Canadian Journal of Educational Administration and Policy, Issue #92, March 14, 2009.
© by CJEAP and the author(s).
CHARACTER EDUCATION RE-CONCEPTUALIZED
FOR PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION*
Mira Bajovic, Kelly Rizzo, and Joe Engemann, Brock University
In this paper we explored conceptual ambiguities of character education within the
present Ontario Ministry of Education initiative. Through the critical lens of moral
development theories and theories of mind, social and cognitive domains and their
affect on character development were examined. Based on these findings three
shortcomings in implementation were identified: a lack of clarity in defining
„character‟, a lack of recognition of the importance of cognitive and social
processes in moral development, and a lack of clarity in effective strategies for
character development. The recommendations for future implementation of
character education were proposed.
In October 2006, The Ontario Ministry of Education introduced Finding Common
Ground: Character Development in Ontario Schools K-12, a discussion paper designed to guide
the implementation of character education in K-12 public schools within the province. The
initiative that spawned this paper requires a commitment from all stakeholders in the school and
greater community to engage students in developing positive habits and characteristics of a
responsible citizenship. The key beliefs and principles in Finding Common Ground: Character
Development in Ontario Schools K-12, hold that the values and attributes of character
development are “universal and transcend racial, religious, ethno-cultural, linguistic, and other
*
This paper was presented at the Canadian Society for the Study in Education (CSSE) conference in Vancouver,
2008.
Character Education Re-conceptualized for Practical Implementation
demographic factors” (p. 2). It also states that there is a growing need to find “common ground”
on the values and attributes we in Ontario hold in common. By carefully reading the principles
within this document, we found that the term “universal” seems to contradict the “need to find
common ground on values” in Ontario. If the values and attributes of character development are
indeed “universal,” what troubles us is why would we need to find “common ground”?
We believe that in order to effectively implement character education in our schools, we
need to have a clear definition of character and practical understanding of the theoretical
frameworks among all stakeholders in Ontario. This is the reality elsewhere in Canada. For
instance, in The Heart of the Matter Character and Citizenship in Alberta Schools, the
understanding of character is based on Lickona‟s (1991) definition of character as a reliable inner
disposition to respond to situations in a morally good way, involving three interrelated parts:
moral knowing, moral feeling, and moral behaviour. This document also offers three different
theoretical approaches (a traditional, a cognitive-developmental, and a caring communities
approach) from the research literature to provide guidance for character education
implementation. In Finding Common Ground: Character Development in Ontario Schools K-12
(2006), character development is described as a foundation of our education system but a clear
definition of „character‟ or theoretical framework guidelines is nowhere to be found. Since
writing this paper, a more recent edition of this document has been released. In June 2008, The
Ministry of Education issued the new, improved version of the Finding Common Ground:
Character Development in Ontario Schools K-12 based on the comments and suggestions
received from the schools‟ stakeholders throughout Ontario. However, while some
improvements are evident, a clear definition of „character‟ and theoretical framework guidelines
are still missing.
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Character Education Re-conceptualized for Practical Implementation
Therefore, in this paper we will attempt to define character as it is influenced by social
and cognitive differences. Second, through the critical lens of theories of moral development and
theory of mind, we intend to provide a clear understanding of the processes associated with
character development in order to make recommendations for successful character education
implementation.
Defining Character
Due to inconsistent definition of what is meant by „character‟, and a failure to align this
initiative with a theoretical framework, in the Finding Common Ground: Character Development
in Ontario Schools K-12(2006, 2008), the implementation of character education in schools
stands little chance of succeeding. Without clear and concise understanding of what is meant by
“character” and without recognizing its ties to the development of moral reasoning, character
education seems doomed to flounder. It seems then appropriate to start with the definition of
character that will lead to adequate understanding of character education, and will allow proper
implementation of such in the future.
