Books by Thomas J . Spiegel
Papers by Thomas J . Spiegel
In this paper I reconstruct the intrinsic connection between the two metaphilosophical concepts o... more In this paper I reconstruct the intrinsic connection between the two metaphilosophical concepts of quietism and (scientific) naturalism. Rooted in Wittgenstein´s late philosophy, quietism is the view that theoretical explanations in philosophy are nonsense or misguided. Naturalism is the view that only those entities exist which are countenanced by the natural sciences. I show that quietist views reject the notion of nature implied by naturalism and, subsequently, the felt need to give theoretical explanations to supposedly 'non-natural' entities. Ultimately, the difference between quietism and naturalism turns out to be a disagreement about the proper philosophical conception of nature. • Naturalism, Quietism, and the Concept of Nature Thomas J. Spiegel 48 Naturalism, Quietism…
Quietism is a well-established, purely descriptive notion in the Christian tradition. In the wake... more Quietism is a well-established, purely descriptive notion in the Christian tradition. In the wake of developments towards the end of the 20 th century, philosophers (e.g. Wright 1992) appropriated the term "quietism" to pejoratively denote the later Wittgenstein's methodological outlook on philosophical practice as a kind of avoidance or rejection of philosophy. It is, however, often unclear what quietism amounts to in detail. The article begins by unearthing the Wittgensteinian roots of quietism before separating four different contemporary uses of the term "quietism" in philosophy. This article then argues that quietism is best understood as the rejection of a specific kind of theory in philosophy, namely that kind of theory which aims the mimic the explanatory mode of the natural sciences. For the purpose of dispelling the preconception that quietism confines us to silence in philosophy, the last part hints at different kinds of methodological approaches which are still entirely unproblematic even under a quietist constraint.
International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion
In this article I argue that the kind of scientific naturalism that tends to underwrite projects ... more In this article I argue that the kind of scientific naturalism that tends to underwrite projects of naturalizing religion operates with a tacit conception of nature which, upon closer inspection, turns out to be untenable. I first distinguish an uninteresting modest naturalism from the more ambitious and relevant scientific naturalism. Secondly I survey three different kinds of attempting to naturalize religion: naturalizing the social aspect of religion, naturalizing religious experience, and naturalizing reference to the transcendent. Thirdly I argue that these projects operate with a conception of nature which is insufficiently clear. I suggest three ways of charitably explicating that tacit conception of what is natural before arguing that neither of these three positions works. Lastly I offer an irenic proposal: we would do good in giving up the scientific naturalism that underlies projects of naturalizing religion in order to embrace Lynne Rudder Baker's recently proposed notion of near-naturalism which allows the naturalist to retain a "science first" attitude while avoiding problematic, overly restrictive notions of what is natural.
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
Naturalism the current orthodoxy in anglophone and largely analytic philosophy. Naturalism is the... more Naturalism the current orthodoxy in anglophone and largely analytic philosophy. Naturalism is the conjunction of the (ontological) claim that all that truly exists are the entities countenanced by the natural sciences and the (epistemological) claim the only true knowledge is natural-scientific knowledge. Drawing on some recent work in Critical Theory, this article argues that naturalism qualifies as an ideology. This is the case because naturalism meets three key aspects shared by paradigmatic cases of ideology: (i) naturalism has practical consequences and implications of a specific kind, (ii) those endorsing naturalism fall prey to dual deception: having false meta-level beliefs about naturalism as being without alternative, and (iii) naturalism has a tendency to selfimmunization. The article ends by suggesting to pull naturalism from our collective cognitive backgrounds onto the mainstage of critical discourse, making at a proper topic for philosophical critique again.
While Wittgenstein's work has been extensively investigated in relation to many other important a... more While Wittgenstein's work has been extensively investigated in relation to many other important and influential philosophers, there is very little scholarly work that positively investigates the relationship between the work of Wittgenstein and Wilhelm Dilthey. To the contrary, some commentators like Hacker (2001a) suggest that Dilthey's work (and that of other hermeneuticists) simply pales or is obsolete in comparison to Wittgenstein's own insights. Against such assessments, this article posits that Wittgenstein's and Dilthey's thought most crucially intersects at the related topics of scientism on the one hand and scientific and philosophical method on the other. In reconstructing Dilthey's conceptions of understanding versus explaining and central points of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough, it becomes apparent that they share a staunch rejection of scientism and use the notion of understanding as a means to prevent methodologies from the natural sciences encroaching onto the human sciences (in Dilthey's case) and philosophy (in Wittgenstein's case). Notwithstanding a number of central ways in which these thinkers differ, this article closes by suggesting that there is some evidence according to which Wittgenstein, like Dilthey, can reasonably be understood as championing some central tenets of the hermeneutical tradition.
