Attitude Framing

This study tested the "valence framing effect": an assumption that nega-tively conceptualized attitudes (as opposing the non-preferred alternative) are more resistant to later persuasion attempts. In the experiment we created choice between two political candidates and experimental subjects were led to conceptualize their political preferences in one of two possible ways: either as supporting the preferred candidate or as opposing the non-preferred candi-date. The data indicate that negative preferences show less overall change when exposed to counterarguments. This finding can be incorporated in two theoretical frameworks: dual process theories of attitude change (Elaboration likelihood model) and descriptive decision making theories (Prospect theory). Results are discussed for their implications for the efficacy of political commu-nication.

In his now-classic research on inoculation theory, McGuire (1964) demonstrated that exposing people to an initial weak counterattitudinal message could lead to enhanced resistance to a subsequent stronger counterattitudinal message. More recently, research on the valence-framing effect (Bizer & Petty, 2005) demonstrated an alternative way to make attitudes more resistant. Simply framing a person's attitude negatively (i.e., in terms of a rejected position such as anti-Democrat) led to more resistance to an attack on that attitude than did framing the same attitude positively (i.e., in terms of a preferred position such as pro-Republican). Using an election context, the current research tested whether valence framing influences attitude resistance specifically or attitude strength more generally, providing insight into the effect's mechanism and generalizability. In two experiments, attitude valence was manipulated by framing a position either negatively or positively. Experiment 1 showed that negatively framed attitudes were held with more certainty than were positively framed attitudes. In Experiment 2, conducted among a representative sample of residents of two U.S. states during political campaigns, negatively framed attitudes demonstrated higher levels of attitude certainty and attitude-consistent behavioral intentions than did attitudes that were framed positively. Furthermore, the effect of valence framing on behavioral intentions was mediated by attitude certainty. Valence framing thus appears to be a relatively low-effort way to impact multiple features associated with strong attitudes.

Three studies tested the valence-framing effect: that merely conceptualizing one's preferences as opposing something will make that preference more resistant to persuasion than will thinking about the same preference in terms of supporting something. In Study 1, participants who were led to conceptualize their political preferences as being against a candidate were more resistant to a counterattitudinal message than were participants who were led to conceptualize the same preference as being in favor of the other candidate. Study 2 showed that this effect was not due to a priming process, while Study 3 provided evidence for the effect's generalizability.

This study tested the "valence framing effect": an assumption that negatively conceptualized attitudes (as opposing the non-preferred alternative) are more resistant to later persuasion attempts. In the experiment we created choice between two political candidates and experimental subjects were led to conceptualize their political preferences in one of two possible ways: either as supporting the preferred candidate or as opposing the non-preferred candidate. The data indicate that negative preferences show less overall change when exposed to counterarguments. This finding can be incorporated in two theoretical frameworks: dual process theories of attitude change (Elaboration likelihood model) and descriptive decision making theories (Prospect theory). Results are discussed for their implications for the efficacy of political communication. .

This study tested the "valence framing effect": an assumption that negatively conceptualized attitudes (as opposing the non-preferred alternative) are more resistant to later persuasion attempts. In the experiment we created choice between two political candidates and experimental subjects were led to conceptualize their political preferences in one of two possible ways: either as supporting the preferred candidate or as opposing the non-preferred candidate. The data indicate that negative preferences show less overall change when exposed to counterarguments. This finding can be incorporated in two theoretical frameworks: dual process theories of attitude change (Elaboration likelihood model) and descriptive decision making theories (Prospect theory). Results are discussed for their implications for the efficacy of political communication.

This study tested the "valence framing effect": an assumption that negatively conceptualized attitudes (as opposing the non-preferred alternative) are more resistant to later persuasion attempts. In the experiment we created choice between two political candidates and experimental subjects were led to conceptualize their political preferences in one of two possible ways: either as supporting the preferred candidate or as opposing the non-preferred candidate. The data indicate that negative preferences show less overall change when exposed to counterarguments. This finding can be incorporated in two theoretical frameworks: dual process theories of attitude change (Elaboration likelihood model) and descriptive decision making theories (Prospect theory). Results are discussed for their implications for the efficacy of political communication.

Prior research has demonstrated the valence-framing effect, in which leading people to frame a preference negatively (e.g., 'I oppose Romney') yields stronger attitudes than does leading people to frame that same preference positively (e.g., 'I support Obama'). Three studies tested whether or not depth of processing (as operationalized by manipulations of motivation and ability to cognitively process) moderate the effect. The valence-framing effect was replicated, such that opposers manifested stronger attitudes than did supporters, but only when attitudes were relevant to the participants (Experiments 1 and 3), and when participants were not under cognitive load (Experiment 2). Our results thus identify depth of processing as an important moderator of the valence-framing effect and provide potential insight into the effect's mechanism.

Three studies tested the valence-framing effect: that merely conceptualizing one's preferences as opposing something will make that preference more resistant to persuasion than will thinking about the same preference in terms of supporting something. In Study 1, participants who were led to conceptualize their political preferences as being against a candidate were more resistant to a counterattitudinal message than were participants who were led to conceptualize the same preference as being in favor of the other candidate. Study 2 showed that this effect was not due to a priming process, while Study 3 provided evidence for the effect's generalizability.