Key Obstacles to Supplying Military Aid to Ukraine

🔔 𝐆𝐞𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐧 𝐌𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐀𝐭𝐭𝐚𝐜𝐡𝐞́: 𝐔𝐬𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐆𝐞𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐧 𝐚𝐫𝐦𝐬 𝐢𝐧 𝐔𝐤𝐫𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐞 𝐡𝐚𝐬 𝐛𝐞𝐞𝐧 "𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐨𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐬𝐨𝐛𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐠" A confidential German military report, obtained by NDR, WDR, and Süddeutsche Zeitung, paints a stark picture of German-supplied weapon systems on the Ukrainian battlefield. 🔹 Key findings: 🔧 PzH 2000 howitzer: Extremely high technical vulnerability — "its suitability is questioned." 🛡️ Leopard 2A6 tank: Very expensive to repair and cannot be repaired at the front due to drone threats. ⚙️ Leopard 1A5 tank: Reliable, but with weak armor, relegated mostly to artillery roles. 🛡️ IRIS-T air defense: Effective, but ammunition costs are prohibitively high. 🛡️ Patriot missile defense: Technically excellent — but logistically crippled due to outdated carrier vehicles and no spare parts supply. 🔹 Better performers: ✔️ Older "obsolete" systems like the Gepard anti-aircraft gun and Marder infantry fighting vehicle performed far better under Ukrainian conditions. 🔹 Operational realities: 📦 Logistics challenges — repairs are slowed by the long distance between the front and rear maintenance hubs (even Rheinmetall sites). 🧠 Ukrainian forces have less experience with Western systems compared to German expectations. 🌍 Conditions in Ukraine are far harsher than what German planners expect for a European battlefield. 🌍 𝐖𝐡𝐲 𝐢𝐭 𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐬: ✔️ Modern Western weaponry often struggles under the extreme pressures of drone-saturated, high-intensity warfare. ✔️ "Old tech" with simplicity, ruggedness, and easy field maintenance is proving crucial. ✔️ Future defense planning must consider combat environment realities, not just laboratory specifications. 🎯 The war in Ukraine is not just a battlefield — it is a crucible revealing what modern armies can (and cannot) rely on. #Ukraine #Germany #DefenseIndustry #Leopard2 #PzH2000 #Gepard #Marder #ModernWarfare #MilitaryLogistics #DefenseLessons #Bundeswehr

"Ukraine has not failed; it's the West that has failed strategically in committing to Ukraine's success." RFU's analysis of interview with Retired US Army LTG Ben Hodges, former Commander US Army Europe 1. Strategic Failure of the West: LTG Hodges emphasizes that the failure lies with the West, not Ukraine. The West has failed strategically by not committing to Ukraine's success and not delivering crucial capabilities in a timely manner. 2. Lack of Commitment: He highlights the absence of a clear commitment from the West to Ukraine's victory, and points out that wavering and failure to express a strong desire for Ukraine to win provide an opportunity for the Kremlin to exploit Western fatigue. 3. Equipment Delay: LTG Hodges identifies the delayed delivery of key equipment, such as F-16s, as a critical mistake. The lack of urgency in providing essential capabilities has hindered the effectiveness of the Ukrainian counter-offensive. 4. Focus on Axes vs. Capabilities: While discussions about the direction of the Ukrainian offensive suggest potential mistakes, Hodges redirects the focus to the fundamental issue—the lack of provided capabilities. He argues that arguing over the number of axes distracts from the core problem. 5. Negotiations and Diplomacy: LTG Hodges expresses skepticism about negotiations, highlighting Russia's historical unreliability in adhering to agreements. He questions the realistic outcome of negotiations that allow Russia to keep its current gains. 6. Russian Military's Stabilization: Hodges' provides rich insights into the factors contributing to the Russian military's ability to stabilize the situation. This includes the West's failure to deliver capabilities on time, the autocratic nature of the Russian government, and Russia's capacity to adjust and make corrections. 7. Financial Support for Ukraine: Despite concerns about Western fatigue, Hodges believes that the promised $61 billion aid package for Ukraine will eventually be delivered. He emphasizes the need for effective communication from the administration to convey the importance of supporting Ukraine. Key Quotes "Our failure to deliver capabilities on time allowed Russia to build up their defenses last summer." "I'm not willing to say there's no way that Ukraine can win; of course there is if we get serious." "The failure to rapidly provide aviation support, like F-16s, is indicative of our broader failure to commit to Ukraine winning." In conclusion, LTG Ben Hodges provides valuable insights into the strategic failures of the West, the critical need for commitment, and the importance of delivering essential capabilities to support Ukraine's success in the ongoing conflict. https://lnkd.in/ggCShEyX Ben Hodges @tvrainnewsroom Kateryna Koval Malik Moroz Artur Borsuk Hennadiy Kovalenko Nathan Colvin

