all the current debates on shame as they are conducted within disciplines as varied as ethics, moral, experimental, developmental and evolutionary psychology, anthropology, legal studies, feminist studies, politics and public policy."
Review: http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/42308-in-defense-of-shame-the-faces-of-an-emotion/
Papers by Julien A. Deonna