Voluntary Action

Few ideas are as inexorable as the arrow of causation: causes must precede their effects. Explicit or implicit knowledge about this causal order permits humans and other animals to predict and control events in order to produce desired outcomes. The sense of agency is deeply linked with representation of causation, since it involves the experience of a self-capable of acting on the world. Since causes must precede effects, the perceived temporal order of our actions and subsequent events should be relevant to the sense of agency. The present study investigated whether the ability to predict the outcome of an action would impose the classical cause-precedes-outcome pattern on temporal order judgements. Participants indicated whether a visual stimulus (dots moving upward or downward) was presented either before or after voluntary actions of the left or right hand. Crucially, the dot motion could be either congruent or incongruent with an operant association between hand and motion dir...

Few ideas are as inexorable as the arrow of causation: causes must precede their effects. Explicit or implicit knowledge about this causal order permits humans and other animals to predict and control events in order to produce desired outcomes. The sense of agency is deeply linked with representation of causation, since it involves the experience of a self-capable of acting on the world. Since causes must precede effects, the perceived temporal order of our actions and subsequent events should be relevant to the sense of agency. The present study investigated whether the ability to predict the outcome of an action would impose the classical cause-precedes-outcome pattern on temporal order judgements. Participants indicated whether a visual stimulus (dots moving upward or downward) was presented either before or after voluntary actions of the left or right hand. Crucially, the dot motion could be either congruent or incongruent with an operant association between hand and motion direction learned in a previous learning phase. When the visual outcome of voluntary action was congruent with previous learning, the motion onset was more often perceived as occurring after the action, compared to when the outcome was incongruent. This suggests that the prediction of specific sensory outcomes restructures our perception of timing of action and sensory events, inducing the experience that congruent effects occur after participants' actions. Interestingly, this bias to perceive events according to the temporal order of cause and outcome disappeared when participants knew that motion directions were automatically generated by the computer. This suggests that the reorganisation of time perception imposed by associative learning depends on participants' causal beliefs.

This study examined whether the dispositional sense of agency modulates ideomotor learning and the implicit acquisition of action-effect sequences. Two experiments using a serial reaction time task were conducted, differing only in the structure of RE mappings: a compatible, structured mapping (Experiment 1) versus an incompatible, unpredictable mapping (Experiment 2). Across both experiments, participants responded to visual stimuli embedded in a repeating sequence, with each response triggering a tone. Dispositional agency, assessed through the French sense of agency scale, enhanced sequence learning in Experiment 1: participants with higher scores on the sense of positive agency subscale exhibited faster reaction times, greater disruption following sequence change and stronger recovery after reinstatement. This effect was absent in Experiment 2, suggesting that dispositional agency supports learning only when RE contingencies are coherent. Situational agency, measured at key task points, followed similar patterns but was not significantly modulated by dispositional agency. Post-experimental interviews revealed limited explicit awareness of the sequence structure. These findings suggest that dispositional agency enhances predictive learning under structured conditions, without guaranteeing explicit access to learned regularities. The results underscore the critical role of RE structure in shaping learning and the subjective experience of control.

Analysis of the current technological transformation of American culture by AI, the threat of radical robotization, the responsive strategy of desecularization, and the potential leadership role of classical American philanthropy in that process.

Il saggio ricostruisce la storia del concetto di intelletto dalla filosofia greca classica fino al dibattito medievale tra Averroè e Tommaso d'Aquino, con una nota conclusiva sul suo rapporto con il Cogito cartesiano.
Il percorso prende avvio da Socrate, la cui affermazione «so di non sapere» non è una resa intellettuale ma la fondazione di un rapporto riflessivo e dinamico con la conoscenza. Segue la trattazione degli Stoici — con Seneca come voce principale — che elaborarono la nozione di logos come principio razionale insieme cosmico e individuale, valorizzando l'interiorità come luogo privilegiato della verità. Aristotele fornisce poi il quadro psicologico sistematico nel De Anima, ma introduce con la distinzione tra intelletto possibile e intelletto agente un'ambiguità destinata ad alimentare secoli di dibattito.
È attorno a questa ambiguità che si confrontano i due protagonisti medievali. Averroè sostiene che l'intelletto materiale è un'unica sostanza separata e universale, comune a tutta l'umanità (monopsichismo): posizione filosoficamente coerente ma incompatibile con la dottrina cristiana dell'immortalità personale. Tommaso d'Aquino, nel De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas, risponde che l'intelletto è la forma propria dell'anima individuale: è questo uomo che pensa, non una sostanza cosmica esterna.
Il saggio conclude individuando in questa lunga tradizione una continuità sotterranea con il Cogito ergo sum cartesiano: la certezza riflessiva dell'atto intellettivo come proprio, da Socrate a Seneca fino a Tommaso, prepara la formulazione moderna del soggetto pensante — pur con la differenza cruciale che il soggetto antico e medievale rimane sempre, a differenza di quello cartesiano, un soggetto incarnato.