Politico [excerpt]: A company based in #HongKong controls a key part of #Poland’s #Gdynia #port — raising #nationalsecurity concerns as it’s close to a dock used to unload U.S. and #NATO #military aid for #Ukraine. Polish authorities say they are keeping a watchful eye on the Gdynia Container Terminal (GCT), operated by Hutchison Port Holdings, a subsidiary of Hong Kong-headquartered CK Hutchison Holdings. The government is under pressure to designate the terminal as #criticalinfrastructure. “Everything that has to do with Poland’s security is being analyzed permanently,” Deputy Defense Minister Cezary Tomczyk told POLITICO. “That obviously includes the issue of supplying arms to Ukraine and we are doing what we can to maximize the security of the process.” GCT is a full-service container and heavy-lift handling facility in Gdynia, occupying around 20 hectares and almost 600 meters of waterfront in the Baltic Sea port. The terminal sits right across from a Polish #specialforces base and #navy shipyard where Polish #missile frigates are being built. The U.S. Department of Defense temporarily uses a nearby dock to unload #NATO and U.S. #military gear for northeastern #Europe, as well as equipment bound for Ukraine. Security concerns are not only limited to Hutchison’s proximity to key NATO and Polish military assets in the port, but also to the company’s ability to interfere with the port’s accessibility. In August, equipment for the American army was to be unloaded on a dock near GCT. However the ship’s bow protruded about 50 meters into Hutchison’s zone, and the company refused to consent to the unloading. The Gdynia port authorities tried to intervene to find a solution, but ultimately the transshipment of the military equipment was unsuccessful. War worries The war raging in Ukraine is serving as a wake-up call for the Polish authorities, and they are now discussing ways of securing critical infrastructure in the country. Last month, the Polish parliament’s Special Forces Committee, chaired by Marek Biernacki, an MP with the Third Way, part of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s ruling coalition, discussed the protection of critical infrastructure objects in Polish #maritime areas — focused on offshore #windfarms and the port in Gdynia. “The committee has prepared an opinion to the prime minister indicating that there is a lack of a legal environment for large investments that should be protected as part of critical infrastructure,” Biernacki told the Polish media. “We will apply to the director of the government security center for the so-called Chinese wharf, which is part of the port in Gdynia and leased to a company with Chinese capital, to be formally recognised as a critical infrastructure facility,” Biernacki told Poland’s Dziennik Gazeta Prawna newspaper. #news #geopolitics

