Papers by Eze Paez
Futures, 2021
Many sentient beings suffer serious harms due to a lack of moral consideration. Importantly, such... more Many sentient beings suffer serious harms due to a lack of moral consideration. Importantly, such harms could also occur to a potentially astronomical number of morally considerable future beings. This paper argues that, to prevent such existential risks, we should prioritise the strategy of expanding humanity’s moral circle to include, ideally, all sentient beings. We present empirical evidence that, at micro- and macro-levels of society, increased concern for members of some outlying groups facilitates concern for others. We argue that the perspective of moral circle expansion can reveal and clarify important issues in futures studies, particularly regarding animal ethics and artificial intelligence. While the case for moral circle expansion does not hinge on specific moral criteria, we focus on sentience as the most recommendable policy when deciding, as we do, under moral uncertainty. We also address various nuances of adjusting the moral circle, such as the risk of over-expansion.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2021
Most nonhuman animals live on the terms imposed on them by human beings. This condition of being ... more Most nonhuman animals live on the terms imposed on them by human beings. This condition of being under the mastery of another, or domination, is what republicanism identifies as political unfreedom. Yet there are several problems that must be solved in order to successfully extend republicanism to animals. Here I focus on the question of whether freedom can be a benefit for individuals without a free will. I argue that once we understand the grounds that make freedom a desirable property of choices, we can see how it is appropriate to predicate it of those made by any sentient agent.
Environmental Values, 2021
Most nonhuman animals live in the wild and it is probable that suffering predominates in their li... more Most nonhuman animals live in the wild and it is probable that suffering predominates in their lives due to natural events. Humans may at some point be able to engage in paradise engineering, or the modification of nature and animal organisms themselves to improve the well-being of wild animals. We may, in other words, make nature 'red in tooth and claw' no more. We argue that this creates a tension between environmental ethics and animal ethics which is likely insurmountable. First, concern for the environment can be compatible with helping individual wild animals but should see redesigning nature as morally impermissible. Second, if we are concerned with animal well-being, we may reject that we have a duty to help wild animals even to the point of redesigning nature, but we must nevertheless concede that it is permissible to do so under certain circumstances. We show how this permissibility can be derived from three animal rights views: Tom Regan's, a novel account inspired by Thomas Pogge and a libertarian approach to animal rights.
A Kantian ethics of paradise engineering
Analysis
Most sentient beings live in the wild and probably have net negative lives. Christine Korsgaard r... more Most sentient beings live in the wild and probably have net negative lives. Christine Korsgaard rejects the view that, if we could, we may engineer paradise: redesign nature and animal organisms so that they have the best possible existences. The genetic changes required would not be identity-preserving, thereby causing animals to cease to exist. I believe she is mistaken. First, on a sentientist Kantian theory, paradise engineering is permissible. Many harms are caused by non-sentient natural entities and processes. Moreover, sentient animals are essentially selves who can survive modifications compatible with their psychological persistence over time. Second, animals share with us in the common possession of the Earth. Just like human beings in need, they have a right to obtain the resources necessary for a reasonable life. Because of the prevalence of suffering in the wild, in order to satisfy that right we are required to reengineer nature.
Animal Sentience, 2019
It is very important that we clarify what we owe to nonhuman animals. To that end, we need a bett... more It is very important that we clarify what we owe to nonhuman animals. To that end, we need a better understanding of animal cognition and emotion. Marino & Merskin's target article is a welcome contribution to this project. Sheep, like most other animals, are sentient beings with interests of their own. It is wrong to discriminate against them based on species-membership or cognitive sophistication. We are morally required not to harm them, and to help them have the best possible lives, just as we would be in the case of human beings with similar interests. We must become the good shepherds, or stewards, of the other animals.
Animal Sentience, 2019
Chapman & Huffman argue that, because humans are neither unique nor superior to the other animals... more Chapman & Huffman argue that, because humans are neither unique nor superior to the other animals, cruelty to animals is not justified. Though I agree with their conclusion, I do not think their argument works. Many human beings do have some capacities that animals do not have and are greater in some respects, in the sense of having superior abilities. It is a better argument to deny that any of that is morally relevant. Sentience suffices for moral consideration, and for deriving a moral duty not to harm other animals and to assist them when they are in need.
It’s Splitsville. Why Animal Ethics and Environmental Ethics are Incompatible
American Behavioral Scientist, 2019
In this article, we claim that animal ethics and environmental ethics are incompatible ethical po... more In this article, we claim that animal ethics and environmental ethics are incompatible ethical positions. This is because they have incompatible criteria of moral considerability and they have, at least in some cases, incompatible normative implications regarding the interests of sentient individuals. Moreover, we claim that environmentalist views lead to an insurmountable dilemma between inconsistency and implausibility and fail to properly account for the importance of wild animal suffering. From this it follows not only that (a) we can endorse one of the two views but not both at the same time but also that (b) we have overriding reasons to reject environmentalism and endorse some animal ethics view.