Variability is an operant dimension of behavior so the degree of variability observed depends upon the reinforcement contingency. One approach to reinforcing variations is the threshold procedure, in which a particular response or response pattern, out of several possible ones, produces reinforcement if it occurs infrequently relative to other responses. Behavioral variability is also associated with clinically relevant populations. Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) tend to behave in a highly repetitive manner compared to controls, whereas individuals with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) tend to behave in a highly variable manner. The purpose of the first experiment was to assess whether the BALB/c mouse strain, a proposed murine model of behavioral deficits associated with ASD, also models invariant responding characteristic of ASD compared to control, C57Bl/6 mice. Behavioral variability is imperative to the acquisition of novel responses, i.e., learning. Concurrent reinforcement of operant variations facilitates the acquisition of a difficult response. The purpose of the second experiment was to determine whether a history of variable responding during a critical period of development, adolescence, affects learning in adulthood using an Incremental Repeated Acquisition (IRA) task with a Performance and Learning condition. On the IRA task, performance sessions approximate behavioral repetitions because the target response does not change from session to session whereas learning sessions require organisms to acquire a new target response each session.

Understanding the evolutionary origins of altruistic punishment, a critical mechanism sustaining cooperation, remains a central challenge in behavioural science. Voluntary participation is considered a powerful approach that enables its emergence, but its explanatory power typically rests on the common assumption that non-participants have no impact on the public good. Yet, given the decentralized nature of voluntary participation, opting out does not necessarily preclude individuals from influencing the public good. Here, we revisit the role of voluntary participation by allowing non-participants to exert either positive or negative impacts on the public good. Using evolutionary analysis in a well-mixed finite population, we find that positive externalities from non-participants lower the synergy threshold required for altruistic punishment to dominate. In contrast, negative externalities raise this threshold, making altruistic punishment harder to sustain. Notably, when non-participants have positive impacts, altruistic punishment thrives only if non-participation is incentivized, whereas under negative impacts, it can persist even when non-participation is discouraged. Our findings reveal that efforts to promote altruistic punishment must account for the active role of non-participants, whose influence can make or break collective outcomes.

The capacity to inhibit actions is central to voluntary motor control. However, the control mechanisms and subjective experience involved in voluntarily stopping an involuntary movement remain poorly understood. Here we examined, in humans, the voluntary inhibition of the Kohnstamm phenomenon, in which sustained voluntary contraction of shoulder abductors is followed by involuntary arm raising. Participants were instructed to stop the involuntary movement, hold the arm in a constant position, and 'release' the inhibition after ∼2s. Participants achieved this by modulating agonist muscle activity, rather than by antagonist contraction. Specifically, agonist muscle activity plateaued during this voluntary inhibition, and resumed its previous increase thereafter. There was no discernible antagonist activation. Thus, some central signal appeared to temporarily counter the involuntary motor drive, without directly affecting the Kohnstamm generator itself. We hypothesise a form of...

This paper proposes the Timing Theory of Conscious Will, a novel reinterpretation of the Libet Effect based on phase-wave dynamics and collapse timing modulation. The theory argues that conscious will does not initiate neural actions but regulates the timing (t_c) at which pre-motor phase waves collapse into a final behavioral trajectory. The paper provides a formal model, resolves classical paradoxes, and introduces a four-condition experimental paradigm for empirical testing. It positions free will as temporal control and defines consciousness as a neural timing regulator.



This work is an exploratory contribution situated within the IPCSALT–UPF phase-based meta-framework.

Sense of Agency (SoA) is a core concept related to our experience as intentional agents in our environment. Explicit and implicit measures have been used to study SoA. Recent findings suggest that the most common implicit measure, namely Temporal Binding (TB), may reflect memory processes rather than SoA. Here, we implemented two TB measures and an explicit measure in a novel goal-directed extended action task to better understand SoA measures. Participants either watched or produced dot movements to a target of choice and then estimated the duration between two tones that played either upon movement completion (TB1, akin to traditional TB studies) or based on the start and end of movements (TB2). Participants reported stronger explicit SoA during active than passive movements. Results from neither TB version aligned with prediction based on TB-accounts as a reflection of SoA. We discuss memory-based and scaling accounts as alternative interpretations for our data.

