Mind body problem

All over the world, people reason dualistically. We consider it more probable that mental states, such as love, continue after biological death than we think bodily states, such as hunger, will continue. However the extent to which culture affects mind-body dualism remains unclear. Here, we draw on a large and diverse cross-cultural sample (24 countries, N = 10195) to systematically quantify cultural variation in tendencies for mind-body dualism. Our findings replicate previous work suggesting that mind-body dualism is culturally universal. Furthermore, our experiment reveals that religion amplifies dualistic tendencies. At the same time, however, the modal response across most countries was the cessation of all states. In addition, explicit afterlife beliefs were more prevalent than implicit afterlife beliefs (i.e., continuity judgments). Overall, these data suggest that intuitive materialism is the cross-cultural norm, with dualism arising from culturally acquired beliefs.

ABSTRACT The purpose of this qualitative study was to examine the embodied qualities of aerial practice among 13 US undergraduate students (M age = 20.46 years old). Drawing on the philosophy of embodiment, interview questions addressed bodily sensations, cognition, and the role of music and mirror viewing. The first emerging theme from the analysis was bodily sensations and cognition, including integrating cognitive and sensory bodily awareness (thinking and sensing the movements), bodily awareness and visual cues (e.g., emphasizing bodily sensations), and pain and the body. The second theme was music, mind, body, and emotion, including the embodiment of music and performance without music. In movement programs, cognitive and sensory bodily awareness are keys to all stages of skill acquisition. Overreliance on mirror viewing may diminish proprioception. Given that pain does not entirely disappear with continuous practice, it can affect movement execution. Bodily expressions with or without music can be embodied and artistic.

The work of Oliva Sabuco, a Spanish philosopher and Renaissance writer, focuses on a holistic medical philosophy that intertwines physical, psychological, and social health. In her main work, Nueva Filosofía de la Naturaleza del Hombre, she explores the interaction between body and soul, emphasizing the crucial role of emotions and digestion in human health. Sabuco identifies three "pillars of health": optimism, happiness, and digestive harmony. She argues that these factors promote harmony between the soul and body, which in turn enhances brain and bodily functions. Poor digestion or negative emotions, on the other hand, can disrupt the connection between the brain and body, leading to illness. A central concept in Sabuco's theory is chilo, a nourishing fluid produced through digestion that sustains the brain. She highlights the importance of balanced nutrition, avoiding overeating, and selecting appropriate foods. Sabuco provides detailed dietary recommendations, including simple and nutritious meals, as well as practices for cleansing the body, such as induced vomiting and fasting. Her approach integrates anatomical knowledge, medical principles, and psychological influences to address and prevent illness. Sabuco advocates for personal responsibility and self-care, embedding her philosophy within a humanistic framework.

The mind-body problem is one of the most difficult challenges of modern science. An interesting attempt at providing a reductionist model of reality was made in the 18th century by Ruder Josip Bošković. The attractiveness of this model lies in the fact that it does not readily fit into any of the above categorizations. Although frequently associated with the third - a fact that laid it open to violent criticism, causing the philosopher serious trouble - it stands apart as an independent theory. For, according to Bošković, reality is neither material nor spiritual. Nor is it a union of both of these orders.

From a phenomenological viewpoint, shame and guilt may be regarded as emotions which have incorporated the gaze and the voice of the other, respectively. The spontaneous and unreflected performance of the primordial bodily self has suffered a rupture: In shame or guilt we are rejected, separated from the others, and thrown back on ourselves. This reflective turn of spontaneous experience is connected with an alienation of primordial bodiliness that may be described as a "corporealization": The lived-body is changed into the objective, corporeal body or "body-for-others." The polarity of "bodiliness" and "corporeality" may further a phenomenological understanding of several mental disorders connected with shame and guilt. This is shown by the examples of body dysmorphic disorder and melancholic depression.

