Sergejs Gubins

Welfare effects of road pricing and traffic information under alternative ownership regimes

by Thomas Graaff, Erik Verhoef, and Sergejs Gubins

Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 2012

Willingness to pay for information Private road operator Private information provider ICT a b s t... more Willingness to pay for information Private road operator Private information provider ICT a b s t r a c t This paper models strategic interactions between a road supplier, a provider of traffic information, and road users, with stochastic travel times. Using a game-theoretical analysis of suppliers' pricing strategies, we assess the social welfare effects of traffic information under various ownership regimes. The results show that the distortive welfare effect of monopolistic information pricing appears relatively small. Collusion of the road operator and information provider yields higher social welfare than independent pricing by two firms. The intuition behind this result resembles that behind the welfare effects of double marginalization, but is not exactly the same, as traffic information is not strictly complementary to road use.

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Teleworking and Congestion: A Dynamic Bottleneck Analysis

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

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Dynamic Congestion and Urban Equilibrium

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

ABSTRACT We consider a monocentric city where a traffic bottleneck is located at the entrance of ... more ABSTRACT We consider a monocentric city where a traffic bottleneck is located at the entrance of the central business district. The commuters&#39; choices of the departure times from home, residential location, and lot size, are all endogenous. We show that elimination of queuing time under optimal road pricing induces individuals to spend more time at home and to have larger houses, causing urban sprawl. This is opposite to the typical results of urban models with static congestion, which predict cities to become denser with road pricing.

Dynamic bottleneck congestion and residential land use in the monocentric city

Journal of Urban Economics, 2014

We consider a monocentric city where a traffic bottleneck is located at the entrance of the centr... more We consider a monocentric city where a traffic bottleneck is located at the entrance of the central business district. The commuters' departure times from home, residential locations, and lot sizes, are all endogenous. We show that elimination of queuing time under optimal road pricing induces individuals to spend more time at home and to have larger houses, causing urban sprawl. This is opposite to the typical results of urban models with static congestion, which predict cities to become denser with road pricing.

format_quoteFirst-best time-dependent road pricing leads to lower urban density by encouraging more time spent at home.format_quote

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Welfare Effects of Traffic Information: Strategic Interactions between a Road Supplier and an Information Provider

by T. Graaff and Sergejs Gubins

Welfare effects of road pricing and traffic information under alternative ownership regimes

by T. Graaff and Sergejs Gubins

Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 2012

Willingness to pay for information Private road operator Private information provider ICT a b s t... more Willingness to pay for information Private road operator Private information provider ICT a b s t r a c t This paper models strategic interactions between a road supplier, a provider of traffic information, and road users, with stochastic travel times. Using a game-theoretical analysis of suppliers' pricing strategies, we assess the social welfare effects of traffic information under various ownership regimes. The results show that the distortive welfare effect of monopolistic information pricing appears relatively small. Collusion of the road operator and information provider yields higher social welfare than independent pricing by two firms. The intuition behind this result resembles that behind the welfare effects of double marginalization, but is not exactly the same, as traffic information is not strictly complementary to road use.

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