We investigated adults' voluntary control of 20 facial action units theoretically associated with 6 basic emotions (happiness, fear, anger, surprise, sadness, and disgust). Twenty young adults were shown video excerpts of facial action units and asked to reproduce them as accurately as possible. Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1978a) coding of the facial productions showed that young adults succeeded in activating 18 of the 20 target actions units, although they often coactivated other action units. Voluntary control was clearly better for some action units than for others, with a pattern of differences between action units consistent with previous work in children and adolescents.

The Brazilian Atlantic Forest harbors the world's richest areas of land planarians (Platyhelminthes: Tricladida). Nevertheless, the number of undiscovered species from this biological unit remains seemingly high. Herein we describe Geoplana piriana Almeida & Carbayo, sp. nov. from the state of Rio de Janeiro, and Geoplana tingauna Kishimoto & Carbayo, sp. nov. from the state of Santa Catarina. Each species shows a dorsum with a unique color pattern among Geoplaninae species. Their internal morphology also differs: G. piriana sp. nov. shows a unique combination of features, including an extrabulbar, non-bifurcated prostatic vesicle, a non-folded male atrium, a horizontal, cylindrical penis papilla, a female atrium anteriorly narrowed, and lined with an epithelium with multilayered aspect. Geoplana tingauna sp. nov. possesses a prostatic vesicle constituted of a pair of branches opening into the very distal portion of a tubular, unpaired portion, a feature not seen in other Geoplaninae species.

Resumen de los libros primero (I), segundo (II) y tercero (III) de la obra Ética a Nicómaco del autor griego Aristóteles. Un resumen por capítulos de cada uno de los primeros tres libros. Los temas que trata el autor en los primeros tres libros son:
- Libro I: Sobre la felicidad
- Libro II: Naturaleza de la virtud ética
- Libro III: Acciones voluntarias e involuntarias

The intent of this paper is to establish a non-reductive neural base for the conscious self and freedom. Given (1) the dependency of consciousness or the conscious self on the neural brain (2) established correlates between mental (cognitive) and neural states, (3) the persistent claim for 'free will' exhibited in human praxis, an attempt is made to continue the debate on 'free will' in the light of Libet's claim that "readiness potential" precedes the "will to act"? Do we need to locate, detect or create consciousness or the conscious self before we can accept it? We know that conscious self is contingent or related to the physical brain, but until (or unless) we can establish what role non-neural elements (temperature, pressure, neural oscillations and sleep) play in making 'conscious self' possible we cannot detect, locate or create the conscious self. All we know is that conscious self or consciousness is related to the physical brain, but it could be a fundamental property of the physical universe-as such not only related to the physical but related to the laws of physics. Consciousness is contingent or related to the physical brain but we do not know whether it is purely physical (as Dennett claims), whether it is reductive (as Smart suggests), whether it is non-reductive (as Chalmers claims), whether it is irreducible (as Searle claims), or whether it is immaterial (as Sartre claims). Consciousness is an existential/emergent mode of being and so is 'free will', hence only existentially detectable. The emergence of consciousness from organic sentience gives rise to the phenomenal, intentional, functional, moral and the existential but non-reductive self. The detectable genetic and neural activity generates the non-reductive 'state consciousness' (Rosenthal), which I shall call existential sentience. It is existential sentience' (the awareness that we are conscious) that is responsible for the self, which is nonreductive though organic in its roots. All creatures exhibit levels of sentience but human sentience exhibits something unique -the awareness of being conscious. The awareness that we are conscious to begin with is selfawareness. So belief in the conscious existential self is basic if one is to accept the phenomenal, functional, moral, and volitional self.

Research on voluntary action has focused on the question of how we represent our behavior on a motor and cognitive level. However, the question of how we represent voluntary not acting has been completely neglected. The aim of the present study was to investigate the cognitive and motor representation of intentionally not acting. By using an action-effect binding approach, we demonstrate similarities of action and nonaction. In particular, our results reveal that voluntary nonactions can be bound to an effect tone. This finding suggests that effect binding is not restricted to an association between a motor representation and a successive effect (action-effect binding) but can also occur for an intended nonaction and its effect (nonaction-effect binding). Moreover, we demonstrate that nonactions have to be initiated voluntarily in order to elicit nonaction-effect binding.