DeRoche and Williams (2001) argue that two main purposes for educating children and
youth are cognitive development related to their academic achievement and character formation,
which includes personal values and civic competencies. Character may be defined as a complex
set of psychological characteristics, formed in part by growth in cognition that enables a person
to act as a moral agent (Berkowitz & Bier, 2004). As such, character is considered as a
sociomoral competency that incorporates moral action, moral values, moral personality, moral
emotions, moral reasoning, moral identity, and foundational characteristics. Character also must
be comprehensively defined to include thinking, feeling, and behavior, and character strengths
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Character Education Re-conceptualized for Practical Implementation
should be accepted as a family of positive traits reflected in those thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors (Lickona, 1991; Park, 2004). Hunter (2000) defines character as the amalgamation of
three elements: moral discipline, moral attachment, and moral autonomy. He proposes that
character is constructed with those moral elements and is influenced not only by the individual
differences in knowing and understanding of moral norms but also with different social and
cultural factors that determine individuals‟ moral behaviour.
Character is, in part, borne out of moral elements, thus both character and morality
should be accepted as interrelated. A person of „good‟ character is usually cognizant of the moral
implications of their actions and act in accordance with what is moral (Nucci, 2001). Good
character consists of knowing the good, desiring the good, and doing the good. Nucci suggests
that morality requires that one act in ways that are consistent with his moral judgment, and this in
turn requires that moral understanding be translated into a sense of personal responsibility and
action. Thus, if moral action hinges on personal responsibility, such action can be used as an
evaluation of what it is to be a „good‟ person. Recognizing that character formation is dependent
at least in part on moral development, we now turn to theories of moral development as a basis
for critically examining character education.
Theories of Moral Development
In cognitive-developmental theories (e.g., Kohlberg, 1984; Piaget 1932; Power, Higgins
& Kohlberg, 1989; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 2000; Narvaez, 2002) moral reasoning
concerns a specific aspect of moral judgment. According to Kohlberg (1984) morality should be
described in terms of two fundamentally different aspects: an affective aspect (i.e., the moral
attitudes, values, ideals) and cognitive aspect (i.e., the person‟s moral competencies). As such,
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moral behaviour depends both on the aspired moral ideals or principles and on the ability to
judge and act accordingly.
Kohlberg describes moral development through six stages ordered into three levels of
moral orientations that reflect children‟s growing competence in taking a socio-moral
perspective: from a pre-moral, primarily egocentric orientation through a conventional, primarily
rule-conforming orientation to a self-accepted, principled orientation. He stresses that at the
earlier stage „„the center of moral choice and feelings are based on the outcome of personal well
being‟‟ (p. 393), while the later stage of moral development is associated with the ability to
imagine the perspective of others. At the heart of each stage is the motivation for making the
right choice. The earliest motivation is avoidance of punishment, which evolves into serving
individual needs while recognizing that others also have their personal interests. By the next
stage a child develops a need to be a good person both in the opinion of others and his own. This
moves to obligation to maintain the system and eventual recognition that the welfare of all
individuals depends on established laws and duties. The final stage is the acceptance of universal
moral principles and a desire to abide by them (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989; Rest,
Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 2000; Narvaez, 2002).The unifying premise of the Kohlberg model
for moral development is ‟justice,‟ not as a distinct value, but as a process which underlies an
individual‟s capacity for moral judgment (Power et al.). Children‟s conceptualization of
fairness evolves through each of the six stages and guides choices between right and wrong.
Promotion of moral judgment becomes socially accepted behaviour within a structural capacity
and once it is developed, although performance is situationally varied, the capacity resides within
the individual (Power et al.). Kohlberg anticipates that once the stage structures were correctly
identified, not only would moral judgment be unitary in nature, but also each moral development
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stage would follow the next in exact same sequence. Kohlberg describes these sequences of
development based on children‟s evaluations of right or wrong behaviours and their
consideration of intention in justifying their judgment. The stages emerge from children‟s own
thinking about moral problems. Thus social experiences do promote development, but they do so
by stimulating mental processes. In this context, we argue that it is important to define the best
teaching approaches in stimulating mental processes of children before the implementation of
character education in our schools can begin. It is also important to understand that social and
environmental experiences play an important role in the development of moral reasoning.
