Political Science

study examined the interaction between preferred modes of information ptocessing (visual and verbal) and two cognitively-based anxiety-reduction techniques. One technique was based on the use of images as a coping strategy while the other employed a self-instructional approach. Thirty-six subjects reporting high levels of dental fear were assigned to one of three groups (two types of treatment and a no-treatment control). One-half of the subjects in each group had been identified as preferring the visual mode of information processing while for the other half the verbal mode was preferred. After treatment. subjects viewed an anxiety-inducing vtdeotape depicting a visit to the dentist. Results indicated that, while both treatments were significantly effective in reducing self-reports of discomfort while viewing the videotape. there was no significant interaction between the type of treatment and preferred cognitive mode. The results were interpreted as indicating that treatment may override individual cognitive styles. Furthermore. the data suggested that the normal individual has the ability to adapt to divergent and non-preferred forms of information processing.

This work examines the dynamic relationship among elites, media, and the public during authoritarian rule. Using Brazil’s military regime (1964–85), it investigates whether changing press censorship influenced public support for military rule during the period of political liberalization. This paper uses the exposure-resistance model of opinion formation, in which a person’s probability of supporting a position depends first on her probability of exposure to and reception of an elite cue advocating that position, and secondarily on the probability that she resists that position once exposed. Her likelihood of exposure to and reception of elite cues increases with her attention to news media and the extent of her political awareness; her odds of accepting the positions advocated by elites depends on her political ideology and her critical capacity to evaluate the content and source of the cue. Using three public opinion surveys carried out between 1972 and 1982, and an analysis of newspaper content during the dictatorship, this research demonstrates that censored media convinced Brazilians to support military rule initially, only later during political liberalization, to expose them to increasingly critical coverage of the regime, convincing many to abandon their support for the regime.

This paper evaluates the theory that in authoritarian regimes leaders of civil society follow the mainstream press not so much for the specific information it provides, but rather as a barometer for the government’s tolerance for opposition activities or to gauge the government’s ability to quash such activities. By observing trends in coverage and the government’s treatment of journalists and their publications, activists can gauge when it might be safer to plan mass actions, which in turn can encourage mass participation ⎯ strengthening their cause. The analysis in this paper relies on a careful coding structure of A Folha de São Paulo, one of the main Brazilian newspapers, during the period from 1974 (the start of political détente) to 1982 (the first direct gubernatorial elections after the 1964 military coup). The content analysis contains information on coverage of subjects generally considered taboo under authoritarian regimes, such as criticism of the economic model, crimes and corruption by government officials, satire, exposés on the leader’s family or information critical of the leader himself, coverage of the opposition and its electoral efforts and criticism of government policies. The data also contain information on reports of arrests and injuries to the media and activists, anti-media acts by the government, such as censorship and closures of publications, and coverage of the release of prisoners and the return of exiles. Additionally the data include information on strikes, protests and other anti-regime activities reported both in the national and foreign press. Using negative binomial regression with a lagged dependent variable as well as autoregressive Poisson models, this paper demonstrates that key opposition actions followed trends in coverage. This relationship was mediated by the government’s actions against the media and attacks on journalists and editors. Elites planned more events during periods soon after reporters successfully reported on taboo subjects without suffering repercussions from the government.

In recent years, the number of drug courts has proliferated throughout the country. One widely held belief is that the central figure in a drug court is the judge. While the judge may be the central actor in the courtroom, what is not clear is whether the drug court judge is the most central actor in the actual disposition of

The internet has been hailed by many as the keystone of the Information Revolution. With the ease with which people can communicate across borders and the rapidity with which information travels, people lauded the internet as a potential revolutionary tool of dissident groups. Scholars and activists alike believed that not just the internet, but also other information and communication technologies (ICTs) would help revolutionize the ways in which dissident groups could communicate, among their memberships, with the media, government and with potential benefactors abroad. Just this year, for example, we witnessed Iranian protestors exploiting text messaging and Twitter to help organize post-election protests.

While the internet has proven a useful tool for dissident organizations in some capacities, one key function for which the internet does not appear useful is in appealing to and organizing core supporters of dissident organizations if the members are poor, geographically isolated, of a minority language group, or residing under a repressive regime. ICTs can help dissident organizations to (1) raise awareness of their cause(s) among both expatriates living abroad and sympathetic internationally based organizations; (2) raise funds, usually internationally, to support operational expenses, and (3) to counteract unsympathetic portrayals of the movement in the media, often reflecting the limited information available from domestic sources. In all three applications listed above, dissident organizations are applying the ICTs predominantly to a transnational audience. Information via the internet generally cannot reach the people from these groups who actually will take to the streets in the home country or region and who might benefit from any concessions granted by the government (or whomever the opposition targets with its actions).  While a well-managed website designed and maintained by a few leaders can help an organization attract outside support and attention, the internet cannot replace nor directly aid revolutionary action under many circumstances.

In this paper, I explore several dissident organizations’, such as the Zapatistas in Mexico and the landless movement (MST) in Brazil, use of ICTs to see whom they target with these communications and for what purposes they serve. By observing a wide range of organizations, I can determine which demographic factors impede members’ ability to rely on ICTs for regular communication.