La nota ascendenza aristotelica del pensiero di Tommaso risuona chiaramente nella ripetuta espressione «bonum est quod omnia appetunt;., attorno alla quale l'Aquinate elabora la sua agatologia. Per evitare indebite semplificazioni del suo significato, occorre risalire all'espressione originaria greca, che Tommaso traduce dal I libro dell'Etica a Nicomaco di Aristotele: où mxv-r I È<f!Lé:'t'CH 1 . I commentatori sono concordi nel riconoscere in questa espressione un'eco del pensiero di Eudosso d i Cnino, più diffusamente citato nel X libro dell'Etica a Nicomacd. Ivi, Aristotele presenta la duplice forma del ragionamento di Eudosso circa la tendenza relativa al bene. Per un verso costui afferma che «tutti gli esseri tendono (È<fitɵ.evcx) ad esso .. e per altro verso constata il fatto che "tutti sono portati (<f!Épecr&cxt) alla stessa cosa•. Il verbo impiegato nella seconda espressione è il termine tecnico che designa il movimento di traslazione degli astri, di cui proprio Eudosso aveva elaborato la teoria 3 . Se si volesse rendere

Many people with Tourette syndrome (TS) are able to volitionally suppress tics, under certain circumstances. To better understand the neural mechanisms that underlie this ability, we used functional magnetic resonance neuroimaging (fMRI) to track regional brain activity during performance of an intentional inhibition task. On some trials, TS and comparison (non-TS) participants chose to make or withhold a motor action (a button press), while on other trials, they followed 'Go' and 'NoGo' instructions to make or withhold the same button press action. Using representational similarity analysis, an fMRI multivariate pattern analysis technique, we assessed how TS and comparison participants differed in neural activity when internally choosing to make or to withhold an action, relative to externally-cued responses on Go and NoGo trials. Analyses were pre-registered, and the data and code are publicly available. We considered similarity of action representations within regions implicated as critical to motor action release or inhibition, and to symptom expression in TS, namely the pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), insula, caudate nucleus, and primary motor cortex (M1). Strikingly, in the TS compared to comparison group, neural activity within preSMA displayed greater representational similarity across all action types. There was lower response-specific differentiation within preSMA of action and inhibition plans, and of internally chosen and externally-cued actions, implicating the region as a functional nexus in the symptomatology of TS. Correspondingly, patients with TS may experience volitional tic suppression as an effortful and tiring process because, at the top of the putative motor decision hierarchy, activity within the population of neurons facilitating action is overly similar to activity within the population of neurons promoting inhibition. Group differences in representational similarity were also present in M1. Here, representations of internally-chosen and externallycued inhibition were more differentiated in the TS group than in the comparison group, potentially a consequence of a weaker voluntary capacity earlier in the motor hierarchy to proactively suppress action. Tic severity and premonitory sensations correlated with M1 and caudate nucleus representational similarity, but these effects did not survive correction for multiple comparisons. In summary, more rigid preSMA neural coding across action categories may constitute a central feature of TS, which can account for patients' experience of 'unvoluntary' tics, and effortful tic suppression.

The purpose of this study is to determine whether nonprofits that serve a membership (that is, mutual nonprofits) have more in common with cooperatives (also member-oriented associations) than with nonprofits that are oriented toward the public. A MANOVA was used to analyze the effect of organizational type of which there were four categories (publicly oriented nonprofits, mutual nonprofits, cooperatives without shares, and cooperatives with shares) on the five dependent measures (social objectives, volunteer participation, democratic decision making, government dependence, and market reliance) derived from the social economy framework. The results offer some support for the hypothesis that serving a membership is an important factor in the basic characteristics of an organization, and that is true regardless of whether the incorporation is nonprofit or cooperative. However, charitable status also appeared to influence on the results. The implications for the social economy and civi...