In completing this work I accumulated intellectual debts to so many people and institutions that it is now beyond my powers to remember what I learned from whom, much less to fully acknowledge all of it. The acknowledgements that follow are therefore necessarily incomplete. Trinity College, Oxford, provided me with a stimulating intellectual environment for five crucial years , and gave me training in both Theology and Sanskrit, skills which were instrumental in making this work possible. The Buddhist Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin gave me the freedom to develop my interests in Buddhism in my own way during 1980-83. I am grateful to the Harkness Foundation for generous financial support during 1980 -82, and to the University of Wisconsin for providing me with a University Fellowship in 1982-83. It was this financial support which made possible the speedy completion of my PhD dissertation, on which this book is largely based. Finally, the Department of South Asian Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chicago has, since August 1984, provided me with an intellectual setting that is both relaxed and exciting: an ideal place for the completion of this study. I am especially grateful to Frank Reynolds, Wendy O'Flaherty and A. K. Ramanujan, all of whom have gone out of their way to make me feel at home in Chicago. My intellectual and spiritual debts are more numerous. Trevor Williams showed me long ago in Oxford that it is possible to both be religious and study religion. Richard Gombrich introduced me to both Sanskrit and Buddhism, and gave me substantial encouragement during my early studies. When I first came to the US Frances Wilson acted as my kalyanamitra and guided me through the administrative complexities of a large American university. Minoru Kiyota was gracious enough to act as my dissertation advisor at the University of Wisconsin in a field far from his own, and to allow me an unusual degree of freedom in pursuing my goals. He also opened my eyes to the range and quality of the work on Indian Buddhism currently being produced in Japan. To him I owe a special personal debt. From Geshe Sopa I learned what Tibetan I know, and learned something also of the depth and range of traditional Tibetan scholarship. Keith Yandell has provided me with continuous philosophical challenges and a personal friendship that has shaped my intellectual outlook in very important ways. Noriaki Hakamaya has been consistently generous in giving me both time and advice, and first showed me, in a series of seminars on the Mahayanasamgraha from 1981 to 1983, how best to study Indian Buddhist texts. Stephan Beyer may recognize many of the ideas in this study as closely related to his own. John Keenan will recognize that our fruitful disagreements about both Buddhism and philosophy continue. Finally, a special debt of gratitude goes to Delmas Lewis; without his conversation and friendship this book would not exist in its present form. My thanks are also due to W. W. Bartley III for reading the manuscript of this work and making helpful comments, and to David Ramsay Steele, Sue Olson and Lisa Zimmerman of Open Court for agreeing to publish this work and for doing so in such an expeditious and helpful manner. Portions of the first chapter of this work (in very different form) have appeared in the Journal of the American Academy of Religion (1981) and Religion (1983). A portion of the second chapter appeared in Philosophy East and West (1983). My wife has neither typed nor proofread this book; my daughter is not yet in a condition to type or proofread anything; but I am indebted to them both for almost everything else. October 1985 We do the tradition a disservice if we refuse to move beyond the exegetical mode of academic discourse to the normative, the judgemental. A close study of the material discussed in this work makes it increasingly apparent that the authors of these texts took themselves to be engaging in a normative enterprise, and one, moreover, that they thought to be capable of support by persuasive, and at times demonstrative, rational arguments. To ignore, as is so often done by historians of religion, this fundamentally important dimension of the material is a failure to seriously consider the intentions of the texts' authors in their own terms, and such a failure necessarily results in partial and inadequate views about the importance of normative discourse in almost all religious and philosophical traditions. It was, in part, an increasingly strong desire to avoid such a partial and inadequate representation of my sources that reshaped what was originally conceived as a historico-exegetical study into what is now also a philosophico-critical study. The presence in the following study of normative elements-of the putting to my sources such potentially unpleasant questions as: Ts that a good argument?' or 'What reason do we have to think that the premisses of that argument are true?'proceeds, then, from the logic of the sources themselves. A full defence and explanation of asking (and the theoretical possibility of answering) such normative questions of texts (or persons) from different cultures and different periods would require the elaboration of (negatively) a critique of the varieties of relativism, and (positively) a theory of rationality and a theory of truth. Aside from these prefatory remarks I shall offer neither, but will content myself for the moment with a utilitarian and hermeneutical defence:

This paper presents the leading neuroscientific model in which consciousness is understood as an emergent property of complex neural activity rather than a separate non-physical substance or soul. Evidence from brain imaging, neurological disorders, anesthesia, split-brain studies, and neural stimulation demonstrates that conscious experience directly depends on brain structure and function. No empirical data supports the existence of a soul or independent consciousness separate from neural processes. The findings suggest that subjective experience arises from distributed information processing within the brain.

The scientific study of consciousness is a a seductive topic given that we are a species which ascribes consciousness to each other. We communicate on the assumption others are conscious agents like ourselves. So to investigate the evolution of this phenomenon as in the book The Ancient Origins of Consciousness would seem promising. Unfortunately, despite great detail and 1 eruditon in the discussion of evolution, the endeavour hits the same obstacles and make the same mistakes as is seen in swathes of psychology. The central error is that consciousness is treated as the same sort of publicly observable phenomenon as behaviour or brain physiology and so can be the subject of scientific study. But it isn't and it can't, and this paper offers an explaination why.

