Conclusion (Conflict Resolution and Ontological Security)

The version of record of this manuscript is: Rumelili, B. (2015) ‘Conclusion” Rumelili, B. (ed.) Ontological Security and Conflict Resolution: Peace Anxieties. Routledge (PRIO New Security Studies Series), pp.193-201. Word count: 4.147 Conclusion Bahar Rumelili, Koç University Revisiting the Conceptual Framework The conceptual framework of the volume was offered not as a definitive framework but as one open to refinement and challenge by the contributors. The concluding chapter of this volume is therefore an appropriate place to take stock of these refinements and challenges. This volume offered three core arguments regarding the role of ontological security in conflict resolution. First, conflicts especially over time become sources of ontological security for the various actors involved. The conceptual framework laid out in detail how conflicts become a source of ontological security at the individual, societal/ state and interstate/inter-party levels. Conflicts enable individuals to address fundamental anxieties of death, meaninglessness, and condemnation by providing objects of fear, and a stable set of meanings and standards of morality that revolve around the construction of the other conflict party as the enemy. At the societal/ state level, conflicts provide stable and legitimate focal points for securitisation practices and constructions of systems of meaning and morality. Conflicts regularize and legitimize the construction of the other conflict party as a vital and immediate threat and the presentation of its identity in clear-cut oppositional terms. Finally, at the interstate/ inter-party level, it was argued that conflicts place political actors at a state of ontological security vis-à-vis one another and provide them with a formed framework to make sense of international life. The second argument of the volume was that, conflict resolution, therefore, generates ontological insecurity, which unleashes political and social processes that reproduce and reactivate the conflicts. The conceptual framework offered a model, which aimed to show how conflicts move through states of varying levels of fear and anxiety as they undergo a process of resolution. Building on the conceptual link between anxiety and fear, i.e. fear helps contain anxiety, and thus removal of fear unleashes anxiety, the argument was advanced that conflicts-in-resolution are characterized by lowered fears but heightened anxieties. Heightened anxieties generate a striving for objects of fear; therefore, conflicts-in-resolution always remain vulnerable to political attempts to reproduce and reactivate the conflicts by re-igniting the fears. The third argument of the volume was a corollary of the previous two: Stable peace necessitates not only the settlement of disputes, but the reinstatement of ontological security through the formulation of alternative narratives and routines. In the conceptual framework, how alternative narratives and routines may be developed and the forms that they can take were not specified, on the basis that these will inevitably be context-specific, and therefore have to be studied empirically. The conflict cases studied in this volume spanned a wide geographical and historical context, and included a broad range of international and domestic conflicts in various stages of negotiation, resolution, and reconciliation. It attempted to analyze the role of ontological security in protracted international conflicts such as Cyprus and Israel/Palestine and domestic ones such as Turkey’s Kurdish conflict, while discussing the effects of ontological insecurity following seemingly successful peace processes, such as Northern Ireland. The book also included chapters on the reinstatement of ontological security following the resolution of two Nordic conflicts - Åland islands between Finland and Sweden and the Karelian conflict between Finland and Russia-, while also looking at local ‘peace formation’ practices to reinstate ontological security following liberal peace-building interventions in contexts, such as Somalia and Sierra Leone. Although no single theoretical framework can possibly fully accommodate all relevant factors in such a wide range of cases, a significant number of cases suggest refinements to the conceptual framework in the following directions. First of all, the cases suggest that conflicts are rarely stable in ontological security terms. Despite the manifold ways in which conflicts produce ontological security, in the case of neither the Israeli-Palestinian, nor the Cyprus conflict, are we able to observe a singular stable formed framework of ontological security that shapes the narratives and routines of all groups within conflict societies. Instead, we encounter a multiplicity of self-narratives that change and evolve over time across different groups within societies. Thus, what needs to be acknowledged is that stable conflicts are ideal types, and that each conflict is unstable to a certain extent. Anxiety is always present, but may be contained at low levels and confined to certain sectors of society marginalized in the political process. This has two further implications for the theorization of the role of ontological security in conflict resolution. On the one hand, it invites us to give greater weight to anxiety as an enabling condition of conflict resolution. In other words, the framework needs to recognize that some level of anxiety needs to be present