Rest (1984) and Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, (2000) substantially refines
Kohlberg‟s stages of moral development theory. While Kohlberg‟s stage model is based on the
insistence that every individual exists in a particular stage, Rest‟s schemas follow the
developmental pattern, but allow a more gradual transition across the range of moral
development. The Four-Component Model created by Rest (1984) describes the process of moral
action. The model consists of (a) rational decision-making, (b) moral evaluation, (c) moral
choice, and (d) moral fortitude. According to Rest, this model was based upon “processes” and
not “virtues” or personal “traits” (p. 5). Additionally, the cognitive process involves interplay of
the components rather than stage procession. According to Rest, a concept of “fairness” was
inherent in the mental paradigms of individuals, although the definition of fairness was relative
to the individual‟s level of cognitive moral development (p. 10). For example, in stage 2, Rest
(1984) describes fairness as, “direct exchange of favor for favor” (p. 10). Stage 3 entailed a
fairness of “maintaining positive, long-term relationships…that I know I can count on you and
that you can count on me….” (p. 10). Fairness in stage 4 was defined in terms of the solidarity of
the greater society which relied on the general willingness of people to submit to the law. Rest et
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al. (2000) also stress the importance of community involvement in children‟s moral
development. They argue that common morality might be different for different communities
(and therefore relative), but the common morality has to be debated and scrutinized by members
of the community and therefore, reflects an equilibrium between the ideals and the moral
intrusions of the community. Rest also argues that morally productive societies do not merely
prescribe law, but debate law and evolve law. Thus the need for discourse among all school
stakeholders: students, teachers, administrators and members of wider community.
The social learning theorists (e.g., Bandura, 1989; Nucci, 1997; Turiel, 1983)
conceptualize moral development as a social learning process and believe that children learn
what is morally acceptable through direct or symbolic stimuli and reward during the learning
process. Bandura (1989) argues that two kinds of learning experiences affect moral behaviour: a
direct tuition based on rewards and punishment and observational
learning based on learning moral behaviours by observing other people. To Bandura (1994),
examples and actions observed depend on the outcome of four processes: (a) attention processes
that determine whether the child pays attention to the modeled behavior; (b) retention processes
that determine what a child remembers of the modeled behavior; (c) behavioral production
processes that determine how what was seen is incorporated in one‟s own behavior; and (d)
motivational processes determining the attractiveness of the modeled behavior to the child.
Alternatively, observation of behavior may lead to the inference of rules of conduct that can be
applied under different circumstances. This extrapolation of rules from exemplary behavior
Bandura calls „abstract modeling.‟ Through this abstract form of observational learning, children
may, for instance, adopt certain values by which they may henceforth judge behaviour of others
and later internalize that behaviour as their own. Bandura postulates that observational learning
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Character Education Re-conceptualized for Practical Implementation
does not limit itself only to the adoption of new, presumably good moral values and behaviors; it
also may enforce or weaken existing values. As such, a child‟s moral thinking and development
vary according to the content offered within the environment.
Within the context of schools, Noddings (2002) argues that the teacher (and any other
caring adults in the school system) must model for children, show care for others, and provide
opportunities for discourse among students in order to reach common understandings for others.
She calls for the „confirmation of the good in others‟ and stresses the importance of the
development and sustaining of relationships among children, rather than developing traits of
individualism.
In social-domain theories, moral reasoning is developed in accordance with the
child‟s interaction with socializing agents in different social settings (Nucci, 1997; Turiel, 1983).
Children‟s concepts of morality and social convention emerge out of their attempts to mediate
differing forms of social experience associated with these two classes of social events (Nucci,
1997). It has been shown that exposure to different moral regulation and norms in family, school,
or peer groups can have a profound impact on children‟s development of moral reasoning
(Gerris, Dekovic, & Janssens, 1997). Children construct different forms of social knowledge,
including moral knowing as well as other types of social knowledge, through their social
experiences with adults, peers, and siblings. Nucci argues that the moral judgments of children
do not stem directly from institutional social systems, but from traces inherent in social
relationships, including experiences that entail damage to others, the violation of some rights,
and conflicts between opposed claims. He defines morals as concepts, reasoning, and actions
related to well-being, rights, and the fair treatment of other people. According to Nucci, morals
defined in terms of justice, well-being, and rights can be distinguished from social
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conventionalities, which are standards for particular behaviours that are determined consensually
by a certain social group. Narvaez (2002) suggests that to become people of good character,
students need opportunities to develop their intuitions in well-structured environments, and
guidance to develop proper ethical skills. Educators need explicit instruction about the theory
behind the skills they are teaching, hence the necessity to further their theoretical understanding
before implementing character education in practice. We argue that for adequate implementation
of character education, the importance of the school and the broader community needs to be
recognized and identified as fundamental in fostering positive moral behaviour.