The shortcomings of DSM-5 and related psychiatric diagnostic systems are discussed, whilst maintaining sympathy for clinicians’ need for a shared category system. The ethological approach offers an alternative which promises to base clinical treatment on a more scientifically sound footing. Some examples of this approach are described, relating it to the behaviour of children diagnosed with ADHD or ASD; ethological concepts are used, such as behaviour observed when there are external or internal blocks to ongoing behaviour (frustration or motivational conflict), or behaviour seen along a dimension from simple displacement activities to playfulness. Concepts like pathology and disorder can be the object of study, but are not useful starting concepts to guide a scientific study; they are essentially practical and political concepts related to what a community agrees clinicians may treat. A scientific study acknowledges the need to study the range of human behaviour to provide a “map” ...

Disability" is hardly a new aspect of human life. It can be present at any time and in any place, including at any stage of life and across any socioeconomic divide. Disability, furthermore, can take a variety of forms and result from a range of causes. 1 At present, there are well over a billion persons in the world who experience a disability of some kind. Although this number represents only 16 percent of the total population, the personal significance of disability sharply increases when one considers its indirect impact on family members, friends, and society. 2 Given the pervasiveness of "disability" in human life, the relative lack of consideration of this issue throughout philosophical history is surprising, even shocking. There are, perhaps, some ready ways to account for this neglect. First, "disability," even etymologically, assumes an account of "ability," which in turn presupposes an account of what the human being is and what a human being can or should be able to do. Given the complexity of the human subjectitself the subject of manifold disagreements throughout philosophical historythe inattention to "disability" becomes less surprising. Second, though pervasive in human life, many disabilities are "invisible" and unknown until explicitly revealed. Given the hidden nature of many disabilities, it is less surprising that they have eluded philosophical 1 The Social Security Administration of the United States of America, for instance, delineates the following as broad categories of disorders that may make adult persons eligible for public assistance:

This article proposes an epistemological, ontological, and methodological reconstruction of the Freud–NDQ Project (Quantitative Neurodynamics), explicitly repositioning it within the traditions of Philosophical Naturalism, Critical Empiricism, Scientific Realism, revised Logical Positivism, Pragmatism, and contemporary Philosophy of Science. Starting from Sigmund Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), the work seeks to update its energetic intuitions through an operationalizable informational and neurodynamic model, without resorting to strong metaphysical assumptions. Carl Gustav Jung's analytical psychology and Erich Neumann's developments are integrated into the model through a conceptual naturalization of archetypes, understood as recurring psychobiological patterns and not as autonomous ontological entities. Quantitative Neurodynamics (QND) is redefined as an integrative scientific model that describes the mind as a dynamic information processing system, and Integrated Quantitative Psychodynamics (IQP) is presented as an experimental clinical methodology based on empirical indicators such as the Neuropsychic Flexibility Index (NFI). It is concluded that the Freud–QND Project, in its naturalized version, constitutes a theoretically coherent, clinically pragmatic, and epistemologically defensible proposal for an expanded scientific psychology.

Human persons are at once simple and complex: simple, because they possess a unified and indivisible essence in the form of the soul; and, complex, since this immaterial soul is conjoined to a material body, accounting for the human whole. This paper highlights the nature of this union and explores the psychology of the human person based on Thomistic philosophical tradition. Our thesis is that Aquinas's hylomorphism, which counters in advance the claims of Descartes on human identity, offers a comprehensive understanding of the human person and provides a robust foundation that understands the human person as transcending the limitations of body and mind, and this has implications for philosophical, psychological and scientific enquiries.

Synopsis: Despite many significant accomplishments, mainstream scientific psychology has not provided a satisfactory theory of mind, or solved the mind-body problem, and physicalist accounts of the mind are approaching their limits without fully accounting for its properties. The computational theory of mind has collapsed, forcing physicalism to retreat into what necessarily constitutes its final frontier, the unique biology of the brain, but this biological naturalism seems destined to fare little better. Some critical properties of human mental life can already be recognized as irreconcilable in principle with physical operations of the brain, and others appear likely to prove so as well.

Discussions about Darwinism often show a surprising level of misunderstanding, as if different people come to the subject with incompatible presuppositions. There is a polarisation which is not just the familiar split between Christians and atheists, nor the demarcation between the disciplines of theology and science. Rather, there is a faultline between paradigms that may be labelled as "dualism" and "holism" (or, crudely speaking, Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism) with members of the two groups sometimes reacting in opposite ways to the same information. For the dualists, theology and science deal with different things, religion is supernatural not natural, Heaven and Earth are in different places, divine creativity is not human creativity, and eschatology has got nothing to do with the process of evolution. The holists see things oppositely. These differences of perspective can go a long way towards explaining the confusion which, even among those who agree about the validity of modern science, often bedevils discussions about science and religion.