in stable conflicts, in order for change to be possible. What transforms stable conflicts into unstable conflicts or conflicts-in- resolution is the crossing of a certain threshold in anxiety. As will be noted later, the theorization and empirical specification of this threshold is a difficult task that nevertheless needs to be undertaken to study the role of ontological (in)security in conflict resolution. Second, the cases caution against studying the role of ontological (in)security in conflict resolution in isolation from other internal and external developments. While the relevant internal and external developments are case-specific and cannot possibly be all incorporated in a common framework, that conflicts are only one among multiple sources of ontological security needs to be more explicitly recognized. For example, the EU integration process has significantly impacted the terms on which ontological security is pursued in both the cases of Cyprus conflict and the Åland islands. Browning and Joenniemi put significant emphasis on how changing notions of sovereignty and national subjectivity have played a crucial role in diminishing the significance of Karelia in Finnish national narratives. Richmond, on the other hand, discusses how peace-building interventions aim to secure subject populations according to a Western liberal ontological framework, and consequently generate ontological insecurity. Therefore, an ontological security perspective to conflict resolution needs to be particularly cognizant of the fact that the conditions of ontological security are themselves unstable, contested, and in flux. Third, interesting observations stem from the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland cases, concerning the implications of ontological insecurity on conflict and peace processes. The conceptual framework of the volume has presupposed somewhat of a bi-directional movement on the axis of securitisation and desecuritisation; making the assumption that ontological insecurity would either reproduce and reactivate conflicts, or serve as a springboard to peace and the containment of anxiety through alternative narratives. Both the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland cases demonstrate that the implications of ontological insecurity are much more complex and variegated. For example, according to Lupovici, Israel ‘works to maintain the conflict by preserving Hamas as the Palestinian enemy other and distinguishing it from the Fatah –with whom, on the other hand, Israel continues, to some extent, to practice conflict resolution.’ This is a strategy of splitting the Other, of securitising one faction while partly desecuritising the Other, which is not simply reproducing but simultaneously transforming the conflict. Similarly in the case of Northern Ireland, Mitchell emphasizes how a peace process that is sensitive to the ontological security dynamics concerning the primary Self/Other dyad has generated insecurities on part of ‘other Selves’ and ‘other Others’; that is actors who cannot and will not be integrated into the peace process. This is an example of the reinstatement of ontological security in a peace process through the splitting of identities and the generation of new conflicts. Therefore, as Mitchell argues, an ontological security perspective on conflict resolution should not limit itself to the primary Self/Other relationship and be attentive to the ways in which identities and the conflict itself are always in transformation (see also Mitchell 2011). Lessons for Ontological Security Studies It is possible to draw a number of lessons from the contributions to this volume to guide the future development of ontological security studies. This volume constitutes one of the earlier attempts to apply an ontological security perspective empirically across a range of case studies. The case studies indicate a number of areas where ontological security theory is in need of further development. First, the case studies indicate a number of common challenges that stem from the operationalization of ontological security/insecurity as a binary concept. In none of the conflict cases it is possible to encounter absolute states of ontological security or insecurity; rather one witnesses varying degrees of ontological insecurity across different actors. The conceptual framework to this volume sought to capture this gradation by distinguishing between states of low and high anxiety as opposed ontological insecurity and security. Assuming that anxiety is omnipresent and cannot be entirely contained, further work needs to be done on clarifying the critical thresholds at which anxiety (or ontological insecurity) begins to produce the effects that are analyzed in this volume. As the case studies on Israel-Palestine, Cyprus, and Kurdish conflict indicate, no conflict, no matter how protracted and entrenched, generates a state of absolute ontological security for all sectors of conflict societies, such that there is no motivation for change. Similarly, as the cases of Northern Ireland and Åland islands clearly show, no peace process, no matter how comprehensive and effective, can reinstate ontological security for all groups in conflict societies. Therefore, the concept of ontological security/insecurity needs further empirical specification, especially with regard to the identification of critical thresholds. Secondly, all contributions to this volume stress that the pursuit of ontological security is