Theory of Mind
Theory of mind are those processes which develop in infants, through childhood and
beyond which enable an individual to process and respond to external stimuli (Flavell, 2004).
The basis of need to develop theory of mind is quite simply that a child cannot understand the
stimuli to which he or she is exposed, without first understanding something about mind. Mind,
referring to the ‟unobservable,‟ including desires, beliefs, emotions, and perceptions, must
therefore be developed. Only through the development of theory of mind can an individual
explain and predict the actions of others (Flavell) and inasmuch respond or act suitably. Theory
of mind then becomes the basis for social understanding, and as such will have bearing on the
development of an individual‟s character. According to Hughes and Leekam (2004) social
interactions are transformed with the level of skill in „reading the minds‟ of others.
Just how theory of mind is developed has been studied using four theoretical
perspectives, the first being nativist, which suggests it is essentially a maturational process, yet
recent work indicates cultural differences in both rate and pattern of development (see Vinden,
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1999; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). The „theory theory‟ suggests that social environments
influence the rate of development, and cultural differences will influence how different states of
mind are interpreted (Hughes & Leekam, 2004). Simulation theory argues for the importance of
“self-awareness and the imaginative capacity for pretence” (Hughes & Leekam, p. 596),
suggesting that the degree to which pretend play is part of children‟s environment will impact
theory of mind development. Finally, the executive functioning perspective argues for the
interrelatedness of developmental growth with goal-directed behaviour, such that both quality
and quantity of social interactions will impact the subsequent development of theory of mind
(Hughes & Leekam). The review of theory of mind literature by Hughes and Leekam uncovered
that the development of an individual‟s theory of mind can have positive, negative, or neutral
implications for interpersonal relationships, noting that an individual‟s awareness of the internal
states of another are associated with empathy as well as malicious behaviour. A goal for
developing character in our young would be to reduce the incidence of malice by increasing the
ability to reason and judge the right course of action and to then act on these judgments.
We would argue that if an individual cannot perceive a situation from more than one
point of view, (understanding that not all perceptions will be accurate), he/she would be less
likely to consider the needs of others and thus may be more inclined to make choices which are
unjust and motivated by individual gain rather than what is right. According to Chandler, Sokol,
and Wainryb (2000), only a handful of studies exist which examine children‟s emerging
understanding of values (see Carpendale, 1995; Carpendale & Chandler, 1996; Flavell, Flavell,
Green, & Moses, 1990; Flavell, Mumme, Green, & Flavell, 1992), and virtually none examine
the interaction between what is believed to be right and what is believed to be true. Chandler et
al. argue that research which does not at least attempt to study the interaction between what is
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right and what is believed to be true is at best, only part of the story. By way of an extension,
how do persons reconcile what they believe with what they judge to be moral so that they can
then determine an appropriate response? This should be of interest to anyone charged with the
responsibility of developing character in our most valuable resource, our children.