Fodor and Putnam initiated the anti-reductionist consensus thirty years ago by noting the analogy between computational states and mental states (Fodor, 1965, 1974; Putnam, 1965, 1967). Any computational property can be “realized” or “implemented” in a variety of ways (electronic, mechanical, hydraulic), so it would be a mistake to identify any computational property with, say, an electronic property, since the same computational property can be implemented without the electronic property, for example mechanically. If thought is ...

The relationship between the physical body and the conscious human mind has been a deeply problematic topic for centuries. Physicalism is the 'orthodox' metaphysical stance in contemporary Western thought, according to which reality is exclusively physical/material in nature. However, in the West, theoretical dissatisfaction with this type of approach has historically lead to Cartesian-style dualism, wherein mind and body are thought to belong to distinct metaphysical realms. In the current discussion I compare and contrast this standard Western approach with an alternative form of dualism developed in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophical tradition, where matter and pure consciousness are held to belong to distinct and independent realms, but where the mind is placed on the material side of the ontological divide. I argue that this model possesses a number of theoretical advantages over Cartesian-style dualism, and constitutes a compelling theoretical framework for re-conceptualizing the mind-body problem. When Western scientific investigation began uncovering the physical mechanisms underlying conscious sensory experience, a deep conceptual problem immediately came to the fore. Experimental analysis revealed a systematic correlation between, for example, the frequency of sound waves propagated through the atmosphere and our perception of high versus low musical notes. And the different frequencies of visible light were systematically correlated with our perception of different colors. Furthermore, anatomical research revealed various physiological aspects of our sensory organs that encode these salient features of the environmental stimulus and transmit them though the central nervous system. There was clearly a fundamental association between the environmental stimulus and anatomy of our sensory mechanisms, on the one hand, and our subjective conscious experience, on the other. Yet it seemed entirely mysterious how the one could be equated with or even give rise to the other. How could the sentient, first person, qualitative realm of experience stem from or be identical to physiological activities occurring in the sense organs and brain? The basic nature and characteristics of the two types of phenomena appear to be totally disjoint when viewed in their own terms. This seemingly fundamental disparity remains one of the main challenges to a purely physicalist worldview. Cartesian-style dualistic ontologies constitute a standard alternative model. According to the version put forth by Leibniz, the two realms are postulated to be separate and independent, but to progress through time in parallel according to a 'pre-established harmony'. This theoretical picture accommodates both the detected correlation between phenomenological

Recebido em mai. 2009 Aprovado em jun. 2009 TÁRIK DE ATHAYDE PRATA * PODE-SE EXPLICAR A CONSCIÊNCIA ATRAVÉS DE PROCESSOS CEREBRAIS? OS ARGUMENTOS DE JOHN SEARLE CONTRA A CONCEPÇÃO DE THOMAS NAGEL RESUMO O artigo analisa os argumentos de Searle contra a tese da lacuna explanatória, tal como ele a vê na teoria de Thomas Nagel. Seus argumentos (cf. seções III e IV) -baseados num exame do conceito de necessidade -exibem diversas fragilidades, de modo que ele fracassa em refutar a referida tese.

Today's mobile networks are moving towards creating base stations and mobile stations that are compatible with many standards simultaneously. One way of achieving it is to reconfigure and time multiplex the processing resources based on the present necessity. Field Programmable Gate Arrays have become one of the best choices for implementing digital signal processing and Software Defined Radio platforms due to advancements in VLSI over the past few decades. Partial Reconfiguration has regained its importance in the last decade and is the one of the best methodologies to implement an Software Defined Radio. This paper presents an implementation of physical layer specifications of IEEE 802.11g using dynamic partial reconfiguration on FPGA. The Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) Physical layer is implemented with various encoding and modulation schemes to achieve different data rates. The design has been implemented in Xilinx Virtex-5 board.

Martin Lenz introduces Spinoza to us as a bundle theorist of mind, for whom there cannot be a single finite mind. Since Spinoza conceives of the mind as the idea of the body, there will be a bodily side to any reinterpretation of his theory of mind. This contribution embarks on what could be characterized as a corporeal interlude to Lenz's Spinozist theory of mind. I investigate what follows for Lenz's theory if one takes into account more explicitly the structural complexity of the attribute of extension, expressing itself in the plurality and variability of bodies. While Lenz reads Spinoza through a lens of intersubjectivity and parallelism, my reflection leads to the consideration that the plurality and variability of bodies might call for a transindividual rather than an intersubjective account and suggests conceiving of body and mind as equal rather than parallel. This could complicate Lenz's account of the identity of the mind over time. But such a complication would be a boon rather than a problem. It invites developing Lenz's thought beyond what the context of his book allows, helping us to navigate the intricate dynamics in which we strive for our bodies to become more capable and our minds more eternal.