Utilitas, 2019
Pedro Galvão claims that, on the ideal rule-consequentialist code, all sentient humans have right... more Pedro Galvão claims that, on the ideal rule-consequentialist code, all sentient humans have rights, whereas animals do not. Because agents are not impartial, total well-being would be lower if they were aware of a general disposition to harm in order to promote the good. Animals cannot be aware of that disposition, so it would be justified to harm them when that is best. Galvão also claims it is wrong to help an animal, even when optimific, if that harms another animal. I argue he is misguided. First, impartial agents would err in the moral calculus, causing falsely optimific harms. To compensate for that, all sentient individuals must have rights – though those protecting some humans may be stronger. Second, when helping is optimific, it is at least permitted. Moreover, since most sentient beings are wild animals with net negative lives, agents should be generally disposed to intervene in nature on their behalf.
Animal Sentience, 2017
Jonathan Birch proposes a criterion for the subjective scope of animal protection legislation. He... more Jonathan Birch proposes a criterion for the subjective scope of animal protection legislation. He says nothing about its material scope: which harmful practices it should regulate. I argue, first, that most moral views would agree that the worst forms of animal exploitation should be legally forbidden, even if there will inevitably be disagreement about some cases of animal experimentation. I also argue that, when feasible, there should be legal provisions to help wild animals.
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 2017
I critically examine Jan Deckers' position in Animal (De)liberation, where he defends two main vi... more I critically examine Jan Deckers' position in Animal (De)liberation, where he defends two main views. The first is 'qualified moral veganism': most humans have a duty to abstain from consuming animal products, even if there are circumstances in which doing so is justified. The author argues, on the one hand, from a pan-sentientist view which attributes sentience to all elementary entities and their compounds. Thus, all living things (such as animals and plants) have a capacity for positive and negative experiences. On the other hand, he develops a consequentialist view which assigns moral agents the unconditional duty to promote their own 'holistic health'. This is partly constituted by the agent's 'moral health', that is, her acting in a morally justified way. On Deckers' view, moral agents must care for the health of all living entities; give greater weight to the interests of organisms to which they are more closely biologically related; and respect the integrity of nature. Diets containing animal products have a very high negative health impact, because of how they affect the environment, human food security and the well-being of nonhuman animals. In addition, even though plants are sentient, they are likely less so than animals and their interests must be given less weight. Therefore, most humans should shift to a vegan diet. Deckers' second proposal is that a qualified ban on the consumption of animal products should be enacted. After discarding other alternative strategies, Deckers defends its feasibility relying on data obtained via a series of surveys. Though the argument partly succeeds in developing a coherent account accommodating the author's intuitions, I conclude that his ontological and normative frameworks remain too underdeveloped, his appeal to biological relatedness has implausible implications and the methodology he employs in defence of his political position is problematic.
Ng's strategic proposal seems to downplay the potential benefits of advocacy for wild animals and... more Ng's strategic proposal seems to downplay the potential benefits of advocacy for wild animals and omit what may be the most effective strategy to reduce the harms farmed animals suffer: vegan outreach.
Bioethics, Jul 2016
Emergency contraceptives may sometimes prevent implantation, thereby causing the death of the emb... more Emergency contraceptives may sometimes prevent implantation, thereby causing the death of the embryo. According to some positions contrary to abortion, because the embryo is a human animal, there are usually decisive moral reasons not to use them. In this article, I will show that objecting to the use of emergency contraceptives on those grounds is unjustified. If organisms are real existents, then according to the most plausible conception of what is required for a group of cells to compose one, the embryo cannot qualify as a single organism. On the other hand, if organisms are virtual objects, then whether or not the embryo qualifies as one is morally irrelevant. I conclude that even if those positions are right about the morality of abortion, they are not entitled to oppose the use of emergency contraceptives.
Due to a variety of natural causes, suffering predominates over well-being in the lives of wild a... more Due to a variety of natural causes, suffering predominates over well-being in the lives of wild animals. From an antispeciesist standpoint that considers the interests of all sentient individuals, we should intervene in nature to benefit these animals, provided that the expectable result is net positive. However, according to the environmentalist view the aim of benefiting wild animals cannot justify intervening in nature. In addition, harmful human interventions can sometimes be justified. This view assumes that (i) certain entities such as ecosystems or species have intrinsic value, and that (ii) at least sometimes these values are more important than nonhuman well-being. In this article I review the arguments in support of this view advanced by three prominent environmentalists (Albert Schweitzer, Paul W. Taylor and J. Baird Callicott) and show how none of them succeed at grounding these assumptions.
Dilemata. International Journal of Applied Ethics, 2015
Donald Marquis’s Future-of-Value Account of the wrongness of killing provides one of the stronges... more Donald Marquis’s Future-of-Value Account of the wrongness of killing provides one of the strongest arguments against the permissibility of abortion. According to his argument, we have very strong reasons against abortion when killing a foetus deprives it of a valuable future. Since Marquis assumes that we are essentially human animals who begin to exist very early in pregnancy, these reasons apply from a very short time after conception. In this article I will argue that we need not accept this ontological premise and that, instead, we may embrace a Lockean view about what we essentially are. I will show how, then, it is possible to reformulate Marquis’s argument in a way that allows us to infer that it is not until late in pregnancy that the foetus’s valuable future can give us reasons against killing it.