The present essay discusses perception as action of both the object and of the soul in medieval Latin commentaries on Aristotle’s De sensu et sensato. Beginning with the Aristotelian principle that sensible qualities are defined by their ability to act on the external senses so as to engender sensations, we first explore medieval positions concerning the thorny issue of whether sensible qualities can remain active even when they are present in extremely small quantities of matter. Then we turn to the activity of the soul, which was discussed in relation to the ability to perceive several perceptual qualities simultaneously. Many medieval authors emphasised that powers of the soul have an active role in the process of perception, as they form judgements and pay attention to the objects of the senses. The final section of the essay is dedicated to a case study of Walter Burley. New evidence coming from manuscript research suggests that Burley may have been one of the medieval Latin thinkers who considered the concept of action in detail while commenting on De sensu. In particular, we discuss the hypothesis that Burley may have authored a question commentary on De sensu which is preserved in ms. London, British Library, Add. 18630, ff. 54r-67v and attributed to him in the manuscript. Although the authorship of the text remains uncertain, we show that this commentary is identical with a hitherto anonymous De sensu commentary preserved in ms. Oxford, Merton College, 276, ff. 1ra-8vb. Moreover, we claim that this commentary has strong ties with another question commentary on De sensu that has been attributed to Burley in secondary literature and we present some preliminary observations concerning the complex relation of both works with Burley’s literal commentary on De sensu. We argue that these commentaries bear witness to the main alternative positions concerning both issues discussed in this essay. Therefore, if Burley wrote all of them, his case would represent a remarkable example of the liveliness of the debate about the active aspects of perception within the medieval Latin De sensu commentary tradition.

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This article explore the relationship between the structural understanding of crimes (i.e. the identification of offence elements) and the development of the definitional general part (i.e. how offence elements should be defined and applied). In particular, I am concerned with ‘multi-event’ offences, where D’s ulterior mens rea relates to a future conduct event to be completed by D or another. This includes inchoate offences such as conspiracy; complicity liability; as well as so-called prior fault criminalisation. I contend that structural misunderstanding of these offences has led to a definitional deficit, creating a series of (seemingly) intractable problems that can only be addressed through a reimagining of the definitional general part.

This paper explores the ways in which libertarian natural rights theories have confronted the environmental challenges brought about by property acquisition. It has three aims: first, to challenge some supposed libertarians on the issues of nature and technology; second, to explore the environmental potential of the Locke/Nozick stipulation; third, to point out some of the difficulties to which the stipulation leads when it is applied to solving environmental problems. We claim that the stipulation leads to two outcomes, depending on how it is interpreted. The first provides the possibility of effectively developing a strong environmental libertarianism, but only at the cost of imposing severe restrictions on acquisitions; the second avoids these restrictions, but at the cost of renouncing to any meaningful environmental policy. The paper concludes with some reflections on the relation between the theory of property and environmentalism.

Este artículo examina los modos en que el iusnaturalismo libertario ha afrontado los desafíos medioambientales que suscita la adquisición de la propiedad. Se persiguen tres propósitos: primero, discutir algunos de los supuestos libertarios acerca de la naturaleza y la tecnología; segundo, explorar el potencial medioambientalista de la estipulación de Locke/Nozick;
tercero, indicar algunas de las dificultades a que conduce dicha estipulación cuando se la aplica a la resolución de problemas medioambientales. Sostengo que la estipulación conduce a dos resultados, según como se la interprete. El primero ofrece la posibilidad de desarrollar efectivamente un libertarianismo medioambiental robusto, pero solo al precio de imponer severas restricciones a las adquisiciones; el segundo evita tales restricciones, al precio de renunciar a una política medioambiental significativa. Concluyo con algunas reflexiones acerca de la relación entre teoría de la propiedad y medioambientalismo.

The feeling of control over actions and their external effects is known as Sense of Agency (SoAg). People usually have a distinctive SoAg for events caused by their own actions. However, if the agent is a child or an older person, this feeling of being responsible for the consequences of an action may differ from what an adult would feel. The idea would be that children and elderly may have a reduced SoAg since their frontal lobes are developing or have started to loose their efficiency. The aim of this study was to elucidate whether the SoAg changes across lifespan, using the Intentional Binding (i.e., the temporal attraction between a voluntary action and its sensory consequence) as implicit measure. Data show that children and elderly are characterized by a reduced SoAg as compared to adults. These findings provide a fundamental step in the characterization of SoAg dynamics throughout individuals' lifetime.

Intentional binding (IB) refers to the temporal attraction between a voluntary action and its sensory consequence. Since its discovery in 2002, it has been considered to be a valid implicit measure of sense of agency (SoA), since it only occurs in the context of voluntary actions. The vast majority of studies considering IB have recruited young adults as participants, while neglecting possible age-related differences. The aim of the present work is to study the development of IB in 10-year-old children. In place of Libet's classical clock method, we decided to implement a new and more suitable paradigm in order to study IB, since children could have some difficulties in dealing with reading clocks. A stream of unpredictable letters was therefore used: participants had to remember which letter was on the screen when they made a voluntary action, heard a sound, or felt their right index finger moved down passively. In Experiment I, a group of young adults was tested in order to replicate the IB effect with this new paradigm. In Experiment II, the same paradigm was then administered to children in order to investigate whether such an effect has already emerged at this age. The data from Experiment I showed the presence of the IB effect in adults. However, Experiment II demonstrated a clear reduction of IB. The comparison of the two groups revealed that the young adult group differed from the children, showing a significantly stronger linkage between actions and their consequences. The results indicate a developmental trend in the IB effect. This finding is discussed in light of the maturation process of the frontal cortical network.