The dissonance between kinematic reality and narrative verisimilitude in high-concept fiction has precipitated a profound epistemological crisis. Contemporary exegesis remains paralyzed by a bifurcated fallacy: the Materialist Negation, which dismisses conceptual phenomena as mere simulacra, and the Multiverse Conjecture, which relies on ad hoc stipulations of infinite variability. This paper delineates the systemic insolvency of these prevailing paradigms. By interrogating the ontological boundaries between the atomic and the noetic, we identify a critical lacuna in classical mechanics. We posit that the answer lies not in the proliferation of physical universes, but in the recognition of a distinct, autopoietic dynamic system that operates under a radically different set of energetic constraints.

Measurement problem in quantum theory is informed by the difficulties which howbeit, fall under philosophical investigation involving the behavior of sub-atomic particles, especially as it has to do with interaction between the mental and the physical. This problem dates back to antiquity with the belief in the duality of mind and body (mental and material) as distinct essences of nature. This paper is an attempt to highlight the issues involved in the measurement problem in quantum theory, while at the same time showing that the resultant paradoxes encountered in the process have always been present; they are just a resuscitation of ancient problems that philosophers have reflected upon as regards the description of physical reality.

This article examines Descartes' philosophical thought within the framework of the problem of the self. Descartes approaches the quest for certain and true knowledge on an epistemological basis. Unlike his predecessors, he does not frame this quest ontologically, but rather as a process concerning the source and legitimacy of knowledge. In order to attain clear and distinct knowledge, Descartes employs doubt as a methodological tool and systematically questions all beliefs whose truth cannot be guaranteed. In this context, he proceeds by directing his doubt first toward sensory experience, and then toward propositions acquired through reasoning. This sustained process of methodological doubt leads him, through rational intuition, to a piece of knowledge whose certainty cannot be doubted: the existence of the self. Thus, Descartes positions the self as the foundational ground of certain knowledge. In his philosophical approach, he addresses the problem of the self through the question of quidditas-that is, the inquiry of "what" something is. The question "What am I?" does not aim at a singular or individual entity, but rather seeks a universal definition applicable to the human species. A quidditative inquiry aims to define a being by the essential characteristics that distinguish it from others. Accordingly, an investigation into the nature of the human being seeks to produce a definition that transcends individual differences and holds universally. The aim of this article is to examine Descartes' account of the self within the framework of the concept of quidditas.

The purpose of this research is to discuss the problem of the nature of the mind, the place of mind in experience, and the relation of mind and experience to reality at large. Morris aims to show that thought and mind are not entities, nor even processes involving a physical substance distinguishable from the rest of reality, but are explicable as the functioning of parts of experience as symbol to an oganism of other parts of experience. Being then the symbolic portion of experience, the physical or mental can neither be sharply opposed to the rest of experience nor identified with the whole of experience. Since experience will be shown to be a portion of reality, it follows that mind and reality can never be utterly separated nor indiscriminately identified. A functional view of mind gives a new basis for the interpretation of philosophical problems.

Öz Felsefe tarihinde çok önemli bir yere sahip olan Descartes'ın Cogito ergo sum yani Düşünüyorum öyleyse varım olarak bilinen argümanı bilgi sistemindeki kesinlik arayışında Descartes'a Arşimet noktası oluşturmuştur. Öyle ki Cogito argümanı Descartes'ın Birinci Meditasyon'da ortaya koyduğu kötü niyetli cin hipotezini bile aşmasına olanak sağlayarak sağlam bir hareket noktası ol muştur. Özellikle İkinci Meditasyon'a bakıldığında, Cogito'nun açıkça zikredilmeden "düşünce"nin bir tek kendisine ait olduğunu ve kendisini "düşünen ben", "düşünen akıl", "düşünen varlık" gibi nitelendirmelerle ifade eden Descartes, düşünen ben'i ile var oluşu arasındaki ilişkiyi keşfetmiş bunun yanında kendi "Ben"ini bir muamma olarak tanımlamaktan da geri durmamıştır. Nitekim "Ben"in işlevi literatürde halen tartışılmaktadır. Bunun yanında, Cogito argümanı, daha Descartes'ın kendi döneminde, bir çıkarım mı yoksa kıyas mı olduğu yönünde tartışmalara konu olmuştur. Bu yazının Giriş bölümünde söz konusu tartışmalar İtirazlar-Cevaplar bağlamında ele alınacaktır. Ayrıca, özellikle Jaakko Hintikka, Cogito argümanının bir çıkarım değil, performans olduğunu ileri sürmüştür. Descartes, Cogito'yu bir kıyas olarak mı yoksa kıyas olmayan bir çıkarım olarak mı yoksa performatif bir edim olarak mı ele almaktadır? İlk olarak Cogito argümanının genel olarak işlevine değinilecek ardından İkinci Meditasyon'da bulunan Cogito argümanının alt argümanları Anthony Kenny'nin analizi doğrultusunda ortaya konulmaya çalışılacaktır. Daha sonra, Hintikka'nın Cogito argümanının performans olduğuna dair iddiaları aktarıldıktan sonra, Cogito argümanındaki "ben"in zamir olarak işlevi ve Cogito'nun çıkarım olup olmadığına yönelik tartışmaları özellikle Analitik felsefe geleneğinden gelen bazı filozofların yorumları ışığında irdelenecektir. Sonuç olarak Descartes'ın Cogito argümanının hem çıkarım hem de performans yönü gösterilmeye çalışılacaktır.