Relations, vol. 3 (1), May 2015
Reply to Stijn Bruers' ‘The Predation and Procreation Problems: Persistent Intuitions Gone Wild’ ... more Reply to Stijn Bruers' ‘The Predation and Procreation Problems: Persistent Intuitions Gone Wild’ [2015. Relations, vol. 3 (1)]. There he presents an axiology which includes well-being and biodiversity. On his account, however, the latter has much more importance than the former. Tremendous gains in well-being are proscribed when they can only be obtained through a great loss in biodiversity. That is why we should not phase out predation by genetically reprogramming predators. I argue that, even if we value biodiversity, it cannot be that important. This is shown, first, by considering the results of Bruers’ account regarding the sacrifice of both nonhuman and human interests. Second, I suggest how rejecting Bruers’ view on biodiversity has acceptable implications regarding his two other worries, r-selection and the inadvertent killing of sentient invertebrates.
Relations 3 (1), May 2015
Studies about the moral consideration of nonhuman animals have experienced a tremendous developme... more Studies about the moral consideration of nonhuman animals have experienced a tremendous development in the last decade. An important topic which is recently receiving increasing attention is the idea that we may have reasons not only to abstain from harming wild animals but also to help those in need. Life in the wild is far from being idyllic: wild animals undergo systematic harms on a daily basis, due to intra and interspecific aggressions (predation, parasitism) and other natural causes (e.g. starvation, disease, harsh weather conditions). Though it is usually accepted that we have no obligation to prevent or to reduce the occurrence of these harmful states of affairs, if the interests of nonhuman animals are morally relevant at all, it seems that the interests of animals living in the wild should also be taken into account in moral deliberation. This number will be dedicated to addressing in detail this vastly unexplored issue, challenging life in the wild as a “flat moral landscape”.
Revista de Bioética y Derecho 32, 2014: 82-90
In this article, we will challenge two common assumptions regarding the relation between anthropo... more In this article, we will challenge two common assumptions regarding the relation between anthropocentrism and speciesism. The first assumption is that anthropocentrism and speciesism are equivalent concepts. However, there are clear counterexamples of non-anthropocentric speciesism, that is, cases in which there is a preferential consideration of members of a certain nonhuman species over the members of other nonhuman species. The second assumption is the inevitability of anthropocentrism, which would supposedly justify speciesism. Nevertheless, this justificatory attempt is based on a fatal ambiguity between epistemic and moral anthropocentrism. Once this ambiguity is dissolved we will show how moral anthropocentrism does not follow from epistemic anthropocentrism and that any attempt to justify speciesism from epistemic anthropocentrism is deeply unwarranted. Finally, we will conclude that both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric forms of speciesism are unjustified.
Télos, 2014
In this article I elaborate upon four different categories of practical reasons and the possible ... more In this article I elaborate upon four different categories of practical reasons and the possible combinations they admit. These are explained by appeal to the distinct structure of each of the four different ways in which the obtainment of a state of affairs can be valuable. First, I explain the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative values. Second, I distinguish between person-affecting and impersonal values. The combination of these categories produces six possible ways in which the obtainment of a state of affairs can be valuable —four basic and two derived. It also shows that it is not possible for something to be at the same time both agent-neutrally and agent-relatively valuable.
Book Chapters by Eze Paez
Why Environmentalism Cannot Beat Denialism. An Antispeciesist Approach to the Ethics of Climate Change
Núria Almirón and Jordi Xifra (ed.), 'Climate Change Denial and Public Relations'. London: Routledge, 2019
DARDENNE, E., GIROUX, V. AND UTRIA, E. (2017). Peter Singer et la libération animale. Quarante ans plus tard. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Renne
Peter Singer has transitioned from a partially preferentialist to a fully hedonistic version of u... more Peter Singer has transitioned from a partially preferentialist to a fully hedonistic version of utilitarianism. That change has prompted a revision of his views about the death of nonhuman animals. Where he previously claimed that only individuals who could project themselves into the future (most humans and some nonhumans) could be harmed by death and had an interest in living, he now concedes that death is bad for all sentient individuals with a future of net positive experiences. Singer, however, has not yet developed two significant issues: whether the prudential value of an individual's future must be assessed in a time-neutral or in a time-relative way; and whether our reasons not to kill an individual are given by said prudential value or by the value of her future impersonally conceived. In this contribution, I argue that Singer must opt for a time-neutral account and an impersonal view of the badness of death. Thus, our reasons not to kill nonhuman animals, and to prevent them from dying, are as strong as the ones against killing typical human adults in similar circumstances. Finally, I explore the implications of this position for our obligations regarding animals under human exploitation and those living in the wild.
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Papers by Eze Paez
Book Chapters by Eze Paez