inherently a political process, which empowers certain political actors over others, and legitimizes certain types of political action rather than others. However, the outcomes vary. For example, I argue that ontological insecurity empowers spoilers of peace processes and legitimizes securitising acts, while at the same time enabling change. Lupovici argues that the ontological insecurity that stems from the incongruity between multiple Israeli identities generates a deadlock in Israeli policy. Joenniemi, on the other hand, argues Åland islanders pursue ontological security by promoting identity-based tensions with Finland. More theorization is needed to specify how ontological security/insecurity (re)allocates authority among actors and produces different policy outcomes. In shaping policy outcomes, ontological security/insecurity functions as a structural condition that interacts with other structural and agentic factors. In this vein, Loizides’ chapter places due emphasis on how internal and external political developments affect the political actors’ capacities to produce ontological security through different identity narratives. At the same time, ontological security/ insecurity is a condition that can be manipulated and mobilized by political actors in pursuit of their political objectives. Therefore, the two-way interaction between ontological security/ insecurity and other political factors deserve further scrutiny. Third, how power dynamics interfere in the production of ontological security needs further elaboration. As Çelik’s chapter forcefully demonstrates, the power differences between conflict parties or across different groups in conflict societies can generate structural asymmetries in ontological security, where the pursuit of ontological security by one group produces ontological insecurity for others. However, this does not necessarily mean that ontological security is reducible to power, as a sense of mutual ontological security may also develop around power asymmetries, providing both the weak and the strong with stable role identities, narratives, and routines. For example, partners may choose to stay in an abusive relationship because of the ontological security it provides (Mitzen 2006). Whether an asymmetric relationship is a source of ontological security or insecurity depends very much on the existing self-narratives of those who find themselves in a position of weakness or strength. On the other hand, internalizing a position of weakness and inferiority can be a product of false consciousness or a discursively imposed subject position. Therefore, ontological security studies needs to be critically attuned to how the production of ontological security works across power asymmetries and to how the pursuit of ontological security meshes with relations of domination and resistance. This brings me to my final point concerning the ethics of ontological security. Given that the ethics of security has elicited much discussion in critical security studies (e.g. Browning and MacDonald 2013; Burgess 2011; Floyd 2011; Taureck 2006), similar soul-searching and clarification of ethical stances in ontological security studies are also highly warranted. Any stable social relationship or situation may be a source of ontological security; violent conflicts, domination, discrimination, and exclusion as well as peaceful coexistence, equality, and inclusion. Therefore, the pursuit of ontological security is not in and of itself a good thing, as it may be driving the reproduction of normatively undesirable relationships and situations. Under such circumstances, actions that unsettle established narratives and routines, in other words, the production of ontological insecurity would undoubtedly be holding the moral high ground. However, while everyone may agree that in case of abusive relationships, ontological insecurity would be preferable to security, not all issues lend themselves to clear-cut ethical choices. Plus, although change may be normatively desirable overall, there will always be groups who are rendered ontologically insecure as a result of change. In particular, Mitchell’s and Richmond’s contributions to this volume put normative dimensions of peace at the center of their analyses, and raise questions with respect to whose ontological security is privileged in various types of peace processes. The Value-Added of Ontological Security Within the burgeoning field of ontological security studies, different approaches and perspectives are already discernible. This volume constitutes an application of the core concept of ontological security to a substantive field of inquiry with its own already well-developed body of literature, i.e. conflict resolution. Not only ontological security has close affinities with the factors emphasized in socio-psychological approaches to conflict resolution, but the various conflict cases studied in this volume have previously been analyzed through a variety of perspectives. We do not –and cannot- claim that ontological security provides an entirely new perspective on conflict resolution that competes with the existing perspectives. However, we contend that ontological security provides a unique and much-needed conceptual link between several different factors previously identified as critical to conflict resolution. The contributions to this volume bring out several unique features of ontological security that constitute its value-added: 1. Ontological security is a multi-layered