When Copernicus and Galileo proposed that the earth circled the sun and not the 217 other way around, Christian believers faced the difficult prospect of surrendering a long-held belief that had seemingly undeniable support from the biblical text. After all, Joshua reported that the sun, not the earth, stood still; what could this mean if not that the sun orbited the earth? Today, centuries later, believers unanimously hold a heliocentric view of the solar system and are somewhat embarrassed by the ignorance of our pre-Enlightenment brothers and sisters. Ironically, however, such embarrassment masks the possibility that we ourselves may one day be found guilty of having held notions yet to be realized as "backwards." We face just such a possibility with our conception of the Holy Spirit's presence. It is my suspicion that, contrary to some of our most trenchant modern sensibilities, we are mistaken when we construe the presence of the Spirit in largely individualistic terms. Yet in this case, it is not the biblical text that is misleading. In contrast, a close inspection of the biblical record and of its earliest interpreters re-Veals that the earliest Christians naturally tmderstood the presence of God's Spirit primarily in corporate rather than individualistic terms. The holism that marks first-and second-century conceptions of commw'li.ty life tends to strike our modern ears as a form of primitive hocus-pocus. However, Very recent discussions of" emergence" and "supervenience" in philosophical circles may provide us moderns with the conceptual resources necessary for better owning the biblical record. In this paper, I will argue that biblical notions of the Spirit's "indwelling" and "filling" ought to be primarily understood as descriptive of the Spirit's relation to the believing community and perhaps only secondarily in rela-Since the Enlightenment, systematic theologies have almost invariably described the Holy Spirit in terms of an interface between God and huma11 individuals qua individuals. Since the biblical text leans the other way, there are good reasons for seeking out better conceptual resolU•ces for understanding the presence of the Holy Spirit than can be offered by reductive theories of metaphysics that became so influential in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This paper surveys recent work in supervenience and emergentism in order to suggest Ways for recapturing a more holistic, which is to say more biblical, pneumatology. Brad J.

You know," says Eric R. Braverman, M.D. tongue planted firmly in cheek, "medical science has made a remarkable anatomical discovery. For most people, the head is attached to the rest of the body." And it is with this favorite quip that a renowned M.D. begins The Edge Effect, his new book about brain-based medicine. In a format written for the layperson's benefit, Dr. Braverman shares the fruit of his twentyfive years of research and clinical practice: to maintain total health, and reverse illness and disease, one must start the way most of us came into this world-head first. In contrast to long ago when Dr. Braverman was working with other pioneers without recognition in labs at Harvard, incorporating the brain in health assessment has received a lot of attention recently 1,2,3 . "Sure, there have been a lot of books lately about the brain," Dr. Braverman says. "And they have value. But none tells the whole story. One covers diet, and ignores hormones. Another talks about hormones, but doesn't mention supplements. There are plenty about psychology, with nothing about the underlying brain chemistry. If we are going to treat holistically, it's obvious that we have to include the brain. But we have to include the whole brain: chemistry, electricity, psychology, and cognition." The Edge Effect does just that. Would you rather be treated by multiple specialists who would use multiple drugs and procedures, over multiple visits taking months or years, for symptoms such as irritable bowel, hyperventilation, and clammy hands-or would you rather just take some inositol and B vitamins to restore the brain chemical that is responsible for these symptoms? Is this an oversimplification? "Not at all," says Dr. Braverman. "Big problems start as small ones. "Your body is the same. We all have times when we don't feel quite right. We lose our edge, and that can be perfectly normal. But when a condition persists, your body is telling you something, something you shouldn't ignore," Dr. Braverman says. The Edge Effect cites some examples of how we dismiss symptoms and learn to 'live with' them. If we start forgetting things, we're just getting older; if we're constipated, we just have to eat better; if our sex drive is diminished, it's just stress; if we