The humanities and normative theory played a prominent role in creating the field of philanthropic studies. However, the leading outlets for research in this field now publish little scholarship from disciplines such as history, religious studies, philosophy, literature, and ethics-favoring instead disciplines from the social sciences, public policy, and managerial studies. Our review begins by documenting this phenomenon

It has been argued recently that persons diagnosed with a personality disorder (PD) ought to be held responsible for their actions because these actions are voluntary. (Pickard 2011, this journal). In what follows, I argue that this claim is grounded in a conception of voluntary action that is too coarse-grained to provide an adequate understanding of the structure of agency in persons diagnosed with PD. When the concept of voluntary action and that of behaviours typical of PD are examined more carefully, the claim that PD behaviours are voluntary turns out to be tenuous in at least two ways. Firstly, it becomes apparent that the grounds provided by Pickard do not conclusively establish that PD behaviours are voluntary. Secondly, a more refined conception of voluntary agency helps us to appreciate that, if indeed PD behaviours are voluntary, such behaviours seem at best to be voluntary in an anaemic and limited sense-a sense that is quite distinct from the ordinary sense in which we speak of actions being voluntary.

In this article we focus on elderly care reforms in Italy and Sweden. According to Polanyi&#39;s theory, we analyze the process of change of welfare regulation in terms of the relation between public redistribution, familial and societal reciprocity and services provided by the market. The main purpose of the analysis is to outline the processes of convergence and divergence between these two welfare systems that have pursued different paths in their historical evolution. In the first part we compare Italy and Sweden in terms of social expenditure for the elderly and the relationships between female labour market participation and supply provision. In the second part we concentrate on the institutional process of change, focusing on the main reforms that have affected the relationships between local public administration, family, third sector and private market organisations.

Why do for-profit firms take voluntary steps to improve the environment? Do green actions indicate that managers are wasting resources in costly programs to produce benefit that cannot be captured by the firm? Or is voluntary environmental spending profitable for a business sense? Empirical evidence is decidedly mixed. In this study, we use 19 years of monthly stock price returns to examine the profitability of participation in the world's largest voluntary greenhouse gas mitigation program: the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX). After controlling for systemic market risk as well as industry-specific shocks, we find statistically significantly positive excess returns for firms that announce their decision to join CCX. In addition, the progress of proposed greenhouse gas legislation (the Waxman-Markey bill) had a positive and large impact on excess returns for CCX member firms, suggesting that a major incentive for firms to join CCX may be to prepare for future regulation. Marginal abatement costs (proxied by the carbon price), on the other hand, were unrelated to excess returns. Our results imply that voluntary approaches should play a role in combating climate change, but that relying on them alone is not enough.

In this study, we sought to characterise the eects of intense sensory stimulation at dierent stages of preparation for an anticipated action on voluntary and involuntary behaviours. In our experiment, we presented unexpected loud acoustic stimuli (LAS) at four critical times during movement preparation to probe the state of the nervous system (Baseline,-1192 ms,-392 ms, and 0 ms relative to expected movement onset), and measured their eect on voluntary and involuntary motor actions (nger-press and eye-blink startle reex, respectively). Voluntary responses were largely facilitated by the LAS, leading to earlier and more forceful responses compared to Control and Baseline conditions. Notably, voluntary responses were signicantly facilitated on trials where the LAS was presented early during preparation (-1192 ms). Eye-blink reexes elicited by the LAS at-392 ms were signicantly reduced and delayed compared to other time-points, indicating suppression of sub-cortical excitability. Despite being in a suppressive state, voluntary responses on these trials were still facilitated by the LAS. The results provide insight into the mechanisms involved in preparing anticipatory actions. Induced activation can persist in the nervous system and can modulate subsequent actions for a longer time period than previously thought, highlighting that movement preparation is a continuously evolving process that is susceptible to external inuence throughout the preparation period. Suppression of sub-cortical excitability shortly before movement onset is consistent with previous work showing corticospinal suppression which may be a necessary step before the execution of any voluntary response.