Ukraine is still likely to be outgunned by Russian artillery for much of the rest of 2024 – even with an injection of $60 billion in U.S. military aid. How come? The United States and Europe are only just starting to ramp up production of NATO-standard rounds and restock their own arsenals. Even with the approval of new U.S. aid, most factories have yet to ramp up production. • THE U.S. AND EUROPE RESTOCK • The expectation is that the Biden administration will spend much of the year rebuilding U.S. stockpiles to prewar levels as the U.S. Army aims to level up artillery production to 100,000 rounds per month by the end of 2025. Across the Atlantic, Europe’s stockpiles are empty. Most of the output from the European Union’s initiative to get 1.4 million shells into Ukrainian hands—about half of which have already been delivered—won’t get there until the end of 2024. So Ukraine’s partners on the continent are searching under the couch cushions and looking for suppliers outside the European bloc to find enough artillery to keep Kyiv’s gun barrels hot. The Czech Republic appears to have sourced enough money from a consortium of European countries to buy 500,000 rounds of 155 mm artillery ammunition and is currently working on getting the first batch to Ukraine. Refurbishing old artillery ammunition is about 30 percent cheaper than buying new shells, European officials said, but much of it comes from former Soviet satellite countries not keen to be on the Kremlin’s bad side. • UKRAINE OUTGUNNED • For months, Ukrainian troops have been firing about 2,000 rounds a day, barely enough to sustain a defensive war against the Russians. The U.S. “I think it’s fair to assume that the Ukrainians for the next 12 months will be able to have a monthly fire rate of maybe roughly 75,000 to 85,000 [shells] per month, which boils down to something like 2,400 to 2,500 rounds per day,” said Franz-Stefan Gady. That doesn’t leave any room for offensive operations this year. And congressional critics of U.S. aid to Ukraine—such as Sen. J.D. Vance, who argued in the New York Times this month that the United States simply doesn’t have “the capacity to manufacture the amount of weapons Ukraine needs us to supply to win the war”—are going to continue to make that case loudly. • RUSSIAN INDUSTRY MAXED OUT • Russia is on track to produce 3.5 million rounds in 2024 and might be able to surge to produce 4.5 million by the end of the year. But there are questions as to whether Russia is starting to max out its industrial capacity. The Kremlin can’t extend working hours—weapons shops are already working around the clock—so European officials expect that Russia will have to build more factories to produce the shells that it needs. The hope is that by the beginning of 2025, the United States and European defense companies will be producing shells on a significant enough scale to put the Ukrainians on the front foot again. (U.S. Army Photo by Spc. Corey Confer)

Ukraine Produces Weapons ‘Faster and Cheaper’ Than Europe, Says Danish PM Overview: Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has issued a stark warning at the Munich Security Conference, stating that Ukraine, despite being at war, is producing weapons “faster and cheaper” than the rest of Europe. Her comments highlight serious inefficiencies in European defense manufacturing, despite record-high defense spending in recent years. Frederiksen urged Western nations to accelerate military production and streamline bureaucratic hurdles to ensure Ukraine receives the support it needs while also strengthening Europe’s own defense capabilities. Key Points from Frederiksen’s Statement: • Ukraine’s Production Outpaces Europe: Even while under constant attack, Ukraine has scaled up domestic arms manufacturing at a speed that outperforms the rest of Europe. • Urgency to Reform Defense Manufacturing: Frederiksen warned that Europe must rethink its defense production strategy, reducing regulatory delays and inefficiencies. • Europe’s Peacetime Mindset Must Shift: While European nations are not officially at war, the Danish PM emphasized that they can no longer act as if they are in peacetime. Challenges in European Defense Production: • Slow Bureaucratic Processes: Regulations, red tape, and procurement delays are preventing rapid military manufacturing. • Fragmented Defense Industry: Unlike Ukraine, which is focused solely on wartime production, Europe’s defense sector remains divided among multiple national interests. • Supply Chain Vulnerabilities: Dependence on foreign components and long lead times hinder European production capacity. How Ukraine is Producing Faster: • Streamlined Wartime Manufacturing: Ukraine has cut unnecessary regulations to fast-track arms production. • Cost-Effective, Locally Sourced Materials: Unlike Europe’s complex supply chains, Ukraine is maximizing domestic resources to reduce costs. • Direct Government-Industry Coordination: Ukrainian defense firms work closely with military leaders, ensuring faster turnaround for weapons production. Strategic Implications for Europe and NATO: • Need for Defense Industrial Overhaul: Europe must adopt a more agile, wartime-like approach to weapons production. • Stronger U.S.-Europe Defense Collaboration: Frederiksen emphasized that working with the U.S. is key to accelerating joint military production efforts. • Long-Term European Security: Beyond supporting Ukraine, Europe’s defense readiness will depend on fixing its own slow production systems. Conclusion: Prime Minister Frederiksen’s remarks serve as a wake-up call for Europe’s defense sector. If Ukraine, under siege, can outproduce European nations, then fundamental reforms are urgently needed. Europe must cut bureaucratic delays, streamline defense manufacturing, and increase cooperation with allies to ensure both Ukraine’s survival and long-term European security.