The Punch and Judy TV show provides a good example for understanding the
development of mistaken beliefs in children. In one example the character Punch, in an effort to
get rid of Judy once and for all, takes advantage of an opportunity when Judy accidentally falls
into a box. While Punch searches for a rope off stage to tie the box shut, Judy is observed by the
audience leaving the box. These episodes were studied by philosopher, Daniel Dennett (1978), as
an attempt of understanding children‟s growing beliefs about belief. The children that understand
that Punch is operating under a false belief react differently than those who do not understand
this reality. Dennett‟s work formed a foundation for further research by Carpendale and Chandler
(1996) and Chandler and Lalonde (1996). Their work resulted in two main findings. First, every
child participant who believed that Punch acted out of ignorance rather than intention when he
pushed Judy off the cliff in a box judged him less harshly. Second, children who were operating
with a more „interpretive‟ theory of mind recognized that statements or actions were open to
more than one interpretation. These participants judged Punch more harshly for being careless in
his actions, suggesting he should have considered alternative interpretations of the information
he was given, before he acted. “These and other results from this study sequence make it clear
that, like their growing understanding of the moral import of the content of people‟s
informational beliefs, children‟s progress toward a more mature understanding of the interpretive
nature of the knowing process itself also works to rewrite the map of their moral understanding”
(Chandler et al., 2000, p. 95).
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In examining how preadolescents respond in ambiguous social dilemmas, Bosacki and
Astington (1999) hypothesized that “preadolescents‟ ability to understand thoughts and emotions
in others would be associated with social competence” (p. 237). The process of understanding
may be more than one interpretation of the same information is critical. We argue that as a
minimum, initiatives intended to develop the character of children (their ability to judge what is
right, fair, or just) ranging from age 4 to 18 roughly, need to be developmentally appropriate to
ensure that the messages are interpreted in concert with what they also understand to be truth.
Using a theoretical framework of theory of mind (social understanding), differences in
abilities to reason and act morally can be examined. According to Bosacki and Astington (1999)
these differences are comprised of four constructs: conceptual role taking, empathic sensitivity,
person perception, and ability to generate alternatives. Based on these findings, it is reasonable to
conclude that failure to develop any one or a combination of these constructs would result in a
diminished ability to accurately interpret social interactions. This element when integrated with
Hunter‟s (2000) definition of character which incorporates moral discipline, moral attachment,
and moral autonomy, meaning that individuals must be able to perceive accurately the intent of
others‟ actions/words. They also must be able to demonstrate appropriate self control, they must
feel a commitment or sense of belonging to that individual or group, and they must have the
ability to make ethical decisions for themselves. Thus, initiatives geared at developing character
in individuals must not only be developmentally appropriate, they must also enrich the
individuals‟ ability for self control, their connection to their community, and provide opportunity
for meaningful decision making.
If in fact the objective of the character development initiative within the province of
Ontario is to enrich the character, including the ability to reason morally and the abilities to think
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and act critically as individuals, then educators must become more knowledgeable about the
cognitive and social processes which link moral reasoning with moral action so that their actions
can be more intentional and less random. According to Blair, Marsh, Finger, Blair, and Luo
(2006), there are specific neural systems which mediate reasoning related to both social
conventions and care-based morality. Although they argue that theory of mind is not a
prerequisite for developing “affect based automatic moral attitudes” (p.13), it is critically
involved in moral reasoning and as such bears further investigation and recognition. How theory
of mind developed is where we turn next.
Theory of mind is thought to be developed by activation of what Gallese, Keysers, and
Rizzolatti (2004) refer to as mirror neuron systems. According to these authors, there are “neural
mechanisms (mirror mechanisms) that allow us to directly understand the meaning of the actions
and emotions of others by internally replicating („simulat-simulating‟) them without any explicit
reflective mediation” (p. 396). Essentially, in observing an action, the same neurons are activated
as would be if it were the observer performing the task themselves. This may be linked to the
claim by Benninga, Berkowitz, Kuehn, and Smith (2006) that character development initiatives
are more effective when teachers and parents model and promote good character and students are
able to contribute in meaningful ways to the school community. This would provide that
opportunity to „observe‟ which in turn develops the neurons needed to act themselves. It is
through interaction with others that an individual develops social awareness and understanding.
Understanding that there are certain „high yield‟ cognitive strategies may help educators and
parents alike to refine their interventions for the greatest impact.
According to Levine (2002) the brain is composed of complex neural patterns/pathways.
