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Inflation Targeting: a Framework for Communication

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Demertzis
  • Nicola Viegi

Abstract

We analyze how the provision of an explicit numerical inflation target provides a focal point for agents' expectations when information is imperfect. Communicating a target and a tolerance band around it provides a clear framework with which to evaluate monetary policy outcomes. We show how inflation targeting exploits the self-reinforcing loop between success and credibility to help the Central Bank endure large and long lasting shocks. Last, we derive the optimal band width around the target, which exploits the benefits of providing a focal point while maximizing the probability of success.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Demertzis & Nicola Viegi, 2007. "Inflation Targeting: a Framework for Communication," ERSA Working Paper Series 071, Economic Research Southern Africa.
    • Handle: RePEc:rza:ersawp:071
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ehrmann, Michael, 2021. "Point targets, tolerance bands or target ranges? Inflation target types and the anchoring of inflation expectations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    3. Isabelle SALLE & Marc-Alexandre SENEGAS & Murat YILDIZOGLU, 2013. "How Transparent About Its Inflation Target Should a Central Bank be? An Agent-Based Model Assessment," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2013-24, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
    4. Corsello, Francesco & Neri, Stefano & Tagliabracci, Alex, 2021. "Anchored or de-anchored? That is the question," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    5. Maria Demertzis & Massimiliano Marcellino & Nicola Viegi, 2009. "Anchors for Inflation Expectations," DNB Working Papers 229, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    6. Salle, Isabelle & Yıldızoğlu, Murat & Sénégas, Marc-Alexandre, 2013. "Inflation targeting in a learning economy: An ABM perspective," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 114-128.
    7. Isabelle Salle & Marc-Alexandre Sénégas & Murat Yıldızoğlu, 2019. "How transparent about its inflation target should a central bank be?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 391-427, March.
    8. David G. Mayes & Maritta Paloviita & Matti Virén, 2016. "EMU and the Anchoring of Inflation Expectations," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 69(4), pages 341-364.
    9. Demertzis, Maria & Viegi, Nicola & Marcellino, Massimiliano, 2008. "A Measure for Credibility: Tracking US Monetary Developments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7036, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    10. Cheick Kader M'Baye, 2012. "Inflation Targeting under Heterogeneous Information and Sticky Prices," Working Papers halshs-00677671, HAL.
    11. Carola Binder & Wesley Janson & Randal J. Verbrugge, 2019. "Thinking Outside the Box: Do SPF Respondents Have Anchored Inflation Expectations?," Working Papers 19-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    12. repec:rza:wpaper:189 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Camille Cornand & Cheick Kader M’baye, 2018. "Band or point inflation targeting? An experimental approach," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 13(2), pages 283-309, July.
    14. Tatsushi Okuda & Tomohiro Tsuruga, 2021. "Inflation Expectations and Central Bank Communication with Unknown Prior," IMES Discussion Paper Series 21-E-07, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    15. Freddy H. CASTRO, 2012. "Senales de política monetaria y movimientos en la estructura a plazo de la tasa de interés en Colombia," Archivos de Economía 9908, Departamento Nacional de Planeación.
    16. Nautz, Dieter & Pagenhardt, Laura & Strohsal, Till, 2017. "The (de-)anchoring of inflation expectations: New evidence from the euro area," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 103-115.
    17. van der Cruijsen, Carin & Demertzis, Maria, 2011. "How anchored are inflation expectations in EMU countries?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 281-298, January.
    18. Zhang, Jing & Cui, Yinglin & Jin, Yingdan, 2025. "Dynamic interaction between public trust and central bank communication," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 2146-2163.
    19. Andersson, Fredrik N. G. & Jonung, Lars, 2017. "How Tolerant Should Inflation-Targeting Central Banks Be? Selecting the Proper Tolerance Band - Lessons from Sweden," Working Papers 2017:2, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    20. Yigit, Taner M., 2010. "Inflation targeting: An indirect approach to assess the direct impact," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1357-1368, November.
    21. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2015-044 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Salle, Isabelle L., 2015. "Modeling expectations in agent-based models — An application to central bank's communication and monetary policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 130-141.
    23. Luba Petersen, 2014. "Forecast Error Information and Heterogeneous Expectations in Learning-to-Forecast Experiments," Discussion Papers dp14-05, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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