Loneliness and the Crisis of Work, 2021
Zeitschrift für Didaktik der Philosophie und Ethik
Die Einführung in die Logik ist ein wichtiges, vielleicht das wichtigste Propädeutikum des Philos... more Die Einführung in die Logik ist ein wichtiges, vielleicht das wichtigste Propädeutikum des Philosophiestudiums. Logik wird dabei in Tradition von Russell und Frege als formal verstanden; die Lehre der Logik-Einführung orientiert sich demnach an der formalen Logik. Neben einigen bekannten inhaltlichen Problemen ist die "Einführung in die Logik" als eine Einführung in die formale Logik didaktisch nicht unproblematisch. Eine zentrale Spannung ist, dass die Vermittlung formaler Logik eine zunehmende Herausforderung darstellt angesichts der steigenden Anzahl Studierender, insbesondere die Lehramtsstudierenden betreffend. In diesem Aufsatz schlage ich-nach einer Problemdarstellung-ein hybrides Modell für die Einführung in die Logik vor, welches nach der Einführung von Aussagen-und Prädikatenlogik erster Stufe wesentlich Elemente der ‚informellen' Argumentationstheorie übernimmt, um verschiedene inhaltliche und didaktische Probleme der "Einführung in die Logik" zu vermeiden. Ziel des hybriden Modells ist dabei, auf Grundlage der Kombination aus formaler Logik, informeller Logik und Argumentationstheorie die Einführung in die Logik zugleich als eine Einführung in das Philosophieren als Argumentieren zu begreifen, das den Rahmen der Beschäftigung der Philosophie an der schulischen und universitären Lehre setzt.
Philosophical Investigations, 2022
This paper deals with Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox, focussing on the infinite rule-regre... more This paper deals with Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox, focussing on the infinite rule-regress as featured in Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. I argue that one of the most salient and popular proposed solutions (championed by John McDowell), which argues that rule-following is grounded in "custom," "practice" or "form of life, remains unsatisfactory because part of this proposal is the rejection of further "theory" (commonly attributed to Wittgenstein) which seemingly makes it impossible to substantiate the claim of how customs, practices or forms of life ground rule-following. I argue that this conundrum can be solved by introducing Wilhelm Dilthey's overlooked notion of objective spirit as the objectivated sediment of historical human communality. This proposal allows us to substantiate Wittgenstein's hints at the connection between rule-following and customs, practices, and forms of life without introducing "problematic theories." Combining Wittgenstein's views with Dilthey's notion of objective spirit results in a solution that is neither skeptical nor straight, but therapeutic.
There is a close conceptual relation between the notions of religious disenchantment and scientif... more There is a close conceptual relation between the notions of religious disenchantment and scientific naturalism. One way of resisting philosophical and cultural implications of the scientific image and the subsequent process of disenchantment can be found in attempts at sketching a reenchanted worldview. The main issue of accounts of reenchantment can be a rejection of scientific results in a way that flies in the face of good reason. Opposed to such reenchantment is scientific naturalism which implies an entirely disenchanted worldview. However, one of the main problems of scientific naturalism are placement problems. A reenchanted worldview does have the conceptual resources to avoid placement problems, yet seems to throw out the baby (a reasonable appeal to science as an authority) with the bathwater (placement problems). A dilemma results: the Scylla of an undesirable scientific naturalism and the Charybdis of a rampant, seemingly prescientific reenchanted worldview. In this article I argue that there is a safe middle passage between these two options, i.e. the recently proposed liberal naturalism which allows for a moderate normative reenchantment. Liberal naturalism lets us have it both ways: avoiding the placement problems while retaining a necessary and reasonable adherence to science, thereby avoiding both an all-too restrictive scientific naturalism.
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Books by Thomas J . Spiegel
Papers by Thomas J . Spiegel