These pathways are largely formed in humans by age 7, after which time there is considerably
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less plasticity. The brain is in large part, shaped by experience. Levine further claims that
existing pathways can be strengthened or weakened through adulthood (Levine). If this is in fact
accurate, then educators and parents alike need to help establish constructive environments
which will yield the development of „healthy‟ pathways from the outset. This may require a re-
examination of how schools are in fact governed and structured. Including recognition of the
delineation and frequent overlap between what is considered social convention and what is a
moral belief. Where both moral and social conventions appear to collide or overlap is where one
might expect to see the most revealing decision making by individuals. Put another way, the true
test of an individual‟s character is the ability to distinguish, interpret and respond in ways which
maintain that individual‟s integrity. Are persons able to discern a social convention and a moral
dilemma and generate an appropriate course of action from the situation in which they find
themselves? According to Arsenio and Lemerise (2004) an individual‟s ability to reason in
mixed-domain situations results in one of three approaches: domain subordination (one domain
is given priority over the other), domain coordination (where the two domains are integrated), or
a lack of domain resolution. What sets one approach apart from the others, according to Arsenio
and Lemerise is the motivator; an individual is motivated by relational gains, being someone‟s
friend, or some other objective, including, personal gain and the avoidance of conflict. Where the
objective is something other than relational in nature, one might expect to see „character flaws.‟
Attention to the rights and welfare of others requires the ability to reason morally.
However, Greene and Haidt (2002) have argued that before individuals can reason morally, they
must first be able to make moral judgments, requiring activation of emotion. Put another way,
making individuals care about the welfare of others is fundamental to the reasoning and
following actions of an individual. Greene and Haidt examined PET scans to determine which
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areas of the brain are activated within normal and aberrant adults when making moral judgments.
Their findings support the argument that making moral judgments requires activation of
processes in the brain dedicated to “the representation of others‟ mental states (ToM)” (p. 522).
According to Blair, Marsh, Finger, Blair and Luo (2006) the presence or absence of a
victim determines which of the two domains is activated, social or moral. Social conventions
typically do not involve a victim and are seen to be less serious; and more permissible in the
absence of rules, where moral transgressions generally involve a victim and are associated with
emotion. Smetana (1981) argues that transgressions universally judged to be wrong regardless of
the presence or absence of rules are moral in nature and that children as young as age 2 and 1/2
are able to make these judgments. Smetana‟s 1981 research showed the willingness of pre-school
children to judge conventional transgressions as less serious than moral transgressions to be
significant and consistent with the responses of older subjects.
To better understand the role theory of mind plays in developing moral reasoning and the
ability to distinguish social conventions from moral, consideration of incidents devoid of moral
reasoning are examined. Many moral transgressions include either a physical or verbal form of
aggression; by default many acts of aggression, either verbal or physical are moral transgressions
(Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004; Turiel, 1998). Bringing together the model of social adjustment for
social information processing, (Crick & Dodge, 1994) with the domain model of moral
development (Nucci, 2001; Smetana, 1995; Turiel, 1983) is useful for examining the concepts of
social cognition and behaviour, specifically where „knowing‟ does not always translate into
„doing‟ (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004). Domain theory is found to be useful in helping a child
discern what is moral and what is not, and social information processing impacts on the
subsequent actions of the child (Arsenio & Lemerise). In both models, the child‟s ability to
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understand the intentions of another (i.e. Did they mean to hurt me?), have an impact on the
subsequent behaviour of the child. Coie and Dodge (1998) found that both aggressive and non-
aggressive children perceive intentional acts of harm to be wrong. Suggesting a core value of
justice exists among these children. If this is accepted as accurate, the principle of justice may
well be one of those values considered by the Ministry of Education in Ontario, as „common.‟
Identifying characteristics of individuals who tend to act with apparent disregard for
moral knowing may provide some insight for educators looking to minimize this type of
behaviour. Children who are „objective oriented, (proactive aggressors) do not tend to rely on
values when determining the „permissibility‟ of their intended behaviour. These individuals
warrant further examination. What enables one to disregard what is „fair, right, or just‟ in favour
of using aggressive means to obtain desired material objects? In these instances children are not
motivated by reaction to a perceived wrong, but by potential personal gain. Examining the