You know," says Eric R. Braverman, M.D. tongue planted firmly in cheek, "medical science has made a remarkable anatomical discovery. For most people, the head is attached to the rest of the body." And it is with this favorite quip that a renowned M.D. begins The Edge Effect, his new book about brain-based medicine. In a format written for the layperson's benefit, Dr. Braverman shares the fruit of his twentyfive years of research and clinical practice: to maintain total health, and reverse illness and disease, one must start the way most of us came into this world-head first. In contrast to long ago when Dr. Braverman was working with other pioneers without recognition in labs at Harvard, incorporating the brain in health assessment has received a lot of attention recently 1,2,3 . "Sure, there have been a lot of books lately about the brain," Dr. Braverman says. "And they have value. But none tells the whole story. One covers diet, and ignores hormones. Another talks about hormones, but doesn't mention supplements. There are plenty about psychology, with nothing about the underlying brain chemistry. If we are going to treat holistically, it's obvious that we have to include the brain. But we have to include the whole brain: chemistry, electricity, psychology, and cognition." The Edge Effect does just that. Would you rather be treated by multiple specialists who would use multiple drugs and procedures, over multiple visits taking months or years, for symptoms such as irritable bowel, hyperventilation, and clammy hands-or would you rather just take some inositol and B vitamins to restore the brain chemical that is responsible for these symptoms? Is this an oversimplification? "Not at all," says Dr. Braverman. "Big problems start as small ones. "Your body is the same. We all have times when we don't feel quite right. We lose our edge, and that can be perfectly normal. But when a condition persists, your body is telling you something, something you shouldn't ignore," Dr. Braverman says. The Edge Effect cites some examples of how we dismiss symptoms and learn to 'live with' them. If we start forgetting things, we're just getting older; if we're constipated, we just have to eat better; if our sex drive is diminished, it's just stress; if we

Cet article interroge, dans une perspective historique et épistémologique, la manière dont la linguistique cognitive du demi-siècle passé a pris en compte (ou non) le contexte dans les opérations mentales de réception/ interprétation et de production langagière auxquelles elle s’est, dès son fondement, attachée. L’axe de réflexion est l’opposition internalisme vs externalisme et la question posée est celle de la prise en compte du poids et de l’existence de ce qui relève, dans la cognition linguistique, de la réalité (matérielle et culturelle). Sont abordés le traitement du contexte dans les linguistiques cognitives depuis Chomsky et celui du mind-body problem dans les courants hétérodoxes de la cognition située à partir des années 1990. Des propositions sont faites pour une meilleure intégration des environnements de la production verbale aux analyses linguistiques dans une perspective cognitive.

A large literature suggests that people are intuitive Dualists-they tend to perceive the mind as ethereal, distinct from the body. Here, we ask whether Dualism emanates from within the human psyche, guided, in part, by theory of mind (ToM). Past research has shown that males are poorer mindreaders than females. If ToM begets Dualism, then males should exhibit weaker Dualism, and instead, lean towards Physicalism (i.e., they should view bodies and minds alike). Experiments 1-2 show that males indeed perceive the psyche as more embodied-as more likely to emerge in a replica of one's body, and less likely to persist in its absence (after life). Experiment 3 further shows that males are less inclined towards Empiricism-a putative byproduct of Dualism. A final analysis confirms that males' ToM scores are lower, and ToM scores further correlate with embodiment intuitions (in Experiments 1-2). These observations (from Western participants) cannot establish universality, but the association of Dualism with ToM suggests its roots are psychological. Thus, the illusory mind-body divide may arise from the very workings of the human mind. A large literature suggests that people are intuitive Dualists-they tend to consider the mind as ethereal, distinct from the body 1-17 . For example, people believe that one's psychological traits (e.g., thinking about one's wife) can persist in the afterlife, without one's body . Conversely, if one's body were to be duplicated, the replica, people state, would preserve one's physical characteristics (e.g., a scar), but not one's knowledge and beliefs . Although most of the experimental evidence for Dualism is obtained from Western participants, non-Western participants likewise contrast minds and bodies . This is in line with the ethnographic record, demonstrating that beliefs in the afterlife (i.e., disembodied self) and in disembodied supernatural beings (e.g., deities, spirits and ghosts) are prevalent across cultures . For Western participants, however, intuitive Dualism can be especially detrimental, as it interferes with scientific literacy , it promotes stigma (e.g., towards psychiatric patients) and biases judgements of criminal justice and moral responsibility . Why people might be Dualists, however, is unclear. One possibility is that Dualism is the product of culture-it arises entirely via learning. While learning can, no doubt, propagate Dualism, the learning account fails to explain why intuitive Dualism is so pervasive across cultures. On an alternative account, intuitive Dualism is natural for humans-it arises from two core principles that lie deep within human cognition. One such principle is intuitive physics; the other is theory of mind . Per intuitive physics, people consider objects as cohesive entities that can only move by immediate contact, and this knowledge manifests in early infancy . For example, upon seeing one moving ball contact another (stationary) ball, infants expect the stationary ball to launch immediately. So, if the launch is delayed, infants are surprised-a response evident already in newborns . Theory of mind (ToM), however, leads us to attribute the actions of agents to their mental states-to their beliefs, knowledge, desires and goals . Thus, upon seeing a person reach their hand towards a water bottle, one would spontaneously infer that the person believes there is water in the bottle, and it is this belief that caused their hand to move. This inference, however, blatantly violates intuitive physics, as it presumes that the agent's hand (a physical object) can move spontaneously, in the absence of contact with another physical objects. And that violation of intuitive physics is bound to elicit cognitive tension. To resolve the dissonance, people might presume that mental states-the causes of the agents' movement-aren't physical. Thus, the tension between intuitive ToM and intuitive physics can explain how intuitive Dualism arises naturally. The hypothesis that Dualism is natural also generates a testable prediction. If Dualism arises (in part) from ToM, then if ToM were to be attenuated, then so should intuitive Dualism 35 . Recent results from autistic people bear this prediction out 42 . A large literature suggests that autistic people are less adept at reading the minds of others . If autism attenuates ToM, and ToM begets Dualism, then in people with autism, the mind-body divide ought to be attenuated. Moreover, Dualist intuitions ought to correlate