The US has four options for providing Ukraine the defence support it "needed yesterday". Firstly, the Senate passed a $95.3 billion foreign aid bill with assistance for Ukraine and Israel in a vote on 13 February. If the speaker allows the House of Representatives to vote on Senate's bipartisan aid package, it would probably pass. Instead, he decided to derail it. Secondly, President Biden could instruct the US Department of Defence to use the $4B in presidential funds to send military equipment to Ukraine. However, the Pentagon is reluctant to commit these assets unless Congress decides to replace them. Why Biden has decided not to use this option given the catastrophic consequences a Russian victory will have for European security, is not known. Thirdly, U.S. House of Representatives can sidestep Speaker Mike Johnson and force a vote on a $95 billion security assistance package for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, using a discharge petition. It is a rarely used procedural tool that could force a vote on the bill if at least 218 House members - a majority of the chamber's 435 voting members - sign it. The process has allegedly been started. It would, however, be akin to Johnson losing control of the House floor, despite being the lower chamber’s highest ranking official. Republicans might, therefore, be reluctant to support the initiative as it would undermine Johnson's position. Fourthly, the speaker may develop a new proposal altogether. According to media, House Speaker and the chairmen of key House committees dealing with national security are working to develop their own Ukraine aid package that would treat non-military aid as a “loan, hoping to avoid alienating conservatives who oppose further funding for the war-torn country. They might, however, end up alienating democrats in the process. The new proposal might be ready by 22 March. Or not. All four options have two things in common: (1) They all offer a way out of the political stalemate ("frozen conflict") and (2) they are all used to delay the decision on US defence aid as the situation in Europe is becoming increasingly more critical. Internal US estimates suggest that Ukraine will experience a "catastrophic" shortage of ammunition and air defence equipment by April - May. If Ukraine runs out of Air Defence systems or missiles, Russia will be able to establish air supremacy. If that happens, the nature of the war will change dramatically. It will allow it to destroy Ukrainian Ground Forces from the Air, supported by a renewed offensive by the Army. One Patriot and NASAM have already been damaged/destroyed). The missile stocks are running low. The F-16s are not expected to operate over the battlefield before this summer (and then, in small numbers). The next couple of months are critical. Partly because of Russian efforts and partly because of US political infighting. The potential long-term consequences are devastating. Image: u.s. army

💡 #Intelligence about using German #military equipment in #Ukraine turned out to be disappointing and "sobering up", according to a leaked report by the deputy military attaché of Germany. The report, not intended for the public but presented at the Bundeswehr school in Delitzsch, was obtained by German media - NDR, WDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung. It examines in detail the use of military equipment supplied to Ukraine from Germany. 🚀 Here are the characteristics of some of the weapons that Berlin supplied to Kyiv: - Self-propelled howitzer PzH 2000 - "very high technical vulnerability", which "calls into question its suitability". - Tank Leopard 2A6 - very expensive to repair, and it is impossible to repair it at the front, largely due to attacking drones. - Tank Leopard 1A5 turned out to be "reliable", but due to weak armor it is often used only as an artillery mount. - The IRIS-T air defense system is effective, but its ammunition is very expensive. - The American Patriot missile defense system, which the Bundeswehr uses itself and supplied to Ukraine, is "excellent" but "unusable" because its carrier vehicle is too old and the manufacturer no longer supplies spare parts. ☝️ The report indicates that older models that are no longer used in the Bundeswehr or are considered obsolete have proven themselves much better. Among them are the Gepard anti-aircraft mount and the Marder infantry fighting vehicle. 🚨 Another conclusion of the report by the German military attaché in Ukraine: the conditions for using German equipment in Ukraine are more difficult than the conditions for a possible war on German territory. Firstly, the Ukrainians have less experience using Western weapons. Secondly, the logistics of damaged equipment in Ukraine are complicated, since repair centers (including those of the German Rheinmetall) are located at a great distance from the front - Deutche Welle I hope European militaries are listening/learning. This sort of ex-combat feedback cannot be war-gamed. #Intelligence #Journalism