security concept: First of all, unlike other security concepts, ontological security is inherently multi-layered and highlights the integral linkages and the fluid nexus between individual and the collective (group, societal, state) attitudes, beliefs, and practices, without privileging one over the other. Thus, while employing a single concept, the contributions to this volume can exhibit a variation in their levels of analysis. While some chapters focus on how the pursuit of ontological security at the national level impinge on peace processes (e.g, the chapters by Lupovici and Browning & Joenniemi), others focus on the pursuit of ontological security at the group/ communal level (e.g. the chapters by Çelik, Loizides, Mitchell, and Joenniemi), and at the individual level (e.g. Bilgin & İnce). Ultimately, the pursuit of ontological security takes place at multiple levels, which impinge on one another. For example, as highlighted most clearly in the chapter by Bilgin and İnce, the pursuit of ontological security by the Turkish state vis-à-vis international society has generated ontological insecurities at the group and individual levels in Turkey. 2. Ontological security ties varied literatures on nationalism, identity, and reconciliation with security studies: The role of nationalism and identity in the generation and resolution of conflicts have been studied in detail, and the necessity to change dominant constructions of the nation, and stereotypical beliefs about the enemy have been the main focus of reconciliation based approaches to conflict resolution. Ontological security ties  these varied literatures together and helps explain how and why nationalism and identity bear so heavily on conflicts and reconciliation remains difficult but necessary. Thus, the volume includes contributions that highlight the impact of competing/overlapping constructions of national/ethnic identity (e.g. Lupovici and Loizides chapters), the impact of conflict resolution on group identities (e.g. Mitchell chapter) and how changing conceptions of nationalism are critical to processes of reconciliation (e.g. Browning & Joenniemi and Joenniemi chapters). 3. Ontological security highlights the importance of intra-party dynamics and processes in conflict resolution: The literature on conflict resolution often privileges inter-party processes and dynamics of negotiation at the expense of intra-party ones. Various social- psychological approaches and methods of conflict resolution, therefore, put emphasis on establishing contact between conflict parties, confronting prejudices, and building trust. However, ontological security highlights that individual and societal beliefs about the enemy are very much rooted in the pursuit of stability of being, and therefore stresses that these beliefs need to be negotiated internally as much as they are negotiated with significant Others. Thus, the contributors to this volume place greater emphasis on the internal construction and negotiation of identities and beliefs. According to Lupovici, for example, the Israeli stance in the Israel-Palestinian conflict cannot be properly understood without acknowledging the multiplicity of Israeli identities, and the challenges of ontological dissonance. Similarly, Loizides discusses in detail how both the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot identities have evolved in response to internal as well as external developments. The Mitchell chapter also puts the key emphasis on the ongoing tensions and conflicts within the Republican and Loyalist groups in Northern Ireland rather than between them.  4. Ontological security places due emphasis on emotional and practical dimensions of conflict: The literature on conflict resolution places greater emphasis on how beliefs about the enemy and conflict hamper resolution and reconciliation, but less on how certain emotions and attachment to certain practices may facilitate or hinder belief change. In contrast, ontological security invites due emphasis on how making contact with or acquiring new information about the enemy may generate anxiety and resistance to belief change. Therefore, approaches and methods of conflict resolution should take such emotional and practical factors seriously, and not simply assume that the social- psychological obstacles to conflict resolution are purely cognitive. In this volume, anxiety has been singled out as a key emotion, which both enables and complicates processes of conflict resolution. Less attention has been devoted to conflict practices, whose maintenance is critical to ontological security. Conflict resolution entails changes in beliefs as well as practices, and future work on ontological security and conflict resolution can focus on how attachment to routines makes it difficult to enact changes in conflict practices. A Personal Reflection In recent years, as evident in the number of publications as well as the number of panels and roundtables on ontological security in ISA conferences, ontological security studies is making its presence felt as a new area of intellectual focus in IR. Despite this flurry of academic activity, critics are often tempted to ask: Is this yet another intellectual fad which will be sustained by its own tribe of academics? Is ontological security able to bring to light and account for certain phenomena, which were otherwise masked by other related concepts, such as identity and (other types of) security? I believe that these are questions that