A New Philosophy of Music Education. Oxford Universy Press) has recently posed the view that musical understanding is to equated with musicianship. This epistemological turn to musical 'know-how' in the philosophy of music education has faced opposition as well as acceptance. Our paper examines this question of the body in relation to music and movement, which has been raised by Elliott and which was also Émile Jaques-Dalcroze's major pedagogical concern. The general aim of the paper is to show the relevance of the philosophical question of the body in practical music education. This paper discusses attempts to avoid a kind of dualism in which music is either a mental-spiritual experience, which transcends the bodily pleasure, or a somatic experience of 'flesh and blood'. The ideas of Jaques-Dalcroze and Elliott are examined in relation to recent philosophical discussion on the question of the 'body-mind' with particular reference to the views presented by pragmatists emanating from John Dewey's philosophy. We argue that the body can be taken as a conscious object of transformation within a framework of 'holistic duality' rather than dualism, and that this idea should be more consciously considered and applied to research and practice in music education.

A semelhança entre o padrão de interação dos neurônios do cérebro humano e a colônia de formigas torna esta última objeto da hipótese de ser uma estrutura apta a ter uma consciência. Assim, neste artigo, a definição de Thomas Nagel da consciência como algo que é ser para um organismo se torna basilar para o exame dela como um possível sujeito experiencial. A colônia de formigas, se considerada um organismo, poderia ser um sujeito apto a ter experiências internas. Por isso, neste artigo, eu desenvolvo com base no Pampsiquismo, critérios de análise da colônia, apresentando quais características ela deve atender para ser qualificada como consciente. Dessa maneira, ela se torna um modelo apropriado para o exame da relação corpo-mente. Não defendo que a colônia de formigas é um organismo genuíno, mas que, caso seja, terá algum tipo de experiência consciente. No tratamento dessa questão, eu examino se a colônia é um indivíduo biológico, e, em seguida, se é possível que as mentes das formi...

The main features of early rehabilitation after severe brain damage are discussed in the article. The most important component for the entire rehabilitation process and the subsequent life of the patient is considered restoration of consciousness. Team seems to be a key factor in regaining consciousness along with the restoration of vital functions, movement, cognition, and behavior in these patients. The basic working principle is feedback to any minimal movement, or vegetative signal of a patient, beyond specific professional targets. A network of feedbacks with a patient and between professionals, that is, free flow of information, can be built only through work in a transdisciplinary team mode. The net of feedbacks with the patient and inter-professional ones builds up the team as Non-linear Complex System. Characteristics of "Team-Patient" system status are energy, entropy, and complexity. Teamwork techniques are individualized for resulting optimization of system condition. Increase of complexity is a powerful tool for propulsion of recovery process. Then consciousness may appear as a result of system self-organization. The article reflects the authors' view on interdisciplinary studies of the phenomenon of consciousness through its impairment and recovery. It focuses on the work of the "proper rehabilitation team", the mechanisms of its action and methods for researching the occurring phenomena.

Descartes's arguments in support of his claim that the mind is an immaterial substance are examined and found wanting. But despite the flaws in his dualistic view of the mind, Descartes has fascinating and important things to say about how much of human experience involves an ‘intermingling’ of mind and body. There are still philosophical lessons to be learnt from Descartes's legacy.