A 1988 plebiscite determined whether General Augusto Pinochet would continue to rule Chile for an additional eight years. Believing he would win, Pinochet took measures to ensure that the plebiscite appeared legitimate to international observers including actions meant to encourage opposition participation. The fear and uncertainty among the population after 15 years of repressive rule cast doubt on whether or not citizens would participate and vote their true preferences. In contentious environments, people tend to falsify their publicly expressed preferences to reflect what they believe is the position of the majority (Kuran 1995), which creates a “spiral of silence” (Noelle-Neuman 1974) that masks the true degree of discontent. Ultimately, Pinochet suffered a defeat that surprised many including the general himself. I argue that the unexpected strong support for the ‘No’ vote resulted in part from abundant news coverage of party registration drives and government concessions meant to encourage opposition participation. I contend that the media’s coverage of these registration drives and the publication of several opinion polls leading up to the plebiscite generated common knowledge (Chwe 2001) about people’s intention to participate as well as revealing the degree of support for opposition parties, which increased participation among ‘No’ voters.

While many citizens living under regimes deemed by the United States as rogue nations may not support their leader, they likewise do not support the United States’ tactic of economic isolation. In fact, the U.S. intervention in another nation’s sovereign affairs provides ample grounds around which leaders of the sanctioned states can rally citizens against the enemy –the United States – in support of their country, if not their leader, per se. Whereas world leaders gain a bump in public approval during times of war, as shown by the literature on the “rally-’round-the-flag” effect, the rally-against-the-enemy effect rewards leaders who successfully use rhetoric of suffering from economic warfare to sustain their duration as leader. In this paper I contend that U.S. economic policies that impose embargoes on a select set of states enable the leaders of these countries to distract citizens from domestic woes and displace blame. Using survival analysis, I show that, on average, leaders and regimes that are the target of U.S. embargoes, such as Cuba and Iran, for example, last in power longer than do their counterparts in other non-democratic regimes who face less-severe sanctions or no sanctions at all. I show that this finding is not merely a result of the type of leader or regime that “invites” U.S. embargoes.

The incorporation of the principle and practice of forgiveness into interstate conflict resolution programs is a cross-cultural sticking point between Arab/Muslim and Western discourse and practices. Some Western scholars adamantly reject the principle and practice at the higher levels, while most Arab/Muslim scholars embrace forgiveness at all levels of conflict resolution. Our research contradicts the Western tendency of rejecting the inclusion of forgiveness utilizing a convenience sample of laypersons from the United States and Iraq to demonstrate that the principle and practice is accepted by both samples when resolving conflict between 2 countries. Our findings are
theoretically important as they demonstrate both openness to, and cross-cultural comparability in this context.

This article challenges the hypothesis that Western and Arab/Muslim approaches to conflict resolution are radically dissimilar. Reevaluating cross-cultural compatibility, we demonstrate that Arab/Muslim and Western conceptualizations of conflict resolution share profound similarities. We demonstrate this through two methods. First, while contemporary cross-cultural comparisons are limited to the Western structural approach, we integrate the social-psychological and spiritual approaches to contradict the current theoretical reductive tendencies. We establish that the social-psychological and spiritual approaches are more accommodating of fundamental principles and practices emphasized in Arab/Muslim literature, and address
important criticisms commonly leveled at Western theory. Second, we employ survey research to qualify laypersons’ perceptions of sixteen conflict resolution principles and ten conflict resolution mechanisms commonly recognized at the
structural level to qualify cross-cultural comparability. Combined, our research identifies fundamental theoretical and practical cross-cultural parallels between Iraq and United States conceptualizations of conflict resolution at the theoretical and practical levels.

Subsequent to military conflict between two countries, scholars advocate conflict resolution be pursued. This qualitative research measures laypersons’ perceptions of conflict resolution across Western and Arab/Muslim cultures. Querying a sample of citizens from Iraq and the United States, we measure respondents’ receptiveness to conflict resolution in the context of the United States and Iraq relations. We simultaneously qualify which principles and factors they determine acceptable to induce conflict resolution. Research findings demonstrate that respondents across our samples believe conflict resolution in this instance is necessary. Respondents also predominantly embrace similar principles and factors to advance a resolution process. Our theoretical approach and survey findings challenge contemporary conflict resolution comparative discourse between Arab/Muslim and Western approaches, demonstrating that there is a quantifiable degree of convergence that would enable a process to be pursued.

Natural hazard mitigation is a recent field in name only. For decades various professionals have been practicing hazard mitigation: for example, emergency managers have been working with architects and city planners to update building codes for disaster-resistant construction, civil engineers have been working with local officials to design flood-resistant urban drainage systems, and foresters have been working with state officials to enact more effective prescribed burning practices. Yet most often, natural hazard mitigation has taken place as isolated activities scattered within the daily duties of diverse professions -an accidentally cross-disciplinary effort recognized as vitally important to protect individuals and communities, yet not recognized as its own multidisciplinary field. The crucial importance of natural hazard mitigation requires a more coherent approach, with consistent and accessible technical information and training, formal and informal discourse among hazard mitigation professionals, interaction with a greater public awareness of the social components, and recognition of hazard mitigation as a profession in its own right. Simultaneously, hazard mitigation professionals need to strengthen their multidisciplinary tendencies and continue to collaborate with other key fields, such as public health and the various sciences. Today many professionals are starting to bridge the gaps between disaster risk reduction, hazard mitigation, and climate adaptation. This article discusses the benefits of emergency management professionals working with others in community partnerships to achieve resilience