require honest answers. As a scholar, who started as a skeptic and later became an enthusiast of ontological security, I would like to take the opportunity in this concluding section of the volume to provide my own –subjective but nevertheless honest- answer. I stumbled onto ontological security roughly 7-8 years into my career, having already made a modest set of contributions to the field of IR around the common theme of identity –on processes of identity constitution at the state and supra-state levels, self/other relations, and implications for international conflict and cooperation (Rumelili 2004; 2007). My initial reaction was that ontological security is nothing but old wine in new bottles, merely a theoretically fancier way of referring to the ‘security of identity’. Later, I found myself casually employing the concept of ontological security in a purely pragmatic manner. One of the weak links in my previous writings was the link between identity and security. While I was able to demonstrate the nature and dimensions of self/other representations in IR and establish their theoretical relevance, I experienced greater difficulty in showing how they are linked to sense of insecurity, perception of threat, and legitimization of violence. The concept of insecurity was underspecified for my purposes in that it lumped together, for example, both the unease that Turkey experienced when its claims to a European identity went unrecognized, and Turkey’s perception of physical threat from Greece. Both insecurities were rooted in identity constructions but fundamentally different in nature. Ontological security appeared to me as a useful concept to capture this distinction. I began this edited volume project as I was transitioning from a pragmatist to an enthusiast. The more I read key texts of ontological security, the more I realized that it encompasses much more than ‘security of identity’. Especially the way the concept brings together biographical narratives and routines was refreshing in that it captured both the discursive and practical dimensions of being. Although everyone acknowledges that discourse embodies practice, most analyses of constructions of identity, mine included, had privileged texts and textual analysis over practice. Employing ontological security forced me to be more attuned to practical dimensions of identity. The second reason I became more of an enthusiast is because ontological security enabled me to actually pin down the notion of security I had in mind all along. Despite the close affinities that I observed, I was disappointed to discover that my work fell somewhat out of synch with the wide literature on critical security studies, which seemed to have less of an interest in identity except when it is securitised. The wide range of referents, types, and levels of security discussed in this literature did not fully capture the concern that actors have with the reproduction of their identities, and thus that identity remains a security issue regardless of whether or not identity, or any other referent object, is securitised. Ontological security, and the distinction between ontological and physical security, provided me with the conceptual basis I needed to argue this (Rumelili Chapter 1). But ultimately what converted me into an advocate of ontological security has been the distinction between fear and anxiety that ontological security forces us to make. That ontological security is fundamentally different from other concepts of security because it denotes freedom from anxiety rather than fear is the argument that unequivocally proves, at least in my view, that ontological security is not simply the old wine in a new bottle. I have made the first cut at developing this distinction in my contributions to this volume, but I can see that this distinction has many more path-breaking implications for IR theory than I have been able to discover and note. However, one ground for skepticism remains with me, and it is the notion of agency and subjectivity that undergirds the notion of ontological security. Ontological security brings to the foreground, but in doing so remains too closely wedded to, the psychological dynamics that underlie the reproduction of identity, as opposed to the discursive ones. Ontological security studies should take care to avoid the pitfall of putting the individual or collective actors’ pursuit of ontological security at the center without paying due attention to the discursive structures that constitute the narratives and practices that the actors are seeking to stabilize. Often we employ quite rigid criteria of admissibility, and dismiss concepts that cannot provide a superior explanation to the ones that already exist in our field. My experience with ontological security has convinced me otherwise. We may be missing out on great insights by applying such high entry-barriers. Rather than through debates between competing theoretical paradigms, scholarship may be better advanced through sustained engagement among scholars advocating different perspectives around a core idea or notion, such as ontological security. This volume came into being through such an engagement. Very few of the contributors to this volume had engaged with the notion of ontological security in a systematic manner before, yet the concept triggered new ideas, avenues of research and perspectives that would be lost to us, if we had not given it this chance. 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