🇩🇪 Effective but fragile: how German weapons hold up in real war A leaked Bundeswehr report shows Ukrainian troops face serious issues using German weapons 1️⃣ Key problems: 🛑 Panzerhaubitze 2000 — highly effective but wears down quickly, raising concerns over long-term reliability 🛑 Leopard 1A5 — reliable, but weak armor makes it unsuitable for direct combat, used more like artillery 🛑 Leopard 2A6 — very difficult to repair in frontline conditions 🛑 IRIS-T — precise air defense system, but extremely expensive to operate and in short supply 🛑 Patriot — powerful, but limited use due to aging MAN chassis and lack of spare parts 🛑 MARS MLRS — long-range and valuable, but incompatible with U.S. cluster munitions 🟢 One major exception: Gepard The Gepard anti-aircraft guns are the most reliable and popular system among Ukrainian forces. Though retired from the Bundeswehr, Germany restored them to service and even sourced more from abroad. 2️⃣ Other challenges go beyond the hardware: 🛑 Training in Germany was too short — leaving gaps in maintenance and repair knowledge 🛑 Spare parts delivery and repairs are logistically complex — infrastructure is lacking, and hubs are far from the front 🛑 Ukraine’s battlefield conditions are extreme — causing faster wear on all systems Conclusion: none of the major German weapons systems can be considered unquestionably fit for war.

https://lnkd.in/e3hyF9EB "The Russian military has broken the stalemate in the Ukraine war, Robert Gates, former CIA director and secretary of Defense, said Wednesday, following Moscow’s successful push to take the front-line city of Avdiivka.  “It’s no longer a stalemate. The Russians have regained momentum,” Gates told The Washington Post’s David Ignatius in a streaming interview. “Everything I’m reading is that the Russians are on the offensive along the 600-mile front.” Gates noted that European allies in NATO, “who we so often criticize,” have stepped up their support to Ukraine, but lack the ability to immediately send weapons. Production timelines will see NATO support reach the battlefield in 2025, he estimated. Right now, “the only real military lifeline comes from the United States. And as we all know, that is, shall we say, on pause right now,” he said.  Aid to Ukraine still lingers in the House, where Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) is caught between moderates who support Ukraine and far-right members who oppose it without major concessions from Democrats on the border.  Gates called out Congress specifically for being too slow on approving key battlefield capabilities throughout the war, such as missile systems that have allowed strikes against Russian-occupied Crimea, which he called a “no-brainer.” “Congress will debate for a year or more whether to send the Ukrainians tanks, and after a year, they’ll send tanks,” he said. These weapons could have arrived “a year and a half” earlier, and their delay has restrained Ukraine’s abilities, he said. The timing of the current aid package — Biden requested a $60 billion supplemental, which was part of a bipartisan Senate package passed earlier this month — is going to be a determining factor in Ukraine’s survival against a revived Russian offensive in 2024, Gates said. “One of the main values of the package of assistance that’s on the Hill right now, is it would provide Ukraine with significant air-defense capacity, and the wherewithal to establish a strong defensive barrier so they don’t lose any more territory,” Gates said. Passing the package would send a message to Russia that “they’re not going to be successful in achieving their goals,” a necessary step toward a cease-fire, rebuilding Ukraine and its eventual induction into NATO, he added."

PENTAGON PROBLEMS: A top Defense Department official warned that congressional gridlock means the Pentagon still does not have the money to replace some $10 billion worth of weapons it has sent to Ukraine. DOD officials expect funding to replenish the equipment the U.S. has already sent to Ukraine to be included in Biden’s supplemental request, which provides billions of additional dollars in aid for Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel. But that legislation has languished on Capitol Hill for months amid partisan bickering. If DOD does not get the funding to backfill its stocks, the impact of that “ongoing hole” will ultimately be felt by the U.S. military’s own forces, the senior DOD official said. “We have not been able to, with the funding we have to date — and there’s a big funding piece waiting in the supplemental — replenish everything we’ve already given to Ukraine,” the official told reporters. “So it would come back on our own readiness on our own stockpile to a certain extent if we can’t get new funding.”