behaviour of bullies, long believed to be socially inept, reveals a surprising finding by Sutton,
Smith, and Swettenham (1999). From their research studying 7 – 10-year-old bullies they found
that the „bully participants‟ were able to understand the emotional and mental states of a
character in a story better than their classmates. Having the ability to understand another‟s point
of view then, appears to be insufficient for choosing a moral course of action. Gianluca (2006)
adds to the findings of Sutton et al. by incorporating stories which called for recognizing and
understanding moral emotions (moral cognition) such as guilt and shame by the participant. In
this research, findings do not completely confirm that bullies have reduced moral cognitive
processes but is consistent in finding children identified as pro-social, have high levels of
performance on tasks requiring strong theory of mind, as well as moral cognition. According to
Nucci (2001) the bridge linking „knowing the good‟ to, „doing the good‟ is wanting “to do what
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is moral, rather than engage in actions that lead to other goals” (p. 196). Socially competent
children tend to be more focused on relational goals, that is, maintaining relationships and
friendships, than more aggressive children, who tend to focus mainly on instrumental gains
(Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004). Accepting that acts based in morality require some understanding
of the outcome for the victim, as suggested by Turiel (1983), could mean that children who
choose more instrumental goals either do not have the capacity of theory of mind to understand
the experiences of others (i.e., ability to empathize) or they choose to prioritize their personal
gain over the condition of another. Understanding which explanation is more accurate should
prove useful in determining appropriate preventative and intervention methods and bears further
consideration and is beyond the scope of this paper.
Recommendations
Through exploration of theories of moral development and theory of mind, and in clearly
defining social and cognitive influences on character, we concluded that „common ground‟ must
begin with a clearly articulated definition of character. Without such common understanding,
educators, scholars, and practitioners alike will be led in many directions, which may or may not
result in development of positive “character.”
In order to avoid such miss-direction, we offer the following strategies that may yield
positive development of character. First, based on Kohlberg‟s cognitive development theory, we
believe that educators need to engage students in peer group discussions around relevant moral
issues anticipating that students who are at the higher level of moral development would
influence the moral thinking of those who are at a lower level. Second, we need to use inclusion,
meaning engaging all stakeholders and students in meaningful discussion about moral values,
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beliefs, and actions. According to Bandura, the students may adopt certain values by observing
behaviours of others, and later they may internalize that behaviour as their own. This is also
supported by the work on mirror neuron systems done by Gallese, Keyser and Rizzolatti (2004)
which concluded that in observing an act the same neurons are activated as if the observer were
the one performing the act itself. Thus, the importance of educators‟ modeling good sets of
values through these discussions may become of essence in developing moral action in students.
Nucci (1997) also implies that social experiences are important in forming children‟s concepts of
morality and that different moral norms embraced in family, school, and community may have
profound impact on children‟s development of moral reasoning. In connection to Nucci‟s social-
domain theory, educating parents, school members, and members of the broader community
about the theories of moral development as they pertain to character is of great importance. We
believe that by gaining the necessary knowledge, they should be able to engage in constructive
dialogue about moral issues in order to be able to find „common ground.‟
Based on theory of mind, as a third strategy we propose the initiatives within schools
aiming at developing children‟s ability to value relational gains over instrumental gains and their
ability to believe that minimizing self serving or personal gain type behaviour may prove useful.
This strategy would include opportunities for children to collaborate and learn co-operatively. In
this way children may learn that they need each other and as such would make greater effort to
maintain positive relations as a means of securing their own success. Programs such as Roots of
Empathy where children learn to care for an infant as it develops over a school year may also
assist in this regard. A further benefit to creating supportive learning environments where
students feel connected to others would likely be increased student engagement.
To conclude, we believe that without clearly defined research-based strategies for
18
Character Education Re-conceptualized for Practical Implementation
implementation, educators will be left to trial-and-error attempts, making success regarding
character education implementation random rather than intentional and reproducible. This will
require a collaborative effort between practitioner and researcher; a practice that should be
developed to increase the use of effective practices in schools.
19
Character Education Re-conceptualized for Practical Implementation
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Joe Engemann
